CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

115th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

205

JANUARY 1980

AFTER THE SINO-JAPANESE TREATY — WHAT KIND OF EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC ORDER?
Gene Gregory

THE GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA: ARE WE LOSING IT?
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THE BIG, GREY PATCH
John Elsom

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70p

CUK-H06395-205-P2118-

Contemporary Review

Incorporating The Fortnightly

January 1980 Vol. 236 No. 1368 Founded 1866

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P2118

© Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co Ltd, 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H G Leates Ltd, 45/47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U S Mailing Agent Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd, 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N Y 10022 Second-class postage paid at New York, NY Annual subscription (including postage): U K £9 50, U S.A. and Canada $30.00. Rates for all other countries on application Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S and Canada: extra costs given on request (ISSN/0010/7565)

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AFTER THE SINO-JAPANESE TREATY — WHAT KIND OF EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC ORDER?

by Gene Gregory

THE Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty has been widely acclaimed as an epoch-making step in the realignment of the strategic balance and a harbinger of a new economic order in Asia. Signature of the treaty, in the face of vigorous Soviet opposition, is seen by diplomatic observers in Tokyo as concrete evidence that Japan has adopted a more active foreign policy. History, no doubt, will view the treaty as the end of almost a half-century of conflict that began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

While not unmindful of the historical and political significance of the deed, most Japanese focus on its economic consequences. Japan's natural advantage as the advanced industrial country closest to the large Chinese market for industrial materials, durable and non-durable, can now be fully developed. At the same time, the treaty is regarded, in its broader implications, as the first sign that Japan has assumed responsibility as the economic leader of Asia. To a greater extent than ever, since the end of World War II, Japan's future is hinged to Asia.

It is in this context that two less obvious, but most consequential, moves to bring a higher order of stability and cooperation to other parts of the region must be interpreted.

During his meeting with the late President Park Chung Hee in Seoul, just as treaty negotiations in Peking were entering their final stage, the chief policy-maker of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, Masumi Esaki,

proposed the formation of an EEC-type economic association for Japan and South Korea, a proposal that was apparently favourably received by the South Korean leader. Following this unofficial Japanese *démarche*, on August 1 1978, the Korean language *Kyunghyang Daily News* announced that the Government would propose to the next Korea-Japan ministerial meeting the creation of a regional economic cooperation community including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Meanwhile, at the Bonn Summit and preliminary meetings of finance ministers, Japan received proposals that the yen play a more important role as an international key currency through the establishment of a 'Yen Area' in the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins. According to this scheme, the Yen, along with a new European currency unit, would share with the dollar the role of international reserve currencies in a tripodal monetary system intended to bolster confidence in financial assets held in those currencies, relieve some of the pressure on the dollar and stimulate capital exports from Japan.

Just as the peace treaty represents the culmination of diplomacy to establish the fundamental framework for Japan's relations with China, these moves indicate possible new approaches to two priority concerns of Japanese policy-makers for international monetary stability and the promotion of a new horizontal specialization in manufactured goods, beginning in East Asia.

Quite clearly, these two concerns are closely related. Wild fluctuations in the value of the yen have certainly contributed to the speed with which other East Asian countries have overtaken Japanese industry in competitive power. As Japanese industrial structural change slows and that of other East Asian countries shifts from light to heavy and chemical industries at a pace even exceeding that of Japan in the 1960s, industrial structures of countries in the region become increasingly similar and the vertical integration of production that fuelled this growth in its early stages is progressively enervated. Complementarity between Japanese industry and others in the region is gradually giving way to conflictual patterns of relationship in the Japanese and third-country markets, creating a new set of serious problems for all countries concerned.

The problems attending the convergence of industrial structures in East Asia are sufficiently important themselves to merit prime consideration in Tokyo, but their intrinsic relationship to vital political and security considerations render solutions the more imperative. Moreover, since the political and security considerations involved touch the quick of the Japanese body politic, they tend to cloud perceptions of the economic problems and to render their solution more evasive.

Poignant reminder of this critical conjuncture was provided by Defence Agency Director General Shin Kanemaru when he told a Tokyo meeting of journalists and executives of major corporations on July 31 1979 that he considers Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the same boat, thus reiterating the principles set forth in the Japan-U.S. communique of 1969 issued by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard Nixon.

Kanemaru's remark, coming just as negotiations of the Japan-China

treaty were entering the final stages, was pregnant with political implications and thus overshadowed the exploratory talks in Seoul of regional economic integration. The Defence Agency Director General, apparently taken aback by the grave repercussions over his statement, dutifully made a public retraction of his allusion to discussions of the subject with U.S. Defence Agency Secretary Harold Brown, but went on to confirm that he personally believed the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and Taiwan to be essential to the security of Japan.

That this notion is still alive, despite the changes in the international situation surrounding Japan, is not in itself surprising, nor was the flurry of protests provoked by the Director General's remarks at all unpredictable. Much more noteworthy is the timing of these utterances with the Peking negotiations and the proposals made in Seoul by Masumi Esaki, who, incidentally, was appointed to head the Defence Agency in December 1971 following previous 'indiscretions' on the same subject by the erstwhile Director General Naomi Nishimura in a speech at the Tokyo Foreign Correspondents' Club.

Whether the timing of these events was intentional will undoubtedly long remain a matter of conjecture, but their coincidence gave the discussion of East Asian economic integration a decidedly political tone, even if political objectives are not the most immediate or compelling.

Details of Mr. Esaki's proposals to President Park are not known, but Korean press reports quoting Government sources do indicate the broad outlines of the proposals made at the Japan-Korea ministerial meeting. The contemplated regional community, to be tentatively called the Far East Asian Economic Community and patterned after the EEC, would seek mutual economic development through trade promotion, joint projects, financial cooperation, joint technical and financial ventures in third world countries and the elimination of trade barriers. Such an economic community is needed, Government sources affirmed, because Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have reached a level of industrial development where they can cooperate economically with Japan. What was actually discussed at the 10th Japan-ROK ministerial meeting on September 3 1978, has not been revealed. Reports do indicate that the Korean delegation proposed joint development of energy resources abroad; and sources close to the Japanese delegation to the conference described its outcome as the establishment of a new partnership between the two countries. Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda affirmed that he had urged that Japan and Korea forge new relations, emerging from the age of what was called Japan-ROK collusion. But the final communique, reviewing the two-day discussion at plenary and individual meetings, was confined to a joint declaration that the two countries were resolved to move forward to a new cooperative relationship to meet the exigencies of the fast-moving Asian situation and for a qualitative improvement of Tokyo-Seoul relations 'from a long-range perspective'.

It is, of course, impossible to compare such a vague and preliminary statement of objectives with the various steps that gave issue to the Treaty of Rome and the ensuing European Economic Community. Nor is it at all

clear why the European model was selected as the most suitable design for Far East Asian economic integration, unless the explanation is simply to be found in the apparent success of the EEC. A search for similarity or parallelism between the East Asian and European situations provides few compelling reasons for congruous approaches to regional cooperation, much less to economic integration.

On the political plane, diversity rather than homogeneity is the remarkable feature of Far East Asia, as it is defined in the Korean design. On the other hand, the incipient homogeneity of industrial structures to which the Korean announcement alluded is a reality of the new East Asian economic order. As heavy and chemical industries replace light industries in the role of leading sectors of the South Korean and Taiwan economies and slower economic growth in Japan retards the processes of structural adjustment and change, earlier patterns of division of labour between Japan and its immediate neighbours are fading fast. Under present and foreseeable circumstances, too, new arrangements of specialization are difficult to construct and are not likely to emerge through the normal functioning of market mechanisms or the pursuit of independent and conflicting industrial policies.

Since their leading industrial actors are all export-oriented, with their spectacular growth and modernization, East Asia's industrial newcomers are becoming increasingly dangerous rivals for Japanese industry in foreign markets and in the Japanese market itself. At the same time, too, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong industries find themselves pitted against each other in their main markets, competing mainly on price in the face of preponderant oligipsonistic market power.

Quite unlike Europe, where firms felt compelled to seek competitive power through scale economies in production obtained by increasing internal markets through integration, East Asian industries are not noticeably suffering from a lack of competitive power. Where scale economies are an important determinant of comparative advantage, East Asian industries have obtained them through increasing their respective shares in the global market.

Indeed, mainstream business and political interest in regional economic cooperation is propelled mainly by a felt need to avoid expected increases in conflicts between Japanese industry and their counterparts in East Asia in the course of the latters' rapid modernization. Just as industrial structural change has been the prime mover of rapid industrialization throughout East Asia, Japanese policy-makers now consider the coordination of industrial structural change to be the prime requisite for future mutual economic development.

Statements emanating from high and responsible political leaders were clearly not made without considerable preparation, reflection and discussion within both government and business policy-making circles of both countries.

In Japan, a major study of changing patterns of economic relations with Korea was undertaken by the Long Term Credit Bank, apparently for the

principal purpose of providing a basis of bilateral discussions between the two countries. Begun in 1977, the study, which normally would have been circulated for internal use of the Bank only, was simultaneously published in a Korean language version and presented to a select Korean readership at a Seoul reception in the spring of 1978.

Although the main thrust of the Bank's study is an analysis of the growth of the Korean economy and the emergent conflicts between Japanese and Korean firms in the course of the latters' modernization, its signal importance lies in the solutions advanced.

Significantly, the Bank affirms that Korea has already surpassed Japan in international competitiveness in industrial sectors such as plywood, textiles, shipbuilding and overseas construction, and that in the course of the fourth five-year plan Korean home electronic appliances, industrial machinery and motor vehicles will come to greater international competiveness than their Japanese counterparts. It is the Bank's considered view that Korean industry will be able to attain the objectives of the plan, and that it is vitally important to take appropriate measures for the avoidance of a head-on collision between major sectors of the two economies.

Two ways of avoiding conflict are proposed by the Bank: increased investments by Japanese firms in the Korean machinery industry to support the objectives of the Plan, and multilateral action to achieve a new horizontal division of labour in East Asia.

Japanese investments in Korean precision machinery, industrial electric machines and machine tool production are steadily increasing, but this is clearly not considered sufficient to assure the necessary degree of specialization between the two economies.

While the bank makes no specific proposal for promoting this specialisation, on one point the report is unequivocal: a smooth division of labour cannot be achieved through bilateral arrangements. Either a horizontal division of labour based on machinery industries, similar to that existing amongst EC member countries, must be sought, or broader-based multilateral arrangements must be made involving not only Japan and Korea but also the United States, various Southeast Asian countries and India.

In sum, the Bank is saying, the problems that will confront Japan and Korea during the ensuing years can only be resolved to mutual advantage within the framework of Far Eastern or Pacific Basin economic integration. It is against this analysis that Mr. Esaki's proposal, made three months after the report's publication in the Korean version, becomes particularly significant. Japan prefers the more limited approach to East Asian regional arrangements, presumably of the EEC type.

Significantly, neither the economic rationale nor the institutional arrangements proposed by the Japanese fell on virgin soil. As long ago as 1971, the ROK Ministry of Science and Technology published a long-range forecast of Korea in the year 2000 outlining the phased integration of Asian economies. Noting the factors militating in favour of a world increasingly organized into regional economic blocs, the report predicted the emergence of two economic blocs in Asia during the 1970s: one in

Northeast Asia including Japan, Korea and Taiwan; and one in Southeast Asia along the present lines of ASEAN.

The report focuses on the distinguishing features of integrational forces in East Asia. During the 1980s, it will become increasingly apparent that the pursuit of unilateral development plans is counter-productive, leading Asian countries to lay the foundations for a common market through the coordination of their planning processes and objectives.

> An Asian common market will come into being, with Japan at the summit and on the basis of the system of division of labour among small economic spheres. The Asian common market, unlike Europe where the promotion of liberalization has given birth to the European Common Market, will be characterized by the fact that it is a child born out of organization necessitated by an agreed division of labour. . . . After the year 2000 all the countries in the Far Eastern and Asian common markets will try to coordinate their economic policies in a unified direction. They will also undertake a movement to create an organization empowered to make decisions on all problems arising from economic policy.

The parallel between the report of the ROK Ministry of Science and Technology, prepared by the Korea Institute of Science and Technology, and that of the Long Term Credit Bank is striking and significant, suggesting a broad consensus between policy-makers in Tokyo and Seoul. But the differences in approach and substance are also important, for implicitly they point to some of the formidable obstacles which stand in the way of Far East Asian economic integration.

By dint of necessity, the Japanese are forced to maintain a low profile and to approach the subject through Seoul, Mr. Esaki proposed an EEC type of economic integration for Japan and Korea, but carefully avoided naming other participants in what is intrinsically a multilateral endeavour. Similarly, although the Long Term Credit Bank's report clearly rejects bilateral solutions to the emergent problems facing Japan and Korea and gives primacy of place among its proposed solutions to a horizontal division of labour such as exists among members of the European community, no reference is made to the optimal area for such specialization. Not only does the absence of formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan impose limitations on Japan in its role of integrator, but public mention of association in an official multilateral organization with Taiwan would undoubtedly set off the kind of brouhaha at home that was provoked by the recent Kanemaru statements, and very likely complicate relations with China, despite evidence that Peking seems to have moved this thorny issue to the back burners.

South Korea suffers from no such constraints, of course, and has therefore confirmed what logic suggests Mr. Esaki had in mind, a Far East Asia Community including Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

As for Taiwan, indications are that further economic integration with other East Asian economies would be welcomed. At the 12th Taiwan-South Korea ministerial economic cooperation conference meeting in Taipei last December, the two countries initialled resolutions for future cooperation programmes including exchanges of information on the textile and petrochemical industries, development of the machinery industries and

securing natural resources abroad. At the signature of the resolution, Taiwan's Economic Minister Sun Yun-suan stressed the two major problems which require closer cooperation between East Asia's processing economies: coping with trade embargoes from other developing countries and the joint development of resources abroad.

Less than a month earlier, 60 Taiwanese and South Korea textile producers had agreed to avoid cut-throat competition in the face of quota restrictions set by developed nations and to otherwise cooperate in developing overseas markets. The textile associations of the two countries, which have previously held eight such meetings, also pledged to cooperate with Hong Kong textile manufacturers in the face of growing Western protectionism and in the exchange of trade information.

Hong Kong's inclusion in a Far East Asian economic community is even more problematical, however. Quite apart from the prejudice which formal integration in a regional grouping might pose for Hong Kong's political future, it is not at all clear how you go about integrating a Crown Colony into an economic community of sovereign states.

The problem is not insuperable, however.

As Japanese, Korean and Taiwan thinking on economic integration clearly shows, the major immediate purposes of cooperation would not be the lowering of trade barriers nor the creation of an East Asian common market. Although the elimination of tariffs has been mentioned among various other conditions of East Asian economic integration, some eminent Japanese economists argue that integration can be obtained without lowering trade barriers.

The main motives of economic integration cited by its leading proponents derive from more compelling needs to harmonize economic policies, to coordinate trade policy *vis-à-vis* common export markets, and to cooperate in resource development. A horizontal division of labour within the region, the ultimate objective, will be more effectively obtained through positive and direct measures to coordinate and integrate industrial production regionally.

At least in the early stages of such a positive approach to economic integration, formal political institutions are not essential. Nor for that matter is it necessary to have a regional political authority to assure the removal of discriminatory and restrictive trade barriers between East Asian partners. These objectives can be obtained through an OECD-type organization, which would avoid the knotty political problems inherent in the community and free trade area models. Such an organization need not preclude the eventual formation of a Far East Asia Economic Community, its advocates point out, and it would have the advantage of being able to embrace ASEAN and other Asian countries, just as the OECD includes EEC, EFTA, and North American countries among its members.

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NEW ZEALAND IN CRISIS

by Keith D. Suter

'WILL the last person to leave New Zealand please turn out the lights', said an eye-catching phrase used by the Labour Party in the November 1978 New Zealand federal election. It failed to win Labour the election but it provides an indication of the nation's pervading gloom.

During 1978 there was a net migration loss of 26,285, thereby accelerating a disturbing three-year trend. New Zealand's total population is 3.1 million. If the present rate of loss were maintained, New Zealand will be empty by the year 2096. The main emigrants are young and skilled; precisely the people the country cannot afford to lose since they are taxpayers and consumers.

The club of western nations, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development has, in its recent survey, called the New Zealand economy probably the weakest of the OECD member-nations (quite an achievement because of strong competition coming from Italy and Britain). The OECD described its economy as stagnant, if not declining: in the years 1973-7, real income per head, adjusted for terms of trade, fell 11.5 per cent, with no growth of domestic demand for four years, a substantial external deficit, and with reduced profitability in the export sector.

The Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, has rejected the report totally and (typically for him) abused its authors: 'desk-bound advisers sitting safe and secure in their marble palaces in Paris'.

New Zealand, in so far as it is known to the outside world, is seen as being peaceful, pleasant and picturesque. In fact it is now undergoing one of the most traumatic periods of its two centuries of white rule.

New Zealand was discovered and settled over 1,000 years ago by the Maori, a Polynesian race of the central Pacific. In 1642 the Dutch navigator Abel Tasman sighted the country. Dutch navigators later called it Nieuw Zeeland. As with Australia (930 miles away to the north-west), the Dutch and other European explorers evidently did not think much of the land and so did not settle there.

The British, from 1769 onwards, took more interest and gradually claimed control over it, with settlers arriving there in 1840. It received internal self-government in 1852 and by 1907 had achieved full independence from Britain. The Queen is the head of state. Most of the nation's political authority and legal system is based on the British model.

For the past century, the country's political philosophy has been mild socialism. It has remained one of the world's major social innovators, with laws covering: giving women the vote (1893), regulating working conditions, guaranteeing workers' rights against unscrupulous employers, providing state assistance for rural development, old age pensions, the office of Ombudsman, accident compensation and equal pay for equal work. The main exception remains the treatment of the Maoris, who are still campaigning for better treatment.

Until a few years ago (except for the depressions of the 1890s and 1930s) the country's economic life was one of the world's best. Freed from the rigid and stifling British class structure, New Zealanders have been among the world's most egalitarian people. Life was good in material terms (even down to household water supplies: New Zealanders have more baths per capita than any other nation). The unemployment rate from World War II to 1973 was so low that it could not be expressed in percentage terms. A few years ago, a public servant warned his minister that if the number of unemployed were to exceed 100 persons, the Government would fall. Meanwhile, apart from the genocide practised against the Maoris, the nation has been free from violence and invasion.

But the 1970s have seen great shifts in the country's political and economic fortunes. Having existed since World War II with (by world standards) an unusual tranquillity, the country is undergoing a crisis which seems so severe that many young, skilled people are seeking a new life in other countries. What has gone wrong?

The 1970s dawned with the conservative National Party in power. The word 'conservative' has to be used carefully because although the Party's leaders may be conservative, they are obliged to operate in the confines of the country's mildly socialistic political philosophy and so cannot bring about much change in their three-year terms in office. Under the gentlemanly and placid John Marshall, the National Party lost the November 1972 election.

Norman Kirk, the first Labour Prime Minister for 12 years, swept into office on the biggest electoral swing since 1935, with a pile of promises to modernize the nation. Even the conservative mass media had sympathy for his ideas of shaking the country out of its image of being a petrified piece of Victoriana floating in the Pacific.

Big Norm (16 stone, six feet one inch) lived as Prime Minister for only 18 months. An overweight, unhealthy workaholic, Big Norm worked himself to death. 34 years earlier, New Zealand's first Labour Prime Minister, Michael Savage, also died in office and became a cult figure. Big Norm has gone the same way.

Norman Eric Kirk decided to go into politics when rats attacked his children in a government hut where they lived before World War II. He shot one of the rats, wrapped it in newspaper and threw it at the ministry directors saying: 'How would you like to live under such conditions?'. A person of working class origins, this young waterside worker decided that he should enter politics as a way of improving the life of the workers.

As both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister he instituted a whirlwind of changes: he ended New Zealand's participation in the Vietnam war, recognized mainland China, established an embassy in Moscow, increased the country's foreign aid, sent a frigate into the Pacific Ocean to intimidate the French over their nuclear tests (and joined with other nations in petitioning the International Court of Justice to stop them), welcomed coloured Pacific races to New Zealand, and (most controversial of all, given the nation's sporting fanaticism) several sporting ties with South Africa. In January 1973 he said: 'Every action a people takes

in international affairs is an announcement of the kind of people they really are. We know that in their daily lives New Zealanders are decent humane people. My aim is to ensure that New Zealand's actions abroad are in that character.'

At home he increased welfare benefits and introduced reforms to protect human rights. But he stopped short of changes to laws affecting drugs, abortion and homosexuality (he apparently did not want to go too far too fast).

1974 saw two new Party Leaders. Big Norm's successor is Wallace (Bill) Rowling, a quietly spoken academic, who failed to fill the vacuum created by Kirk's untimely death.

The Nationals removed the ineffectual John Marshall and replaced him with Robert David Muldoon, who has since dominated (in or out of office) the country's politics. 'I'm more positive than Jack', he said following his party's coup. 'I can be aggressive and abrasive'. That has turned out to be an understatement.

A few weeks after being elected party leader he was caught in a demonstration. He broke away from the protective police cordon (in itself rarely needed in New Zealand politics) and hit some of the demonstrators. 'I clouted one fellow a little harder than I might have,' he said. The Police Commissioner felt obliged to caution him: 'I would suggest that you don't make too many public comments about clouting people'. Unfortunately, Muldoon has acquired a taste, metaphorically speaking, for clouting people.

Rowling's weak leadership, coinciding with the onset of the international economic recession, meant that he could not withstand Muldoon's electoral onslaught in 1975. Dissatisfaction with Muldoon as Prime Minister meant that he just managed to get re-elected in the November 1978 election (with the aid of altering electoral boundaries). Barring death or a party coup, he will stay in power at least until November 1981.

New Zealand is in the grip of a crisis (or perhaps several crises) and there is a need for humanity, moderation and intelligence. Muldoon can only offer divisiveness, vindictiveness and bluster.

The country's major problem is its economic collapse. This has several causes: the loss of Britain to the Common Market as an importer of agricultural products, the downturn in international trade, the protection of inefficient domestic industries because of import licensing, the loss of people overseas (the building industry, for example, is very weak because there are many empty homes and few buyers), and the burden of paying unemployment benefits to 55,000 persons (mainly women and unskilled). The country is buying time by borrowing heavily overseas—which it will need to repay eventually.

The country has also been hit very hard by the international energy crisis. Half its oil comes from Iran. The Government has just introduced restrictions on the sale of oil (none can be sold on weekends and public holidays and coin-operated pumps are banned) and has threatened that if these do not work then there will be even tougher ones. To make matters

worse, the new Iranian ruler has indicated his opposition to foreign frozen meat (New Zealand's NZ$35 million meat export to Iran each year is now threatened).

The country is wrapped in an acrimonious national debate over why it should have this crisis. It is potentially self-sufficient in energy, with its own oil fields, solar, thermal and tidal power sources. But neither political party took the 1973 oil crisis seriously. Even now, Muldoon's policy is one of conserving oil, rather than encouraging the development of alternative energy sources.

The economy and energy problems are immediate matters. These are now more long-term problems which also require handling. But the Government is slow to realize what is happening, let alone decide on new policies.

New Zealand's foreign and defence policy has been based traditionally on having a protector. The first protector was Britain and New Zealand Governments have been willing, if not eager, to supply troops as their payment for the protection. Nearly 100,000 soldiers served overseas in World War I, for example, and more were killed than Belgians (even though the war was fought partly on Belgian soil).

With the reduction of British forces in the far east, so New Zealand looked to the United States as its new protector. It also made the appropriate payments, as in Korea and Vietnam. Big Norm was working for a more independent stance in international politics but he did not live long enough.

Meanwhile, the US is withdrawing militarily from the region and is unwilling apparently to fight any more Asian wars. Ironically, the Pacific Ocean may well become a new zone of conflict, with the ending of the European empires and independence for the colonies. These new nations may permit the Soviet Union to penetrate the zone or their governments could be taken over by communist leaders from their own countries.

Under the new law of the sea New Zealand will 'expand' considerably. The new law permits nations to declare exclusive economic zones for their own fishing and exploitation. The New Zealand EEZ, covering 1.5million square miles, is 15 times New Zealand's size. It remains to be seen just how the country will protect its new EEZ.

The news is not completely bleak, however. There is a growing demand from the people for a more independent, less US dominated foreign and defence policy.

Muldoon remains firmly wedded to the idea of the US being his country's protector. But it is possible that this policy could contribute to his downfall in 1981 because he is out of touch with a growing number of New Zealanders, who want to continue Kirk's work for a nuclear-free Pacific.

New Zealand is leaving the 1970s badly shaken by international crises which have created damage which New Zealand could do little to stop (except on energy) and is now looking for more radical policies. There is a great need for another Norman Kirk to synthesise all the solutions.

CAMERAS IN THE CHAMBER IN 1980?

by Paul Rose

THIS is the first year since 1963 that I will not be sitting in the House of Commons. It may be the first time that I shall see on television those MPs who voted for the broadcasting of Parliament. No doubt they did so in the belief that it would open debates to public scrutiny, stimulate interest and help put the Chamber at the centre of the political stage. There was also a feeling that it would improve the standard of debate and behaviour in the Chamber.

Sedentary interruptions, cries of indignation and approval in a chamber where two opposing factions face one another divided by a floor designed to keep them two sword lengths apart sometimes reach a crescendo that would do credit to the rival supporters at a cup-tie. Only the scarves and flags are lacking, but the waving of order papers sometimes compensates for this. One hesitates to imagine the scene that might be induced by the introduction of television cameras.

Signs reading 'resign' or 'shame' might soon be replaced by invitations to the viewers to 'support strong super Steel', 'Jim Will Fix It' or 'Enoch washes whiter' while Conservative advertising consultants might ask you about Maggie's latest hair spray—'Is she or isn't she?'. Would MPs be allowed to wear suits emblazoned with their maker's name on the lapel? So far, this is hypothetical. Microphones are in but the cameras are out for the time being.

However, if television can be an instrument for education and enlightenment, it can equally trivialise and become a distorting mirror as the angles and selections are made by the programme producers. To an even greater degree I believe this has happened since the introduction of broadcasting in Parliament. Disembodied voices stridently demand whether the Prime Minister is aware of this or will take action to do that. One half an hour in a Parliamentary week is given over to what has degenerated into the 'Jim and Maggie Show' in which strange noises off-stage sound like tribal incantations by a studio audience.

A few prima donnas enter the act with monotonous regularity and the number of questions for oral answer has doubled. This is the distorting mirror at work. Questions, one would imagine, are intended to elicit informative replies. Not so. They are usually a vehicle to make a point or attempt to score off the Minister. One might also be naive enough to imagine that answers are intended to be informative and impart information. Wrong again. They are more likely to be an exercise in self-justification or a means of saying nothing by mouthing high-minded empty phrases.

If Maggie appeared in the past to nag Jim in her irritating monotone, she was doing no more than play the role assigned to her as Leader of the Opposition. If Jim sounded like a condescending, but benevolent patriarch, it was an obvious response. Now the roles are reversed. Of late

some of the venom and wit that characterised the exchanges between Wilson and Heath have begun to reach the listeners' ears as the performers become more seasoned. This is yet another disincentive to an informative period of questions and answers.

However, the greatest distortion of all is that the listener begins to believe that Question Time is the central pivot around which Parliamentary life revolves. Many diligent backbenchers treat it as an ordeal that has to be endured. They keep their heads down and ask the token question to prove that they are still in the land of the living. In a Parliament of 630 it would be intolerable if everyone thought that this daily ritual was central to his or her work.

The Parliamentary question can be a useful vehicle for opening up public discussion of a topic. It is enough merely to table it. The need for a reply is totally irrelevant and indeed, when received, it usually turns out so to be. What one soon learns is that if the media seize on the question, millions of readers, viewers and listeners may become an audience as a consequence of its appearance on the Order Paper—the programme of the match. A long well researched speech may obtain a line or two in the quality press or 'Today in Parliament'. A press statement judiciously issued on a quiet Sunday may lead to a barrage of interviews. For the propagandist or publicity seeker alike, the broadcasting of Parliament can be looked at as an unfortunate aberration.

The microphone does not follow the Member into his constituency 'surgery' or to local meetings. It does not listen in to the deputations he meets or the quiet word to a Minister in the Lobby. The real business transacted in letters to Government Departments or in the corridors of power is a world away from the superficial showbiz treatment of the Jim and Maggie show. The hours spent at Party meetings, pressure groups, Committees, answering correspondence and the thousand and one everyday chores of an MP cannot by definition be heard by the listener.

Although a small band of regulars find Question Time to be the natural outlet for their exhibitionism or genuine political passion, most Members concentrate on more mundane matters. In any event, most Government backbenchers are assigned the role of Pavlov's dogs, responding to division bells in order to ensure that the players on the field who answer those questions remain in their positions.

For the majority of Members their occasional contribution to debate punctuates long periods of frustration, during which they are expected to exercise no more intellectual activity in the Chamber than to respond to those bells and cheer on their respective Front Bench teams. If this leads to those ungentlemanly mutterings and bawlings that the listener finds so distasteful and discourteous it is because the distorting microphone has explained nothing of the real role of the Member and his multifarious preoccupations.

How can the microphone depict the Member researching an article for a journal? How can it show him organising a campaign to help some deprived section of the community, or fighting to save a local factory from closure? What the listener will hear at peak listening times is the serialised

confrontation of the comic strip characters in a sort of 'Tom and Jerry' show.

Occasionally the cosy atmosphere of Ambridge is conjured up on those occasions when MPs appear as members of the same club, a community bound by traditions and values which are shared by all the protagonists. More frequently, the pressure to score party political points or impress one's personality onto the listener not only trivialises and distorts debate but has resulted in damaging the image of Parliament as the core of our democratic institutions. I suspect, however, that the audience will diminish and that gradually Parliament will accommodate to the innovation and revert to normality.

The problem remains, however, that it is the dramatic moment, the acid exchange between party leaders, the announcement of a new tax or a sensational scandal that will be broadcast. The microphone by selection will do what the newspapers have long been guilty of doing in creating issues and ignoring vitally important but less newsworthy matters. Just as the action replay on Match of the Day will pick out the goals and remarkable near-misses rather than the deft, skilful and thoughtful midfield play, so the introduction of radio highlights, over-emphasises and encourages a certain type of behaviour and attracts a certain type of personality.

I am all for open government, but if each MP in turn were to describe a day or a week in his life as a Member of Parliament then the public would begin to obtain a balanced view of how decisions are actually made. Nothing is decided on the Jim and Maggie show. Decisions are still made behind closed doors and often by anonymous men at the relevant Ministry.

Instead of encouraging open government, the microphones at Westminster have given the illusion that we are listening to politicians at work. What we are hearing is a sophisticated game which bears little relationship to the reality of what politics is about and how politicians function. It is a distraction from the need to reform our institutions in order to give real influence to individual backbenchers and to open the workings of government to political scrutiny.

Those disembodied voices referring to Honourable, learned and gallant Members, employing time-honoured clichés, will no doubt continue to mystify the listeners by their resemblance to a parody of a university debating society. The narrator in hushed tones will explain the scenario rather like a golf commentator at the edge of the green. Petulant or pompous, defiant or dogmatic, the show will go on as they continue to demand whether the Right Honourable gentleman is aware of this or that or whatever they are trying to tell the listening audience outside—if it hasn't already switched off!

THE GREAT GAME IN CENTRAL ASIA: ARE WE LOSING IT?

by John Biggs-Davison M.P.

LORD Rosebery described the policy of the Russian Empire as 'silent, concentrated, perpetual, unbroken'. Holy Russia was conceived of as the 'Third Rome'. Soviet Moscow is the 'Vatican' of an international anti-religion, splintered by the 'protestantism' of various forms of doctrinal and nationalistic deviation but furnishing Russian world ambitions with an ideology of world revolution. Did not Lenin say that if you scratched a Communist you found a Great Russian chauvinist?

Unlike the Tsardom, the Soviet empire disposes of a military machine unprecedented in times of peace. By its inheritance of the colonial conquests of Russia-in-Asia and the gift at Yalta of half Europe, it enjoys the classical strategic advantage of interior lines, stretching from the Elbe to the Pacific. For centuries the Bear has padded towards warm waters. It has now taken to the broad oceans.

The rising American empire had Admiral Mahan to extol from British experience the benefits of sea power. That of Soviet Russia has Admiral Gorshkov who, in his recent book, *The Sea Power of the State,* hailed the Red Fleet as

> the optimum means to defeat the imperialist (*sic*) enemy, and the most important element in the Soviet arsenal to prepare the way for a Communised world.

What in 1953 had been 'merely a minor defensive arm' was now 'a fully modern navy', capable of applying pressure by 'military demonstration' —in the Royal Navy it has been known as 'showing the flag'—and of threatening the interruption of 'sea communications'.

> The flag of the Soviet Navy now flies over the oceans of the world. Sooner or later the West will have to understand that it is no longer master of the seas.

NATO recognises the threat to the supply routes of the West. Oil and minerals must be obtained and imported from outside the Treaty area which perversely ends at the Tropic of Cancer. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, Vice-Admiral Sir David Loram, said in Washington in October 1979:—

> The Soviets are currently building nuclear submarines at the rate of one every seven weeks . . . We are beginning to see emerging from Soviet shipyards a deep water navy, designed for sea control rather than sea denial. It has sophisticated logistic support and increasing access to overseas bases.

It has indeed, thanks to Western frailty, folly and disunity. Soviet maritime forces arrived in the Indian Ocean in the mid-1960s. In 1968 the scuttle from east of Suez began. Assurances to Australasian partners and Arab rulers were dishonoured. In Aden, now a Soviet base and intelligence centre, the Russians even anticipated the British withdrawal. A Soviet harbourmaster was ready to take over; Soviet arms were stockpiled in the hills above.

In 1971 India and Pakistan were at grips over what emerged as Bangladesh. India paid a price of dependence on the USSR who flew in military equipment a month before hostilities began. The proud tradition of the Indian Navy goes back to the East India Company. Today half of its ships are of Soviet origin; and the Russians have facilities at Vishakapatnam.

The British in India had to reckon with the ambitions first of Napoleonic France and later of Tsarist Russia. The Bear reached Vladivostok in 1860. Siberian acquisitions aroused less suspicion in London and Calcutta than did Russian designs on the Euphrates Valley as a route to the Indian Ocean. In 1892 Lord Curzon regarded 'the concession by any Power of a port upon the Persian Gulf to Russia . . . as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture of the *status quo*, and as an international provocation to war'. Any British Minister who 'acquiesced in such a surrender' should be impeached as a traitor. In 1903, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Lytton, who had been Viceroy of India in 1876-80, gave stern warning against 'the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power'.

Lord Palmerston prevented Russia from making Persia her protectorate. He blamed Russia when Persia laid siege to Herat, the Afghan city known as the 'Key to the Gateway to India'. That was in 1831. In the 1830s and 1840s Russia's conquest of the Caucasus was delayed for half a century by the holy war of the Imam Shamil. He sought alliance with England in the common interest of halting Russian expansion eastward. Some British supplies were sent and Indian Army officers to train Shamil's artillery; but Queen Victoria did not answer his letter. Marx regarded the 'Lion of Daghestan' as a great 'democrat'. To the early Bolsheviki he was an anti-imperialist hero. Later however he and the *Muridis*, the *Sufi* (Islamic mystic) movement to which he belonged, came under Marxist-Leninist anathema.

General Skobelev, the conqueror of Central Asia, contemplated the invasion of India through Afghanistan. By 1895 Russia was on the Pamirs. Her borders marched with Chinese Turkestan to the East and with the North-West Frontier of India. In 1895—the Durand line was drawn in 1893—and again in 1907 Anglo-Russian diplomacy settled the frontiers on the River Oxus (Amu Darya) and the Hindu-Kush range and removed differences over Afghanistan, Persia and Tibet.

Britain's third and last Afghan War was fought in 1919 with the usurping and innovating Amir Amanullah; thereafter, in 1921, Delhi abandoned the right to control Afghan foreign policy which had been conceded in the Treaty of Gandamak after the Second Afghan War of 1878-79. The British Legation in Kabul continued however to report to New Delhi as well as London. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan are based on the Treaty of 1921.

The Russian Revolution came but ten years after the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. The Bolsheviks proclaimed self-determination for the colonised but made sure that the entire Asiatic empire of the Tsars

remained under their tutelage. The Soviet Union entered in 1921 into treaty relations with Afghanistan. These were reaffirmed in December 1975. The USSR and Kemalist Turkey did much to obtain in 1934 Afghanistan's membership of the League of Nations. In 1937 she joined Turkey, Iraq and Iran in the Saadabad pact of mutual non-aggression. A decade later Britain's withdrawal from the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent recalled Engels' prophecy of 1858 that the Russian penetration of Asia 'will soon relegate England to a secondary place on that continent'.

The Soviet-Afghan frontier was demarcated by the Tashkent Boundary Commssion in 1948. From the 1950s Afghanistan received considerable economic, technical and military aid from the USSR. Then two revolutions threw her open to the Soviet. There were also two revolutions in Russia. Afghanistan's first revolution, that of July 1973, deposed King Zahir Shah. Sardar Mohammad Daoud, who had married into the Durrani royal house, became President of the Republic. He was a secularist and a moderniser. Encouraged by Moscow, he nationalised private banks, passed new labour legislation, instituted a land reform, set up agricultural co-operatives and introduced a seven-year (1976-83) plan of industrialisation. Military and civil specialists went to the USSR for training. Soviet lecturers and technicians were welcomed to Afghanistan; Soviet geologists prospected; Soviet experts worked in the chemical, oil and neutral gas industries—gas is the main export to the USSR—and on the irrigation system of the Nangarhor Valley.

At the same time President Daoud sought help from the West, for example in the exploitation of iron ore reserves at Hajigak. There was talk of bringing in British military advisers. Moscow became dissatisfied with a neutralist regime whose 'progressive foreign policy' it had praised. On 27th April 1978 President Daoud was overthrown and killed. The new dictator was Nur Mohammad Taraki, the 61-year-old son of a shepherd. Self-educated, he became a journalist, writer and poet.

As Secretary-General of the *Khalq* (people) party, Tarakki merged it with the reputedly more extreme Left *Parcham* (flag) party in a ruling People's Democratic Party. The latter's manifesto did not mention Marxism-Leninism; it did proclaim the commitment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the oppressed. President Tarakki himself began to be addressed with the fulsomeness lavished on Stalin in his day: 'Great leader of the people of Asia'; 'great son of the people'; 'great father of the revolution'; the guiding light of our future'. His was indeed a revolution affecting the future of the people of Afghanistan and of Asia.

The Democratic Republic became an adjunct of the 'Socialist Commonwealth', subject to the Brezhnev doctrine of 'limited sovereignty'. Some 2,500 Soviet advisers were brought in. They were soon busy helping to counter the Islamic and tribal revolt against an atheist and alien yoke. East Germans also arrived. Soviet tanks and fighters were imported. A Soviet air base was established at Shindand, south of Herat, and provision made for an all-weather bridge over the Ama Darya near Heraton to connect the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by road and rail with

Samarkand and Stalinabad. It is now seven years since the Russians began to build roads for the Afghans, including the two-mile Salang Tunnel, north of Kabul, and the four-track highway from Mazir-i-Sharif to Kabul. The road which runs from Kushka through Herat to Kandahar could serve to move tanks and troops to the Kojak pass that leads to Chaman and Quetta in Pakistan's restless Province of Baluchistan.

Afghanistan marches with Pakistan, China, India and the USSR. Of a population of about 17 million, fewer than 10 million, according to Soviet statistics, are *Afghantsy* (Pathans). The rest are Tadzhiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, etc. Ethnically, the frontier with the USSR is artificial. There are a few thousand Afghans across the Soviet border, over 9 million Uzbeks, 2.1 million Tadzhiks, 1.5 million Turkmens and 1.5 million Kirgiz. There are more than twice as many Tadzhiks in Afghanistan than in the neighbouring Tadzhik Socialist Soviet Republic.

Tribalism and irridentism among the Baluchis and Pathans of Pakistan receive Soviet sympathy and subsidies. Recently, in the India Office Library, I turned up notes of mine made when serving Jinnah's Pakistan in the Punjab-Baluchistan borderland of Dera Ghazi Khan. I had recorded that in 1941 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of (then undivided) India acclaimed the right to self-determination of Sindhis, Baluchis and Pathans—three of the 'four nationalities', the fourth being the dominant Punjab, spoken of nowadays by those who would either loosen, or break up, the Pakistan federation. Their separate chambers of commerce were cited by the CPI to attest their distinct nationhood. My notes also mentioned the attractions of the port of Karachi, in Sind, for the Soviet Union.

I revisited Pakistan in September 1979, at the time of the overthrow of President Tarakki by his Minister, Hafizullah Amin. The tour included Mardan, depot of the Punjab Regiment but formerly of the Corps of Guides. (The Guides Cavalry is the regiment of General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan). The Guides' Chapel, so like an English country church, is well tended. So is the Mogul-style Hamilton Memorial, commemorating the subaltern of that name and the soldiers of several races who, just over a century ago, defended to the last man our Residency set up in Kabul after the Treaty of Gandamak.

Latterly it has been the turn of the Russians to come under siege and attack in what was the buffer state between the two great empires. The Muslim resistance to Marxism in Afghanistan harried the forces of Tarakki and slaughtered a number of Russians. Afghan troops mutinied and deserted with their arms into Pakistan. It was humiliating for the Tarakki regime when the late President and his Ministers had their families flown out to the Soviet Union.

Thousands of Afghan refugees in Pakistan have joined the Boat People among the victims of Soviet imperialism by proxy. Those I talked to in the permanent camp at Warsak in the North-West Frontier Province were luckier than those in roadside tents in the onset of the cold weather. The Pathan tribes and their cause transcend the Frontier, heightening the

tension between Afghanistan and the Pakistan of President Zia who had been working to improve relations.

The savage resentment at the oppression of Tarakki provoked such fierce and widespread warfare that Moscow presumably decided to dispense with him. The government of Hafizullah Amin is a more dependable instrument of the Kremlin, now represented in Kabul by a new Ambassador who is a Tatar and a Muslim. The new President made tactical overtures towards Islamic sentiments and suspicions and changed the name of the secret police; but the helicopter gunships of his Soviet protector have lately proved a match for the insurgents and speak louder than verses from the Koran.

The Russians may be expected to hold their bases and points of vantage. The Straits of Hormuz are 300 miles from southern Afghanistan. Their northern shores are in chaotic Iran. The Central Treaty Organisation collapsed with the Shah. Installed not only in South Yemen but in Ethiopia, the Soviet Union commands both entrances to the Red Sea. The threat to the West is global; the gap here in its defences yawns particularly wide.

Suggestions have been made of a Euro-American naval task force and the development of base facilities in Britain's Diego Garcia. Omani proposals for a Euro-Arab security system for the Gulf have been parried by Kuwaiti and Iraqi insistence that outsiders should leave the defence of the Gulf to the countries of the Gulf. Saudi diplomacy has tried to reconcile Oman with other Arab states. The importance of that Sultanate which has fought off Communist-inspired insurgence in Dhofar with British help was stressed by the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Ho Ying, when he called on Sultan Qabos Bin Said at the end of October.

Admiral of the Fleet Lord Hill-Norton, favoured, prior to the upheaval in Iran, some amalgamation of NATO with CENTO. There was then no great ideological impediment and three of the five members of CENTO were also members of NATO, i.e. the United Kingdom, the United States and Turkey. The CENTO area included the exits from the Black Sea and the Gulf 'as well as a substantial India Ocean coast-line'. Lord Hill-Norton was writing for the Institute for the Study of Conflict. He continued:—

> What might be described as the pincer events last year in Afghanistan to the East and the Horn and Southern Arabia to the West must sharpen our perception of how important this sort of association could still be . . . . It must also sharpen our perception of how much has, certainly for the present, been lost, and how extremely important in every way it is for our Governments to work urgently for some similar grouping in the area, as well as in the Far East and South America.

Since Suez and the decolonisation of her empire Britain has underestimated her influence in regions where she has ruled or predominated. She still has a particular place in Pakistan, despite the bloody manner of her partition and the failure to work miracles over Kashmir and other sore spots. Pakistan has a poor press in a secularised West which has not understood Islam and has been surprised by its militant renaissance. It

suspects 'theocracy' even more than military rule. Over nuclear and other questions the United States leans towards India; Britain has shown herself more sympathetic, for example in her re-scheduling of Pakistan's debt. From the President down there are many who want to rejoin the Commonwealth from which the late Mr. Bhutto walked out.

Britain should remind her allies of the stake they all have in the unity and integrity of Pakistan now under internal stress and external menace. The Great Game was not just Kipling. It goes on; for, although empires rise and fall, geopolitical realities persist. It is not for nothing that Pakistan joins hands in northern mountains with China and that together they built 500 miles of highway in the Karakoram.

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The February issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Arabia: the British Connection* (Part 2) by W. Norman Macdonald, *Violent Weapons* by James Avery Joyce, *The Future of London* by Sir Horace Cutler, O.B.E., and *British Theatre* 1949-79 by Glynne Wickham.

THE BIG, GREY PATCH

by John Elsom

IN August, 1979, a treasury official, Mr. M. J. T. Caff, presented a paper, *Government Spending on the Arts,* to a conference on cultural economics sponsored by an American University. It was a grey document, grey in tone and outlook, with its numbered paragraphs and pages of statistics, but fascinating nevertheless, for it must reveal the thinking in many other grey documents, flickering from hand to hand, around Mrs. Thatcher's cabinet table.

The late Richard Crossman described in his *Diaries* how the influence of the Treasury percolates other branches of the civil service, providing the basis for a Whitehall collective opinion, formidable for any government to challenge, even if it were disposed to do so. Mr. Caff is careful not to step beyond the bounds of propriety by suggesting an arts policy. His aims are 'descriptive, rather than analytic'; and he leaves 'wide-ranging issues' for others to discuss. But he does expect these issues to be discussed within the terms of the factual summary, provided by the Treasury; and my fear is that if this summary were accepted at its face value, and the inferences duly drawn, it would result in the most vigorous arts policy since the days of Cromwell.

Of what situation precisely is it a summary? The title, *Governmnet Spending on the Arts,* seems clear enough, but the definitions blur as you read on. In Paragraph 3, for example, spending is defined either as 'direct expenditure' or as 'tax concessions', for 'in either case there is an impact on the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement'. My layman's quibble is that grants and tax cuts, giving and less aggressive taking, should not equally count as spending; but this kind of accountancy also makes no distinction between grants which are give-aways and those which are investments, or between profitable tax-levels and unprofitable ones. A profitable tax level is not necessarily a high one. If VAT at 15% on theatre tickets has had the damaging effect on trade that the past disastrous summer would suggest, then to levy it is self-defeating: it simply kills the geese laying the golden eggs.

If the term 'spending' is a little vague, what can be said about Mr. Caff's 'fairly broad' coverage of the arts — so broad indeed that it ranges from 'the live arts' to 'heritage', 'museums', 'libraries' and 'ancient monument'. This is book-keeping run wild, when Stonehenge, the latest David Hockney and a text-book on quantum mechanics can alike be listed under the same ledger heading. Even if we break up these categories, as Mr. Caff does in his tables of statistics, the question arises as to why they were brought together in the first place, except to prove Mr. Caff's general point that government spending on the arts 'is greater than often believed'.

By lumping everything together, Mr. Caff can prove that public spending on the arts amounts to 0.67 of total public expenditure, having risen from 0.49 in 1968/69. If, however, the arts are supposed to mean anything

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which preserves the past or civilises the future, the growth in public expenditure is scarcely significant, for either percentage is scandalously small. Mr. Caff evidently doesn't consider it to be small: he sees the matter in 'Treasury' terms—which is that the demand is too high.

In his opening paragraph, he asserts that 'the demand for spending on the arts is virtually limitless'. Again I would nit-pick at definitions, for while the possibilities for increased spending may be virtually limitless, as they are in other areas of public spending, such as health or education, the actual demands are rather low. No arts union is holding the country to ransom with exorbitant wage claims, nor could it do so. Mr. Caff connects the 'virtually limitless' demand with the activities of lobbyists in Parliament, the press and the mass media. '. . . the BBC,' he points out, 'have a daily half-hour programme reporting on artistic activity, just before the main evening news. This growth in interest has made it easier for Ministers to agree to increase arts spending.'

The idea that *Kaleidoscope*, a rather cautious arts magazine programme in which I sometimes take part, is helping to dig a bottomless pit of demand, is so amusing that one might suspect Mr. Caff of trying to liven a dull conference, were it not for his insertion, between Paragraphs 1 and 4, of a more substantial point—that 'expenditure by the government on the arts has increased faster than in most other areas of government spending'. He later points out that 'expenditure on the live arts, at constant prices, has more than doubled in real terms in the 10 years up to 1979/80', while 'expenditure on national museums and galleries has almost doubled, and expenditure on historic buildings and ancient monuments risen by half'. 'Overall, the live art's share of spending has tended to increase and museums, galleries and heritage's share to decline.'

He was, in effect, telling the conference that governments have been rather generous to artists in recent years and that artists must expect the rate of growth to slow down, or go into reverse, so that other areas can catch up. It sounds reasonable, but there are many omissions. Much spending has been organisational and institutional, and has had little impact on what Mr. Caff calls 'the live arts'. The spending on libraries, for example, may have risen from £166 million in 1968/69 to £249 million in 1978/79; but authors have still received no money from a Public Lending Rights levy.

Nor does Mr. Caff point out that these increases were calculated from low base levels. The Arts Council's annual grant may have risen from £27 million in 1968/69 to £62 million in 1978/79; but this is still a low figure compared with other areas of government spending, such as the £7.8 thousand million spent on education or the £13.2 thousand million on social security (1977 figures). It is also low when compared with one item in the national income, to which the arts can reasonably be held to have contributed, tourism. In 1977, tourism (with transport, the movement of foreign goods by British vessels) brought in £6.8 thousand million to the exchequer, according to the summary provided by the Government Statistical Service, or roughly 5.49% of the GNP. Tourist surveys have revealed

that the arts are a major attraction for visitors to Britain, ranking second only to general sightseeing. The arts are therefore not a drain on Britain's wealth. The evidence suggests otherwise.

If Mr. Caff's figures were accepted at their face value, and the implications carried to their logical conclusions, we would be left with the idea that because actors' salaries in subsidised theatres have roughly doubled in the past 10 years—from about £30 a week to £60—they should wait while teachers' salaries also double, from about £5,000 a year to £10,000. It is in such human terms perhaps, that the fallacies of the Treasury's approach are best revealed; for if you approach almost any artist in Britain, armed with Mr. Caff's statistics, and state that artists are better off now than they were 10 years ago, you will be greeted with a stare of disbelief. Artists know that this is not so. There may be individuals who have done well; and in certain areas, there may have been improvements. But overall, there has not been an improvement. There has been a decline, and artists feel that they are losing out in many battles, of which only one is that against inflation.

My purpose, however, is not to throw down the gauntlet to Mr. Caff—nor to write sob-stories on behalf of artists; but to take issue with certain orthodoxies, of which Mr. Caff's paper is an illustration, and to express concern that Whitehall's statistical methods are so much at odds with reality. There is a gap between theory and fact, design and execution, analytical methods and practical results, which the Treasury covers up with a big, grey patch of statistics. At the risk of sounding unduly poetic, what alarms me most is not the faulty logic or misleading figures but the sheer greyness.

Other areas of government spending are, more or less, clearly defined. We know what we are buying when we pay for primary schools or nuclear submarines. But governments give the impression of not quite knowing why they spend money on the arts, and so their approach is grey, partly in the sense that it is muddled, cloudy, neutral and anonymous. These opaque confusions extend up and down the scale, from central government to local authorities who dither as to whether the arts should be placed with Parks and Leisure or with Education; and they are formally enshrined in the archaic formulae of the Charities Act, promulgated in the reign of Elizabeth I for the relief and education of the poor.

Subsidised arts organisations are usually registered as charities, for this is the only legal way by which they can receive grants. But I suspect that for most men in the street, as for most civil servants, this device is regarded as a bit of a dodge. How do theatres relieve poverty, except by employing out-of-work actors? Are plays *really* educational? Aren't they at best, just enjoyable? The Charities Act brings practical complications: there is a very shadowy area concerning the payment of directors. Directors of charities cannot be paid in their capacity as directors, although they can employ themselves in some other capacity. It brings problems of categorising. Because subsidised theatres are registered as charities, the Treasury is compelled to see them as being a drain on public resources.

If they were not a drain, they could not receive grants. This is, however, a very limited approach. The Royal Shakespeare Company, for example, needs its grant because in itself it is loss-making. But the grant paid from the public purse to the RSC is re-paid many times over by foreign visitors to Stratford. Was the new Stratford Hilton built so that tourists could pay their respects to Ann Hathaway's cottage? In Stratford, in London, in Edinburgh at the time of the festival, and in many other places, the arts are a link in a chain, whose overall effect is profitable; and if you weaken this link, or try to take it away altogether, the consequences for the local economy can be catastrophic.

Placing the arts among the charities publicly labels them as loss-making; and thus they become vulnerable to governments who want to find ways to economize, particularly if it is felt that the Charities Act is being abused to gain easy access to public funds. Companies with a charitable status are also tied to Treasury methods of accounting, which means that they dare not show a profit at the end of a financial year, for fear of losing their grants. Money cannot be kept in reserve for a rainy day, good years cannot be balanced out with bad ones and that leads to poor housekeeping.

My main objection, however, to the Charities Act and indeed the whole Whitehall approach is that it tempts governments to view the arts in terms of artefacts, like Stonehenge, or institutions, like the National Theatre. The real contribution which the arts can make to society, however, lies in its process, which I would rather cumbersomely describe as the modification of culture. If you regard the arts as being a beneficial process, rather than a set of institutional objects, you would go about subsidising or, at any rate, encouraging them in a very different way. You would seek to stimulate the artistic trade and to further the diversity and pluralism of the market. Such a policy, however, is effectively ruled out by the Whitehall approach, which also fails to take account of the way in which influxes of public money can distort and sometimes damage trade.

It may be idle now to speculate on what might have happened if the money spent on establishing the public library system had been devoted instead to a flat rate subsidy on the price of books. Such a measure would certainly have stimulated the trade of authors, publishers and booksellers, and encouraged the public to build up their own libraries. It would also have dispensed with the need for a lot of civic furniture and an army of librarians. It is not quite so idle to wonder about what might have happened in the 1960s if the money spent on building expensive new theatres and maintaining them, had been used to provide flat rate subsidies on the sale of theatre tickets. Such a measure again would have stimulated trade and encouraged theatre managers to renovate existing theatres. It is still possible in this area somewhat to redress the balance.

The question, however, as to whether public subsidies should be used as a general stimulus to trade or only in those specific areas where the public is likely to benefit is one which attracts an inevitable answer from politicians. 'Obviously' public money should only be given where the public are likely to benefit. In the case of the arts, however, it is not easy

to say precisely where the public benefit lies. If you start trying to define which arts are socially useful and which are not, encouraging or discouraging them accordingly, then, firstly, you are in danger of introducing censorship by the back door, and, secondly, you are starting to limit the purposes and content of art, with the consequent danger of turning artists into moralists and propagandists.

The merit of the Charities Act—for it does have some merits—is that it nearly, but not quite, ducks this question. The arts can, for the sake of convenience, be held to lie in the field of education; and education is one of the general purposes for which the Act was instituted. The precise interpretation of these shadowy rules can be left to amateur boards, up and down the country, who with their professional advisers, run the charitable companies. In a liberal climate of opinion, the boards are not likely to question whether a rock concert really counts as art or education; although when the climate changes, and the boards come under political or economic pressure, they do start to niggle and demand positive social returns for the public money of which they are trustees. The muddle and anonymity of the Charities Act allows room for individual judgements about particular cases. Vague regulations are the better interpreted. There is virtue in greyness, but not perhaps much.

Something else is needed; but before attempting to describe what that something might be, I would like to return to that artistic process which I have claimed to be socially beneficial and which leads to the modification of culture. I grew up in a world where a third of the atlas was coloured British Imperial Pink; and by some benevolent miracle, our empire collapsed and transformed itself without the ferocity of other colonial struggles. The statesmen who steered us away from what might otherwise have been a savage inquisition by history, would have found their task more difficult, even perhaps impossible, if they had not been supported by a pluralistic culture able to adapt to, and express, and further, these changes. If my reading as a child had been confined to what now seems the blinkered imperialism of *Boy's Own* or *Biggles,* it would have been hard psychologically to adjust from carrying the white man's burden to laying it down. Fortunately I could read Shaw too, and Maugham, Bertrand Russell and Graham Greene; and such combined, though diverse, influences helped to wean me from a bigotry which, if blown up to a national scale, could have blown up the nation.

Most social problems, from racism to war, have a cultural dimension; and it is sometimes only in the field of culture that these problems can be overcome. If post-imperial anxiety now seems too remote an example, we can take an illustration nearer to hand: unemployment. Not long ago, in the early 1960s, politicians were saying that a million unemployed was an unacceptably high level. Today they feel relieved when the level stays below 1½ million, but fear the future which may bring levels of 5, 10 or even 20 million. In the past, it was assumed that if British industry were prosperous and cost-effective, it would be able to expand to absorb surplus labour. Nowadays, with silicon chips, microprocessors and all the

other technological gains, we realise that one man's high productivity can mean that 500 men lose their jobs. Both choices facing British industry lead to unemployment. If it fails to modernise itself, there will be unemployment through the loss of markets—and national impoverishment too. If it modernises itself, however, only a fraction of the existing labour force will be needed.

No material solution is convincing. One might be that the range of consumer goods should increase to sop up the energies of surplus labour; but ecologists rightly warn us against wasting the world's resources on unnecessary luxuries. Another is that of the trade unions, who believe that unemployment should be evenly spread by reducing working hours all round; but high productivity cannot be achieved by a large, part-time, part-skilled labour force. Yet another is that the surplus production from the West should be off-loaded on to the underproductive Third World, which certainly needs it—a solution infinitely tempting, but brimming with political complications.

Since these solutions raise as many difficulties as they solve, politicians have to learn how to cope with unemployment in itself; and some of them can be tempted to turn towards the arts as a way of keeping people off the streets. This is indeed a traditional justification for state patronage. As long ago as 1913, H. J. Mackinder, MP, argued in the House of Commons that 'we have . . . increased the leisure of vast masses of people. Moreover (we) have at the present time . . . an increasing monotony of employment.' His view was that the masses should be educated to use their leisure in the pursuit and appreciation of the arts.

I am not disposed to question too closely the credentials of any potential arts ally now, however dead; but Mackinder's argument, and those based upon it, are quantitative rather than qualitative. It would be better, by this token, to have a thousand dedicated flautists than one inspired composer. It encourages art teachers, rather than artists themselves; and supports Lord Redcliffe-Maud's opinion that 'we must not think of the artist as a special kind of person, but of every person as a special kind of artist.' This view, moreover, misses the essential contribution which the arts can make—which is to alter the cultural climate in which unemployment looms as a threat.

Unemployment is essentially not a problem. Fewer people need work. That's all. If the unemployment is caused by high industrial productivity, the country as a whole need not be the poorer; and if the wealth is well spread, the individual person need not starve. These may be big 'ifs'; but the really difficult problems are psychological. We have been conditioned to believe that a person's worth is related to his or her earning capacity and productivity; and so to be declared redundant is like being made worthless. There are societies where not to work is regarded as sensible and desirable: in ours, it is considered shameful. An unemployed man is either an object of pity or treated as a layabout; and the social pressures are such that he too is likely to accept the judgement of his peers and lose self-esteem. The dread of being thought useless lies behind many restric-

tive practices in industry; while he who feels socially rejected, is liable to seek revenge by becoming anti-social. Nor should we under-rate, for the most sane man, the mental flexibility required to change from a life structured by work to one which is, in that sense, unstructured. The real curse of unemployment is not the lengthening dole queue, but the surge of nervous breakdowns; not poverty, but crime; not unproductive days, but interminable nights, when would-be suicides think about the future and do not want it.

As a country we are hooked on employment, a drug grown among the poppies of the protestant work ethic, distilled in each slump and liberally dispensed around when business booms. It is a cultural drug, whose original medicinal value was lost when the sickness changed. But pluralistic cultures in the past have shown the ability to adjust to changing circumstances, when they are allowed to do so. This is largely because there are professions—the artists'—whose role includes the modification of culture. It is the artists who seek out the restrictive practices of the mind and lay the ghosts which cause them.

I am not suggesting, of course, that this is a self-conscious duty; or that writers get up in the morning and say, 'Now what area of our culture can I modify today?' But in the course of their work, they do seek the fresh thought or the illuminating phrase, the unexpected delight or the knot of tension under the skin which, if massaged gently away, releases a new flow of energy. It is a process whose net result is the modification of culture, if only on a personal level. But the writers who are widely read, the musicians who are heard, the painters whose work is seen, extend this process to a public scale, not only for others, but with others, for the public has to discover for itself which artists relate to its needs and which do not. It is likely to be a slow discovery, starting with a few enthusiasts, swelling to a crowd, dwindling or growing, until perhaps it embraces nations. It may be an Orwell who first sees, through the pursuit of a modern utopia, the sties of an animal farm; but it was his public who took the myth to heart and used it as a mental tool, one among many, for interpreting the present.

If I were therefore rhetorically asked, 'Who is more socially valuable, an artist or a doctor,' my reply would be equally rhetorical, 'If you do not have artists, then you must have a lot of doctors, for you will need them all'.

But artists in particular need the benefit of a pluralist arts system; for it the market is deliberately restricted, if it is only open to certain kinds of artists and not to others, there is the real danger that the culture may be modified in the wrong way, by shrinking. The culture becomes a collective tunnel vision, very narrow and intense, like a laser beam. By becoming obsessed with one problem instead of many, one idea, philosophy or fashion, or even one cultural tradition, however honourable its origins, this thin, overheated cultural spotlight can burn out the eyes.

The social value of artists is thus linked to the pluralism of the system; and in Britain, for the most part, we have been lucky in that our culture

has stayed flexible and comparatively pluralistic. It has had its limitations —a certain chauvinism, some censorship, poor libel laws, some capitalistic monopolies; but its essential diversity has not been seriously threatened. But I do not think our luck can hold. There are too many ways in which the pluralism of our culture is being knowingly or unwittingly threatened.

One such challenge is that of the mass media, where, say, the power of scheduling television programmes is concentrated into a few people's hands. Another is the way in which independent publishers band together into conglomerates for their economic protection. The commercial theatre producers are going through bad times and are lowering their sights accordingly. Smiths have a near monopoly on magazine sales. The subsidised arts receive their grants through one main body. the Arts Council, and by means of the Charities Act, which characterises their activity as educational; and a narrow interpretation of education implies a re-inforcement of the existing culture, rather than its change or modification.

Despite the 'arm's length principle', political influence does count in the dispensing of grants. Few people believe that on artistic merits alone, the RSC and the National combined are worth half the grant money given to 172 other theatres; and in the recent cut backs, suggested by the Arts Council in response to the government's determination to reduce public spending, it was not the major theatres, the big money spenders, who were threatened— but the smaller theatres, the struggling ones and the theatres of the future. We have built ourselves a subsidised arts system and, in doing so, damaged the economy of the existing commercial one. We are now trying half-heartedly to reverse the process, but under-financing the subsidised sector, without providing financial help to the remains of the commercial market. In these expensive shifts of policy, artists have benefited very little; and their trade has suffered—not only in money terms, but pluralism too.

In the past, pluralism has always been associated with a pluralist economy, one where there are many small businesses, each producing small profits of which a fraction is spent on the arts. Nowadays, our economy is shrinking and becoming increasingly centralised. This is because few people are needed to produce the country's wealth; and they have to work in larger units for the sake of mass production. These large units in turn need to be controlled or at least influenced by government. In such a situation, there are no major sources of patronage, apart from government and a few large industries in search of publicity through the arts. There are very few rich private patrons, no truly affluent middle classes; and the amount which private individuals can afford to spend on the arts amounts to little more than small change. In the 1900s, stalls seat for a straight play would have cost 15/- which in real terms today would be about £15. No theatre management todays expects the public to pay £15 for a stalls seat: the market starts to flag at £5 and over.

The main hope for retaining a pluralist arts system is if the government positively decides to do so, by stimulating trade. If it resolves to take so dramatic a step, it must not only re-think previous policies but must look

again at the kind of factual analysis which the Treasury is providing. It must try to penetrate the grey surrounding the Treasury's own cultural tunnel vision. I am not suggesting that the scope of my tunnel vision is wider than theirs or Mr. Caff's. It is merely angled differently; and the act of writing is itself undertaken in the hope that, by shifting these angles slightly while relating them together, we may collectively illumine the grey areas where individually we are blind.

That is the social justification for the arts, the widening of the collective vision. It is the only reason why grant money should be given at all. All the other motives are incidental—the boost to tourism, the solving of problems through the modification of culture. What actually matters is that we as a nation have clearer sight; and can learn to delight in the colours and shapes around us. The struggle against greyness, like the running battle with philistinism, is not one to be lightly undertaken. It requires an imaginative faith to guess that in a November sky, there are many drops of rain, each perfectly formed, each different, each flashing forth the colours of the rainbow as the sun penetrates each prism. It needs an act of will simply to remember that nothing is grey but inattention makes it so, nothing coloured but boredom makes it grey.

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POEMS

AT THREE O'CLOCK

At three o'clock
it starts to rain
on Waterloo Bridge
it starts to rain
under the bridge
an old man shares his sandwich with the gulls
long-beaked like him
he leaves
their cries die down
they
take their places on the hand-rail
between them regular intervals of the wet timber
look
unlike
Baltic Mediterranean
gulls
flying to see ships off
to see the ships leave
not knowing where
you've come
without mac or umbrella
a boy a thin boy
starts running
over Waterloo Bridge
starts running
under the bridge
the gulls like soldiers in a formation dress to
an occasional passer-by in unison
turning their penguin heads and
guardedly looking sideways with their flat
black eyes
one gull
clings to the wire feet branched sharp against the grey sky
at each gust
flapping its wings to keep balance
it starts to get dark
on Waterloo Bridge
it starts to get dark
under the bridge
the line of street-lamps is lit
the rain targets in the river regret in green the rain bedecked asphalt
folds its wings and
a protruding feather

stirs in the wind
like a woman's dress

E. DUBNOV

Translated from the original Russian by the author and D. Holohan.

HAVING PLACED YOUR HAND UPON THE GLOBE

Having placed your hand upon the globe,
Agitated waters in the sea,
Having risen high and having flown
Through the stormcloud far above the tree.

The blue of haystacks, blinding like the snow,
The golden branches and the gilded leaves,
Silver grasses bending like the bow,
The island winds and fields of corn in sheaves.

Having risen high above the cloud,
Having rocked the ships upon the deep,
How the earth will throb, the grass will sound,
How the silvery fish will laugh and leap.

Set your foot aslant on grass and stone,
Clothe the sounds in warm translucent mist,
Spreading weightless wings upon the foam,
Clenching stubborn words in bony fists.

Over hills and over fields and lakes,
High above the city and the sea,
Colours rush on granite, meet and break,
Drops of light pulsate and make you free.

Through the wind, the countries and the years,
Through the grass to heaven and to earth,
Through the nearest leaf and furthest spheres,
Into foreign speech and second birth.

E. DUBNOV

Translated from Russian by the author and C. Newman.

BRITISH PENAL POLICY: THE SHACKLES OF THE PAST.

by Malcolm Ramsay

IT is widely recognised that Britain's social problems, such as her poor industrial relations, and her relatively dismal performance in economic terms stem, at least in part, from a failure to slough off the dead skin of an outmoded past. Our pioneering industrial development has left us with industries and attitudes unsuited to a changing world. The empire, to the administration and exploitation of which we geared ourselves as a way of life and livelihood, is now gone while the arrogance and the imperial attitudes still persist, souring present-day race relations.

British penal policy bears the marks of the past in precisely the same way. Here, too, a legacy which is not appreciated for what it is demands a fundamental reappraisal, hitherto denied. If we suffer much from crime, this is because, as a nation, we suffer more from excessive punishment. Punishment is not the answer to crime: if it were, the war against crime would long ago have been brought to a triumphant conclusion. In Britain, this war has been and continues to be fought in a far more ruthless and vindictive spirit than in other western countries, the United States excepted, where the whole scenario is bloodier still. The only result has been to confirm deviants in their identity or, unsociologically speaking, to harden criminals in their resolve. The autobiographies of the more literate lawbreakers, such as John McVicar and Jimmy Boyle, graphically prove this point. We may not be in a position simply to dispense with punishment, but we do need to rid ourselves of the notion that more punishment means less crime.

British penal policy still savours of the severities of the middle ages. This is not entirely the fault of the policy makers, as represented by the Home Office: it is a reflection of the climate of opinion in relation to which policy is formulated. It could however be argued that successive Home Secretaries and their advisers have not done enough to change the attitudes either of the powerful or of the public in general. Certainly no particular effort has been made to do this. In the period since the war we have gradually ceased to hang and to flog, yet nostalgia for the gallows and the cat is still all too prevalent.

In the campaign before the general election of May 1979, the successful party shamelessly played the 'hanging card' which, subsequently, it adroitly trumped with the parliamentary 'conscience card' on a vote in the Commons. We have been spared the resumption of judicial murder at least for the time being. The underlying outlook is still bleak. We have a situation where an M.P.—in this instance, Graham Page, speaking at Westminster in November 1978—can assert that 'public support for corporal punishment being available to the courts has increased over the

last two or three years. It is increasing, and it will continue to increase as long as we have the upsurge of crimes of violence.'

We may not hang or flog our convicted criminals, but we do incarcerate them without mercy, for longer periods and in far greater shoals than most other western countries. The latest figures available, given in a written parliamentary answer of April 1978, demonstrate the high proportion of the United Kingdom population in prison in comparison to other EEC countries. For every 100,000 of the entire population, the United Kingdom has 87 men, women and children—some under 16—in prison. The average for all nine EEC countries is 63. Only West Germany exceeds the United Kingdom, with 92 people in prison for each 100,000 of total population—Germany, with a heritage of militarism and imperialism comparable to our own if not worse—Germany, where opinion polls, as in Britain, continually indicate widespread popular nostalgia for capital punishment. The EEC average of 63 would be far lower if it were not for the relatively enormous British and German prison populations: in the Netherlands, only 23 per 100,000 population rot in prison, while even in France the figure is only 59.

Our current penal policy is a reflection of the pattern of its development in the past. Britain, the first industrial nation, was the first country to develop imprisonment on a systematic scale, which it did in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The first nation to innovate in the penal sphere, Britain was also the last to discard the physical torments, the hanging and the flogging, of traditional society. Such was the price Britain paid—and continues to pay—in this as in other respects. There are advantages to a 'late start'.

Britain led the way in the development of imprisonment as a form of mass punishment; and, with the United States, in the architectural and organisational perfection of model prisons. In the 1830s and 1840s Cherry Hill Penitentiary, Philadelphia, and Pentonville Prison, London, served as the leading examples for the rest of the would-be 'civilised' world. As Sidney and Beatrice Webb noted, the plans for Pentonville, drawn up by the architect-cum-engineer, Sir Joshua Jebb, were reproduced countless times throughout the world in general, and the empire in particular. Prisons were one more type of institution of which to be proud in early Victorian England, and to export, along with all the other innovations and products of an imperial and imperious nation.

Other European nations, which developed imprisonment as a mass punishment later than Britain, combined enthusiasm for the new penitentiaries with speedy abolition of capital and corporal punishment, in what was almost a straightforward swap in many cases, round the middle of the nineteenth century. In Britain, however, the construction of a full-scale prison system took place while the 'sanguinary' code, applying the death penalty in theory to even the most trivial offences, was still in force. The number of prisoners for each 100,00 of population had reached its highest ever level, at around 140, before the death penalty had been curtailed by the legislature to any great extent, by 1830: not until 1861 was

capital punishment restricted, in effect, to murder. Likewise transportation was still being practised on an extremely extensive scale; and, according to the official tariff, imprisonment was a lesser sanction than transportation. Here again Britain stood out in continuing to dispose of its criminals absolutely, instead of having to cope with them at home. France, the only other country to transport convicts overseas, never relied on this policy so heavily as did Britain. Whereas France did not institute transportation until the late nineteenth century, Britain had used it systematically from the early eighteenth century and, on a more irregular basis, still earlier. The final ending of transportation to Australia in the 1860s was presaged by a considerable furore about the release of convicts on home ground to an extent that had never happened before in Britain. Other countries had never known so tempting and so convenient an option by way of penal policy, in contrast.

If imprisonment, as first developed in Britain, was seen as a 'secondary' punishment (to use the official term), and then had to be made far tougher to supersede the death penalty, this goes far to explain why imprisonment has tended to be more repressive in character in Britain than elsewhere, as well as more extensively used. Sir Evelyn Ruggles-Brise, Chairman of the Prison Commission in the early years of this century, wrote that foreigners had 'a general idea that our punitive methods are harsh, if not barbarous'. He considered this reproach unjustified but, then, with unconscious irony, boasted that Britain did indeed dragoon its prisoners with a fierceness all its cold-blooded own: 'The comparatively few foreigners who had a personal acquaintance with our Institutions did not conceal their admiration for the order, method, discipline and exactness which characterise our methods,' he wrote.

One way in which, in the nineteenth century, British prisoners were ordered and disciplined was on the treadwheel, day in, day out, or at hand cranks. In this debilitating labour, the prisoners' energy was usually expended simply on grinding thin air. No other country introduced these completely useless contraptions, except Britain, where they were widely admired, despite the fact that they had adverse health effects on many prisoners. Nor did they cut the crime rate. As a leading French penologist commented, the treadwheel degraded the dignity of labour. Another form of prison discipline was flogging. Other countries occasionally made provision for this, at least in the nineteenth century, but used it on a far smaller scale. In just the same way flogging was used far more extensively in the British army and navy than in the armed forces of other countries. More tellingly still, corporal punishment continues even now in many British schools when it has long been abandoned on the continent. Corporal punishment for offences against prison discipline, usually the last context in which it was employed, ceased to be inflicted, to give some examples, in Austria in 1867, in Denmark in 1933, and in Holland in 1886. In Britain, the use of corporal punishment for breaches of prison discipline ended only in 1967.

If British prison discipline rested, or was thought to rest, on corporal punishment, until so very recently, this was not unsurprising in that cor-

poral punishment as a form of sanction awarded by the courts for a range of offences, sometimes by itself, sometimes coupled with imprisonment, continued in use until 1948: its abolition had been officially recommended to the Home Secretary by the Cadogan Committee in 1938. The Cadogan Committee observed that, even then, 'as a penalty for criminal offences by adults, corporal punishment has been abandoned by every civilised country in the world except those—i.e. the British Dominions and, to a very limited extent, the United States of America—in which the development of the criminal law has been influenced largely by the example of the English criminal law'. The Cadogan Committee, it may be noted, also found that while robbery with violence in particular was often visited by judges with corporal punishment, supposedly by way of deterrence, there was no evidence that this had ever in fact had any deterrent effect whatsoever.

The Cadogan Committee stressed that 'corporal punishment is a question on which people are apt to hold strong views, and in many cases these views are based on sentiment rather than on intellectual conviction'. This is still as true now as it was in 1938. In Britain we have cut ourselves off from the remainder of the western world in our desire to punish criminals so severely. 'Hang 'em, flog 'em,' is a peculiarly British desire, to which must be added 'lock 'em up,' for long periods in antiquated institutions. In Britain, we have created a peculiar scale of suffering and thus of punishment, by comparison with other countries. Our prison population rises ever higher even if—and perhaps in part, because—we have dispensed with hanging and flogging for the time being. We are caught in a vicious circle, in which the remembrance of past vengeance stimulates the desire for the imposition of further punishment. Saddest of all is the fact that we scarcely even recognise the pains we inflict on prisoners and their families—the forced labour for pocket money (without even national insurance or the benefit of inspection under the factory acts), the denial of proper toilet facilities, the barriers to communication with the outside world (censorship of mail, six hours of visiting time a year)—as the terrible privations they undoubtedly are.

Our overflowing prisons are an indictment of our failure to shed the mentality of the world's greatest slaving nation, as it used to be. They are a sure reflection of our continuing inability to change our ways of thought and, in consequence, our policies. Whatever the fiscal and financial crisis of people and state, the 'law-and-order' budget remains sacrosanct. Yet, surprise, surprise, the crime rate goes on rising. The crime rate was thought to be disturbingly high when men could be flogged, it was considered to be alarmingly high where mere lads were being hanged for sheep stealing: sheep were still stolen, crimes were still committed. There is no answer to crime, except to come to terms with the lack of an answer. We can chip away at the problem, by providing training, work and leisure opportunities of a fulfilling kind for all who want them: and most do. We can try to make people feel that their streets and their council estates belong to them, and that they too have a part to play in making them fit places, instead of leaving this to the police and other professional agencies. To this end we could, and ought to, encourage the development of local

participation in and democratic control over the police, at present scarcely nominal. Within the parameters and constraints of our social democracy, we could do a great deal to make this a more pleasant land. But before we can hope to bring crime, its control and its punishment within less outrageous bounds, we must first free our minds from the shackles of the past.

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ON THE MAP . . . ABOUT THERE

by Michael Kelly

AT UNESCO the other day, I explained that I had just come from Sierra Leone. My UNESCO friend asked where Sierra Leone was exactly, how big, what language was used there, what sort of regime, what wealth. I gave some of the general knowledge-type details. Sierra Leone is in West Africa; stuck between Guinée and Liberia, which means it's on the left and going up a bit round the big left-hand curve of Africa away from Nigeria. About the size of Ireland. Slightly over 3 million population. Several tribal languages, seven or eight main ones, with English the official language, and Krio the unofficial lingua franca. (Variants of Krio are the unofficial lingua franca of all West Africa, particularly near the coast and in larger urban settlements where many tribes foregather to live and do business.) Fascinating! And the resources? Not really wealthy. But not Sahel-level poverty. Rich enough for subsistence farming purposes in rice, yams, palm oil, beans, greens, fruits, meat and fish proteins. Diamonds something of a money-spinner but also something of a racket. Too many Lebanese and international adventurers involved. Iron in a vague way. Gold in an even vaguer one. Fishing. Palm kernels. The regime the usual tribal balancing act with party thugs in uniform maintaining what national discipline there is, in uneasy parallel with official police and military services. The President a shrewd semi-literate with conveniently mixed tribal parentage. Very over-identified with the assiduous fix-its of everything in Sierra Leone and traditionally throughout West Africa. The over-educated Creoles are increasingly marginal and out-manoeuvred.

What did I mean by Creoles? Well, the origins of Sierra Leone and of its capital, Freetown, are in a series of settlements since the late eighteenth century made by the British for freed slaves from America, Europe, the West Indies, and other parts of Africa (rescued from slave ships on the high seas). The detribalised freed inhabitants, however many Yoruba and Igbo and other tribal strands were more or less obvious, became known as Creoles and their language as Krio. In many ways, in their tiny settlement in and near Freetown, in the beautiful hilly peninsula now known as the Western Area, the Creoles had been successful as well as plucky. Generations of bishops, doctors, lawyers—before these things became normal for Africans; with their own university, Fourah Bay (affiliated as a college to Durham University since 1876), now fully independent. The usual fluctuations of fortune at English hands. Tolerated, even respected, while the Sierra Leone hinterland seemed unattractive, the mere infamous White Man's Grave; demoted and discriminated against in favour of white clergy, officials, civil servants and administrators once diamonds began to reflect the greed in the eyes of men with the firepower. But for all snobby disapproval of 'pidgin English' or 'broken English', Krio has flourished. Even if its originators, the Creoles who represent less

than 2% of the Sierra Leone population, have lost political and administrative clout, their language is dominant and, with modifications minor except to scholars, is used up and down the West African coast. The survival of this excellently pithy and expressive language, in spite of harassment by educators and contempt from generations of foreigners, is about to be given the accolade by the publication next year of a major Krio dictionary from Oxford University Press, no less.

The current regime used Creole professional competence during its first years of authority after breaking the Mende tribal hegemony of the Margai government in the late 1960s. Now the objective qualifications, subjectively perceived privileges of the Creoles, are being eroded in terms of scholarships and appointments. Creoles talk about a 'brain drain' to America, England, international organisations, other African countries. Diaspora is nothing new to the Creoles. Under British discrimination they worked as professionals and clerks up and down the West African coast from Fernando Po and Cameroon to Senegambia. Those days are returning. Only this time they are not appreciated; but resented by their own tribalist 'compatriots'. Their usefulness to the regime is now over. Not only must senior Creoles yield to 'up country' new boys in almost all areas of government service; Creole children can no longer win their traditional disproportionate number of scholarships. Within Sierra Leone, standards go down. The Creoles will still skimp and manoeuvre to send their children to the old prestigious schools of Freetown: the Prince of Wales, Government Grammar School, Albert Academy, Mary Walsh and the Methodist Girls' School. They get their children straight into Oxbridge and other prestige universities in England and America, even if they can no longer expect the places that are their objective due at Fourah Bay.

In the bush, up country, educational provision outside a few provincial towns can be abysmal. I have myself visited all-age primary schools with one classroom, one teacher, about 20 books between more than 80 children for all subjects. Teachers are 60% untrained. School supplies are mediated through Lebanese agents. The politicians and the Lebanese want their cuts. Real peasant and slum, children remain unsupplied with books and teachers. After all, who cares? The Aid organisations are self-regarding bureaucracies who believe merely in going through the motions. The Creole professionals, inspection and education officers, have been totally defused. The commercial 'educational' suppliers and publishers (from overseas), the out-of-touch authors of irrelevant condescending material, don't care. As long as the money comes in, the books and materials can lie undistributed in warehouses on the harbour wharf feeding only rodents. The Sierra Leonean taxpayer is not sophisticated or militant or informed enough to do anything about it. However, I have noticed some sparks of rather unholy glee at rumours that Jerry Rawlings' regime in Ghana has dealt with parasites on Ghana's sick economy. (Millions of pounds of cocoa profits that never saw a penny's way back to Ghana, etc.) Also, the looting of Lebanese stores and property in the recent riots in Liberia are approved. It is said that senior members of the Sierra Leone government

are finding their Lebanese connections, arrogant, ubiquitous, conspicuous wheeler-dealers, a sudden embarrassment.

It is all on a minute scale. Another petty tropical mess. It is only that the people are so attractive and gentle and hospitable, so trusting and often so talented. I am a child in their beautiful, witty language and providence has exposed me to their tiny, pretty country. So it is eccentric to know where Sierra Leone is or to be concerned. It would be pleasant to encourage informed interest. As the Creole proverb puts it: That cow wey no get tail, na God go drive he fly. (If a cow has no tail, only God will see the flies off.) And God's ways are mysterious and unflappable. Sometimes I feel human interest may help to supply an extra, temporary, tail to the poor old Creole/Sierra Leonean cow. There is a small, but agreeable, and not revoltingly inhuman or exploitable tourist trade with several good hotels and restaurants in the Freetown area. It is worth a look and a taste. Some of us like it enough to work there and to work at it.

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THE HOMOSEXUAL DEBATE

by Cecil Northcott

THE Church of England has initiated a nationwide debate on homosexual relationships in a report published by the Church Information Office (Great Smith Street, S.W.1. £3) entitled *Homosexual Relationships: a Contribution to Discussion.* This report is the result of a working party's five years of hard work in an attempt to hammer out a fresh understanding of the homosexual situation in the modern world, and of the relationships between those men and women who are aware that sexual love may exist between man and man, and woman and woman, as well as between men and women. The working party is unanimous in its report but not so the Board of Social Responsibility, to which it reports. The Board, like any other group of ordinary citizens, is divided on the complicated issues aroused by homosexuality and warns against the hope of a clear, simple and unanimous statement from the church, or indeed from any organised body. The church hopes that by February 1981 it may have something to say on the problem which may be pastorally helpful to everyone concerned—both church and non-church.

Tradition, for the church, condemns the 'homo' and homosexuality although there is very little in the Scriptures to provide guidance. The story of the men of Sodom is often quoted as an instance of the wickedness contained in homosexuality. But the story of Sodom, the report suggests, is not history but legend (Genesis 19) and 'it cannot be taken, as so commonly in the past, to record an instance of divine action, intended expressly to condemn and punish homosexual behaviour. It is a reflection, rather than a cause of existing attitudes and beliefs, the nature and origin of which must be sought elsewhere.'

The other Biblical references are in the Book of Leviticus (18.22 and 20.13) but here, it is important to note, the regulations were made to order the life and work of an actual community. They were not commands for the obedience of universal application but were meant for the guidance of the small family groups of the ancient Israelites. Homosexuality was a threat to the social order and the death penalty was prescribed in order to root out the 'evil thing'. The 'homos' of the day were chiefly among the Canaanites and risk of contamination with them was to be avoided at all costs by the exclusive 'separateness and distinctiveness of the people of God'.

The report says that in the New Testament the key passage is Romans 1.18-32. Here St. Paul is said to be primarily concerned with the sinful state of the world outside the church, in sharp distinction from the people of God as in the Old Testament, whose concern he had inherited. Homosexual behaviour is seen as part of what it means to be a 'heathen'. For many people the Biblical judgment on homosexuality will settle the debate and give them confidence that the Biblical condemnation is sufficient even

for the modern world with all its relative information about the emotional, spiritual and physical state of the human race.

'It is at least possible', the report suggests, 'to ask whether, granted our greater knowledge (as compared with the New Testament), of the homosexual and his condition, homosexual relationships might not in some cases be as genuine expression of love as other human relationships.' The example of contraception is quoted as indicating the change and development of Christian attitudes towards ideas that were once condemned by the church and are now accepted by the Christian conscience. The report declares also that it cannot accept the claim of many homosexuals that their relationships are as natural and valid as heterosexual ones. But the working party does think that there is an obligation to consider how a homosexual can bear witness to the sacramental mirroring of divine love which the church sees in marriage, and continues:

> It is of the first importance that he should not condemn himself, or be condemned by others, because of his homosexual orientation, and this means that he should be enabled to recognise it and encouraged to believe in the possibility of coming to terms with it and putting it to good use . . . we do not think it possible to deny that there are circumstances in which individuals may justifiably choose to enter into a homosexual relationship with the hope of enjoying a companionship and physical expression of sexual love similar to that which is to be found in marriage.

But the report is clear in its declaration 'that to accept homosexual erotic love as an authentic development of the Christian tradition would involve the repudiation of too much that is rightly characteristic of Christian teaching about sex . . . on the other hand to declare that homosexuals may not in any circumstances give physical expression to their erotic love is to circumscribe unduly the area of responsible choice and to lay on individuals a burden too heavy for some to bear.' The working party is careful to add that it cannot accept the view that homosexuals are entitled to full equality in social, educational and theological terms. But there is a case for reform of the law in many respects. The group thinks that the age of consent for homosexuals should be lowered from 21 to 18, believing that this is high enough to protect the 'normal late developer' and the young men between 18 and 21 who are at risk.

The traditional condemnation of the homo and his homosexuality has resulted in a submergence of the many problems and solutions which arise whenever a homosexual situation is dealt with in a calm and rational manner.

The reports says:

> The difficulty is that there is no objective test for sexual orientation, it is a subjective view of oneself. The position is complicated by some people's orientation lying between the exclusively homosexual and the exclusively heterosexual. Homosexuality also depends partly on the social setting in which a person was placed.

It also dismisses the often used argument that the homo condition is an illness that can be cured, if the homo so wishes, by the right psychiatric and physical treatment. Some homos are responsive to treatment and welcome it. But perhaps the majority of homos do not wish to change and

only ask for help and recognition? 'It is very undesirable to put pressure on homosexual people to try to solve their problems simply by marrying them, as this false solution may bring misery to the spouse and children.'

The report expresses concern over the mutual distrust and lack of communication between the police and organised groups of the Gay Movement which meet regularly to give their members help and advice. Many homosexuals act oddly because they cannot 'conform to the heterosexual norm' even if they wished to do so. The report pleads for a greater understanding of the homosexual condition. 'There is much we do not yet know or understand. Indeed, perhaps the one thing of which we can be sure is that those who claim to know the whole truth about homosexuality are misleading us.'

The debate raises a number of problems for those who accept the Christian faith and, in particular, for bishops who may be called upon to ordain a practising homosexual. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Donald Coggan, has stated that in his view it would be wrong for a bishop to ordain a homosexual openly knowing that he was a homosexual. But the Bishop of Gloucester, Dr. John Yates, who was Chairman of the working party which produced the report, admitted to a *Church Times* reporter that the working party had provided only one Christian view of homosexuality.

> Our report is not claiming to be the only view Christians may take. Many sincere Christians will have a quite different view, more conservative or more radical. Our task was to define the limits within which it is reputable for Christians to take a view. For example, we did not consider the position that maintains that homosexual marriage is in every way as good as and equal to heterosexual marriage to be a Christian view.

This issue of Christian marriage—what it is and what it is for—may well be the big one on which everything else centres in the debate on homosexuality. For we are all, in a sense, homosexuals. We wrestle with our particular aspect of the problem aided by all kinds of assistance within the bounds of Christian marriage. The 'homo' is a lonely person unsupported by a 'hetero' marriage and therefore likely to create a character of oddity, making his life beyond the bounds of normality.

The report is a good one, for it opens up many questions of human civilisation far beyond the customary arguments that arise when the usual 'homo' debate begins. It strikes at the heart of relationships and is a prime example of the Church of England's ability to investigate, report and provide ample fodder for argument. It should prove to be a formative document of major influence in the life of Christendom.

REFLECTIONS FROM PARIS — 1933 to 1979

by Frank Littlewood, O.B.E.

IN 1933, amongst all the important things that were happening in Paris at that time, there were two, the echoes of which came together in my mind on a visit there recently. One of these events had a significance in the years to follow; the other had none except to my wife and myself for we were there on our honeymoon.

The event of significance was the founding of the Anglo-Britannique Association, though not seen as such at the time, and even now perhaps not recognised in the way it should be—at any rate on this side of the Channel. The Association held its *Assemblée Générale Annuelle* in Paris last year at the end of March, and a representative group based on Cheltenham. My wife and I with other members from this country were able to attend.

The association has as its battle-cry 'Entente Cordiale Internationale', and amongst its list of aims are —

> To strengthen the bonds of friendship between France and Great Britain, bonds made in battle during 1914-18 and 1939-45 in the Services and the Resistance movement.

There are various other ancillary objects mostly concerned with collaboration between the two countries in the arts and sciences, the organisation of friendly exchanges, and also the creation of scholarships with opportunities for young people to improve their knowledge of the other's language.

But to judge from what was said and much that was quietly left unsaid at the reunion, it was the keeping alive of the memory and traditions of those 'unknown soldiers without uniform who fought in a hard and perilous struggle without thought of their own safety' that was the real purpose of this coming together of some 400-500 men and women. So much of the work of the Resistance movement, with the dangers attached to it, was without recognition by any Government body and, so often for reasons inherent in the work itself, could never be so recognised. Perhaps this was why the Association set up their own awards to those who 'served the cause of the Allies during the wars'. A civil award has also been instituted for those who have shown distinction, since the liberation, in work for the friendship and better understanding between the Nations. On appropriate occasions the emblems representing these awards, the medals and the sashes are worn and recognised by the membership.

Such a time was the evening ceremony of re-kindling the flame at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the Arc de Triomphe which with other members of our group we attended, and as we looked round and saw those who had really undertaken 'war service' so proudly wearing their medals, we could not help feeling inspired by the spirit and devotion that shone from their aging faces.

The Association, in which the French members vastly predominate, was actually founded at Vichy by Colonel Hilleret in 1933—in contrast,

that was the year when on this side of the Channel sixty-six nations sent teams of representatives of the World Economic Conference in London (opened by King George V himself) hoping to find a means of ending world trade depression. One recalls that nothing whatever was accomplished. Not long afterwards, one of Britain's leading delegates, Anthony Eden, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, came over to Paris, emerging as 'a statesman of the future' according to a diplomatic journalist friend of mine who had to cancel his dinner invitation to us to wait upon this young looking Minister, who at that time seemed only notable for the black trilby hat he wore with such style and to which he gave his name.

As events unfolded themselves in Germany, Colonel Hilleret was joined by a local Justice of the Peace, M. Remy Guedaudelle. These two kept the new organisation growing but still secret until 1937. One of the branches was formed at St. Denis. It was here in 1940 at the Hotel de Ville that several demonstrations were held in expression of sympathy with comrades in Czechoslovakia. Vichy at once dissociated themselves from the aims of the Association which promptly went underground upon the occupation in 1940.

According to the outline history given me, convinced that France was not beaten, the section at St. Denis, whose President was M. Verot, began to plan for the Resistance movement. M. Verot became the chief of an organisation under the name of 'Lord Denys'. He remained leader for four years. More than 200 British Servicemen were saved; important documents and information were passed to the Allies; French fugitives were hidden; and young men who had avoided deportation to Germany were enabled to join General de Gaulle.

The organisation of 'Lord Denys' worked with the organisation of 'Lord Jim', the organisation of Major Lambrecht of Brussels and Captain Charles of the Intelligence Service and the F.F.I. 'Lord Jim' and Captain Charles were shot, and Major Lambrecht assassinated by the Gestapo.

After the liberation, convinced more than ever that a good understanding between France and Great Britain was essential, M. Verot set to work to form a permanent liaison. The St. Denis Branch started up again and in 1945 M. Verot and M. Becherot launched an appeal to their comrades in other branches at Reims, Arras, and other towns, and in Paris. The response was heart-warming; yet there were many difficulties.

It seems a pity there are not more branches in Britain. Is this because the country was never occupied? Perhaps the strength of the Association lies in those who had to depend silently on each other's loyalty during the occupation and the traditions that grew out of mutual dependence? But the little group from Britain felt it was more than a privilege to be present and take a small part in the celebrations; and that we should each try and do something towards promoting the interests of the Association and the spirit of co-operation that lies behind it, especially now we are close together in the European Economic Community.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Sophie's Choice. William Styron. Cape, £5.95. *Familiar Strangers.* Bryan Forbes. Hodder & Stoughton, £5.95. *The Devil's Alternative.* Frederick Forsyth. Hutchinson, £5 95. *A Coat of Varnish.* C. P. Snow. Macmillan, £5.95. *The Revenger's Comedy.* Derwent May. Chatto & Windus, £5.95. *London Irish.* John Broderick. Barrie Jenkins, £5.95.

The successful American author, William Styron, has chosen a highly emotive and topical theme for his new novel. *Sophie's Choice* is an attempt to examine not only the terror and degradation of the Nazi concentration camps but also the subsequent effect of their imprisonment on those fortunate enough to survive. The period is 1947. The narrator, Stingo, is an aspiring writer who has rented a room in a less than salubrious district of New York to complete his *magnum opus*. Among the heterogeneous crowd of fellow lodgers he meets a young Polish woman, Sophie Zawistowska, and it is only when she reveals the tattooed number on her forearm that he becomes aware of her recent experience.

In and out of Sophie's bed-sitter is her lover, Nathan, a loud-mouthed extrovert whose conversational excesses indicate considerable mental instability. Stingo is soon accepted as their boon companion. The overt sexuality displayed by Nathan and Sophie proves a shattering experience for Stingo, who has reluctantly retained his virginity. He conceives a compensatory passion for Sophie, but it is only after Nathan's defection that he is permitted some degree of intimacy. It is during this period of their abortive love affair that Stingo receives Sophie's confidences regarding those terrible years. As a Pole, Sophie had special problems under the Nazi occupation although, through a series of manoeuvres, she received preferential treatment while working as a secretary for the camp Commandant of Auschwitz-Birkinau. Unfortunately, she failed to benefit from the privilege and ultimately was faced with a terrible 'choice'—which of her two children should be exterminated in the gas chamber on the condition that the other was spared.

The assumption is that she suffered an unwarrantable burden of guilt which remained with her in the post-war years, particularly as she had no means of knowing that the undertaking had been honoured. Physically and emotionally crippled, she has little to offer the ingenuous Stingo—or indeed anybody else. Her eventual return to the now chronically unstable Nathan comes as no surprise: neither does the gruesome suicide pact between them, which is a pity, for it leaves the last section of the novel disappointingly predictable.

Packed as it is with interesting research and relevant detail, the purpose of *Sophie's Choice* would seem to be to present new data on the notorious Auschwitz-Birkinau Camp. Unfortunately, this fails to materialise. Distilled at secondhand through artificially long conversations between Sophie and Stingo, the sinister reminiscences come over luke-warm. Perhaps such horrors require telling at secondhand, even if the well-tried narrative device robs these gruesome circumstances of their impact? Or perhaps, in the final reckoning,

William Styron has little to reveal that is new about the Nazi atrocities? Even so, this long, meticulously planned novel covering so many aspects of politics, creative art and personal relationships, more than repays a second reading.

A different kind of 'choice' confronts the chief character of Bryan Forbes's new novel. In *Familiar Strangers* the dilemma is whether or not to become a Soviet spy. The novel opens with Tony Stern, a successful though somewhat frustrated thriller writer, arriving at the depressing lodgings of his deceased cousin, Theo Gittings, also a writer, although more prestigious. Once the two men had been as close as brothers, yet in latter years had drifted apart and an examination of Theo's private papers reveals the reason. Theo was in fact a Russian agent, recruited at Cambridge in the Thirties along with those others whose names are now universially known. Where Theo differed from all but one of them was in his decision to remain in England despite the instructions of his Russian masters to flee to Moscow. The ultimate price paid for his obduracy was a dismal fading into obscurity.

Through Tony's oblique memories of the Cambridge days and extensive quotes from Theo's fictitious journals, the apprenticeship of a traitor is convincingly developed. Tony's own personal life, where it obtrudes to halt the main direction of the narrative, is less satisfactory. With the exception of the warm-hearted though canny waitress, Judy, his wives and mistresses remain shadowy.

The publication of *Familiar Strangers* coincided with an avalanche of new information about the as yet undefined group of U.S.S.R. converts which included Burgess, Maclean and Philby. As fiction it has the advantage of being able to speculate on some of the conundrums not yet solved by research and documentation. Many of the answers are to be found in the blackmail of known homosexuals—at a time when the possibility of a prison sentence and social disgrace constituted a very real threat—and family maladjustments. It could be argued that the taint of Theo's defection and perverted sex life contaminated all who came close to him and that Tony's doomed love life was just one more instance of this unseen, destructive force. So it seems, at any rate when, years later, Judy suddenly appears in the shop where Tony is signing copies of his new book. Nothing materialises from the chance encounter and Tony's arid detachment provides a sombre ending to a particularly engrossing novel.

Frederick Forsyth could have been forgiven for his decision not to tempt providence by writing a fourth novel after the phenomenal success of *The Day of the Jackal, The Dogs of War* and *The Odessa File*. Yet, almost inevitably, he has yielded to pressure and in *The Devil's Alternative* develops some later experiences in the field of international espionage and the general hazards of technological warfare on a global scale. By projecting the action into the year 1982 he has given himself elbow-room to speculate on a new type of disaster—the hijacking of a giant oil tanker. Ironically this terrifying project springs from the determination of a handful of Ukrainian freedom-fighters to obtain autonomy for their homeland. Also with a finger in the explosive pie are agents, counter agents and an appealing heroine whose final unmasking is somewhat unfairly sprung upon the attentive reader. Frederick Forsyth is not afraid to use death and terror where need be—or to introduce real-life characters such as the United Kingdom Prime Minister and the President of the United States. One of his main feats is to draw the entire world into his futuristic melodrama so that our own small foothold has no more significance than, as D. H. Lawrence once put it, a grey, fog-bound island bobbing about in a choppy sea.

Horror of a more enlightened kind dominates C. P. Snow's new novel, *A Coat of Varnish*—a 'thriller' which, apart from the generous sprinkling of clues, bears little relation to the average 'whodunnit'. The scene of a brutal murder is Belgravia which, by its pleasantly civilised aspect, underlines the savagery of the apparently meaningless crime. An elderly resident, Lady Ashbrook, has been informed that she is not, after all, about to die of cancer, yet, at the moment of her reprieve, she is strangled and battered to death;—an uncomfortable reminder that even in an eminently respectable society violence lurks not very far below the surface. From that point, some eighty pages after the quietly domestic opening, the hunt for the killer is on. Neighbours, relatives and hangers-on are interrogated by considerate, intelligent police officers who keep a sophisticated eye on personal confrontations and possible avarice in anticipation of Lady Ashbrook's will. All details, some of them grisly, which relate to the investigation of an unlawful killing are remorselessly explored. Alas, one dead-end only leads to another and it seems that the police are faced with a total *impasse*. Yet even in this vanishing world of fading affluence the identity of the killer cannot be permanently concealed. The uncovering of the chief suspect is wholly satisfying to the reader, if not to the chief detective who, for lack of hard evidence, is unable to bring a charge.

Rather unexpectedly, violence also has a part to play in Derwent May's new novel, *The Revenger's Comedy*. The setting is a country mansion in Essex; the starting point a gathering of some ill-assorted guests for a house-party hosted by the egregious William Piratus. Adroitly, Derwent May overcomes the problems of making this very limited 'closed society' interesting. The commentator is John Berry, a failed writer who though ingenuous is not unintelligent. He has been lent a cottage in the environs of the main house and so receives from Piratus an invitation to join in. On close inspection, the visitors prove to be an unsavoury crew—writers, journalists and broadcasters so lacking in appeal that their popularity remains a mystery. Some of the women thrust their sexuality at the not unresponsive John; the men in their variable moods are flattering or aggressive in turn. Only the apparently innocent Jill seems likely to engage John's serious attention: yet even that hope fades into disillusionment. At last, the hours of internecine warfare draw to a close, culminating in a plot by Piratus to kill off the visitors by setting the house on fire. John is given the opportunity to escape, but is drawn back by his love for Jill. In the event, all are saved with the exception of Piratus, who perishes in the nearby estuary: the changing moods and aspects of which have been so evocatively described throughout this skilfully animated novel.

Finally, a novel which fails in some respects to live up to its announced intentions, yet succeeds superbly in other ways—*London Irish*. The author, John Broderick, is an Irishman who sees his country in perspective and has conceived the original idea of devoting a novel to fellow-expatriates in London. This colony, possibly larger than is generally realised, clings closely to its religious and domestic taboos and shows little sign of becoming more than superficially integrated. However, despite frequent references to 'fathers' and Irish style funerals, this aspect is not really developed and what matters is the impact of the characters on each other in interesting and unusual circumstances.

Two Irish cousins, Rosamund and Michael, meet in a Dublin cafe where they learn through a casual comment that their wealthy, London-based uncle, Andrew Pollard, is about to marry a young girl. As heirs apparent, Rosamund

and Michael at once set off for England and encounter Nancy, the chosen successor to their deceased aunt. It sounds a conventional enough situation but at this point the novel enters a more complex sphere. Michael and Rosamund are in love; should have married years ago but will never do so now: Andrew Pollard is excited by the revival of his sexuality, yet beset by fears of possible impotence. As for Nancy herself, she suffers from a psychological revulsion for the sex act and prefers titillation by an acknowledged homo-sexual. It seems that there is to be no clear cut ending to this dark comedy of suppressed passion and avarice, yet John Broderick cunningly devises one. The ubiquitous Mrs. Reid, little more than a tenant caretaker in one of Andrew Pollard's properties, knows how to play upon her employer's moral and religious scruples. Ultimately, it is she who wins the prize of matrimony and financial security, leaving Rosamund out in the cold and Michael as Nancy's first effective lover. It is a pity that this important development is revealed only in a hastily cobbled-together finale which concludes with Michael's death in a car accident. Yet such things do happen and it is no fault of the novelist if this kind of coincidence always seems less convincing in fiction than in real life.

Also Received

Wild Tales. Nikolai Haitov. Translated and introduced by Michael Holman. Peter Owen. £6.25.

Inevitably, works of fiction by South European writers seem to lose much in the process of translation. The Bulgarian novelist and short story writer, Nikolai Haitov, is no exception. Hailed as a success within his own country, there is no problem here of an exile seeking to gain recognition in the West. All sixteen stories, many set in the seldom explored Rhodope Mountains, show a lively appreciation of human foibles and problems. Yet it must be acknowledged that in the aggregate they come over as rather stilted and monotonous.

Catastrophe Practice. Nicholas Mosley, Secker and Warburg. £5.90.

This blend of 'plays for not acting' and a short novel (90 pages) is part of a very ambitious analysis of the state of the world in general but more importantly on the manner in which the individual deals with crisis or 'catastrophe' within the mind, not necessarily prompted by outside events. An ambitious theme—yet in the execution the working out of the theory is far from clear. Such a degree of obscurity, though impressive at a first glance, succeeds only in masking the author's intentions. Of the contents, which includes prefaces and quotations, the novella is most likely to prove rewarding.

A Book of Trances. Guneli Gun. Julian Freedman. £4.50.

Set in Turkey by a Turkish-born writer who describes her work as 'fictions' rather than novels, these simply expressed, loosely associated episodes resemble fairy stories, as the sub-title, 'A novel of Magic Recitals', seems to confirm. Yet despite a rather annoyingly elusive quality, the work as a whole has undeniable charm and individuality.

The Felling of Thawle. Geraldine Halls. Constable. £5.95.

There is much to recommend this light-hearted story of the fortunes and misfortunes of an ancient, once wealthy and now effete family. Lord Guy, the sole survivor of the de Boissys, sets out to defraud the state of the full sum due in death duties by an ingenious act of vandalism and general defacement of old masters and priceless ornaments. The narrative device of telling his story and those who inhabit his orbit through brief, titled chapters is unusual in these days although quite effective. Yet it must be admitted that the novel loses pace badly in the long sections devoted to antiques and art sales.

The Vicar of Christ. Walter F. Murphy. Cassell. £6.50.

This enormously long novel (630 pages) about Declan Walsh, the first American to be enthroned as Pope, is well worthwhile for its careful unfolding of a remarkable man's career and the portrait it provides of his unpredictable character. Although it is of course the purist fiction, *The Vicar of Christ* reads like a documentary and is cleverly stage-managed to give the illusion of truth.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

POLITICS AND INDUSTRY

Politics in Industrial Society. Keith Middlemas. Andre Deutsch. £14.95.

This is an important but unsatisfactory book, because it attempts too much and proves too little. Ostensibly it is about *power* relationships. In one sense it is an original and useful source book for a study of industrial relations over the last seventy years: in another sense it is an attempt to prove that the parliamentary system played a secondary role or (as the quotation from a Ministry of Labour official puts it on the opening page) 'became merely a body for registering decisions arrived at outside itself'. This is one of the many half-truths pronounced by the author, partly because he reads too much into Cabinet Minutes and trusts too much Tom Jones's *Whitehall Diary*. True he edited the Diary and wrote a massive and brilliant biography of Baldwin, both of which I reviewed some years ago in this Journal.

At times I think Keith Middlemas might well write the history of the National Government 1931-1940; no such history yet exists. He has amassed most if not all the material for such an enterprise But it is a mistake to write a detailed political-industrial history of the last seventy years only to prove that a triangular economy—government, employers and trade unions—presents us with a continuing and complicated dilemma. It is no doubt interesting to trace the features and history of this triangular economy, its ups and downs and to note how we have grown accustomed to its face. Mr. Middlemas uses the word *corporate* several times and then warns us not to confuse it with the Fascist State of Mussolini or Portugal. He flirts with various Marxist publicists but registers no strong opinion against, for example, the declared statements of Mr. Moss Evans of the T.G.W.U., when monitoring the policy and votes of his twenty *sponsored* Members of Parliament.

I believe, with Lord Hailsham and Lord Scarman and many others, that our representative system of government faces a constitutional crisis and that we await suitable measures to diffuse that crisis. Mr. Middlemas entitles his concluding chapter *A Crisis of the State*? and merely suggests that democracy may have to take some new forms. He does not do justice to his own detailed and often fascinating historical account of industrial-political relations under Lloyd George, Baldwin and Attlee; of the consensus period started by Butskellism and ending with Mrs. Thatcher; of the changing role of the T.U.C. under Citrine, Deakin, Woodcock, Feather and Len Murray. He does not fully develop another interesting theme, namely the management of public opinion, using the educative and coercive power of the State. He mentions briefly the names of various voluntary educative bodies, but pays little attention to their considerable research and influence. I mention only one: P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning), because I was a co-founder in 1931 and know how it affected industrial practice and 'official' thinking.



In spite of these criticisms I recommend this book to serious students of British politics and industrial relations because Mr. Middlemas has laboured long in wide fields of research and there are nuggets of gold to be discovered in his findings and also valuable ideas which need closer examination. Anyone who has lived through the General Strike of 1926 and the world crisis of 1931; anyone who remembers the concessions made in two world wars to the unions to increase production and achieve a consensus; anyone who has witnessed in recent years the effect of the Donovan Report on the legislation of the Wilson-Heath-Wilson-Callaghan governments would do well to read the fifteen chapters of this book, coupled with Bullock's life of Ernest Bevin.

Nobody has begun to re-write Bagehot, certainly not Crossman and alas not Middlemas, because a queer Tory-Marxist flavour colours his analysis. For example, writing of 1968 he says 'Once again a Labour Cabinet betrayed the movement for "national" reasons; worse it was downgrading the role of the T.U.C. within the State.' It is true as Scanlon said in 1969: 'Conventional collective bargaining techniques are not appropriate for dealing with technological changes, particularly when the time in regard to planning has been reduced from decades to months.' In a word, the T.U.C. found it necessary to invade areas previously they had recognized as the sphere of government. And more and more the C.B.I. has followed suit and now has its own important Annual Conference. But can either of these pillars of the triangular economy vouch for the branches or shop-stewards—what might be called the infra-structure? How long can government itself vouch for its own back-benchers? Lloyd George and Churchill had visions of an Industrial or Economic Parliament. Recent governments have developed the NEDC (National Economic Development Committee) but there is little agreement on any future institution. The most that can be said is that all sides ask for a constructive dialogue. Perhaps it is time that the British pragmatic approach was given a more precise framework; some of our competitors seem to have profited by such a framework.

KENNETH LINDSAY

CLEMMIE AND WINSTON

Clementine Churchill. Mary Soames. Cassell. £7.95.

Until now, 'Clemmie' has been seen—by her choice as well as by the role Sir Winston played—as standing in the shadows of her husband. Her part, as she saw it, was always to be her husband's prop and stay, and her children came a long way behind. 'It took me all my time and strength to keep up with him', she told Mary later, 'I never had anything left over'. Moreover, as the children grew up, her own natural restraint perhaps stood as a barrier between them and herself; Winston, ever the wanderer and ever tilting at windmills of his own, indulged and spoilt them. So they grew up opinionated, ambitious and rumbustious, to have—Mary apart—stormy and, largely, unhappy lives.

For Clemmie, Winston came first. And he bestrides the book like a colossus. What emerges, however, is a warm and tender colossus, ever scribbling notes to Clemmie, and it is on these that this fascinating study is based. Clemmie, however, was a personality in her own right: beautiful, Puritan, realistic, much the better manager, by temperament a radical Liberal whereas he was a romantic Tory, but capable of even more loves and hates than Winston. She could, in his words, drop on people 'like a jaguar out of a tree'.

She never really approved of the three terrible Bs—Bracken, Birkenhead (F. E. Smith) and Beaverbrook—and she did not hide her dislikes. She could, in a French Winston could not match, rebuke De Gaulle, and earn from that

stern unbending patriot a gracious apology. And she could, in one exasperated moment, hurl at Winston a plate of spinach; happily she was no marksman. In all their trials and triumphs, they were close and devoted and stayed so through 57 stormy years. This is a warm and moving story.

There are many points raised here that are fresh and vivid: the Scottish roots (Hozier is from the same root as MacLehose); the childhood in rented lodgings, with parents separated, and both of them erratic; even in married life, the endless removals from house to house; her own distaste for Chartwell; and her own repeated capacity for accidents and injuries.

Some of the other conclusions are perhaps less intended by the author. The Churchills were in the years before 1930 relatively poor, and Winston lived primarily by his pen. Socially, they lived well. He spent a fortune on Chartwell, which cost him originally £5,000. Between January and September 1944, in perhaps, the eight most crucial months of the war, they gave 75 luncheon parties and 19 dinner parties. Only on four occasions in that period did Clemmie sadly record 'Dinner alone with Winston'. But poverty is very relative. Worried though she was over money, this was a world of 'Upstairs, Downstairs'. At Chartwell, Winston required 9 indoor servants, two secretaries and at least six outdoor servants.

To read this book is to see the great man—perhaps the greatest commoner in English history—from an unusual and from a privileged angle. He was in fact very uncommon and in style, if not in resources, a son of Blenheim. After the social revolution of our times, men and women like these are not likely to appear again. This is an affectionate portrait, but it is also both frank and revealing, not only of the two central *dramatis personae* but of a world that has gone.

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE UNITY OF MIND AND NATURE

Mind and Nature. A Necessary Unity. Gregory Bateson. Wildwood House London. £7.50.

This book is written by one of the world's great polymaths. Professor Bateson has made contributions to a number of fields including anthropology, psychiatry and particularly genetics *Mind and Nature* is an alembication of the totality of his experience, and it must rank as a major seminal contribution to the decade of the 1970's.

The purpose of the book is well delineated in the Introduction. It is to attempt to determine how concepts and information fit together, how logic—the classical method of relating chains of ideas to the outside world—fares in the complex world of 1979, how it is essential for humanity to 'think Nature's way' if we are to be in tune with the ecological patterns which connect all creatures in our finite and increasingly frail planet. The author re-examines biological evolution in the light of advances in cybernetics. In a revolutionary approach he dubs evolution basically a mental process. Great possibilities exist for the human mind to grapple with the *global* problematique. But we lack the available insights to do so; and even if we had such insights our heads would still remain firmly in the sand. Above all we must discard our penchant to look at things quantitatively; pattern and quality must dominate our cerebral activity. Echoing E. F. Schumacher the author stresses the beauty of smallness and the complexities which inevitably follow the lodestar of growth.

There is a particularly interesting chapter on the nature and criteria of mental processes. The mind is seen as an aggregate of interacting parts and

components triggered by differences and related to the general phenomenon of entropy. Both genetic change and learning are included in the category of stochastic processes, partially random, sometimes interacting, sometimes isolated one from another. The present status of Darwinian theory and of Lamarckism is reviewed and the book ends with some reflections on the limitations of the human imagination.

In no way can Bateson's book be described as easy reading Specialist knowledge in several areas is required; sometimes the prose is circuitous and the precise meaning of the passage does not emerge. Nevertheless as a work of high scholasticism and erudition *Mind and Nature* will undoubtedly carve for itself a niche in the scientific literature of the late 20th Century.

JOHN A. LORAINE

MOLECULAR BIOLOGY

The Eighth Day of Creation. The Makers of the Revolution in Biology. Horace Freeland Judson. Jonathan Cape. £7.95.

This book is centred on the science of molecular biology The first section has as its epicentre deoxyribonucleic acid, genetic material sometimes referred to as 'the secret of life ' The second concerns itself with the feasibility of breaking the genetic code while in the final section the general structure and function of proteins are reviewed.

The text is replete with biographical details regarding the scientific personalities involved in these notable discoveries. It is relatively easy to discern the author's favourites. He obviously has a great respect amounting to veneration for Max Perutz, Nobel Prize winner in Chemistry in 1962. Perutz is pictured as the conciliator, the man capable of keeping together a disparate and sometimes highly temperamental team, yet at the same time retaining a fixity of purpose in his chosen field dealing with the chemical nature of the blood pigment haemoglobin Francis Crick is admired for his towering intellectualism, his originality and flair, the archetypal 'ideas man' of scientific folklore. That his nature was sometimes explosive there is no doubt and his reactions to the publication of *The Double Helix* in 1968 by his co-worker and joint Nobel Prize winner James Watson (which he dubbed an 'infuriating invasion of privacy, vulgar, inaccurate and a gross violation of friendship')—tell their own story.

Rosalind Franklin—the formidable 'Rosie' of Watson's imagination—is portrayed sympathetically as a dedicated, shy and somewhat retiring scientist living in an era in which the role of women in scientific work had not yet been adequately formed, coming very near to a discovery of great originality and dying tragically of cancer before the age of 40. But of all the characters, by far the most intriguing to Judson was Jacques Monod. Certainly the life of this researcher had been very varied. He joined the Communist Party in 1940, became very active in the French Resistance during the Second World War and was no supporter of Charles de Gaulle and his entourage. However, he soon became disillusioned with politics and in the late Forties returned to his laboratory where molecular biology became his consuming interest. Monod's Nobel Prize was awarded in 1965 for his distinguished and classical work on enzyme synthesis.

The book provides much information about the life of the international scientist—the interminable travel, the meeting of the same minds at far flung points of the Universe, the intensely competitive nature of the whole enterprise

when the most minor of original discoveries is treated as a major triumph. I found the description of the Fifth Congress of Biochemistry in Moscow in 1961 interesting and entertaining. About 6,000 people attended and molecular biology was well to the fore in the programme. But Lysenko, favourite of Stalin, and noted for his eccentric and bizarre views on genetics was enjoying his 'second time around' under Nikita Kruschchev's hegemony. As a result political factors played a major role in the Congress and Western scientists, including Perutz and Crick, had perforce to trend warily.

There is unlikely to be a more detailed and meticulous description of the trends and personalities of molecular biology than that produced by Judson. However, the book, alas, will remain mainly the purlieu of the specialist reader. The text is very long and sometimes repetitious; the scientific data presented presuppose a knowledge of protein biochemistry and allied subjects. But for those fascinated with the progress of a burgeoning scientific discipline of the late 20th Century *The Eighth Day of Creation* should not be omitted from the reading list.

JOHN A. LORAINE

THE PHENOMENON OF POLTERGEISTS

Poltergeists. Alan Gauld and A. D. Cornell. Routledge & Kegan Paul. £9.95.

These noisy spirits—poltergeists—have been reported from the first century AD, and some commentators have so designated Livy's 'showers of stones', which were among the adverse omens of the Second Punic War (218 BC to 201 BC), but may have been fragmented meteorites. Written accounts of these troublesome happenings, these raps and levitations and aports, make diverting reading, and Messrs. Gauld and Cornell have assembled a veritable Book of the Poltergeist, which is the most definitive in terms of amplitude of case studies and discussion of theories that our present knowledge permits. It may be dipped into, like a latter-day *Anatomy of Melancholy,* for anecdotal pleasure irrespective of a serious scrutiny of the matter at issue.

Dr. Gauld is Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Nottingham, and Mr. Cornell is a member of the council of the Society for Psychical Research: thus, their views merit the most respectful attention. It must be admitted that the position from which they survey the peaks of their problem is no mere bivouac: after a strenuous battle with all the 'rational' explanations of the phenomena, viz: trickery, natural causes such as underground water, or water locks in the loft, and errors of observation and memory, their conclusion is that:

> to assume without supporting evidence, and despite numerous considerations (discussed in their text) to the contrary, that ('rational' explanations) *do* lie behind (the phenomena) is to insulate one's beliefs in this sphere from all possibility of modification from the cold contact of chastening facts. It is to adopt the paranoid stance of the flat-earther or the religious fanatic, who can 'explain away' all the awkward facts which threaten his system of delusions. At its worst, such a stance borders on insanity; at best it constitutes an unhealthy and unprofitable turning away from the realities of the world.

Brave words, indeed; some would say extreme. What is perfectly apparent is that Messrs. Gauld and Cornell embarked upon their task, and considered it a task of substance (as it surely is, and an invaluable contribution to the field of psychical research) from a previous state of conviction, based upon years of research.

It is a natural reaction to feel some disappointment that the sample cases investigated by the authors themselves are so frail in comparison with the

rich cases detailed in most contemporary writings, which form the main material. Under their searching eyes, happenings falter and grow fuzzy at the edges: a beleaguered boy is seen, from an upper vantage point, to be himself stamping on the floor; the researcher suspends the activities of a poltergeist for three months by undertaking to the frightened family to expel it, but merely, unknown to them, sits and smokes a cigarette inside a room that was feared. In the former case of the stamping boy, however, the researchers concluded that he could not have executed *all* the reported phenomena himself, (e.g. pounding noises of no obvious origin, and, possibly, movement of heavy furniture); that no other person was responsible for them; and that ordinary causes could be eliminated.

Messrs. Gauld and Cornell are, of course, scrupulous to avoid occasions where they might have manipulated evidence, and it is instructive when they indicate such a situation which might have been abused by others less fastidious. The discrediting of the late Harry Price (e.g. the haunting of Borley Rectory and the case of the spirit child, Rosalie) irresistibly springs to mind, and one is intrigued by some throw-away defensive remarks of Dr. Gauld's—'I can only say here that these allegations appear to me to be based upon very debatable evidence.'

Mr. G. W. Lambert's work upon the possible effects of underground water is examined, and Mr. Cornell describes for the first time in print a series of 'house-shaking' experiments carried out in 1961 in which a powerful vibrating machine shook the whole structure of a house, but caused only insignificant movement of test objects. The conclusion of an enterprising project: 'the geophysical theory of poltergeist phenomena cannot possibly be sustained.'

What then, and it is unfair to expect more than a dusty answer if we press for certainties, do our two researchers offer us? Firstly, and this is a finding that is reassuringly familiar and acceptable—'There is convincing evidence that in some poltergeist cases the intelligence at work is that of a living agent.' That is the 'agent' theory. Secondly, and this is positively eerie, coming from such a clinical source, where Dr. Gauld, a psychologist be it remembered, uses a computer to analyse the characteristics of 500 poltergeists into clusters, 'There are a few cases, both of poltergeists and of hauntings, which fulfil our proposed criteria for accepting the intelligence at work as that of a discarnate entity.'

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN U.S.S.R.

Land of Crosses. Michael Bordeaux. Augustine Publishing Company. Chulmleigh. Devon. £3.

Since the Baltic land of Lithuania was finally incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1945 its people—mainly Roman Catholic—have maintained a struggle for religious freedom. It is a remarkable story of a small country's heroic devotion to the church and its native land and the facts, coming from Mr. Bordeaux, can be relied on. He is the head of Keston College, Kent which has become a centre of research into the place of religion in the Soviet Union, and other communist countries.

Before the second world war there were 1,180 recognised places of Catholic worship in Lithuania, one to every 2,500 of the three million population. To-day, with roughly the same population, the steady suppression of public worship has resulted in a decline of over 50 per cent to 574 Catholic churches.

Even so Mr. Bordeaux says 'the overall picture is considerably better for the average Lithuanian Catholic than for his Orthodox counterpart in the Soviet Union where over half of all churches have been closed within the last twenty years'.

In a well documented chapter Mr. Bordeaux examines the faith of the people which has successfully resisted various onslaughts by the state including attempts to abolish Easter, Baptism, funeral rites and the Cross as a sign of devotion and witness. It was a foolish move to erase the Cross from Lithuanian life for it resulted in the 'hill of crosses' near the town of Siauliai which has become an emotional and religious centre of Lithuanian life. Behind every one of the crosses planted on the hill is a story of personal fortitude and devotion. Twice pillaged and partially destroyed 'the hill of crosses' now has nearly 400 flourishing on the hill. One planted in 1977 has the inscription 'If the roots remain the tree will shoot up again. Atheists are helpless here'.

The sovietization of education, publishing and culture proceeds unchecked in Lithuania but the church lives on and no doubt has caught a breath of new life from the Pope's visit to Poland, a land of comparable experience, and a near neighbour.

CECIL NORTHCOTT

MAN OF THE MEDIA

The Dilemmas of Journalism. Gerald Priestland. Lutterworth Press. £4 50.

No one uses the current means of communication more adroitly than Mr. Priestland, and no communicator has made a five minute slot of B.B.C. time more profitable for religion than he with his aptly named 'Yours faithfully'. But more than a communicator Mr. Priestland has turned himself into something of sage, a preacher in a pulpit, as well as a master at the microphone. His book is a welcome addition to the rising concern about the modern methods of mass communication and their effect on the manners and morals of those who look and listen.

For the problems of journalism, as Mr. Priestland points out, are more than what is contained in the collection of facts, although as C. P. Scott affirmed, for a previous generation of communicators, 'Facts are sacred but comment is free.' But there is no doubt that those who call themselves journalists of the modern vintage have more dilemmas and problems than their predecessors. There is not only the 'spoken word' to contend with but the 'seeable word', the word that goes in at the ear as well the eye. He is not only an addict of the 'written word' but of the 'recorded word' which, in a sense, stores up for the future what the past saw and said.

Mr. Priestland himself is a 'Quaker newsman', and while he is a pacifist he prefers to be called a 'peace maker' a name that must inevitably colour all that he does on the air. A cluster of dilemmas revolve round the 'pacifist' idea for Quakers are bidden to 'walk cheerfully over the world, answering that of God in every man' and 'since they believe that there *is* something of God in every man they should, as journalists, be very slow to condemn, optimistic about the chances of understanding. But, working as they have often done amidst the wreckage of war and disaster, they should not underestimate the number of times it may be necessary to pick oneself up and start all over again.' This is a book of sharp perspicacity, a revelation of how in the deep thickets of the mass media the personal pathways can be followed.

CECIL NORTHCOTT

SHORTER REVIEWS

Place Name Changes Since 1900. (Scarecrow Press Inc. Metuchen, N.J: Bailey Bros and Swinfen Ltd. Folkestone, England. $10.00). This valuable world gazetteer of name changes has been compiled by Adrian Room who published his *Place Names of the World* in 1974. It includes over 4,300 name changes which have been officially recorded from 1900. The author estimates that half the populated places in the Soviet Union have had name changes since the 1917 Revolution, and also there have been a vast number of alterations in China since the abdication of the Emperor in 1912.

On the other hand, Mr. Room has found no change of names in Iceland. Also the United Kingdom comes very low on the list. Obviously, this gazetteer can only select a small proportion of all these alterations. Certain categories do not appear. These include alternative spellings, alternative names in different languages, new names as the result of administrative reorganisation, and temporary re-namings as in Poland at the end of the Second World War Although not entirely comprehensive, this volume should prove valuable in many reference libraries.

Royal Children (Robert Hale. £7.95). This interesting and informative book by Dulcie M. Ashdown is concerned with the place of Royal children, and how they lived during the period from 1066 until today. She outlines family life in the Royal families and adds an element frequently absent in the historical textbook. It is, in a sense, a limited social historical study of a very small and privileged class. The political implications are exceptional. Dynastically of course, the book is very useful. The author has nothing new on the Princes in the Tower and her account of Edward VI is quite brief. About a quarter of the book is devoted to the Victorian age and after. On the nineteenth century she writes with particular authority having already written books on *Queen Victoria's Mother* and *Queen Victoria's Family*. The volume is profusely illustrated.

Play Resumed with Cardus (Souvenir Press. £6.50). This is a third collection from the articles and reports on cricket written by the late Sir Neville Cardus during a professional lifetime of writing, particularly for the *Manchester Guardian*. In this selection, Sir Neville writes about many of the great players from the old days. Hobbs was his particular hero. About a third of the book is devoted to the 1930 Test series in England when the Australians in the last four games decisively defeated England and when the young Bradman made his name. Sir Neville's prose is a delight in itself to enjoy, with so much felicity of language and style and the love of the game at its best. It is a delight to get away in this book from all the commercial overtones and business sponsorship and advertising which now dominate first class cricket.

Life in Wellington's Army (George Allen & Unwin. £3.95 paperback). This study by Antony Brett-James was very well received when first published in 1972 and this paperback edition is welcome. It is a scholarly book, well researched and admirably written. He is concerned to depict 'the daily life of the Peninsular and Waterloo armies when not engaged in battle; to show the nature of campaigning and of "the gipsy mode of life" they led'. He also discusses the relations between officers and men and the armies' relations with the local civilians.

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© 1980 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H G Leates Ltd , 45/47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex U S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd , 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N Y 10022 Second-class postage paid at New York, NY Annual subscription (including postage) U K. £9 50, U S A and Canada $30 00. Rates for all other countries on application Copies can be sent by airmail outside U S and Canada; extra costs given on request. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

February 1980 Vol. 236 No. 1369

EUROPE IN THE NEW DECADE

by Cosmo Russell

LOOKING ahead in Europe is obscured by a fog of imponderables: a truism no doubt but one which must be recognised as the searcher picks his cautious way. Comparison with the early seventies may be a useful progress indicator for whereas the last decade started on a note of optimism and sunshine, it has ended in a much more sombre climate. In 1970 there was anticipation at the prospect of British entry into the European Community, there was comparative prosperity and the Community had a substantial trade balance; no one really anticipated that an oil crisis was on the horizon. A principal worry, well voiced by Sicco Mansholt, when President of the European Commission, was concern over pollution. With the recession, this fear, curiously, has receded although it is only in the background.

If one looks at the contemporary scene, there is a more acute military problem due to virtual outstripping of the Nato alliance by the Eastern bloc both as regards nuclear and conventional forces, disillusion with the Community due to patterns of spending, grave concern over the problem of energy, an economic recession and finally the disturbing factor of continuing violence in everyday life. All these concerns are quite enough to last until 1990! They will have to be faced, more particularly by the Western world. All, to some extent, are interlocking.

To start with the military factor: one must begin with the basic assumption that the world will be wise enough to eschew war. If not, no forecast has any validity. On the 13th December, 1979, Nato took the decision that three European allies, Britain, West Germany and Italy should deploy the Pershing II and Cruise missiles to counter the threat of Soviet SS-20 rockets. Holland and Belgium may accept them later. This in a sense sets the scenario for the Madrid European security conference—the next phase of Helsinki—later this year. There is a marginal factor here, which is increasingly serious. No one can now have any illusion over non proliferation. India has a nuclear device. Pakistan may have one shortly. In his final Reith Lecture also on 13th December, 1979, Professor Ali Masrui referred to a potential nuclear deterrent in the possession of Islam and advocated the holding of such by the Organisation of African Union. While admitting that the prospect was horrifying, his attitude was that such a development might have the effect of bringing the present East West confrontation to its senses and to a realisation that a new and more

radical version of SALT was increasingly necessary. Looking ahead it would be correct to assume that the proliferation menace must be the major preoccupation of the new incumbent of the White House in 1981 and that America must be assisted in this task by her European allies Given the economic climate the factor of high cost on armament, with or without escalation, and a certain military commitment have an uncomfortable ring of the thirties behind them. But both are subject to a further factor, which was not present in the thirties but is also non-nuclear. This is the problem of energy.

Community figures published November, 1979, referred to the fall in imported oil to cover the Community's energy needs from 60.5% in 1973 to 48.4% in 1978. Total Community gross energy consumption was 971 million tonnes in 1973, 972m.t. in 1978 and is estimated at 1,300m.t. in 1990. A glance at the following table shows the wider outlook.

	% of total					
	1978			1990		
	Domestic production	Net imports	Gross consumption	Domestic production	Net imports	Gross consumption
Solid fuels	39.8	4.8	20.9	26.9	8.4	17.7
Oil	14.9	88.8	55.7	22.3	72.3	47.3
Natural gas	31.1	5.8	16.8	20.0	18.5	19.2
Nuclear energy	6.5	—	2.9	24.6	—	12.3
Other (solar)	7.5	0.5	3.6	6.1	0.7	3.5
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Now, if we look at the actual figures for oil:

1978		m.tonnes		1990	
64.5	470.0	541.7	145	470	615,

these show that domestic oil production will rise by more than 100%, that oil imports will remain constant but that total consumption will increase so that, if correct, the estimate means substantial variation from oil to other fuels. Yet one might think that the pundits do not anticipate much more than maintenance of the existing coal output, with considerable reliance on a rise in imports presumably from America and Southern Africa. There is substantial reliance forecast on greater imports of natural gas with a fall in domestic production. Sources of import here could be Norway (Northern Europe), North Africa (France and other Mediterranean countries). There is also a substantial forecast increase in nuclear energy. This last seems based on the 10% increase in electricity generated by nuclear power between 1973-78 in Germany, France and the United Kingdom and almost 25% in Belgium. Certainly, if energy consumption is to continue as estimated, the promotion of nuclear power stations, however unpopular, appears unavoidable. The only means of slowing down the development of nuclear power stations to generate electricity would be to increase the output of coal, implying a reversal of the unwise policy

adopted by all Western Europe and which, according to the estimates, seems likely to continue.

However if the supply of energy according to the estimates is correct, the maximum growth rate compatible with supply will be 3.5% per annum to 1985. The Community average growth rate (1979) was 3.1% (U.K. 0.3 and the lowest of the Nine). A more apt comparison is with 1973 when the growth figures were: Community 6.0; U.K. 7.9. They speak more eloquently than comment.

It follows from the foregoing that energy saving programmes have been and are likely to be actively encouraged throughout the Community. As an example it has been calculated that measures taken to save energy in 1977, working on the non-verified hypothesis that the relationship between energy consumption and economic growth remained steady on balance, resulted in a saving of 70 to 80 million tonnes or between 7% and 8% of the Community's total estimated consumption in that year. Saving has been ascribed both to actual energy saving and to trends in energy prices and production techniques although the precise role played by each of these factors cannot be distinguished. Various somewhat optimistic studies suggest that by 2000 to 2020, energy savings could amount to 15% to 35% in the industrial sector, 20% to 35% in the transport sector and up to 50% in the domestic and service activity sectors. If this is really the case and if an average figure is 30% across the board between 1980 and 2000, halved to 15% up to 1990, it will clearly make an enormous difference to the estimated gross consumption pattern over the eighties; reducing the figure of 1,300m.t. to 1,135m.t. approximately and in particular leading to substantial saving in oil, which will still be the principal fuel.

How will this affect jobs? The general pattern, which has lasted over the last 20 years, has been a decided fall in agricultural employment, a small increase in jobs in industry and a sharp rise in the services—the so-called tertiary—sector. This should not be confused with growth in the case of agriculture. Here, production has risen while jobs have declined; at times there has been a 3% growth and a 4% fall in farm workers. These figures indicate a growth in labour productivity of 7% per annum; if maintained this means doubling every 10 years and quadrupling every 20 years; a faster rate of growth than industry.

The serious factor in industry over the last decade has been the decline of the traditional industries: textiles, coal and steel, while in the case of the United Kingdom motor cars may have to be added together with shipping. If one looks from the sectoral pattern of industry to the regions, this has had a curious effect. The richer heartland of Europe from Manchester to Milan has suffered proportionally more than the European development areas, e.g. Ireland, the Italian Mezzogiorno, Scotland and Western France. In Britain the coal and steel areas have always been development areas; with the vast redundancies from steel, their priority has gone to the top of the list.

In the seventies the services grew by some 18% compared with jobs

in agriculture, which fell by 33% and jobs in industry, which fell by 12%. An interesting feature is the part services have played in Community imports, where in 1979 they accounted for 5.6% of Gross Domestic Product 1958-79, and in exports, where the equivalent share was 4.7%. The relevant U.K. figures here were 6.7% and 7% which were the second highest in the Community after the Netherlands. It should be noted also in 1979 that % shares for total imports and exports of the Community and three representative countries were:

	Community	U.K.	France	Germany F.R.
Imports	28.2	28.7	20.5	25
Exports	28.2	28.7	20.6	26.7

These show that the U.K. trade figures (in GDP %) were just above the Community average and indeed more than France and Germany although not to be compared with the Netherlands where the relevant figures were imports 50.9, exports 51.3.

A Community analysis (November 1979) notes substantial increase in trade with developing countries since 1974 but does not indicate how far this is due to the rise in oil prices. It finds the trend somewhat disquieting from the aspect of competitiveness since any improvement has been achieved exclusively with the developing countries while the balances with developed market economies outside the Community have uniformly deteriorated. The positive feature has been an increasing surplus on services account wherein tourism provided large receipts but also with a note that France had notably developed civil engineering and professional services. The U.K. contribution also derives in large measure from its immense banking and insurance potential. Net Services in European units of account (million) were: 1974; 2.04: 1978; 9.29: 1979; 5.5 The latter indicates some decline in external tourism in 1979, which could be attributed to dollar weakness. By the end of the decade it appeared that the Community trade balance would show a deficit (−2.4 in 1978).

What then is the general picture on trade in the eighties and indeed for the European economy as a whole? The first factor to be noted tentatively is the likelihood of increased food production with fewer people employed in agriculture. Here it must be admitted that the Common Agricultural Policy of the Community has achieved its general mission to provide reasonable consumer prices with fair returns to the Community. Here too the smaller farmers have been assisted in some regions, notably the mountain regions of France, Bavaria, the Mezzogiorno and the Scots hill farmers. But there is a social and a regional problem here, which goes to the core of the European problem and this will be considered in a moment. The world problem to which European food production must contribute, no doubt to an increasing extent in the future, is one of inevitable and increasing shortage unless the population explosion becomes less. This involves maintenance of production and effective disposal of surpluses. This should not be at low prices to

the Soviet Union but, as far as may be, to the third world. This is where the twin problems of food aid and food sales present problems, which are vast and which can only be indicated as constant.

The industrial pattern differs. Here Europe will find increasing competition from the third world and the inference is that this will most affect labour intensive industries, notably textiles. Europe has encouraged this trend in the past. It has provided the pattern of association with ACP (African, Caribbean, Pacific) associates and, with guaranteed prices for raw materials, it was the mainspring of the Lome Convention. It forms part of the contemporary North-South relationship. It presents a vast problem which will not go away, for it affects jobs and production in the West. Additionally, industry in Europe is likely, even allowing for energy saving, to be governed by 3.5% growth. One can however imagine that policy will make strenuous attempts to break this barrier and to find types of industry which can sell their products in sophisticated markets on a competitive basis as well as promoting overseas and Community trade.

While service activities are dependent in the long run on the primary (agriculture) and secondary (industry) sectors, there should still be plenty of leeway for them in the eighties. Nor should they be ignored as replacement for declining industry where the possibility arises. Coal is a problem, which ought not to be treated in negative terms as has been the case in the past. Steel is otherwise. It will create new regional problems that clearly cannot be solved through pumping office workers into new development areas, although this may help. Much transfer of government departments to old mining areas has taken place in the Netherlands. In France, insurance companies have been cajoled into the Massif Central and in Britain publishers have gone to Basingstoke.

The temptation in times of recession to turn the clock back to protective practices will remain considerable. One can only think that it would be a fatal and deplorable development. The whole post war period has shown that trade is interlocking and that particular problems can only be resolved through agreement. It is of course not invidious to note that protection became paramount in the thirties. If a Community system had been present prior to the Great Slump of 1929 the Second World War could have been avoided. Were protection to return today between Members of the Community, it would involve the collapse of the post war economic peace and the only beneficiary would be Communism, allied to much lower standards of living. So what are the issues before the European Community in the eighties?

The immediate difficult problem of the U.K. contribution to the Community budget is serious but, as the Prime Minister has said, it should not be the occasion of a crisis. The short-term matter could be solved. The longer term problem is more crucial for it involves the common agricultural policy. Possibly this will be approached in the following way.

Present negotiations on Community enlargement will mean that Greece will join in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in the mid-eighties. This is one reason for what Lord Carrington has called a more balanced pattern of policies (Brussels November 1979). It is a fact that the Community, which bases its budget on its 'own resources' recognised by Member States and consisting of customs duties, agricultural levies and V.A.T., will have reached the limit when it touches the 1% ceiling on value added tax. While it is impractical to think that the Community spends less than £20 per head for the British taxpayer if it is to achieve its purpose, there is certainly saving to be obtained on the agricultural policy, which absorbs 84% of the Community budget with only 5% of the Agricultural Fund spent on guidance or direct contribution to benefit individual farmers. The remaining 95% of the Fund is spent on the Guarantee Section used to steady prices by buying in farm products when the price falls below an agreed point, or to pay compensation when the exchange rate of a country falls and renders purchases from others too costly. This happened some years ago when the £ sterling fell and the Fund was paying £ one million a day to keep prices low for the British housewife. While generally protecting the farmers' interests in maintaining the price level, the cost of the Section's operations is vast, involving storage of these surplus products—the 'lakes' and 'mountains'—and their eventual disposal at an uneconomic price. Food storage is as old as Genesis; in fact the goods are no more than supplies which would be more than useful in time of shortage and last no more than a few days. What has defeated the Community hitherto has been the vast cost of storage itself and the best way of disposal. Some powdered milk goes as food aid to third world countries in need and one wonders indeed why all stocks should not be disposed of in this way. They probably would be were it not for the economics of disposal. However the fact remains that the CAP has become top heavy in this way and that the size of the Guarantee Section is still related to a time when the Community farming population was some 20%. It is now certainly no more than 8% for the Community (2% for the U.K.). Moreover, as already noted, farming techniques are more advanced.

A sensible target for the structural reform called for by the Prime Minister could be to halve the Guarantee Fund to take account of the fall in the farming population. This would mean that farmers would only receive what would be tantamount to a subsidy for a proportion of the particular product when the price fell below an agreed target price. The balance would have to find its true market level and one useful result would be to lower the price to the consumer. In fact, the system would be comparable to the deficiency payments previously made by the U.K. Government prior to Britain joining the Common Market. If the Guidance Section were then made up from 5% to 20% of the total Fund, this would in practice reduce the cost of the CAP from 75% to 50% of the total budget of the Community. This is still very substantial but it is most unlikely that a greater reduction would be accceptable to

other Community partners. An attractive feature would be to make further aid available for individual farmers who need it. The case for a Rural Fund has been made in the European Parliament and the new Guidance Fund, amounting to some 17% of the budget and therefore a little less than 3,000 million European units of account, could be used in conjunction with the Regional Fund of 1,000 million eua to promote an effective regional policy. This would also pave the way for the very substantial further commitments when the new Member countries arrive. Understandably the British contribution to the budget would not only save through the reduced Guarantee Fund but could also benefit more from the Guidance or Rural Fund than Britain does now.

There is an important regional and indeed social and political factor in this suggested reform. Firstly there is the factor of the European countryside itself. It happens that farming regions *are* the countryside and therefore repositories of scenic beauty and the glories of nature in all its forms. If we need food, we also require the 'clean lungs' of nature. Tourists flock to these regions in ever greater numbers, thus confirming not only the need but also a readiness to bring income with them. Secondly, it is also true that some of the most beautiful regions are also the poorest agriculturally but could become more profitable through a combination of hill farming, particularly sheep and cattle, forestry and tourism with the latter providing a seasonal income for resident farmers and farm workers. Thirdly, there is the structure of farming. There is a place for the family farm together with the new factory farm. Recession has to some extent put a brake on the move from the land to the towns. A change in the character of the CAP as indicated should benefit the small farmer. Lastly, a new look should and indeed is likely to be taken at the situation of 'imbalance' between regions. It is a fact that the so called less favoured farming regions will never achieve the same income levels as the rich industrial concentrations, but to set against this there are other compensations, which could be attractive to many people dissatisfied with contemporary industrial society.

As this article goes to press, the news has just come through that the European Parliament has rejected the Community budget for 1980. This is also a rejection of the CAP in its present form. Perhaps a better balance of Community activity is on the way?

[Cosmo Russell last year completed thirty years' service with European institutions. Starting with the Council of Europe in 1949, he is now working for the European Commission in Brussels. He contributed several articles, on matters relating to Europe, to the *Contemporary Review* in 1979.]

DIABOLICAL WEAPONS

by James Avery Joyce

SINCE the Second World War, rapid advances in weapons technology have produced 'improved' instruments of human destruction whose effects are particularly cruel. Not only do they inflict unnecessary suffering upon military personnel, but many of them are indiscriminate, striking combatants and civilians alike.

What is this so-called 'new generation' of conventional devices? Today's arsenals contain blast and fragmentation bombs, whose main effect is to injure by fragments not detectable even by X-ray; incendiary weapons, including napalm and flame-throwers; delayed-action land-mines, as well as booby-traps designed to stab, impale, crush, strangle, infect or poison the victim. In addition, there are new types of small-calibre rifles and bullets that cause extensive wounds by expanding or flattening in the human body.

The discovery that such diabolical weapons are not confined to the military cupboard has aroused revulsion among public opinion in many countries. Humanitarian organizations have called for prohibitons or restrictons or, at least, exposure to the public gaze of the nature of modern 'ground' war, fed by the fiendish advance of military technology under the shadow of the so-called nuclear umbrella.

The movement to prohibit or at least restrict the use of these weapons began several years ago, motivated by purely humanitarian concerns. It became clear, however, that questions of national security were also involved. So a number of Governments eventually recommended the convening of a United Nations Conference.

The General Assembly in 1977 decided to convene this Conference on the recommendation of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. This earlier Diplomatic Conference was not strictly a U.N. Conference, but was organised by the International Red Cross, a basically Swiss body. It held four sessions in Geneva from 1974 to 1977 under the auspices of the Government of Switzerland.

Consequently, a U.N. Conference opened in Geneva last September (1979) with some 80 national delegations attending, whose aim was to conclude agreements to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons which may be excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects. The Conference had before it reports adopted by a Preparatory Conference containing proposals on non-detectable fragments and on land-mines and booby traps, as well as proposals on some aspects of an agreement on incendiary weapons. The proposed limitations ranged from partial restriction to total prohibition.

At the Preparatory Conference, unanimous agreement was reached on a

proposal prohibiting the use of any weapon whose *primary effect* is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays. The recommended text concerning land mines and other devices would apply to mines, booby-traps, and manually-emplaced devices designed to kill, injure or damage, but which are activated by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time. The measures envisaged called for a total prohibition of the use of such weapons against civilian populations as such, or against individual civilians, recalling the decision taken in 1977 that: 'In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.'

The text on incendiary weapons applied to such incendiary weapons as any munition primarily designed 'to set fire to objects, or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat or a combination of the two, produced by chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.' Such weapons might take the form of flame throwers, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, or bombs. The Preparatory Conference also looked towards some form of umbrella treaty to serve as a legal framework for the new rules they envisaged, together with optional protocols dealing with specific weapons.

This is how the U.N. Secretary-General charged the 81 governmental delegations who met in Geneva.

> The task you have assumed is no doubt complex. The issues before you relate not only to the conventional weapons, whose use may be prohibited or restricted but also to the technical characteristics and effects of such weapons. . . In our world today, the unforeseen ramifications of the arms race constitute a challenge to all powers, great, medium or small, to employ their collective intelligence and vision in facilitating breakthroughs towards disarmament.

Specific weapons examined in great detail at the Conference included two that we have space to deal with here. The first are weapons that are designed to cause severe burns. In the darker ages religious or political heretics were burnt at the stake. In a more 'civilised' age, we know more about what their sufferings must have meant, since rarely did many of them survive to record them:

> Burns from napalm most typically occur on the unclothed areas of the body, particularly the hands, head and face, and feet and legs. Because of the thin layer of tissue over these areas napalm burns rapidly affect the underlying muscles, tendons and bones, which greatly complicates the surgical problem. Reconstructive surgery to treat such conditions requires a long series of operations over several years and is unlikely to be available to ordinary people in most societies in wartime conditions.[1]

The above term 'civilised' appears in quotation marks because we are actually referring to what is happening *now* in the 1980's. In Cambodia—one sometimes heard the slogan in Washington: 'Beat them back into the Stone Age!'—the United States used napalm bombs and flame-throwers. Between April 1970 and March 1973 the U.S. Air Force dropped an estimated 78,154 tons of munitions on Cambodian targets (Department of Defense, press release, June 1973). Presumably these raids included a similar proportion of napalm to that used in Viet-Nam and Laos. The

Khmer (Cambodian) Air Force also used napalm, dropped from old propeller-driven fighter-bomber planes (*Herald Tribune*, 11 Jan. 1974). 'The fighting took a very severe and heavy toll of the civilian population' (U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1974).

Turning to the Middle East, according to some foreign military observers, the Israeli use of napalm in 1956 contributed to victory by constituting a shock for which the Egyptian soldiers were not then prepared. In the war of June 1967, Israel used napalm extensively against Egyptian troops fighting in the Sinai desert, as well as on some civilian targets. On one occasion four Israeli jet aircraft dropped napalm bombs on the Augusta Victoria Hospital in Jerusalem. Since patients and staff were sheltering in the basement, no-one was hurt (*The Economist*, 1 July 1967). But on 15 February 1968 Israeli planes attacked more than 15 villages and refugee camps along the River Jordan with napalm, killing 56 people, including 46 civilians; injuring 82, including 55 civilians, and sending some 70,000 refugees fleeing towards Amman (*Le Jour*, Beirut, 16 Feb. 1968). On 4 August that year, Israeli planes carried out a napalm raid on Slat (Jordan), killing 28 people, 22 of them civilians, and injuring 82 (*Arab Report & Record*, August 1968.)

Egypt has since made good (or bad) its earlier deficiency. But one is entitled to wonder about the quantum of human suffering that is at this moment being packaged into the four billion dollars' worth of mutual 'arms support' that the United States has agreed to put behind its so-called Camp David peace 'guarantee'.

The Geneva Conference was facing real day-to-day issues, legal and political, military and medical. Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Philip Noel-Baker, has pointed out that 'there was no doubt that, up to 1939, incendiary weapons were forbidden by the accepted laws of war, and that they were universally condemned by the moral conscience of mankind."[2] Yet, the extensive use of incendiary weapons in World War II, Korea, Indo-China and elsewhere since 1939 has seen incendiary weapons developed from the unreliable devices of World War I to major weapons of strategic and tactical warfare. Following the Korean war, the International Committee of the Red Cross again raised the question of incendiary weapons in the modernizing of the Geneva Conventions. For few authorities could doubt that such a ban would contribute to 'protecting the victims of war', which is the major purpose of the Geneva Conventions. Hence, the calling of the September 1979 Conference, as stated above, to implement the Conventions.

It may not be appreciated in Western countries—especially the United States, on which no enemy has yet dropped a single bomb—what long-term damage has been done by this step-by-step reversal of the 19th Century laws of war. As in the case of the survivors of the atomic bomb on Japan, burned persons find themselves socially stigmatized. Deformities resulting from burns rather than radiation mark them as *hibakusha*, a name connoting disease and disgrace. At best, the patient with extensive

burns will be seriously scarred in spite of all efforts at reconstructive surgery. Many disfigured patients, even in cases where function has been restored, will psychologically withdraw and never make an adequate social readjustment.

The thickened oil incendiary agents which are collectively grouped under the name 'napalm' are intended to cause burns by the direct adhesion of the burning agent to the body and by the combustion of clothes, houses, vegetation and so on. Burning hydrocarbon fuels are also characterized by the production of thick, black smoke (carbon particles), and a tendency to produce carbon monoxide, unless there is good ventilation. Exposure to burning hydrocarbon fuel in an enclosed space, even with good ventilation, may lead to death within two minutes at 600°C and five minutes at 250°C. Systemic hyperthermia (heatstroke) results from the overheating of the blood during its circulation through the subcutaneous blood vessels, while respiration is prevented by severe burning of the mouth and pharynx, followed by an obstructive oedema of the pharynx, trachea and lungs.[3]

According to a U.S. Army Field Manual (1960) personnel casualties result from a number of flame effects. Thickened fuel sticks to and burns hot on the 'target', i.e. the human being. It is difficult to extinguish, 'thus deterring the individual from accomplishing his combat mission. . . . The shock effect of flame on the individual is great.' And so on. . . .

Again, metal incendiaries splatter small particles of molten or burning metal on the victim. These small particles cause small but deep burns. Such burns are rare in normal civilian life; they are *invented* for war purposes. Magnesium burns produce ulcers which gradually enlarge to form extensive lesions. According to Drs. Wilson & Egeberg (1942), this tissue destruction may be increased by the formation of bubbles of hydrogen in the wound. In order to remove the magnesium, the outer layers of the skin must be scraped under local anaesthesia soon after injury. Were such prompt facilities available, we might ask, to Vietnam or Cambodian peasants in the mid-1970's or to the fleeing Lebanese refugees in 1978 and 1979?

It might be stressed here that B & C weapons (bacteriological and chemical) were not on the agenda of the September Conference—they belong elsewhere in the U.N.'s long-term programme for dismantling the world's military hierarchies. But it was not without irony that, while the Conference was sitting in Geneva, military records were being released in Washington giving formerly suppressed details of an experiment to determine the attack and defence capabilities of biological weapons, in which a Navy ship blanketed San Francisco with a bacteria-laden smog for six days in 1950. Their conclusion was that nearly everyone of San Francisco's 800,000 residents were exposed to the cloud. Though the aerosol containing bacteria known as serratia was pronounced harmless by the military at the time, it has been found to cause a type of pneumonia that can be fatal. One victim's children, grandchildren and great-

grandchildren are now all suing the Army for 11 million dollars!

Be that as it may, the other major item on the September agenda was the abolition of anti-personnel weapons. Behind this item lies a long and painful history. The second Lateran Council, in 1139, attempted to outlaw the use of the crossbow—at least between Christians! It had some success but, unfortunately, the crusading English King Richard I failed to distinguish between infidels and the French, so effectively destroyed the ban. The prohibition of both explosive bullets and dumdum (expanding) bullets is, however, of considerable historical interest, since it represented two rare successes achieved in banning the use of *certain* weapons in war. They are also of contemporary interest since, in the absence of substantive disarmament measures, a number of countries in the 1970's have introduced new bans of a similar nature.

On 11 December 1868, an international commission signed the Declaration of St. Petersburg, which remains to this day a corner-stone of the laws of war. This declaration stated:

> That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
> That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; (but)
> That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable. . .

The Declaration went on to forbid the use by the contracting parties of 'any projectile of a weight below 400 grammes, which is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances'. This Declaration was reaffirmed in the Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference, held in 1874, and formed a basis for the famous Hague Rules of Land Warfare, in 1899. Although The Hague Peace Conference, attended by 26 governments, failed to achieve its primary aim—the reduction of armaments—it adopted three Declarations, namely: (1) to prohibit the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons; (2) to prohibit the use of projectiles containing asphyxiating or deleterious gases; and (3) to prohibit the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body.

So where do the proscribed dum-dum bullets stand today? Wars produce weapons, but weapons also produce wars. For example, in the wake of the Korean War, U.S. weapon designers set about producing a range of new weapons for use against large concentrations of men. These were ready by the early 1960's, at which time the U.S. escalated its programme of military, political, psychological and covert actions 'to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam', including such objectives as 'to increase border patrol and insurgency suppression capabilities by applying *modern technological area-denial techniques* to control the roads and trails along Vietnam's borders. . .'[4]

As the war progressed, new cluster bomb units (CBU's) of increasing sophistication were developed. Since these attacks were frequently in populated areas, area fragmentation bombs obviously resulted in a large number of civilian, as well as military casualties. But, we need not here

pursue further the futility of these questionable 'denial techniques', except to record that many of the minor countries at the September Conference did not fail to condemn the 'imperialistic powers' (this includes Russia, nowadays) for inflicting their sophisticated cruel weapons solely on *them* and not on each other!

We should, perhaps, add a short final note about the 'high velocity' projectile that occupied several long sessions at the Geneva scrutiny. Here the argument for military efficiency was seen to be diametrically opposed to the humanitarian principles of international law—going back to 1899. The vulnerable parts of a standing man, it was pointed out, exist in only 15 per cent of the 'presented area' (i.e. his total body), so there is an 85 per cent chance that a hit with a conventional round will not kill or incapacitate immediately.

It followed, therefore, that the selected bullet should be given a much greater chance of incapacitation to complete its job. *This requires that the bullet should produce an explosive type wound.* But the imponderables were too vast, so the Conference recommended that 'Governments jointly and individually carry out further research on the wounding effects of small calibre weapon systems . . . and that an international symposium on wound ballistics be held in late 1980 or 1981 under United Nations auspices,' with the Secretary-General's appropriate assistance.

It is to the credit of the Geneva Conference, however, that political ideology played little part (except for a few anticipated 'walk-outs' over the China *vs.* Russia rivalries in South East Asia). The Conference had before it a Mexican outline of a Draft Treaty, while the Netherlands and the United Kingdom delegations had prepared a draft Convention as a contribution to the form of an umbrella treaty. The State Parties to this Convention would 'confirm their determination that, in the event of an international armed conflict, the civilian population and the combatants shall at all times remain under the protection of the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict'; and that they base themselves on the principle that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare *is not unlimited.* Accordingly, they accept the general principle of the protection of the civilian population against the effects of ballistics, especially prohibiting the use of weapons, projectiles and material, and of methods of warfare of a nature to cause 'superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.'

There were various blockages to general agreement cropping up continuously. The reluctance of the United States to give up napalm seemed evident to this observer; but Israel was happily not supported by any other delegation in its insistence that the new prohibitions in the draft convention should not be directly related to the 1949 Geneva Convention for the protection of War Victims, which Israel has habitually repudiated.

The Conference's noble aim to produce a General Treaty was not, alas, achieved, since it was unable to complete its main task of formulating a specific text because of so many 'delicate and complex issues involved'—

i.e. 'military necessity'. Considerable work remains to be accomplished, therefore, both on the question of incendiary weapons and the use of other conventional weapons which were frankly admitted to be 'excessively injurious'. It was agreed, however, that re-convening on 15 September 1980, agreements already achieved should not be reopened at the forthcoming session, and that all efforts should be then 'concentrated on working out agreements on outstanding issues'.

The official report records that the '81 United Nations member countries accepted two draft Protocols and an outline of a draft Convention as a basis for further efforts on measures to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons deemed to be injurious or to have indiscriminate effect'. One of the draft Protocols provides for civilians and, in certain circumstances, combatants, rules against the use of incendiary weapons, including flame-throwers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, and napalm bombs.

One cannot help wondering, in following these three weeks of intensive discussion, whether any gathering of (virtually) military advisers of governments, bound by their home instructions, based primarily on considerations of national security, could ever break through that complex of fear, apprehension, and public ignorance that obstructs those halting humanitarian impulses towards a rational and disarmed world order.

NGO's that habitually lobby delegates at Geneva and put forward their own views and proposals on the official agenda items, were in full evidence at this Conference. For example, veteran disarmament observer, René Wadlow, editor of an international review, *Transnational Perspectives*, had circulated proposals to all the 81 delegations calling for a new morality in the methods of national defence and security. Other representatives from women's and religious groups, sat in at the plenary sessions and reported back to their respective memberships. For although some Governments did, this time, *promise* to turn away from their past inhuman practices, it must ultimately rest surely with 'We the Peoples' to clean the earth of these infamous weapons.

Notes:

(1) *Incendiary Weapons*, a SIPRI Memograph (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 1975.

(2) P. Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race*, 1956.

(3) SIPRI (*op. cit.*)

(4) *Anti-personnel Weapons* (SIPRI Memograph), 1978.

[Dr. Joyce's new book, *World Labour Rights and their Protection*, will be published by Croom Helm (in association with the International Labour Organisation, Geneva) in April 1980.]

INDIA'S CASE FOR A PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT

by Buddhadasa P. Kirthisinghe

THE Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26th June, 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference of International Organization and came into force on 24th October, 1945.

Within it, the United Nations Organization established as the principal organs of the United Nations, a security council, an economic and social council, a Trusteeship council, an international council of justice and a secretariat.

The Security Council consists of fifteen members of the United Nations; China, France, U.S.S.R., Great Britain and U.S.A. were made permanent members. The main function of the Security Council was maintenance of international peace and security and each permanent member of the Security Council has a veto power over all decisions taken therein and thereby exercises vast power and prestige over all activities pertaining to peace over mankind.

With the exception of China, the permanent membership of the Security Council was unbalanced in favour of the Western nations. Here again China was represented until recently by a group of Chinese who had fled from the Mainland China to the Island of Formosa. Now this injustice has been corrected with the expulsion of Formosa and the admission of the People's Republic of China, representing the one fourth of mankind that live in the Mainland China.

Until 1947 India was still under British Colonial rule and when Great Britain granted India independence in 1947, India was admitted to the United Nations in 1948, but not as a permanent member of the Security Council, although nearly one fifth of mankind lives in the South Asian sub-continent.

Some years back President Nixon and his American Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, undertook to support Japan's efforts to join the United Nations Security Council as a permanent member. It was a statesmanlike gesture to recognize Japan's role as a major industrial power in the world, along with her rising role in revolutionary Asia.

But permanent membership in the Security Council should also be pledged to India, the most populous democracy in the world. She is not only a mother civilization that has contributed to the life and thought of a large section of mankind, stretching from Afghanistan to Japan; she is also the eighth-ranking industrial nation. India with Sri Lanka (Ceylon) has sustained democratic values, since gaining independence, for over 30 years. This is not surprising as democratic principles existed in Buddhist councils from ancient times down to this day, and in the

Buddha's time there were democratic Republics of Vallijis and Lachavis who were admired and endorsed by him.

The modern States of India and Sri Lanka, although politically and economically independent, have a common democratic heritage. That Buddhism helped greatly in the evolution of democratic forms of government in ancient India is borne out by what the Marquess of Zetland, a former British Viceroy of India, says in his introduction to the book, *Legacy of India.* Lord Zetland says among other things:

> It may come as a surprise to many to learn that in the Assemblies of the Buddhists in India, Ceylon and Burma two thousand or more years ago are to be found the rudiments of our own parliamentary practice of the present day. The dignity of the Assembly was preserved by the appointment of a special officer,—the embryo of 'Mr. Speaker' in our House of Commons. A second officer was appointed whose duty it was to see that when necessary a quorum was secured, the prototype of the Parliamentary Chief Whip in our own system (British). A member initiating business did so in the form of a motion which was then open for discussion. In some cases this was done once only; in others three times, thus anticipating the practice of Parliament in requiring that a Bill be read a third time before it became law. If discussion disclosed a difference of opinion the matter was decided by the vote majority, the voting being by ballot.

When two Communist giants, the U.S.S.R. and China, are permanent members of the Security Council, there is every justification to extend this privilege to India. India can justifiably call herself the largest democratic power on earth, based on her population, even though the greatest economic and military democratic power is the United States of America.

Some of the Great Powers of World War II have since declined to mere small power status. No one would suggest that they be expelled from the Security Council, but the justifiable claims of India and others should be recognized, in view of many world changes since 1945.

Both in the General Assembly and at the Human Rights Commission, India with Sri Lanka, both former British colonies, have played a consistent role as eradicators of Colonialism and racism; and one of the landmarks in the history of the United Nations was the adoption of the resolution 1514 regarding the granting of independence to all Colonies.

Although the United Nations is not a world government, it represents the hopes and aspirations of all mankind for bringing peace, social justice and economic amelioration. India and Sri Lanka have always been prepared to forego selfish national interests to forge a strong world organization with sovereign powers. Thus, India, Japan and also, on a rotating basis, a state in Africa, have every justifiable claim to permanent seats in the Security Council.

India's claim should be supported by the U.S.A. as there is evidence that Soviet Russia, the U.K. and France will do so. China and India have been on friendly terms for over 3,000 years. If there are any differences, they are on ideological grounds. Whereas China has eradicated poverty and become a third superpower, in India poverty is still rampant, although she is progressing economically.

President Nixon's administration was always hostile towards the peoples of South Asia, and particularly towards India. But this unfriendly climate has changed considerably in America since the White House was occupied by a true friend of democracies, President Jimmy Carter. He and his able Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, recognize not only Japan's role internationally but also that of India. The recent visit of the American President to the Indian capital and the sending of his mother, Mrs. Lilian Carter, to represent American people at the late Indian President's funeral in New Delhi, are reminders of goodwill and understanding.

When the opportunity comes for considering permanent seats in the Security Council for India in the United Nations, it should have the support of all present permanent members of the Security Council. India, as a Commonwealth nation, should also find active support from all member nations of the Commonwealth led by Great Britain and Canada; particularly when the resolution goes before the General Assembly. U.S.S.R. is bound to uphold India's claim together with strong backing from Asian and African states. It is to be hoped that the U.S.A. will then be bound to support the entry of both India and Japan as permanent members of the Security Council.

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The March issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Korea* by K. W. Watkins, *Nato and the Warsaw Pact* by Major-General J. I. H. Owen, O.B.E., *Can Charity Come in From the Cold?* by G. Laurence Harbottle and *Reflections on the Post-Impressionists* by Cyril Fradan. The *Quarterly Record Review* is unavoidably held over and will be published in a later issue.

THE FUTURE OF LONDON

by Sir Horace Cutler, O.B.E.

THE eternal drawback in prophesying is that the prophet may well not be around to say 'I told you so'. Additionally, a prophet-politician is likely to fall under suspicion. The reasoned view might be that anyone with real insight ought to be making things happen instead of talking about them.

I accept both the risks and the criticism in advance. In taking my look into London's future I am also conscious that the capital is not cut off from the rest of the country. We are affected by national and international events just as we are sometimes host to them. We are, perhaps, the weathercock of the nation's fortunes both economic and social and it is certainly true that the extent and effects of any national problem are always magnified in London.

What sets London a little aside from the rest of the country is its history and its size. Its history does not concern me much for the present but it is London's size—or more accurately, the changes in its size—which hold the key to the future. In common with the country as a whole London has suffered and is suffering from unemployment. A male unemployment rate of between 4% and 5% does not sound bad, but in the worst areas the figure is 14% plus and where there is unemployment on that scale deprivation will follow. To put it in perspective, London has lost 500,000 jobs, mainly manufacturing, in a decade. In the same time its population has fallen by a million to seven million.

London's population is also ageing. The number of children in its schools is falling, the number of pensioners is increasing. It is the young and the active who have left. The contraction in London's population has had both welcome and unwelcome effects. True, there is now a crude surplus of housing units over households—but this obscures the problem of access to and mobility in housing, both of which derive from years of rent control and municipal involvement in housing. There are parts of London where 80% of the houses are state owned.

True, also, that in theory at least there should be less competition for space on the roads and on the commuter trains. Unfortunately, other factors have been at work. The simple and inescapable fact is that London's economy, the shape and size of its public services, and the orientation of its private markets are all geared to a bigger population than it has. The public services' base costs do not vary in proportion to population served, and with fewer people left to meet the bill that bill grows.

When you add in other ingredients the picture is complete.

Just a few of these factors:

(1) *Inflation:* This not only increases the burden on individuals but it

discourages private sector and public sector investment. In turn, this leads to lost jobs and worsening amenities.

(2) *Personal aspirations:* This accounts for people's reluctance to take on jobs such as bus driving, with unsocial aspects, and for the growth in private car ownership—both of which are having an adverse effect on London's public transport.

(3) *Changing social attitudes:* For a start, the last thirty years' trend has been away from self-reliance as the welfare state—originally a health service but since extended to almost every aspect of life —encourages irresponsibility. Then consider crime, which becomes more prevalent and more violent with each succeeding day.

(4) *Changing political attitudes:* As government has slid its fingers into every corner people have hit back. Even in an elective democracy it is impossible for every citizen to influence the workings of the government machine and when so much government is undertaken by the non-elected—the quangos—it is hardly surprising that there is a growth of pressure groups, political splinter groups, proponents of 'rights' (from Gay Lib to Abortion on Demand) and, of course, of militancy in the Trade Unions.

(5) *Technology:* The silicon chip is coming, and when it does there will be a major shake out amongst office workers: the effect will be even greater than when the typewriter superseded the quill pen.

(6) *Mother Nature:* Eastern England is slowly sinking into the sea. London itself, which is bedded on clay, is sinking into that bed at the rate of 1 inch every eleven years. At the same time sea level is rising, perhaps due to the melting of the polar ice caps. These factors contrive to shorten the odds—now one in fifty—that flood conditions could occur which would kill thousands, cause £3,500 million damage and put Central London effectively out of action for a year. Action is being taken to avert such a disaster, of which more later.

It looks a gloomy picture. Indeed, in some ways it is. There can be no denying that there are grave problems, both social and economic, and that they are none the less serious for being medium and long-term rather than immediate. On the other hand, London has a great deal going for it. It has natural resources and a fascinating history. It is still foremost in the financial world: it hosts many major international events, both commercial and sporting: it has a booming tourist industry and it probably has more to offer in the cultural field, from parks and museums to the theatre, ballet and opera than any other city on earth and many of the facilities are free. It has the biggest and, on balance, most efficient

fast-transit system (the Underground) of any really large city, and London is surrounded by a living lung in the green belt.

It stands to reason that any policy for the future must build on existing strengths and attempt to eliminate weaknesses. So far so good. But in the nature of things many of the problems can only be solved by government. The antiflood programme, for example, involves the construction of a barrier across the Thames at Woolwich, and the raising of the flood banks down river. London has a number of smaller, non-tidal rivers too and these present the risk of flash-flooding. In all, the work in hand and planned to take place will cost easily more than £500 million, and could scarcely be undertaken by private enterprise. The same is true of the extensions needed in the rail sector of public transport, the construction of roads and the installation of the public utilities.

Wherever government is involved there are two immediate drawbacks —bureaucracy and politics. The former slows things up and the latter often puts things into reverse. I might explain that London has two tiers of Local Government (the GLC and the Boroughs) and that central government also takes a (sometimes overdeveloped) interest. When different political parties control the different levels of government (and, surprisingly, even when they do not) there are obvious difficulties inherent in differing political philosophies, outlooks and objectives. Even worse, though, is that local aims and strategic targets are often in conflict—as witness the proposed £130 million Southern Relief road through East London's docklands, which although part of an agreed strategy is now opposed for local reasons by two boroughs who were both party to the agreement.

Many of these problems are not unique to London, but exist there on a larger than life scale. Despite these difficulties a great deal has been achieved, and some very odd political alliances have emerged on specific issues. Much remains to be done but I am confident of the outcome because I discern in central government, for the first time in years, a real determination to come to grips with what the true problems are. The idea that each difficulty can be resolved simply by throwing money at it is discredited. Blanket subsidies are out, selective investment is in, public expenditure is going down (I hope) and private initiative is to be encouraged.

California has proved that domestic economy can be given a shot in the arm by cutting public expenditure. Indeed, I understand that the aftermath of Proposition 13 was the creation of 500,000 jobs! It is very foolhardy to try to compartmentalise the ingredients of regeneration but unless I do so I will present readers with a shapeless mass—so here goes!

The Economy

As the nation's economic fortunes improve so will London's. We will never see manufacturing industry back on its former scale, but we will see continued pre-eminence in commerce, finance and service industries.

The Physical Environment

The completion of the Thames Barrier will ensure maximum possible safety for years, and the recent recruitment figures for the Metropolitan Police are encouraging for anyone who objects to being mugged or burgled! The 1980's will see the completion of the M25 motorway around London. This road, some 120 miles in length, will link fourteen radial motorways and will drastically affect (for the better) London's traffic pattern. London needs a third airport, to be operational by 1987. The GLC prefers the location to be by the sea at Maplin in Essex, with the terminals in East London linked by high-speed train. In the same decade, London's derelict Docklands will really take off. This 8¼ square mile area offers the biggest intra-urban redevelopment opportunity in the world. A start has been made but the prospect is for large-scale economic growth there as soon as there is a reasonable prospect of the completion of the road and rail infrastructure. As the working week gets shorter—as it will—and as the number required to work in the economy falls—as it will—a greater emphasis will be placed on leisure facilities. This must mean increased and more diverse use of our parks and open spaces and also the opening up of the Thames and other natural assets.

The Social Scene

I am quite sure that people will respond favourably to the responsibility of self-reliance. I doubt whether we will ever see the return of the extended family, but voluntary work with the old and the young and the disabled will expand. Returning to the leisure theme, tourism will in itself become ever more important to London and the tourists will ensure the good health of the London professional theatre. Personal mobility will increase notwithstanding the energy crisis. I await with great anticipation the invention and commercial marketing of the personal backpack helicopter.

On the Horizon

It is when I look at potential events that I become more excited because the implications are vast. To take just a few of them:

(a) The EEC is very keen on the construction of the fixed channel link —either a tunnel or, as I prefer, a bridge. Again, the English Terminus is likely to be in London and again, the employment prospects are highly encouraging.

(b) *The World Fair* 1987 *and the Olympic Games* 1988 are both on the drawing board, as it were. The GLC has commissioned and received a feasibility study of holding the Games in London and this study has now been put out for public consultation and discussion.

(c) *London's underground railways* are likely to be extended eastwards

and southwards, and it seems inevitable that close ties (and perhaps integration) with British Rail's vast commuter network will come about.

(d) *London's bus network* is fifty years out of date, both in concept and execution. The buses are the GLC's biggest practical and political headache. It may in fact be that there is no 'solution' and that the urban bus has simply had its day—but we shall see.

(e) London's pre-eminence as an *international exhibition and conference centre* will be maintained both with the re-emergence of Earls Court and the provision, probably in East London, of purpose-built facilities.

These thoughts are only a few of those going through my mind. I have not the space to detail all that the GLC is doing. For example, London has Inner City problems akin to those evidenced in Europe and the United States (where I have recently been to see for myself) and the GLC is accordingly now spending 75% of its budget in Inner London. Still less can I set down all that the Government and the Boroughs are doing and planning—it would take a book.

What I can say is that despite the gloom the future looks good. Indeed, I believe that there is no middle ground—we will either achieve success or court failure. I see a London of about its present population, cleaner, quicker moving yet more leisured: I see success in business and eminence in the arts; I see public amenities (not necessarily publicly funded) on a scale unmatched elsewhere in the world.

There is a time for sowing and a time for reaping. Seeds sown in the next decade will give abundant harvests for years to follow.

[Sir Horace Cutler is Leader of The Greater London Council.]

ARABIA: THE BRITISH CONNECTION:
Part 2: The Confrontation

by W. Norman MacDonald

THE Arab corridor, the western wall of which is the Sahara and whose eastern frontier probes the mountains of Turkey and Persia, was the main artery between Britain and India. Consequently, throughout the nineteenth century the British had been vigorous annexers and protectors, in the area. In Egypt and the Sudan, in Aden and Somaliland and—to a lesser extent—in the Persian Gulf, they were much in evidence.

Since Turkey controlled certain strategic localities in the corridor, she enjoyed British support, and as long as she controlled her empire and subject peoples—in many ways as diverse and fractious as that other empire whose borders it abutted in southern Europe—the British were content.

Turkey however was a power in decline—indeed had been since the Crimean conflict—the outward manifestations of which was an indolent corruption at home, juxtaposed with a savage feebleness abroad.

The British had been aware of one aspect of this decline; discontent among Turkey's Arab subjects, and by nineteen fourteen this discontent had reached the borders of revulsion. In deciding to take advantage of this situation, however, the British blundered into a policy that—at best—was little better than zestfully indecisive. In time, events would correct this initial mistake, but the damage had been done. Some years were to pass before Britain saw the light and eased the considerable misunderstanding this indecisiveness had caused. The result of this acceptance of reality, would be a new desert kingdom.

After the ejection of the Turkish garrison from Al Hasa, Ibn Saud wrote to Percy Cox, the political resident in the Gulf; as follows: '. . . and now-a-days we have conquered the country of our fathers and grandfathers El Hasa and El Qatif. In view of my friendly feelings, I desire to be on the same terms with you as existed between you and my ancestors.'

India, parochially conscious of her own interests, sent Shakespear back to the Gulf with orders to secure an alliance. A treaty was drawn up providing military aid to the house of Saud in their dynastic quarrel with the Rashidis, and also considerable financial aid.

The Indian view of Arabia came from listening posts close to home; Bagdad and Kuwait. Naturally, at that distance, the only man of stature on the immediate horizon was Ibn Saud.

The Foreign Office however took—it considered—a larger view, and took it from what it had long regarded as the epicentre of the Islamic world; Cairo. It was here in nineteen fifteen that it set up its own listening post, the Arab Bureau under D. G. Hogarth. This fomenting vat of intrigue, espionage and bluff thought that if an Arab revolt was in prospect, it would come from the Hejaz, led by their own protegé the Hashemite Sharif of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali.

This view had a vociferous advocate in a British officer who, before the war, had been something of an authority on—among other things—Crusader castles; T. E. Lawrence. Although a poor Arabic speaker, he had been dispatched to the Sharif's son Feisal as his liaison officer, a task that initially dismayed him.

To the east, a Rashidi army advanced out of Ha'il towards Zilfi. Ibn Saud took the field, Shakespear riding at his side. The Nejdi leader had tried to persuade this unbending Englishman to retire to safety, but Shakespear would not hear of it. As the battle howled and thundered around him, he was still taking photographs. Suddenly there was a flash of weaponry, a crowding of horsemen, and he was cut down.

Shakespear's death was a triple blow; to Ibn Saud, to Britain, and to the proposed treaty. Had he lived, the Arab revolt and the future of Britain in the Islamic world might have taken a very different course. Annoyed with British indifference, and rent with grief for the man he had come to love and trust, Ibn Saud temporarily withdrew, until December nineteen fifteen. On this date he signed a treaty with Shakespear's India Office successor, Percy Cox, at Al Qatif. During the negotiations, Cox made no mention of the Arab Bureau, nor of its pushy courtship of Hussein.

In many ways, the struggle to evict the Turk, the only—as time would prove—rallying point around which all the tribes would gather, had within it the same seeds of friction that so bedevilled the rest of allied strategy; Easterners in conflict with Westerners. The westerners of the Bureau, possessing greater authority by virtue of their mentor, knew that their case would be looked on with consideration. The easterners of the India Office did not press their case with sufficient vigour. Sure of their man, they failed to realise that he was a relatively unknown quantity in Whitehall where, in any case, Indian opinion was regarded as parochial to a degree which, although it had validity in the peacetime atmosphere of the Great Game was, in wartime, merely another facet of a strategy increasingly assuming world-wide implications.

Nor was their case furthered by the arrival of Cox's political representative in nineteen seventeen. Harry St. John Bridger Philby was possibly the greatest Arabist and explorer of his generation. Born in Ceylon in eighteen eighty-five this irascible, outspoken Cambridge-educated Briton, devoted the rest of his long life to the peninsula. Rough-cast in the Burton mould, he was a scholar, linguist, insatiable traveller, ethnologist, historian and naturalist—he would later have a variety of desert lizard named after him —but his wandering was controlled by a disipline Burton never attained.

His arrival was supposed to coincide with that of an official from Cairo, who intended travelling overland from Jeddah. This arrangement was thwarted by Hussein who claimed that Ibn Saud's control of the heart-land tribes was minimal, and so the journey was impossibly dangerous.

Never one to brook a challenge, Philby suggested to his host that he travel to Jeddah instead. Enthusiastic, Ibn Saud provided him with camels and an escort, the majority of whom loathed caring for a Christian, thus making it an extremely difficult trip. Nevertheless, Philby covered the four

hundred and fifty miles to Taif in fifteen days, thus completing the third crossing of the peninsula in a century.

It was during his visit that Philby became the first official to note Ibn Saud's contempt for Hussein, and he became convinced of the outcome should the pair ever come to blows, and said so, in his inimitable way. Unfortunately this bluntness had already made him more than his fair share of enemies. As a result, he lacked backing and authority and his views were ignored.

Hussein meanwhile had become so inflated with his own importance that he took to styling himself 'King of the Arabs' in his correspondence with Ibn Saud. Nor did his subsidy endear him to his Nejdi neighbour, to whom he was the worst kind of renegade having betrayed the Turks without formally allying himself with the British.

Britain however continued to support him, regarding the Sharifites as more sophisticated than Ibn Saud, who knew but little of the world beyond Arabia. Yet a struggle between the two could not be long delayed given the removal of a unifying factor—and this removal was proceeding apace —the Sharifite forces just short-heading the British into Damascus in November, nineteen-eighteen.

To Philby, the war appeared all but over and he decided to explore further this fascinating land, now on the precipice of modernity. As the Turks fled Damascus, he embarked on a fifty-day journey to the hitherto unmapped Wadi Dawasir, five hundred miles south of Riyadh.

The fruits of this foray were three-fold; valuable scientific information, hard cartographical facts and—where Philby was concerned—a fierce determination to be the first European to cross the Empty Quarter.

Prior to Philby's departure, Ibn Saud 'Prince of the Nejd, Al Hasa, Al Qatif and their Dependencies, and leader of the tribes Abdul Aziz Al-Saud' wrote to Hussein Ibn Ali:

> I have received requests to work diligently to mend fences between us, since such disputes are harmful to everyone. As to the people of Al Khurmah, you should doubt reports that I am stirring up trouble among them. By the God of Abraham and Muhammad, I am not. When they come to me to complain of religious matters, I tell them they should not talk like this. I suggest you should influence the tribes of the Hejaz, and I the tribes of the Nejd so that the sedition will be stopped, and the fighting cease.

Hussein returned the letter unopened. Indeed he had already informed the Foreign Office that he intended re-occupying Al Khurmah, a disputed area on the border of Nejd.

The Foreign Office backed their man, the Secretary of State, Lord Curzon, making it clear at a meeting arranged at Hussein's request that 'our policy is a Hussein policy' whilst adding dampingly that 'we must be satisfied that our man will win if it comes to a fight.'

Philby—who was present—again warned his superiors of the possible consequences, and yet again was ignored. The result was approval for Hussein, a stern warning to hold fast to Ibn Saud.

Philby's measure of the man rapidly proved accurate. With his customary swiftness, Ibn Saud launched his forces on a night march towards Turabah —west of Al Khurmah—the Ikhwan entering the town as Ibn Saud swept

in from the east with his main body. The result was a massacre, the Sharif finding himself the commander of about one hundred survivors out of an army originally estimated at over five thousand.

Despite the fears of the British authorities in Jeddah for the pilgrims—eleven thousand of whom were British subjects—Ibn Saud stuck to the wartime Al Qatif agreement and withdrew to Riyadh, satisfied to have added—however slightly—to his dominions.

The British meawhile reassessed their position, the nineteen-twenty-one Cairo conference deciding that direct rule by the Colonial Office was no longer tenable, and should be replaced by indirect control through mandates. The result was theoretically self-determining Arab territories who were, in reality, dependent upon British guidance.

The Sharif's family were rewarded for their wartime loyalty, his eldest son Feisal getting the Kingdom of Iraq, and his second son Abdullah, the Emirate of Trans-Jordan. Ibn Saud—another wartime ally—got nothing. Furthermore, he was now surrounded by his enemies; Feisal in the north; Abdullah in the northwest, and Hussein in the west.

More disturbing, however, was that Britain was the author of this arrangement; an arrangement that mitigated against a friend with whom a treaty was in operation, a treaty moreover that Ibn Saud had rigidly adhered to.

The Nejdi leader's reaction was swift; he launched a campaign in the Shammar, before it became a Hashemite fief. The area—leaderless since the assessination of Ibn Rashid in nineteen-twenty—soon fell, the old Rashidi capital of Ha'il succumbing in November, nineteen-twenty-one.

The Shammar tribesmen fled to Iraq, and from this refuge raided the Ikhwan, who replied in kind, penetrating deeply into the newly mandated territory. The Iraqi High Commissioner Sir Percy Cox, arranged a treaty between Ibn Saud and King Feisal, to try and solve the main problem; the frontier. To Ibn Saud the very idea of a frontier seemed absurd, given the nomadic nature of the inhabitants. Nevertheless, the Al Muhammarah agreement of nineteen twenty-two set up a joint Nejdi-Iraqi commission to regulate tribal relations, and settle the questions of wells and pasture. Ibn Saud, his old tribal feelings affronted, disowned the work of his negotiators.

His forces meanwhile had not been idle, probing keep into the Wadi Sirhan, the strategic bridle-path into Trans-Jordan. This irritated Britain, who replied with armour and aircraft, cutting to pieces one Ikhwan group advancing on Amman. The eight survivors who returned to the Nejd found that Ibn Saud possessed another quality; realism. He punished them severely, for he knew that the British could overwhelm him at any time they chose. Consequently, he resumed negotiations at Al-Uqair.

This time Cox dictated terms, drawing the frontiers on a map with a red pen. Although in many ways ignoring reality, the so-called Protocols of Al-Uqair were signed in December, nineteen twenty-two. Two years later, the Hejaz was extensively penetrated by Saudi forces. Since nineteen

fifteen, Hussein had been spared by the Saudi adherence to the wartime Al Qatif treaty.

Now seventy-two, his arrogance and indolent inefficiency greatly reduced the few friends he had left. His earlier follies apart, he now put himself in a position that even the British found hard to endure; with the sublime tactlessness of total unreality, he demanded to be recognised as King of the Arabs. Furthermore, as if to cap a pretension as ridiculous as it was impossible to sustain, he assumed the title of Caliph.

At one remove, he had succeeded in uniting all his opponents. To the Saudis he gave a motive for Jihad, or holy war, for no true muslim could accept him as Vicar of God, and to conservative opinion in India, this assumption gave particularly deep offence. This the British could not ignore and so, it seemed to them, they had been handed a good reason for cutting off his subsidy. On the thirty-first of March, nineteen-twenty-four they did just that.

On September the fifth, the people of Taif opened the town's gates to the Ikhwan, and a month later Hussein abdicated, taking the road to Aqaba in a car laden with British gold. By the sixteenth of October Mecca fell and, although aware of events, the British were nevertheless surprised by their rapidity. In Medina and Jeddah Hussein's son Ali still held on grimly, but events were overtaking him as swiftly as they were everybody else.

In July nineteen-twenty-five Britain annexed the Aqaba region to Trans-Jordan, thus providing Abdullah with a strategic outlet to the sea, but by the late autumn Whitehall realised that the inevitable must be faced; Britain would have to settle with Ibn Saud.

Accordingly, as the Nejdi-Hejazi war drew to a close, a British mission set out for Arabia. Its leader, Sir Gilbert Clayton, was one of the most distinguished of British arabists, and a former head of the Arab Bureau.

He arrived in Jeddah whilst Ibn Saud was besieging the town, and the two men at the Saudi leader's temporary camp at Bahra. They took to each other at once.

By November the second, the treaties of Hadda and Bahra were signed, settling all outstanding business between the Saudi Sultanate and the mandated territories of Iraq and Transjordan save one; the British annexation of Aqaba. This matter would remain unsettled until nineteen-sixty-five.

After dinner on October the thirty-first, the Sultan suggested that a far more extensive agreement was possible, indeed that the Al Qatif agreement should be revised.

Clayton returned to London to raise the new openings with his government, but on arrival found that Whitehall was divided as to whether a new agreement was really necessary. Eventually it came round to the Colonial Office's view that one was. They had been alarmed by Italian expansion in Abyssinia, and the treaty of friendship Rome had concluded with Iman Yahya of the Yemen.

Conversely, the India Office was apathetic, as Muslim opinion had become hostile to the reforming Saudis because of the maltreatment of

pilgrims during the recent Hajj. Compromising, London decided that its Consul in Jeddah, S. R. Jordan, could negotiate with the King.

The King however took a different view. So far as he was concerned, Jordan was but a minor official, unable to tackle the major issues he raised.

When the talks ran aground on the question of the suppression of slavery without compensation and the Ma'an-Aqaba situation, Jordan was recalled to London.

At a meeting in Whitehall on the thirteenth of January nineteen-twenty-seven, the guidelines of future policy were determined. The principle of freedom without compensation stood, despite the King's opposition. On the Aqaba matter however, the British were less certain, especially when Trans-Jordan's High Commissioner made it plain that he would not be held responsible for public order if the region were returned to the Hejaz.

Once more Clayton was dispatched to Jeddah, this time with unequivocal instructions; bring back a treaty. The King delightedly welcomed his friend but, after six meetings, no progress had been made. Slowly Clayton's charm took over, and on the eve of the seventh meeting, the King relented.

His advice was that the King must give in, or risk the whole treaty. He must sign a general article agreeing to co-operate in the suppression of slavery, but could agree to compensation in an exchange of notes, with some system of allowing Consular officials to act in the spirit of the treaty. A further exchange of notes would quote the King as being opposed to the occupation of Aqaba, but willing to accept the situation for the present.

This clever solution meant that the King could now sign the treaty without loss of face. The remaining points, such as the protection of pilgrims, and the King's independence were settled without difficulty. The treaty of Jeddah was signed on the twentieth of May, nineteen-twenty-seven, valid for seven years initially, but capable of indefinite extension.

For Ibn Saud it was international recognition; for London it was the usual agreement with a minor ruler, the like of which had been the common coinage of imperial diplomacy for a century and more. Yet neither party could foresee the future, with its startling wealth from natural resources.

Two years later, Clayton was dead and King Ibn Saud mourned yet another British friend. Writing to the British Resident in the Gulf he said:

> We feel we have lost a very great champion, and a faithful worker towards the good relations existing between us and the British government. Your news was particularly distressing because of what we know of the deceased's true sayings and faithful actions.

[W. Norman MacDonald, who has lived and worked for many years in Kuwait, contributed the first of three articles on 'The British Connection in Arabia' in Volume 24, No. 1359 of *Contemporary Review*. The third article in the series, 'The Last Enigma', will be published early in 1980.]

THE REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

by J. Vijayatunga

IN day-to-day parlance, everybody on the island, except foreigners or English-speaking Singhalayas, calls it simply 'Lanka'. Ceylon was a name of foreign coinage. The prefix Sri was used in poetry and prose. When a Republican Constitution was adopted on May 22, 1972, Ceylon was named The Republic of Sri Lanka. Ceylon became a self-governing nion within the British Commonwealth on the Fourth of February 1948. The previous August India became independent. The Republic of Sri Lanka remains a member of the British Commonwealth.

In May 1970 Mrs Srimavo Bandaranaike, widow of the assassinated P.M. who had canvassed the electorate as 'the weeping widow', became Prime Minister. Her Party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, founded by Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, defeated the United National Party, which had assumed office in February 1948. The first Prime Minister was D. S. Senanayake. His son, Dudley Senanayake and next, Sir John Kotelawala were successive Prime Ministers. The present President, Mr. Junius Jayewardene, and S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, both held Ministerial offices in each of the UNP governments. Bandaranaike was Minister of Local Administration in the first Cabinet and Minister of Health in the Kotelawala Cabinet. But Bandaranaike, who had a distinguished record at Christ Church, Oxford, where his contemporaries were Quintin Hogg (Lord Hailsham), Malcolm MacDonald, Beverley Nichols, Edward Marjoribanks and Douglas Woodruff, had set his heart on becoming Prime Minister, and the election of Sir John Kotelawala as Prime Minister robbed him, he felt, of what should have been his chance. He organised the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and he recruited *Bhikkhus* (Buddhist monks) to his Party. As happened in Burma, and later in Vietnam, he turned them into political *Bhikkhus*, a concept contrary to Buddhist tradition. Ironically he was assassinated by a *Bhikkhu*.

Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike's seven years in office (from May 1970 to July 1977) must be named the saddest years of Sri Lanka's history of more than twenty-five centuries.

On 16th March 1971 she declared a State of Emergency which lasted until the overwhelming defeat of her Party in the general elections of July 1977.

On 20th July 1971 she made a Statement in Parliament prefaced by these words:

> It is over three months now since an attempt was made to unleash a reign of terror in this country, probably unprecedented in our history.

She went on to describe 'the treacherous attack made on the people of this country', the beginnings of 'an insurgent movement sometime late in 1964, or early 1966'; she mentioned 'caches of handbombs, arms, ammunition and uniforms . . . discovered in various parts of the island . .'

An all-island curfew had been imposed with effect from 6 April 1971. Continuing her address to the Parliament, she said:

> The House is aware that wild rumours had been circulating, some no doubt deliberately circulated with malicious intent in order to tarnish the good name of the Government; that several thousand people were being killed by the Armed Services and the Police. These reports appeared in some foreign newspapers as well. Therefore, it is my duty to give you some idea, as far as is possible, of the number of casualties, which have been the result of this whole episode. In my estimation, which is based on the information that is available to me, the total deaths do not exceed 1,200. These figures include Police and Service casualties . . . I do not claim that these figures are absolutely correct. . . .

In the same speech she stated that 35 Police, 15 Army, 6 Navy, and 4 Air Force, officers and other ranks were killed, *'The total deaths do not exceed* 1,200.' Twelve hundred deaths in a disaster caused by a tornado, floods, earthquake or epidemic may be viewed with some equanimity. But 1,200 deaths out of a population of 12,747,755 (Census 1971) caused under an Emergency in this Buddhist island is no light matter. Mrs. Bandaranaike seemed to have regarded the death of 1,200 of her compatriots as incidental and of little concern.

In justification perhaps, she continued:

> We cannot forget the fact that what the insurgents planned for this country was a terrible bloodbath, in which thousands of innocent men and women would have been killed with brutality and without any compunction whatsoever. The crimes committed by these insurgents and the crimes which they intended to commit were against the overwhelming mass of peace-loving and civilised people of this land . . . Before I conclude, I think it would be useful to Members of the House if I referred briefly to our activities in regard to the 14,000 people who are now in custody . . . I hope I have not worried the House with too many details.

The following information, issued on July 13, 1978 by W. M. P. B. Manikdiwela, Secretary to the President, may be of interest.

> The number of insurgents in prison at the time the present Government assumed office was 124.
>
> The number of persons imprisoned for Foreign Exchange Frauds under the Criminal Justice Commission Act at the time the present Government assumed office was 7.
>
> All the prisoners referred to in these categories were released from prison on 2 November 1977.

On September 29, 1971 Amnesty International issued a Press statement as follows:

> Lord Avebury has just returned from Ceylon where he spent ten days making inquiries on behalf of Amnesty International. Amnesty's decision to arrange this mission was taken in view of the continuing detention without charge or trial of some 14,000 men and women detained under the State of Emergency imposed on March 1971 in connection with the activities of the Janata Vimukta Peramuna. Official statements made it clear that many of those in detention were not believed to have directly supported the events of 5 April, while in the cases of those close to the JVP leadership Amnesty felt that the normal processes of law should operate whether or not they are prisoners of conscience . . . According to the most recent official statement (19 September) the total number brought into custody during the official emergency is 16,255 of whom 1,651 have been freed and 14,744 remain in custody . . . Not one of the 16,255 people detained has been charged or brought to trial . . .

Lord Avebury's report was well-documented, factual and unbiased. Among those he had interviewed—and they were a cross-section of all the communities in the island—were Mr. Junius Jayewardene, the leader of the United National Party, and his elder brother, Mr. Corbet E. Jayewar-

dene, a retired Judge. Lord Avebury's report deserves inclusion in the next history of Sri Lanka, yet to be written. Amnesty International has done a great service to humanity in general and to the people of Sri Lanka in particular.

What Lord Avebury did not include in his report were certain instances of rape and murder by the Police and Army. There was a particularly revolting case of rape and slow torture ending in the murder of a fifteen-year-old Singhala virgin near the ancient southern township known as Tissamaharama. The tape recordings of the rape, torture and murder of the girl given by her parents and other witnesses are an echo of similar incidents in Amin's Uganda or in Haiti under Papa Doc.

The inhabitants of Sri Lanka fall into these categories: Singhala; Ceylon Tamils; Indian Tamils; Ceylon Moors; Burghers and Eurasians, including descendants of the Portuguese; Indian Moors; Malays; Pakistanis; Veddas (Aborigines) and Europeans.

Seventy-two-year-old Junius Jayewardene, leader of the United National Party which dealt a crushing blow to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, assumed office as Prime Minister in July 1977. Though beset by internal 'revolts' of the Tamil United Liberation Front and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Mr. Jayewardene set about adjusting the maladjusted economy of the previous seven-year misrule. Mrs. Bandaranaike's plans to nationalise the Chartered Bank, and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation were deflected by a matter of twenty-four hours. The legislation had been completed and was to have been rushed through Parliament: but in the twenty-four hours between her leaving and the UNP Prime Minister assuming office, that legislation was halted. Mr. Jayewardene assured the banks of complete freedom to carry on banking and at the same time he invited American, Russian and Chinese banks to open up operations in Sri Lanka.

Perhaps the freshest wind of change was that brought about by Mr. Jayewardene's ungagging of the Press, and the removal of the ban on 'non-Government' newspapers (as defined by the Bandaranaike regime), Under the former regime advertising was limited to pro-Government newspapers. Under Mr. Jayewardene's rule Government advertising began appearing in all newspapers including those belonging to the Trotskyite and Communist Parties. The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon, publishers of *The Ceylon Daily News* and the leading Singhala and Tamil newspapers which had supported the UNP and which therefore had been taken over in 1973 by Mrs. Bandaranaike's government and controlled under a ruthless censorship, are now under a 'broad-based' ownership in which employees can buy shares. The Foreign Press Corps in Colombo, one of the best-informed in Asia, can now function without government restraint on reporting. On the other hand, the tea and rubber plantations which had been nationalised will remain so.

Mr. Jayewardene announced shortly after assuming office that he favoured a Singapore-type capitalism—'the only solution' as he termed it—and that a 200-square-mile free trade zone ('another Singapore') was planned. Foreign investors were assured of considerable freedom within the

free-zone but in the remainder of the island Socialism was to be the guiding policy.

The enthusiasm created by these public announcements was interrupted by riots and street-fighting in various parts of the island, particularly in the preponderantly-Tamil north. They were instigated by Mr. Jayewardene's defeated opponents, and, to some extent, by the Tamil Party. A night-time curfew was imposed in some places and as many as thirty deaths reported.

'Political conspirators', as they were described by Mr. Nissanka Wijeyeratne, the Education Minister, were luring students to their ranks. Accordingly, schools were closed.

Dr. Nath Amarakoon, who served under the Bandaranaike government for seven years as secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Construction, and Mr. V. W. Kularatna, a lawyer who was Chairman of the Presidential Commission of inquiry into universities in 1975, appeared before a Magistrate in Colombo charged with attempts to create disaffection.

The UNP election manifesto mentioned a change to a presidential form of government. Accordingly, three months after he became Prime Minister, the government voted for a French-style presidential constitution.

On the 4th of February 1978, exactly 30 years after Ceylon became independent, Mr. Junius Jayewardene became Executive President. On 6th February he appointed Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa, deputy leader of the United National Party, Prime Minister. Fifty-three-year-old Mr. Premadasa, a Buddhist, was born in the slum area of Colombo. He was elected to the Assembly as member for the Colombo Central constituency. As Prime Minister he will retain his portfolios of Local Government and Housing and Construction.

The Assembly's term before dissolution will be in 1983. As President, Mr. Jayewardene's six-year-term will extend beyond the exact date of the dissolution of the Assembly.

There is no doubt that Mr. Jaywardene, himself the son of a Judge, knows exactly what Sri Lanka needs to re-establish her economy, and, in general, to create that atmosphere in which Sri Lanka can function as a worthy member of the Asian nations and as an effective member of the United Nations.

[Jinadasa Vijayatunga, author of *Grass For My Feet* (1935) was joint-editor with S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike of the quarterly, *Island Review*. He was Bandaranaike's helper in the Maradana (Colombo) Ward's municipal elections and it was after a victory in these that Bandaranaike made his official entry into politics. Mr. Vijayatunga has taught English in his old school, Mahinda College, Ceylon, also in Rabindranath Tagore's international school in Bengal. He has lived in London since 1964 and is at present working on a new book, *Nehru and His Contemporaries*.]

THE BRITISH THEATRE: 1949-79

by Glynne Wickham

ROUTLEDGE and Kegan Paul must be congratulated on reissuing a revised edition of John Elsom's *Post-War British Theatre,* first published in 1976, and making it available at the modest price of £3.95 in paper-back, for it is, above all, a useful book that will be as widely welcomed by teachers and students of English abroad as it will by a less restricted public of habitual theatre-goers in Britain itself. This is because the book attempts, uniquely, to fill a long-felt need: provision of a concise and virtually complete compendium of all those actors, playwrights, and directors who have leapt into prominence during the past three decades (many of whom, like comets, have already dropped out of sight again) together with a comprehensive survey of all the instantly recognizable changes that have overtaken the British theatre during this period. If, at times, the style resembles that of entries in *The Oxford Companion to the Theatre,* the entries themselves are exclusively British (Brecht excepted), modern, and linked to each other within a coherent narrative.

It is not that our theatre has lacked good critics or good books about its progress in recent times. Indeed, many people whose work made it imperative for them to buy all these books as they first appeared may be forgiven if they wonder now, on viewing the shelves that contain them, whether the quality of British plays and production between 1949 and 1979 could possibly have been so outstanding as to warrant the sheer quantity of attention that the books represent. Already many of the plays rushed into print under Faber's imprint in the 1950s, or those of Penguin and Eyre Methuen in the 1960s, are so heavily 'dated' as to cause anyone glancing today at their titles and authors to wonder whether any theatrical management will ever see fit to revive them.

It is also to be doubted whether there was ever a time when publishers encouraged authors to believe (or authors conned publishers into believing) that so many actors, actresses and directors warranted a full-length biography before reaching the age of fifty. Something of this, of course, stems from the impact of television where the many quiz and chat programmes contrive to suggest that only show-bizz personalities are interesting enough to merit exposure to the public.

Happily, this is by no means the whole story. Each shelf of books, decade by decade, still yields a title or two that stands out from the rest as sufficiently distinguished not only to linger in its readers' memory, but as likely to remain on lists of recommended reading when all the rest have vanished. My own selection includes Kenneth Tynan's *He that plays the King* (1950), Richard Findlater's *The Unholy Trade* (1952), Laurence Kitchin's *Mid-Century Drama* (1961), Martin Esslin's *Theatre of the Absurd* (1961), Ronald Hayman's *The Set-up* (1973) and Cole Lesley's biography of Noel Coward. Others might choose differently and place John Russell Taylor's *Anger and After* and Irving Wardle's *The Theatres*

of George Devine on their short-lists.

This is a difficulty of which Mr. Elsom is aware when he asks in his Introduction, 'Why do we need a short history of post-war British theatre at all?' To this question he supplies two answers. The first is to supply 'a general introduction . . . which tries to relate the many different facets': the second is, 'to consider the evolution of the theatre, particularly in such matters as critical standards.'

In the first of these objectives he is remarkably successful. Nearly all the names that matter are found an appropriate niche; architecture takes its place alongside of actors and acting, even if designers are ignored; coterie groups of bewildering variety rub shoulders with such establishment giants as the R.S.C. and the National; practical considerations—like money, subsidy and public taste—figure as prominently as questions of theory and fashionable ideology; even the provinces receive occasional, if rather erratic, nods and winks. To have achieved this within little more than 200 pages evokes as much admiration for the sheer virtuosity of the accomplishment as does a tight-rope walker who completes the crossing of the high wire without a safety-net.

It is when considering the second of Mr. Elsom's declared objectives that the cracks in this skilfully constructed fabric become apparent. Perhaps this is the inevitable price to be paid for trying to compress so much into so short a space, since description is far more amenable to the demands of condensed narrative than evaluation. As Mr. Elsom streaks through the history of European drama and theatre in his opening chapters, 'Actors, stars and changing styles' and 'Well-made plays?' the reader becomes uncomfortably aware of frequent short-circuiting within the argument and, on that account, suspicious that the omissions derive from a wish to arrive swiftly at a neat conclusion that will allow him to hurry on. This process becomes only the more marked as Mr. Elsom advances his narrative into the fifties and sixties. Why, for instance, in a relatively long discussion of T. S. Eliot's plays (five pages) does the name of E. Martin Browne not figure at all? Yet not only did Mr. Browne direct all of Eliot's plays and help him to rewrite them, but he also launched Christopher Fry as a dramatist. And why, on this same point, is nothing said of his triumphant revival of the York Cycle at York in 1951, and of the revivals of other medieval plays like Sir Tyrone Guthrie's production of Sir David Lindsay's *A Satire of the Three Estates* (1948) which, in their stage-conventions and in their handling of dialogue, came as a revelation to those who saw these productions, and played at least as large a part in freeing young playwrights like John Whiting and John Arden, from the restrictions of the proscenium arched stage and the well-made play as anything Mr. Elsom later claims for Brecht?

It is this constant over-simplifying of issues that leads ultimately to the book's failure to fulfil its author's second objective which is to provide a satisfying account of the evolutionary character of those changes between the climate in which our theatre operated before the second world war and that in which it operates now. Is this wholly attributable to the re-

quirements of brevity? Or does it derive from a failure to comprehend the true nature of the changes in question and the root-causes of these changes? Here the chapter devoted to Brecht supplies a clue. Mr. Elsom elects to follow a fashionable view in attributing the major responsibility for the changes in the style of British Drama since the war to Brecht. Now while no-one would wish to minimize his influence on British playwrights and directors during the past ten to fifteen years, it is far too easy to attribute to him or to the Berliner Ensemble ideas about plays, acting and production which had entered the blood-stream of the British theatre long before British theatre-goers had heard of Brecht. As early as 1935, for example, T. S. Eliot had staggered British audiences with the alienating effect of the speeches of self-justification that he gave to his four Knight-murderers in the final scene of *Murder in the Cathedral.* Choric figures, similarly, who step out of character to address the audience as friends, and temporarily demolish the sacred 'fourth wall' of the proscenium arch in the process, had appeared in Pirandello's *Six Characters in Search of an Author,* in W. H. Auden's *The Ascent of F.6* and Thornton Wilder's *Our Town* before the war, and again in Jean Anouilh's *Antigone* and Arthur Miller's *A View from the Bridge* shortly after it. Even 'the Common Man' of Robert Bolt's *A Man for all Seasons* has his prototype in the character of the same name in Reginald Arkell's *1066 and All That* which was first produced at the Birmingham Rep. in 1934 and in London in 1935. In other words, techniques which it has become fashionable to attribute to Brecht's innovative genius were in fact familiar and available from other sources for young British playwrights to copy and expand. Indeed one may see them exploited by Fry, Ronald Duncan, John Whiting and John Arden in the 1950s before translations of Brecht's plays appeared in our bookshops, or a visit to East Berlin became an obligatory part of any aspiring director's education. Many of these same techniques had also been the subject of experiment in adaptations of Greek plays by French, American and English dramatists during the inter-war years, and were being rapidly extended in the 1950s (as I have already remarked) by widespread revivals of medieval plays. No less influential was the slow but steady percolation of ideas about dramatic art derived from Japanese and Chinese theatre practice that arrived in England long before the war in the plays of W. B. Yeats, or in such popular West End successes as *Lady Precious Stream* (1934), ideas that had begun to be applied to Shakespeare productions at the Old Vic and at Stratford-upon-Avon in the 1940s and 1950s.

More misleading still is Mr. Elsom's total neglect of the revolution in British attitudes to the place of drama and theatre in education that has taken place during the past fifty years. Is the fact, for instance, that artistic control of our theatre has virtually passed out of the hands of non-graduates and into those of university graduates during this period of so little relevance as to warrant such neglect? Likewise the appearance of the National Youth Theatre? Likewise the fact that drama is now accepted by the Department of Education and Science as a subject for 'O' and 'A' level examinations, and warrants the appointment of Inspectors at the

taxpayers' expense to assess and maintain standards in the subject in schools and the qualifications of its teachers? To read John Allen's *Drama in Schools: its Theory and Practice* (which was also published this year) before or after reading Mr. Elsom's book suggests that an entire dimension is missing from the latter, a dimension moreover that must have played a vital role in forging the new attitudes towards the theatre among young people from all sectors of society over the past thirty years. It is, after all, from their ranks that those writers whom Mr. Elsom classifies as of 'the second wave', and all the leaders of today's fringe groups—the alternative theatre—have arisen.

Perhaps it is still too early to assess with any hope of precision what the effects of this revolution in the status of drama within all aspects of our education system have been on what we find presented on professional stages both in London and in the provinces today. What is certain is that not since the Tudor era has anything like it been seen in England. The entire climate has changed in ways that would have seemed unpardonable as well as unrecognizable to Edwardian and Victorian parents and theatre-managers alike. I am not arguing that all these changes in schools and universities have necessarily been entirely for the better; only that at least in a concluding Chapter entitled 'Climate and Language', which seeks to summarize what has occurred in the British theatre since the war and to account for it, they merit serious attention.

If Mr. Elsom fails to accord adequate treatment to this elusive but important aspect of his subject, he handles another and equally evasive aspect of it, the implications of patronage and subsidy, with exemplary thoroughness. I say 'evasive' because the public is rarely privileged to come face to face with how the Arts Council and Local Authorities actually apportion funds, or how these allocations vary from year to year. Seldom, if ever, can we put faces to the names of the men and women who apportion these funds in the name of the Arts Council, or in the name of this City Council or that. Rarely, if ever, do we know on what grounds decisions are made, why some claims for larger grants are met while others appear to go unheeded, or how particular individuals find their way onto the Arts advisory panels that make these decisions. No wonder, in these circumstances, if the public fails to recognize over the course of a decade in what direction policy has shifted, or to comprehend the likely consequences of this shift.

Mr. Elsom renders his readers a singular service in his treatment of these questions, revealing how what started innocently enough as a rescue operation has transformed itself in the course of thirty years into a wholesale reconstruction of British theatrical life; for it is now no exaggeration to say that the size of the Arts Council's annual grant largely determines what any theatrical management can contemplate presenting to the public, and even whether it can afford to stay in business. What Mr. Elsom's analysis of this development succeeds in doing is to open to question, virtually for the first time, the whole principle of a form of patronage so vast and so monopolistic as to control the paths that dramatic art can

and cannot take into the future. He shows it be a form of patronage, moreover, that has become so nearly anonymous and unaccountable to the public it purports to serve as to invite a rigorous clarification of its credentials. How has it come about, for instance, that so many of the individuals appointed to the governing bodies of our theatres, whatever their other virtues, possess no first-hand, professional knowledge of theatre history or practice? Nowhere does this emerge more clearly than in his study of the scale of subsidy needed to sustain the R.S.C. and the National, and the implications that maintenance of these subsidies contain for the future of that other national theatre represented by the provincial repertory companies and touring groups. And what possible justification can be found, when seeking names for the auditoria of the completed National Theatre, for preferring two names that are meaningless in any dramatic context to those of such dedicated pioneers of the campaign for a national theatre as Bernard Shaw, Harley Granville-Barker, Geoffrey Witworth or Lilian Bayliss?

A question within this context that he does not raise, but which still needs to be asked, is where do the amateur dramatic and operatic societies stand? These groups, which in general represent individual communities both in towns and villages all over the country, all pay those taxes which the government of the day entrusts to the Arts Council to re-distribute as subsidies to professional theatre, opera and ballet companies. A recent survey conducted by the Central Council for Amateur Theatre reveals, for example, that in five South Western Countries, there are nearly 8,000 dramatic societies whose membership involves nearly half a million people. Yet current economic pressures make it daily more difficult for the amateur companies to meet the costs of hiring theatres (usually school or village halls) and of mounting their productions. Is it unreasonable that many of them are now asking whether Peter is to be robbed indefinitely by the Arts Council to pay Paul? This question is only exacerbated by the attitude of the Trade Unions, more especially Actors' Equity and the Technicians' Unions, whose understandable activities in the interest of their members' salary scales are making it steadily more imperative for managements to employ fewer of them unless subsidies are raised to meet these demands. And, as Mr. Elsom points out, where the Unions pay lip-service to the principle of industrial sponsorship they appear in the event to think that this is the exclusive responsibility of management. Even Arnold Wesker's Centre 42—prospectively a people's theatre if ever there was to be one in Britain—only secured the support of ten unions and a derisory total of £335 in cash towards the Theatre Workshop at Stratford East in 1960. Nothing has happened since then to suggest that attitudes in that quarter have changed or are likely to do so.

What, finally, is Mr. Elsom endeavouring to say in this 'revised' edition dated 1979? Is this book simply a passive retrospect, a statement of what has happened in the past three decades coupled with a historian's assessment of why it happened? Or does it seek to indicate, in terms of critical appraisal, whither the theatre in Britain is likely to move in what remains

of the twentieth century? He tells us frankly in his Introduction that his approach is subjective and that he will leave readers free to guess at his predilections: nowhere does he overtly assume a prophet's mantle: but in a penultimate chapter entitled 'Many Roads, Few Maps' he is as clearly disquieted as he is aware of the fragmentation of critical standards that has characterized theatrical developments in the seventies, and that looks like continuing into the eighties. Where will it stop? Mr. Elsom offers no clues, thinking, perhaps rightly, that prognosis lies outside his brief. Significantly, television does not even appear to merit an entry in his index: yet many readers no less justifiably will feel disposed to argue that the most important single *innovation*, where drama of the thirty year period under review is concerned, has been the advent of television with its nightly fare of plays, features, documentaries and serials purveyed, virtually gratis, into the living rooms of larger audiences than could ever be crammed into a single theatre in an entire year. Compared with this, the rival claims of 'Theatre of the Absurd', 'Theatre of Cruelty', 'Street Theatre', 'Liquid Theatre' and so on pale into insignificance or, at the very least, swim sharply into focus as the élitist minority cult that each has actually been. Just as significantly, where both the number of jobs available and the salary scales attaching to them are concerned, there is no longer any doubt which of the two, theatre or television, is exercising the greater coercive pull on the common pool of talent. When the tail begins to wag the dog the time has come for the dog, if it wishes to survive, to devote more time and thought to re-examining the mechanics of its own animation than to admiring its own reflection in a variety of mirrors. This book seeks so consistently not to disturb or offend that for all its virtues and good intentions it fails in the end to do more than offer the theatre yet another such mirror in which to admire itself and congratulate itself upon its own appearance. When, as seems likely, Mr. Elsom is asked to prepare a third edition, it is to be hoped that the revisions undertaken then will include a more radical and comprehensive examination of the climate and language (to use his own phrase) that have surrounded the changes discussed than that which accompanies revision of the 1976 edition.

[Glynne Wickham has been Professor of Drama at the University of Bristol since 1960. (The first Chair of its kind in the U.K.) He has held visiting Professorships at the State University of Iowa, (1959/60); Yale University (1969/70); Dalhousie University (N.S. Canada), (1976/77) and served as Chairman of the National Drama Conference, National Council for Social Service (1970-76). He is at present President of The Society for Theatre Research (since 1976) and Governor of The Bristol Old Vic (since 1963). Publications include: *Early English Stages*, Routledge & Columbia U.P. and *The Medieval Theatre*, Wiedenfeld & St. Martins Press, 1974 (hard-back) 2nd ed. 1979 (paperback).]

POEM

SECOND MEDITATION: BLACK-MINT DREAMS

(for Richard Hugo and Madeline DeFrees)

We stand, children born of black waters;
three waxed figures waiting, like unkissed girls,
to hide a promise, or repeat a crime;
breath our perfumed and terrible dreams
on the white thunder of paper. We wash
our dark poems in the dark pool, like echoes.
Shadow must seek shadow. They lead the way.

Night waits in embers of the tavern.
We press into each other's silence,
fragile bones nesting near the water,
placing marks where no such marks have been.
We swell like blossoms to touch it all, to hold
our bare illusions for each passer-by,
for each wild mint flower dying beneath us.

We sit below the marshes, below the graves
of Carbonado, collecting darkness
like a past. An old man recites our names
as though stepping on the corpse of a dead god.
We pitch our clumsy camp like trespassers
who touch embers of the sleeping. The dead
love their names. We go among them unnoticed.

FREDRICK ZYDEK

QUARTERLY FILM REVIEW

by James Morton

A FILM chosen to open the London Film Festival must always be regarded with a certain amount of initial respect. Jiri Menzel's *Those Wonderful Movi-Cranks* opened the 1979 offering and quickly appeared at, and disappeared from, the Paris Pullman and Phoenix Cinemas. It is fairly easy to understand how it gained its exalted position and why the audiences didn't like it. Menzel, a decade or more ago, directed the magnificent *Closely Observed Trains* and the engaging *Capricious Summer*. Traditionally the opening film is not usually a particularly controversial one. He therefore qualifies for the accolade of the opening night on both counts.

Audiences didn't like it because only the very best Slav films can attract an English audience and this isn't one of them. The language barrier really is a killer. In French, Italian, Spanish and German films we do have *some* idea if the sub-titles are given, even a vague interpretation of the dialogue. In the Slav language films for all we know they are reciting Wordsworth's *Daffodils*. This is the first way in which an audience is inevitably alienated and it requires something rather better than average to overcome their resistance. Sadly *Movi-Cranks* is at its best only average.

The film is loosely based on the real life Slovac film pioneers, Ponrepo, the owner of the first travelling cinema, and Jan Kriznecky, who improved the mechanism of a Luiere camera. In the film they join forces to make the first Czech movie. The film which we see is largely picaresque, following the adventures of Pasporte (the Ponrepo character) as he flits from town to town one step ahead of creditors and rivals. The film it most resembles is the earlier *The Picture Show Man* made in Australia and *The Picture Show Man* does not suffer by comparison. The fire in the projection room could be taken shot for shot. It is a far cry from Menzel's earlier work.

Since he made *Bullitt* Peter Yates has been a most sought after director. Among others, Hoffman wanted him to direct in *John and Mary*, Racquel Welch her in *Jugs Ears and Speed* and his work has suffered. Now he directs an absolute cracker of a film, *Breaking Away*. Cast with largely unknowns, this is the story of Town and Gown in Indianapolis. Dave is a cycling fanatic and to the despair of his father he learns Italian, shaves his legs and urges his parents to have a large family *a lá italienne*. Three other friends from High School are quasi dropouts, unwilling to follow their fathers into the job of stone cutting. After a row on the campus the University bicycle race is opened to teams from the town. The four lads racing as Cutters, the abusive name given by the students to the townsfolk, enter.

It is not fair to tell you if they succeed. It is fair to say that the audience was willing them to do so. To get a live audience to participate in some-

thing appearing on the screen in itself is no mean feat and by the time of the race Yates has us eating out of his hands. He is extremely fortunate with his casting. Dennis Christopher has enormous charm as the fey Dave. As his redneck father Paul Dooley cannot understand why he should have to be called Poppa, and the cat have his name changed from Jake to Fellini. He runs the gamut of emotions from bewilderment, through anger to pride in his son, with a deal of skill. The film itself is doing enormous business in America and in these desperate days it's easy to see that its hometown corn philosophy is appealing. It is a compliment to say that in its humour the film owes much to Preston Sturges.

The finest film in London at the moment is being shown at the Plaza in Camden Town, which has garnered itself a small corner in the films of Max Ophuls. This time it is showing *Letter from an Unknown Woman* with Joan Fontaine as the betrayed lady and Louis Jourdan as the caddish pianist who seduces and forgets her. The film has all the style of Ophuls; crane shots, tracks, 360 degree turns, everything we associate with him. It could be cloying and sentimental beyond redemption but his bitter sweet touch makes it the best of his American films.

I am always sceptical when distributors announce that films have been made in Black and White to engender authenticity. It seems to me they are made in that form to economise on production costs, by no means an unsensible thing to do nowadays. Woody Allen's latest remake of his earlier film, *Manhattan*, starts with an attractive shot of the New York skyline to music by Gershwin and a voice over by Mr. Allen giving the opening lines of a proposed novel. Such plot as there is is merely the skeleton on which to hang a series of one line gags such as 'I had an orgasm once but my analyst told me it was the wrong type'. In brief, Allen's wife has left him for a lesbian relationship. He is now sleeping with and trying to dispose of the large Ms Hemingway playing a seventeen year old student. He meets Diane Keaton who is in love with his best friend, a quasi-happily married man. Now, aficionados of the Allen real life saga will remember that Ms Keaton lived with Allen for some time and it would seem that he has still to get over it. The principals play musical beds and if slick New York Jewish humour is in your line and you haven't seen *Annie Hall* or at least forgotten the jokes from it then *Manhattan* will pass a pleasantly amusing couple of hours. Sadly it is so inferior to Allen's *Interiors* in which he did not act that one is driven inescapably to the conclusion that he cannot exercise sufficient self discipline in the films in which he appears.

With *Warriors* such a success in America there was bound to be a series of spin offs and follow ups. This was doubly assured by the fact that the Chicancos are now the up and coming minority race in the States and some sort of recognition is being given to them. I doubt they will much appreciate the homage to their position, *Boulevard Nights*, which is a non-musical West Coast *West Side Story*. A stirring tale of two brothers who live in a Los Angeles shanty town with their widowed mother,

a lady marked for death by her first consumptive cough at the end of the credits. In fact she stops a bullet aimed at one of her errant sons. The other has, by the end of the film, reformed, married and drops off the dying sibling on the hospital steps. The acting is inept, the direction turgid and the film limps along covering more or less every gangland cliche. It is right to say that I saw this film with an audience which was almost exclusively coloured and they thoroughly appreciated the strip cartoon sentiments, actively encouraging the projectionist with calls of 'He's bad to her' when one of the sons pushes his mother about and with absolute cries of horror when she slumps to the ground fatally striken during the elder son's wedding reception. In passing it is interesting to note that there is no police force to speak of in Los Angeles. Gangs battled away uninterrupted.

The third of the films, *Wanderers*, is due here shortly and will not be reviewed.

The Secret Policeman's Ball is the first film directed by John Cleese of Monty Python and Fawlty Towers fame. In fact it doesn't really need much directing as it is the record of an Amnesty Gala at Her Majesty's Theatre. The same old committed faces, now middle-aged, run through undergraduate routines before a totally captive and sychophantic audience. There are of course good bits, notably Billy Connelly telling the septic story of two Scots who learn the Pope's favourite tipple is Crême de Menthe. Perhaps he sums up the whole atmosphere with his remark 'I'm the only bloke here who left school before he was twenty-one'.

Bear Island directed by Don Sharp is the latest Alistair MacLean novel to be filmed. The warning signs are there in the credits which show Murray Smith was brought in to try and do something with the dialogue. He has partially succeeded in this tale of Murder on the Alaskan Express, or in the Igloo to be precise. The usual cast of second division stars go through very competent paces murdering each other in search of gold or secrets or both. Outside it's like *Bullitt* with splendid chases through the snow. Inside Agatha Christie rides again. But, in search of something to take the children to which doesn't include a scene of bestiality, you could find a great number worse, including the latest Walt Disney thriller *The London Connection* which seems to be a remake of *Puppet on a Chain*.

THE EMPTY PLAINS

by Elizabeth Gowans

IT was another o' them big tourist coaches—scrunching the gravel and catching the last of the evening sun broadside on as it turned. Funny, she thought, how they always managed to make the place just before dark. No doubt someone up in the city who planned these tours had a big map with all these sorts of places marked on it and they checked them off with a pencil and told the drivers what time to leave in the mornings and how long they could stop if the ladies wanted to get down or the gentlemen wanted to take pictures. That would be it, she supposed. Roast lamb tonight. Knives, forks, spoons. Not that any of them would know the difference. Glasses, serviettes. In fact it was roast lamb every night at Roadside Lodge. Two tables had to be reserved for people who were already staying there. Those sort of people were . . . she paused . . . There must be a word for people who were difficult to understand? Different? If they were proper tourists why didn't they come in coaches like the others? Not that she didn't *like* the idea of people travelling in private cars, but she couldn't understand how they would know where to travel *to* if somebody wasn't in charge—as on a coach. Well—they'd soon cotton on to the roast lamb trick if they stayed around much longer.

By now the people were streaming into the Lodge, dropping their bags, calling to each other and asking where the Ladies Room was. This was the part she always found a little frightening. There were so many of them —mind you—you could tell they didn't *really* know each other—they couldn't have shared a silence for example . . . Was that perhaps why they shouted so loud . . . (?) to scare each other off like blue jays . . . (?) and that way they'd never meet? They were beginning to sit down now—still shouting at each other—untidying the place . . . Already she could imagine the mound of washing up that would be left afterwards. Ah well—it didn't matter—and she got paid for it. It was certainly better than sitting at home with her father—watching the hog. She never told him about the people she served—the handsome young men in pastel shirts and the elegant women, people with fancy beards, expensive sweaters and delicate hands—the children in little suits—and women who took their earrings off at the table, looked at them and put them back on again. She knew what he'd say. Some of them were foreign too (!). And they drunk wine! By and large they said 'please' and 'thank you' to her—if not to each other—but there was something in the way they said it—as if they all shared a secret they were afraid of giving away by laughing out loud. Oh! One family had broken away from the main herd and was heading towards a Reserved table!

I'll have to cut them off, she thought, going over. Steer them back.

'You can't sit there,' she said flatly. 'You have to sit over there.'

'Why not?' said the woman.

'I want to sit here,' said the child.

The things they thought to say, these people.

'It's Reserved,' she told them. 'Mr. Thal said so.'

And they paused a split second—gave her that 'look'—then turned and went.

After the coaches had gone in the mornings, she could never remember what the people had said to her—but looking across the vast empty expanse of land—was left with a dull sense of wonder. Wonder that she had seen — had *spoken* to all those people at all—and that now they had vanished from her life completely and would never return. One remark—which she had overheard about herself—she *had* remembered. 'I expect they borrowed her from a neighbouring farm,' a visitor had said. 'Probably helps out here for a couple of hours after the milking.' Now that was an ignorant thing to say! Anyone could tell this was sheep country and not dairy! You only had to look at the grass to know that.

But there was definitely something funny about that boy in the corner. He'd probably end up knocking his glass over if not the whole table. It would be awkward and she'd have to clean it up—but there was plenty more food in the kitchen. . . . Mr. Thal was always careful to see about that. In fact he did all the cooking himself and seemed to know in advance just how many people would be in the coaches that day and, somehow or other, even if people arrived in private cars or on motor bikes, he managed to say he'd been expecting them! Still, it was none of her business. As Mrs. Thal would have been the first to say.

Really—she thought Mrs. Thal was very lucky to have been married to Mr. Thal—and Mr. Thal doing all the cooking. Not that that wasn't a little funny; but him having been in the navy probably made a difference. Somehow. She liked Mr. Thal and would have been very upset if her father had found out about his cooking. In fact—she had often thought that if it weren't for Mrs. Thal—she could have talked to him. Ah well—someone was calling. Strictly speaking that was one of Julia's tables, she thought, bearing down on it. The people looked into her face and she looked from one face to the other—concentrating hard. No one spoke. She looked down at the table. But the knives and forks lay untouched. What had these people been doing since they sat down? Where were their plates?

'You had your mains?' she asked sternly.

Again that quick look down, that something being suppressed . . . flew past her . . . 'We . . . don't actually want . . . "mains" . . .' said the woman —fiddling with the clasp of her handbag. . . 'Could you bring us some cheese?'

'I'll ask,' she said, still frowning hard—but as she made her way back to the kitchen—turning to squeeze between the tables—she caught sight of the woman with the handbag, actually clutching her mouth and rocking to and fro with laughter!

Now it being one of Julia's tables rather complicated things—and this was the second time this evening. First it had been that table wanting wine —and although the restaurant wasn't licensed—she was always made to set the tables with wine glasses. So naturally the people asked—and then she would have to go to the kitchen and tell Mr. Thal and he would come over and explain that they *weren't* licensed—but that he'd let them have 'a bottle of his own'. It made things difficult—and like the cheese—she always felt something was required of her but didn't quite know what kind of face to put on it. It would be much easier, she thought, if people just ate what they were given and didn't ask questions about the glasses.

'Isn't she *extraordinary*!' said the woman. 'I'm quite glad we stopped here! But can you imagine not having any choice! Not even a Menu!'

'Can't expect much in these out of the way places,' said her husband. 'Seems clean enough.'

'The girl who served us *first* was quite attractive . . . (!) . . . but *that* one . . . (!)'

'Probably off a farm. . .'

'But I didn't think people like that *existed* any more. . . ! Do you think she's ever been kissed?'

'Not unless it was one of the cows . . .!'

'But there's nothing at all . . . *feminine* about her . . . (!)'

'Straight nose. Quite healthy. . .'

'But look at the way she *moves*—like a *tank*! And so stern. . . . (!)'

If it had been her table she would have just told them there wasn't any cheese and that would have been that. Should she say: 'Your table wants cheese, Julia.'(?) It didn't sound right. How about—'Mr. Thal. Is there cheese?'(?) Something wrong with that too—because she knew as well as he did that there was cheese in the fridge. She could just get it out, she supposed, but there'd be problems about the right kind of plate. . . Perhaps if she stood in the kitchen doorway Mr. Thal would ask her what the matter was. . . .

Now Julia Thal didn't take the work seriously at all. That was obvious. Getting all dressed up that way first and then smiling and talking to the people. And laughing. You'd think they were at a party! You could see people watching her as she passed through the tables. They were looking at her behind. And at her legs. But she wasn't much use in the kitchen—even if it was only the vacations they had to worry about her being there. And she wasn't friendly. There'd been that time when she'd taken the bus to town and they'd bumped into each other in the main street—and Julia hadn't said hello. Mind you—she hadn't said hello either—but that was different. And she'd been thinking of other things.

Yes. That'd been the day when she'd been called upon to use all the knowledge she had ever been able to garner from the women's magazines and romance novelettes that the guests left behind in their rooms and

that Mrs. Thal had let her keep. They left all sorts of things. Stockings—some of them quite good; paper bags with names like Christy's Fashions on them; combs, with the odd tooth missing—hair clips, half-used lipsticks and talcum powder tins that weren't even empty. But it was the magazines and novelettes that meant the most to her—and these she kept in a cardboard box, provided by Mr. Thal and read over and over again. She could have written you a *list* of known ways of making yourself more attractive—or of keeping your man at home—(Indeed, Mr. Thal certainly never went *anywhere*.)

She knew better than to take any of her spoils 'home'. Not that she would have *minded* seeing most of it go into the fire: but she couldn't have borne hearing her father mock them—and call them names. Names she didn't even like to think of . . . like 'Vanities' and 'Works of Satan'. . . 'Deceits and Connivers' and 'Trash' and 'Rubbish'. He would have taken delight in tearing the magazines to shreds—and the heroes of the stories and episodes would have crinkled and turned brown before her eyes as he stuffed them in the fire—before bursting into flames. Once she had spilt some coffee on one of the illustrations and had felt quite wretched about it for days afterwards. It was the picture of 'Michael, the young apprentice draughtsman, suddenly looking up from his desk to see who was standing there' (!)—And that look on his face!. . . He seemed to be looking right at her as if he could see into her heart. She had—in her collection—4 episodes in that serial—and although they were not consecutive—they'd provided her with endless ground for speculation—and escape. Identifying wholeheartedly with the heroine, she thought Michael the most wonderful man in the world. She remembered that now. That was before she'd been married—to that casual labourer—who'd stayed on.

Puddings were ready and there was to be a choice. The people could have either apple pie and cream or trifle and jelly. There were fifteen of each served up in readiness and after that Mrs. Thal would simply dish out according to demand. That way, it saved the rush and always worked out quite well, especially as they used the same spoons and forks whichever they had. The trick was to ask the people what they wanted and then not get it wrong. Approaching the first table with her tray she noticed that, as usual, the people had not bothered to pile up their plates but just sat behind them as if they expected them to somehow leap magically onto her tray. Even when she said, 'I need your plates,' the penny didn't drop so she had to balance the tray between two of them and pile the plates on it, hoping no one would move an elbow or get in the way. As often as not they didn't even have the good sense to lean back when she reached across for the plates from the other side(!) Sometimes she was afraid she'd say something embarrassing—like 'apple cry and peem'—and the very thought of it made her so uncomfortable she had to speak out loud to cover it up. 'Apple Pie and Cream or trifle and jelly,' she said, hoping the question wouldn't provoke any problems. She'd once been asked whether the cream was fresh and although she'd put her finger in it in the kitchen afterwards and it tasted perfectly alright—she'd no idea

what the woman could have meant. She'd like to have asked someone that.

So. That was four trifle and jellies an apple pie and cream and an apple pie and no cream. Frowning hard and concentrating on not dropping the tray she started back to the kitchen making as straight a path as possible—and oblivious of the amusement she was causing the visitors. 4 trifle and jellies, an apple pie and cream and an apple pie no cream. That was 4 trifle and jellies, an apple pie. . .

They were the sort of people she'd read about in the magazines—who made their mouths fuller by underlining the lower lip with a pencil—and who knew whether they had almond or oval shaped faces. It had worked for them—coming from somewhere else. A big place perhaps. They could open and shut their handbags, cross one leg over the other and lean across the table—or have their cigarettes lighted for them and touch each other on the cheek. And nobody laughed at them and told them to stop acting daft and putting on bloody airs.

Her mind went back to that day of shame in town—the day she'd bumped into Julia—and immediately felt guilty about even being there. And then in the chemists—going to the cosmetics counter instead of prescriptions—and feeling Mr. Thorogood's eyes burning into her back. . . She'd read you were supposed to dab a bit on the back to your hand to see how it went into your skin colour—but how were you supposed to get the lids off without angering the assistant? And surely it would make a mark if you stuck your finger in it?

All the phrases loved by her father pursued her—hounded her that day —from chemists to lingerie—from lingerie to dress shop—and from dress shop to jewellers. She hadn't the wit to lie—even had it not been obvious she was a country girl who'd come in on the bus to 'pick out a few things'. Her mouth in a tough line and chewing her lip she'd made it back to the bus shelter with her purchases. A pair of earrings—small gold beech leaves that had called to her somehow from the Notions counter; a pink nightgown—quite a complicated affair which would be very difficult to iron. On second thoughts—should she have tried it on? But that would have been impossible!—if not unlucky. A blue silk petticoat and some bubble bath (*that* had surprised even herself!); a twin set and a pleated skirt, a large assortment of eye-liners, lipsticks, face powder, nail polish and remover, night cream and similar items which, though expensive, she felt she would have to experiment with at home rather than in the shop. Next time she'd know what she wanted. The stockings had presented a problem because although she had never worn them at home, she knew from her reading that pantihose were more 'sensible' and 'athletic'— but the men preferred stockings and, what's more, they liked to see the ladies putting them on and snapping the suspenders open and shut. . . . So —she'd bought a garter belt and some real stockings, but to be on the safe side—some pantihose too.

'I prefer not to think of that now'—she said to herself out loud as she

arranged the trifles and jellies and apple pies with and without cream on her tray. It would have been better, as her father had said, to blow the lot on chewing tobacco rather than all that rubbish. 'And,' as he'd said, 'What's such a big deal about you getting married you have to get all dressed up for anyway? Don't see sheep carryin' on like that and it's not as if *he* doesn't know how plain you are(!) Now get over there and help in the dip.' Still—she couldn't get those stockings—and the garters—out of her mind! There they were—married—and she'd been practising fastening and unfastening her suspenders until it looked good—and was sitting on the edge of the bed—crossing and uncrossing her legs and trying to time it right so's he'd see as he came out of the bathroom—and he'd come out and walked straight past her in his bath towel, stared out of the hotel window and said: 'Is that a Datsun Mark 4 out there?' And then in the restaurant—she'd tried to sit with her legs prettily arranged under the table in case he should drop his fork and bend down and see them wide apart—and he'd dropped it—and told her to pick it up! Oh! It was too horrible to think about.

'Don't start getting temperamental' he'd said, when she'd first cried, 'or I'll have to hit you.' So she watched it—and tried to act more sensible. There was no one to talk to anyway. Evenings he sat on the porch with her Dad—drinking beer—and they talked about the sheep. It was a foregone conclusion that when her father went, he would take over. Soon he'd do it, she supposed—and then there'd be children. And afterwards? Well . . . already she was becoming like her Aunt Leta—always shouting at her husband's back (because he never turned around when she spoke —didn't seem to hear her)—talking non-stop and trying to fill the gap—the dreadful silence of a man who simply couldn't be bothered with her; Hoping—hoping—and finally not hoping any more. Her mind's eye scanning the place where she lived—she gave the people their puddings. 'You could shoot a gun up the main street and not hit anyone!' she thought aloud—then coming to, picked up her empty tray and walked to the kitchen in a perfectly straight line.

[Elizabeth Gowans, professional traveller and author, has written for radio, television and stage. Her play *Thank You For Having Us* was presented by the National Student Theatre Company during the 1979 Edinburgh Festival as a Fringe production. She holds an Arts Council Bursary and is a winner in the 1979 National Poetry Competition. Her poem 'Messages' will be published by the National Poetry Society in the 1979 anthology.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

THREATS TO MANKIND

Syndromes of The Seventies. J. A. Loraine. Peter Owen. £5.75.

Some time ago I wrote a Foreword for John Loraine's latest book *Syndromes of The Seventies.* I was glad to do so for I have long been one of his admirers.

Now I have read the book again, and I have been once more impressed by the range of his interest and research and by his special emphasis on the interdependence of the great world issues he discusses—poverty and population, urban squalor and unemployment, women's rights and family planning. Throughout he conveys a sense of mounting urgency. What he calls 'the transition of mankind from a growth-oriented to a steady state economy' has to be charted 'within the compass of a single generation' and in speaking of 'the concept of material equilibrium' he quotes Bertrand Russell when he spoke of a society 'where individuals grow freely, and where hate and greed and envy die because there is nothing to nourish them'.

To speak clearly and convincingly about such vast and complex questions requires the gifts of an economist and a political scientist and a devoted internationalist. Loraine is all three, and he is also a doctor, with a warmth of human feeling.

I like his account of his conversion, if it may so be called, when twenty years ago he went to lecture in South America, and in Santiago he saw the shanty town which had grown up on the outskirts of the city. He was appalled at what he saw, the degradation, poverty and squalor, and the people everywhere malnourished or starving. As he says in the book, he never forgot Santiago.

I have had similar experiences especially in Kingston, Jamaica, and later in Lagos, Nigeria. I have been horrified by the prevalence of such mean ugliness, such squalid congestion, such hopeless human misery—hundreds of thousands of people sucked into dreadful slums. I too became convinced that nothing in the world is more important than the world-wide drift to urban squalor. And when I was free to do what I liked, I applied to work for the United Nations Population Fund which has done such outstanding work in the past decade; under the able administration of Rafael Salas it is now able to offer the best expert advice on population questions to every country in the world that asks for it.

I must admit that I have since been much diverted to problems of immediate political confrontation, in the Middle East and in southern Africa particularly; but I constantly try to remind myself that even the likelihood of racial and national conflicts on a terrible scale is no more important or urgent than the world-wide problems on which John Loraine has been teaching and preaching for twenty years.

Support for his campaigns has been steadily growing. Even with Iran and Afghanistan on our anxious minds as we end one decade and start another, emphasis on the long term initiatives which John Loraine has long advocated is sustained and reinforced.

When Willy Brandt made his announcement in London just before Christmas of the report shortly to be made by his Independent Commission on International Development Issues—the Commission composed of eighteen world-known leaders in economics and politics—he said that the Commission would propose reforms in the world's financial and monetary system; in the relation-

ships between transnational corporations and host countries; in provision for food production and food security; in population policies—a list which reads like an index to Loraine's book.

And he added 'We want economic growth, but not just economic growth. We want it as a way of creating a safer, more satisfying, freer life for all the peoples of the world'.

And when William Clark of the World Bank made a report at the end of last year he quoted President Kennedy's famous phrase 'If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich' and he concluded his report with these words 'The key decision before us all in the next few months is how high a priority we shall give in the Eighties to development in the poorer countries.

'On that depends just how the world divides—or unites—in the rest of the century. Whatever is done, it is worth remembering that in the year 2000 there will be nearly four times as many people in the developing world as in the industrialised world'.

He reinforces the warning which Robert McNamara himself gave us when he recently addressed the World Bank Board of Governors about 'the vision and courage and boldness that history is clearly asking of us all' in creating 'the new interdependent world order'. He said 'We must use the time we have. And we must use it now. It will never return'.

John Loraine's book gives us a searching review and an urgent challenge on these great issues. He seeks to convince us that, as I said in the Foreword to his book, there is precious little time left to take decisions vital to the future of the whole world.

HUGH CARADON

POSTWAR BRITAIN

Britain Since 1945. David Childs. Benn. £11.95.

Dr. Childs, who is best known for his scholarship on German affairs has produced a rather exorbitantly priced volume on *Britain Since* 1945. In paperback it could well become standard reading for a generation to whom Clem Attlee and Winston Churchill—or even Macmillan and Gaitskell—are no more than figures from history. The narrative is an interesting mixture of sixth-form history and quotations giving colourful commentaries on the times.

The early chapter on the wave of radicalism which swept Labour into power underrates the pre-war influences typified by the Left-book club and says little about the gigantic tasks of post-war reconstruction facing the Government. It is strong on political statistics, perceptive in its concise sketches of the political personalities of the times and well documented with regard to source material. Dr. Childs does not set out to teach any political lessons although one has the feeling that in seeking to be objective and acceptable to a broad readership, he has subordinated his own analytical capabilities.

In covering a thirty-five-year period still fresh in the memory of older readers, Dr. Childs naturally has to use the broad brush of bland historical narrative but sometimes captures the atmosphere of the times if only by slipping in Roger Bannister's four minute mile or the crashing of two Comets symbolising industrial reverses in 1954. His Chapter on the Macmillan era and the divided opposition with the evolution of the new Left is particularly informative. The latter would of course make a fascinating study in itself but Dr. Childs fails to trace the consequences of that ferment in terms of contemporary schisms. Gaitskell emerges as dedicated, sincere, courageous but

colourless while Macmillan had that indefinable charisma so admired by Harold Wilson, aptly described as 'the certain style' which led him to remarkable success.

Dr. Childs is perceptive about Britain's view of itself as the hub of the emerging Commonwealth, unable to perceive that it was becoming a relatively poor relation. In Foreign affairs, his account of the Bevin period with the transformation of India and the beginning of the cold war is perhaps too kind to the bullying Bevin, and takes little note of the apparent carve up of the world into spheres of influence at Potsdam, which permitted the Russians to sell their Communist allies in Greece down the river, annexing the Baltic States and turning the rest of Eastern Europe into satellites while Britain was overtaxing its economic strength in armament expenditure.

I was intrigued by the suggestion that a vast programme of aid to the East might have produced a Finnish solution to the area, although in his own sphere Dr. Childs is certainly correct in describing how the Soviet desire for revenge and reparation killed Socialism in the whole of Germany. One example of the curious insularity of Britain's internationalist party towards Europe, now perhaps reflected in Benn, Shore and Silkin, is Willy Brandt's comment on Gaitskell:—

> Hugh Gaitskell found it quite natural to introduce me to a London gathering in 1962 as 'our friend from overseas'. He had sharply rejected British entry at a Labour Party Conference not long before. My friend Per Haekkerup, the Danish Foreign Minister, who had been a guest at Brighton, told me that he felt throughout Gaitskell's speech as if the doors at the back of the Hall might open at any moment and Queen Victoria come striding in.

If I may make a personal confession, I myself was still sloganising 'Britain Yes, Common Market No' in 1962 and I have little doubt that had he lived Hugh Gaitskell would have undergone the transformation that led the late Professor John Mackintosh, Michael Barnes and me to explain at a Parliamentary Party meeting how the experiences of 1964 had transformed our view of interdependence and the need to look at politics from a view beyond the narrow nationalism of the early postwar period.

Certainly the EEC debate is well covered by insights into social history, be it the Pilkington Report, educational changes, progress in housing or Women's Liberation. There is an insight into the highly undesirable Kitchen Cabinet of Harold Wilson which devalued the currency of Parliamentary democracy in Britain and Cecil King's apt description of the aloof Ted Heath as 'essentially an able civil servant' rather than a political leader.

Tables at the end of the book are helpful to students of politics as are the indexes of living standards. It has straightforward accounts of recent political developments; but if there is an underlying criticism it is that in biting off so large a chunk of recent history it inevitably fails to trace the origins. He treats the Northern Ireland problem as if it started with Bernadette Devlin, and by failing to probe behind the scenes, produces a simplistic view of inter party and internal party disputes. However, for all its simplification I believe that Dr. Childs has produced a book which will be an excellent source of basic history laced with revealing quotations on an era as distant from the punk rockers and reggae fans of today, as the Crimean War or Disraeli and Gladstone.

PAUL ROSE

THE SCHOLAR POET

A. E. Housman: The Scholar Poet. Richard Perceval Graves. Routledge & Kegan Paul. £9.75.

Mr. Graves prefers the safe snick of a known fact into a receptive groove, or a new fact into the spaces around that groove, to any ranging hazards of interpretation. His biographer's persona is as austere as Housman's public face, and yet, since his devotion to his subject is obvious, there must be a depth to his understanding. Preserving then, as he does, a magisterial tone, he confronts two particular difficulties; he has to transmute the solipsist resident in the furthermost tower of Whewell's Court into a whole man with a family and a decent-sized regiment of friends—a man of ambitions and memories. Secondly, he has to transcend the embarrassment that the main factors in Housman's life are already accounted for. He has succeeded in both these areas by the sheer, cumulative weight of his research, and by a quiet but persistent demand on his reader's reservoir of instincts and emotions. His general fleshing-out of the structure of Housman's life sets him very firmly in the context of his family, and demonstrates that the celebrated aloofness veiled a singular kindness, sweetness and generosity, which impress more, perhaps, than the luridness of his secret life. In his lifetime, Housman spread a necessitous grey smoke-screen to obscure his homosexual activities and the fundamental hurts of the early death of his mother, after a harrowing death-bed scenario in the fashion of those times, his consequent loss of Christian faith, and the refusal of his love by the one man for whom he cared until his own death. *On n'aime que la premierè fois.*

Mr. Graves is not precisely reticent about Housman's adventures in the Corvine labyrinths of Venice, which he circumnavigated during vacations with amazing *sang froid* for such a shy man, but the effect of his determined objectivity, with the same solemnity accorded, for example, to Housman's largesse towards his gondolier friend, as to the dispositions which he made to his own relatives, escapes the comical by merely a whisker. The revelation that Housman appears to have enjoyed the repeated services of male prostitutes in Paris is brutally reduced to a few words. Arguably, it is better so, but I am certain that, if they are available, we should be allowed more details of the governess's 'immoral behaviour' and 'promiscuity', which, it seems, were important elements in deflecting the adolescent Housman from heterosexuality.

The schema of Mr. Graves' study is, regrettably, of a kind which must still fret his scholar's super ego: we read on up to 1911, when Housman was fifty-three, enjoying the chronological flow and the illustrative use of the poems, only to be curbed up short by the next chapter, which is an interpolated and partly retrospective critique of the poetry from 1892 to 1911. The essay on Housman's achievements as a classical scholar, which could be abstracted painlessly intact from the socket of the main narrative, is neat, compendious and useful. One is, however, somewhat taken aback by Mr. Graves' apologetic attitude to the poetry. He begins his discussion thereof with the discouraging comment that there is much that is morbid and self-pitying. I do not believe that even a new and disaffected audience will agree that 'With rue my heart is laden/For golden friends I had' is inferior and sentimental. Dross there may be elsewhere, but he expressly wishes to introduce a new generation to the neglected beauties of Housman's poetry, and this cannot be the way to do it.

MOLLY TIBBS

HAPPY MERRY SOULS

Caroline of Brunswick, A Biography. Thea Holme. Hamish Hamilton. £8.95.
The Americans. Alistair Cooke. Bodley Head. £5.95.

Whatever criticisms may be levelled at the supply of royalties from the minor princely courts of Germany that come to England in the late 18th century they were never dull. Caroline, a Princess of Brunswick, who came in 1795 to marry the Prince of Wales (later George IV) was a lively example of minor royalty who believed she was a major star in the royal constellation. Once the marriage with the Prince was achieved and a British royal progeny was secured, Caroline set off on her own to the vast entertainment of the British people and their consternation. Affronted by her husband she was adored by the populace and her trial by the House of Lords added a remarkable episode to the history of British royalty.

Thea Holme's book comes at a time of wide interest in a television programme on George III and the Prince Regent, but it is by no means merely a 'book of the film'. Well written, thoroughly researched and able to stand on its own feet *Caroline* is a very pleasant product of most readable scholarship with a popular 'touch' that provides a most satisfying portrait of the historical period as well as of one of its most entertaining characters.

One virtue Alistair Cooke shares with the Princess Caroline. They are both superb communicators, using the instruments of their time in telling people about their contemporaries. In Mr. Cooke's case it is the United States of America which he discovered in 1932 and ever since has gone on to explore not only geographical America but the multitude of people who call themselves 'Americans'. He is now one of them himself, but this does not prevent from maintaining an objective view of his own countrymen and of the British too! His chief instrument of communication across the Atlantic is his 'Letter from America' now in its thirty-fifth year with no signs of lagging. Its secret, he says, is that he is talking not *to* America but *about* America—a vast difference so ably and delightfully reflected in this collection of fifty of his letters.

CECIL NORTHCOTT

PRINCESS MINETTE

Charles II's Minette, Princess Henriette-Anne, Duchess of Orleans. Bryan Bevan. Ascent Books. £6.95.

Princess Henriette-Anne, youngest daughter of Charles, remains one of the lesser known members of the House of Stuart and yet she played a significant role during the reign of her brother, Charles II. Only a few weeks after her birth on 16 June, 1644, in Exeter, the town was besieged by parliamentary troops, and her mother Henrietta Maria deemed it expedient to escape to France which she did after a stormy passage. She left her daughter in the care of Lady Dalkeith. Some two years later Lady Dalkeith, suspecting that Parliament intended to coerce her to hand over the Princess, fled to France with her royal charge who was re-united with her mother. Henriette-Anne grew up during the early years of Louis XIV's reign and was for some years his cherished companion. At the age of 17 she married Louis' younger brother, Philippe, Duke of Orleans, and despite Bossuet's reference to her as 'the happy spouse of a great prince' the marriage was not a success. Orleans was in fact a homosexual.

Ever since her childhood Princess Henriette-Anne had shown great affection for her brother Charles and it was he who gave her the nickname Minette. By October, 1662 she had assumed the position of importance as intermediary

between her brother and Louis. Her most vital role was in helping to bring about an alliance between England and France. It was not true that Minette influenced Charles in favour of a French alliance; he had always wanted it but it was her great task to work tirelessiy to achieve it. She cleverly argued in a letter to Charles the advantage of 'entering into a league with Louis against Holland.' The early years of Charles II's reign had been dominated by his chief minister, the Earl of Clarendon, but with his downfall as a result of the 2nd Dutch War 1665-7 Charles was able to pursue his own policy which was to establish in England a monarchy similar to that of Louis XIV, in effect to govern autocratically. A French alliance became the corner stone of his policy and negotiations to this end were carried out in strict secrecy with the invaluable aid of his sister, Minette. The outcome of all this secret diplomacy was the Treaty of Dover 1670 by which Charles was to receive money from Louis, war was to be declared on Holland by both kings, and Charles was to declare himself a Roman Catholic when convenient. Charles has been criticised for accepting Louis's gold in order to achieve freedom from parliamentary control but there is much to be said for his pursuit of the French alliance. Both Charles and Minette saw more clearly than most of their compatriots that Holland was the real enemy. Britain's greatness as a naval and imperial power was fostered during the commercial and maritime wars with the Dutch, and Charles had the insight and intelligence to see this.

In this intimate biography Bryan Bevan re-lives the glorious days of Le Roi Soleil; he describes Minette as the socialite but he has not neglected to emphasise the more sombre aspect of her nature, the tenacity and skill with which she strove to bring about the French alliance which in some measure helped to destroy the Dutch who were at that time the arch-enemy of Britain in the East and in the New World.

S. F. WOOLLEY

MURDER FOR GAIN

The Life and Crimes of Charles Sobhraj. Richard Neville & Julie Clarke. Jonathan Cape. £6.95.

Multiple murder for gain, not for sadistic pleasure, acquires a desensitizing, distancing quality with every repeated act, unless sadism creeps in and attaches to the deed. Charles Sobhraj, who used to read Jung, Nietzche and Lobsang Rampa, and may even now be reading them in his prison cell in India, has a cracking line in rationalization and dissociation from guilt—'Does a professional soldier feel remorse after having killed a hundred men with a machine gun? Did the American pilots feel remorse after dropping napalm on my homeland? No. Society condoned the soldiers, telling them: You have the right to kill; it is your duty to kill—the more you kill the bigger the promotion —Don't I have the same right? In the interest of my own minority? And I can justify the murders to myself. I never killed good people.'

He was a mean killer, though, luring young tourist victims to the lair of his modern flat in Bangkok, drugging them, and despatching them for the booty of their passports and their valuable assets. He claimed a motive of a different kind for some of the ten murders (mostly not yet tried) to which he confessed in interviews with Richard Neville, of *Oz* fame, saying that he was hired for payment by Hong Kong drug masters to eliminate certain selected rival couriers *pour encourager les autres.* Mr. Neville is not convinced: invention and improvization come easily to Charles Sobhraj, an international criminal—drug dealer, gem dealer, conman, swindler, forger, thief—of stunning vivacity,

nerve, creativity, ambition and luck. He was classically 'hopeless', though, in his predilection for gambling, at which he would lose all his hard-grafted spoils, and, not too downcast, start up again the whole wretched cycle of fraud and flight across the borders of the East. He was truly incorrigible.

Mr. Neville and his co-author, Julie Clarke, have laboured by means of interviews all over the world to construct a case history that turns out to be a paradigm of early deprivation and rejection. Sobhraj's childhood comings and goings between his Thai mother and his Indian father, and his consequent statelessness encompass a hemisphere of sorrows. But what is the factor that spawns the will to murder?

However interesting the material, this book, it must be said, occupies an uneasy space on the shelves of the criminologist, because it is written in a form of 'faction'—i.e. the factual content is rendered more palatable by recreated conversations and introspections, based on interviewees' memories, official reports, police statements and private letters. On those purist shelves, notwithstanding, it must remain, beside the chronicles of the Bloody Benders and little Dr. Petiot, and not far away will be the volumes on the Charles Manson atrocities. Both Sobhraj and Manson exerted a Rasputin-like influence on young people, either to induce them to aid and abet them in their crimes, or to manoeuvre them into a position vulnerable to their own extinction. Both men are supposed to have what is termed 'charisma'. Poor Mr. Neville finds himself 'dazzled by a brilliant psychopath', but he is a gentle person and he should know that such wolves abound throughout the penal institutions of the world. We may marvel at the accessibility and frailty of those drawn to such men: the genuine students on their 'trip of a lifetime' to Katmandu, and the hippies growing gaunter and hungrier on their way to Shangri-La. Both Manson and Sobhraj used 'psychological' means to subdue and to establish dependence: brain-washing methods, deprivation, debility, isolation from roots, and drugs. Sobhraj perfected a beastly *modus operandi* of his own, doctoring his dupes first with laxatives under the guise of cures for dysentery, and then with modern psychiatric drugs. Female followers were his self-described slaves. Using the system of René Le Senne's 'Characterology', popular in France, Sobhraj classified those persons on whom his attention fastened into certain categories, so that, he thought, he could predict and manipulate their behaviour. His self-esteem remains, apparently, very high, and he is confident about his future. The serious interest giving point to this book is its documentation of criminal psychopathy derived from direct commerce with the offender, a valuable psychological modus outstandingly explored in the case of Peter Kürten, the Düsseldorf mass murderer, and all too rarely permitted.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Robert Lowery, Radical and Chartist (Europa Publications. £14.50). Robert Lowery's autobiography, edited with an Introduction by Brian Harrison and Patricia Hollis, should prove a valuable addition to the study of the Chartist agitation and the temperance movement in the mid-nineteenth century. Born in 1809 in North Shields, the son of a sailor, Robert Lowery, after a brief period as a boy sailor, became a tailor in South Shields and started on a radical career; and quite naturally he became



an active, prominent and influential Chartist. He was an exceptional speaker but never acquired national status in the movement. On the other hand he mixed with the leading figures. His radicalism was always influenced by morality and after failure of the Chartist conventions and the rejection of the Petition in 1839, Lowery steadily moved away from Chartism and became an important speaker in the temperance movement. Between 15 April 1856 and 23 May 1857, his memoirs appeared at irregular intervals in 33 articles in the *Weekly Record*. They are now reprinted in full in this volume, together with a pamphlet written in 1839, 'shewing how the people may free themselves from oppression', and selected letters, poems and speeches from newspaper reports, within the period 1834-1841. Lowery had an almost naive belief in the power of reason and moral principle in achieving political reform. The Editors conclude that 'Lowery's autobiography is important not only for its information on Chartism and its provincial, artisan and oratorical perspectives, but also for its self-consciousness about class relations, its appreciation of the growth of class harmony by the mid-1850s.' There is a useful section on further reading. David Vincent in a brief Foreword points out that this volume is the third in a series of working men's autobiographies from the Nineteenth century.

A History of Finland (Heinemann. £9.00). This short and popular history of Finland was first published in 1962, with a second edition in 1974. Professor Kauko Pirinen covers the period from the settlement of Finland until the early sixteenth century. The rest of the history is by Professor Eino Jutikkala who, in this third edition has made considerable revision and enlargement of the chapter on modern independent Finland until after the first world war. The text is translated into English by Paul Sjoblom.

The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (Arrow Books Ltd. £4.95 paperback). Any study of President Nixon's Presidency must include his own account set out in his massive memoirs. These are now republished in the Arrow edition, consisting of more than 1,000 pages with illustrations. The first edition was published by Sidgwick and Jackson in 1978.

Horace, Satires and Epistles: Persius, Satires (Penguin Books. £2.50). In 1973, Professor Niall Rudd published his verse translation of Horace's Satires and Persius Flaccus's Satires. In this new Penguin Classics edition, Professor Rudd has added verse translations of Horace's Epistles. In this new volume, the revision of the Satires consists in changing 'the basic sense . . . at only half a dozen points' and making the rhythm more regular. The interpretation of Persius is probably the translator's most difficult task. The Introduction, Notes, Bibliography and Index have been increased to cover the new material.

Where to Stay '80' Guides. The English Tourist Board, 4 Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0DU, have published three Guides, namely *Hotels in England* (£1.95), *Farmhouses and Bed and Breakfast in England* and *Self-Catering Accommodation in England* (£1.25).

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Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

March 1980 Vol. 236 No. 1370

RADICAL THOUGHT IN GERMANY

by David Southern

POLITICAL protest in Germany, whether coming from the right or the left, has exhibited certain characteristic features. In particular its political theory has expressed a Romantic hostility to the modern world. This common heritage of radical thought in Germany is well described by Joachim Fest in his celebrated biography of Hitler where he writes: 'The German mind . . . had little to do with the ability to assume pragmatic attitudes in which thought and life became reconciled... It was asocial in the literal sense of the word and thus basically orientated neither to the right nor to the left but to the celebrated antithesis to life.' In other words, German theorists have traditionally invented abstract concepts, invested them with real attributes, and then sought to apply them to actual circumstances. From where do these characteristics derive? Can traces of them still be found in West Germany today?

The peculiarities of German political thought stemmed from the Romantic Movement. German Romanticism of the nineteenth century was a revolution against the respectability, materialism, rationalism and democracy of the Western European bourgeois temperament. The two most influential German thinkers have been Marx and Nietzsche. Both in their way were children of the Romantic Movement and, despite all their differences, important points of comparison remain.

Both believed in the existence of great hidden forces proceeding on their immutable way beneath the external crust of life. For Nietzsche this ultimate reality consisted in vague spiritual forces to which the Nazis gave substance by postulating a universal racial war. The most real thing for Marx was the existence of 'classes,' which were also, until the final victory of the proletariat, engaged in a perpetual conflict. Thus both believed in a mystic essence of things. Both had a metaphysical theory of reality.

The behaviour of these abstract forces was dictated by universal laws of nature. Nietzsche called this mechanism the Eternal Recurrence, which is similar to Marx's Dialectic, with the difference that Nietzsche sees change as cyclical, whereas Marx sees it as progressive. According to Nietzsche there is an endlessly repeated pattern of events without progress. According to Marx, human society develops through five predetermined stages from primitive society at the bottom to Communism



as the goal of human progress at the top. Both in this way share a dynamic notion of reality.

Hence both can be called monists, in that they postulated a single basic force which constantly reveals itself in new forms. The Eternal Recurrence is manifested in the will to power, which Nietzsche regarded as an internal psychological force, the will to overcome oneself, but which his followers externalized as the will to overcome others. The will to power is always at war with itself: all natural events, all history and the development of every human being consist in a series of such contests. In Marx's theory the Dialectic is manifested in the class struggle. At each stage in history social divisions simplify themselves into a dominant class (thesis) and an oppressed class (antithesis). The antithesis strives and is bound to become the new dominant class (synthesis), which in turn becomes a new thesis, calling forth its own antithesis. All features of society and social change can be explained in terms of this contest. Hence the Dialectic is also for ever at war with itself.

This monist principle takes the place of God in the traditional scheme of thought. The deity, said Nietzsche, was the invention of the weak, who could not face life without the soothing illusion that everything had some ultimate meaning and purpose. The deity, said Marx, was the invention of the dominant class, designed to keep the oppressed class in awe and to distract it from its revolutionary mission.

With the death of God, the existing basis of values also disappeared. Both believed that man had to be given new authentic values in place of the old false values. To Nietzsche the non-existence of God threatened human life with a complete loss of all meaning and value. Life derives its true significance from the Superman, who has overcome himself and attained the state of being for which we all long. To Nietzsche the Superman was an internal psychological ideal, but inevitably his theories were utilized to promote a cult of leadership. Marx put forward the Labour Theory of Value, whereby value is identified with work. The alienation of man in capitalist society—the loss of value and meaning in his life—consists of the deprivation of man from the fruits of his labours. Human life attains its true status in Communist society, where labour once more becomes the truest expression of man's nature. Work and the will to power are related, for the German word for work (*Arbeit*) orginally meant 'struggle'. Lutheranism had made work the central value of German protestantism: it is by their works that the elect demonstrate their faith in salvation. Hence when they placed work and struggle at the centre of their new schemes of values, Marx and Nietzsche were writing within a common German tradition.

Both regarded man as wholly the product of external circumstances. Man, according to Nietzsche, has no inherent qualities, is not naturally equal, does not instinctively love each other, is not innately free. He is simply plastic material to be moulded by his own will, the will of the stronger, and the great life force which goes its way oblivious of individual beings. Marx likewise emphasised that man could have no attributes

independent of his environment, and that if these circumstances were changed man would also be changed. Both distinguished between man's actual nature and his potential nature. The only commandment, Nietzsche held, is that 'You shall become what you are.' He sub-titled his last work, *Ecce Homo,* 'How man becomes what he is.' Marx attributed all human failings to the particular social and historical situation of man. Man could only attain his true dignity and status once favourable social circumstances had been created for him. Both saw freedom as self-realization.

Marx and Nietzsche alike rejected absolutely and unconditionally the whole existing order of things. Nietzsche's hatred concentrated on Christianity, liberalism, democracy, socialism, all those trends which had accomplished the enslavement of man to false and meretricious values and delusive notions of amelioration. Morality was an invention of the weak to restrain the strong. A philosopher who dares to give up false values places himself 'beyond good and evil'. Marx predicted the destruction of all the existing superstructure of politics, law and morality which stood between man and the attainment of his glorious historical destiny.

Both blended unbounded despair of the present with unqualified optimism about the future. The existing world was utterly beyond redemption. Because they pitched their expectations and ambitions for mankind so high, they felt with special acuteness the agony, suffering and misery of the present world. Nietzsche saw man racked by the torment of living in a godless universe. Marx saw man as deprived of all capacity for progress and happiness by the oppression of capitalism. They wanted to improve the lot of man not relatively but absolutely. Only a total revolution in values could remedy the situation. Only the complete destruction of the old society could create the new. They looked forward exultantly to the great cosmic eruption which would swallow up the whole existing society. One must destroy, wrote Nietzsche, in order to create. Revolutions, said Marx, are the labour pains which bring forth the new society. Both were thus apocalyptic thinkers, who believed in a great Nordic Ragnarok, in which the old world would be destroyed and a new world rise from its ashes.

Both thinkers consistently displayed—in Lovejoy's phrase—'a preoccupation with supersensible realities.' Yet despite their abstractness, both were acclaimed by powerful political movements. Right wing radicalism, from the Youth Movement before the First World War, through the National Socialists to the National Democratic Party and similar small groups in the 1960s, used Nietzschean ideas to explain and justify their aims and claims. Marxist theory and symbolism—the labour theory of value, the class struggle and the ultimate Thule of a classless society—completely permeated the German labour movement.

It was not a question of political activists reading Marx or Nietzsche, then seeking to apply what they had learnt to society. Political theories are the products of interests and weapons framed for the furtherance

of those interests. In the German context one must ask, why did radical protest assume such dimensions so that it needed such radical theories? Assuming that theory grows from practical needs, what contemporary traces can be found in West Germany of this old impulse to adopt high-flown theories?

The West German Republic has also had its share of extreme right and left wing movements, but as a political force their significance has been trivial compared with the situation in Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. In terms of political theory the right has had little of interest to offer, partly because the National Socialists wore out the slogans and claims of the right, partly because it has been absorbed into conventional political parties. The wave of left wing student protest which convulsed Germany in the late 1960s, however, and the small terrorist movement of the early 1970s revived interest in left-wing ideology, which had languished in the austere practicalities of the immediate post-war period of reconstruction.

The theorists of the left-wing wave of the late 1960s were Theodor Adorno, Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Marcuse. The literature of the Red Army *Fraktion* largely stemmed from Ulrike Meinhof. All these figures were inspired by a profound dislike and even hatred of developments in Germany since 1945. The events of 1945-9 constituted, in their view, a restoration of capitalism which had robbed the German people of a truly socialist revolution. The economic miracle, which so impressed foreigners, alienated many Germans of left-wing persuasion for it seemed to constitute a lost opportunity to purge the German soul of the sins of the past. In the CDU state established in the 1950s the great capitalists continued to laud it over the ardour and toil of the workers. Thus the old romantic hostility to the bourgeois world and modern industrial society, which inspired Marx and Nietzsche, continues to find modern adherents.

The bourgeois world and industrial society, however, at least as far as internal threats are concerned, appear to be more stable and to command more support than in the circumstances of the mid and late nineteenth century. This apparent acceptance of the existing system is regarded by the new theorists as illusory and the product of coercion. In place of old-fashioned physical oppression the public is manipulated by the cult of material goods and by the mass media. Marcuse in particular saw students as partially immune from the manipulative effects of the media and consumerism: hence they were able to act as representatives of the people, pending the creation of an enlightened public. Like Marx and Nietzsche, they believe that man cannot understand the world in which he has been placed.

The terrorist theorists in particular exhibited the tendency to see events in cosmic terms. Germany was declared to be in the front of a world class-revolution. The great object against which protest throughout the world was directed was imperialism, i.e. the system by which the developed countries under the leadership of the United States exploit underdeveloped

countries and the repressed classes in the interest of the bourgeoisie both nationally and internationally.

This intense self-identification with all the wretched and suffering of the earth, the desire to end 'the most monstrous conspiracy in history' again leads to a curious combination of moral absolutism and moral nihilism. Because the end is absolutely good, everything done to promote it is justified. Because the existing system is wholly bad, anything which undermines it is a step towards the ultimate goal. In the end, it is simply the idea that if you hit something, you must do someone, somewhere some good. It is the instinct which made Bakunin, whenever he saw a fire, rush to the scene to hamper the efforts of the firemen. National Socialist and Communist ideology likewise share this blend of idealism and brutality.

What prominence does radical thought occupy now in West Germany? With the ebbing of extreme forms of protest its ideology has also evaporated. Its upsurge in the late 1960s and after can be explained as a late reaction to the Second World War. After the trauma of National Socialism it was to be expected that there would be a violent reaction to it. The wonder is that the reaction was so small. Radical energies have now been channeled into the movement opposed to nuclear power. In this spirit of rejection of scientific progress, the radical individualism of Nietzsche is more in place than the theories of Marx who, notwithstanding his hatred of capitalism, regarded modern industrial development as a progressive force. The influence of Marxism continues to be extensive and pervasive, both because of its inherent power of explanation and because of its utility as an instrument to promote Communist interests. This modern Marxism, however, purged of the Dialectic and faith in the pre-ordained attainment of a perfect social order, is a sober distillation compared with the heady brew of the nineteenth century. In general one can conclude that the traditional feature of German thought which Fest describes—the heroic aspiration towards an absolute—has faded into the light of common day.

[Dr. Southern's next article for *Contemporary Review* will discuss Franz Josef Strauss's candidature for the Federal Chancellorship in the West German autumn elections.]

YUGOSLAVIA FACES THE FUTURE

by F. B. Singleton

ALTHOUGH President Tito, with his remarkable resilience, had survived the amputation of a leg and might have outlived the Western journalists who have been busily writing obituaries of him, it was clear that the 87-year old veteran of so many battles would not for much longer be able to play the active role in Yugoslav world affairs which he had played since the second World War. It is perhaps appropriate, therefore, to assess the contribution he has made during his long life.

It would be fair to say that he was not a great Marxist theoretician: his background was that of a man of action, but a highly intelligent man of action with strongly developed political instincts. He was born of a Slovene mother and a Croatian father in the village of Kumrovec, which stands on the borders between Slovenia and Croatia. He was originally apprenticed as a locksmith, but during the First World War served as a non-commissioned officer in the Austro-Hungarian army. It is from this background that he learned his fluent German. He was made a prisoner by the Russians, and escaped from prison to witness the early stages of the Russian Revolution, staying there for some years before he returned to his native Croatia—hence his fluent Russian.

During the '20s and '30s he was an active member of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and an agent of the Comintern. After a period of imprisonment in Yugoslavia he spent some time in Moscow, before returning in 1937 to lead the reorganised Communist Party. He was successful in recruiting to the party a number of active young Communists from different walks of life and different parts of Yugoslavia. This group, with the exception of one or two like Djilas and Rankovic', who were dismissed for political reasons, has remained in the inner circle around Tito, although in recent years advancing age and death have taken their toll. Tito, the eldest of the group, known to his comrades as *Stari* ('The Old Man'), has outlived many of his friend and enemies. He was the last survivor of the great war leaders of the Second World War, a man who knew Churchill and Stalin, and in later years worked closely with the now dead leaders of the non-aligned movement—Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno, Haile Selassie and Nkrumah. Had Tito himself died thirty years ago he would still have had his place in history as the man who led the successful partisan struggle against the Fascist invaders, and at the same time presided at the transformation of his country from a Serbian-dominated kingdom into a revolutionary Socialist Republic. At this time his political ideas were derived from Stalin's Soviet Union, and the first Constitution of the new Yugoslavia in 1946 was a carbon copy of the one which Stalin introduced in 1936.

In 1948 he defied Stalin and survived a Comintern-inspired campaign to overthrow him. Yugoslavia then began the slow process of adaptation

to a form of Communism which broke with the State capitalism of the Soviet Union, and based itself on the principles of self-management within a decentralised, market-orientated economy. On the world stage Tito became the champion of the non-aligned nations, organising the Belgrade Summit Conference in 1961, and dominating the subsequent meetings. As a father figure of the non-aligned movement he played an active part in combatting the pro-Soviet tendency within that movement at the Havana Conference in 1979, which was presided over by Fidel Castro. One of the last statements he made before entering hospital was to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Tito has been able to adapt himself to many changes both in the domestic Yugoslav scene and in the world political situation. He not only symbolised 'the brotherhood and unity' of the Yugoslav people, but also the desire of many nations to remain outside the conflicts of the major power blocs.

During the 1960s Yugoslavia began a process of decentralisation of economic and political decision-making in all spheres of life, which was an extension of the principles of industrial self-management which had first been applied in the 1950s. In the late 1960s Croat nationalists, seizing opportunities offered by the process of liberalisation, began to influence the leaders of the Croatian Communist Party to demand a degree of autonomy which went far beyond anything which Tito was prepared to countenance. He was afraid that if the process of decentralisation went too far, it might lead to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Tito then reverted to the Leninist concept of democratic centralism. He suggested that the trouble started with the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party in 1952, at which the name was changed to the League of Communists—the implication being that the party was adopting a new role as a ginger group and an inspirer of ideas rather than as an administrative controlling force. Tito described the Sixth Congress as taking place in 'a euphoria of liberalism'. In December 1971, with the unrest in Croatia raising fears for the stability of Yugoslavia, he acted swiftly, calling the party and the army together to defend the integrity of the federation. Like Lincoln in 1861, there came a point when he saw the necessity to enforce national unity. A degree of diversity could be tolerated, provided that it did not threaten the basic principles on which the State was founded. In the background also there was the fear that if the centrifugal forces became too strong, outsiders (this was taken to mean the Soviet Union) might interfere. As Tito put it: 'As Head of State and President of the L.C.Y., I could not have allowed someone else to come and restore peace and order. I would rather have applied extreme means—and you know what extreme means are'.

In the early 1970s a purge was conducted not only of the Croatian party, but also of dissidents in other republics. A new Constitution came into force in 1974 in which, in Tito's words, 'a determined break has been made with all the remnants of so-called representative democracy which suits the bourgeois class.' Two years later a new law governing the operation of self-management (the law on associated labour) carried a stage

further the process by which the system of self-management penetrated all aspects of Yugoslav economic, political and social life. It is an apparent paradox that as the centralisation of state political power under the guidance of a single party was reaffirmed, steps were taken to encourage a diversified, polycentric system to govern the workings of the economy and of social life.

Also during the '70s, at Tito's instigation, steps were taken to ensure that there would be a smooth transfer of power at both State and party level when eventually Tito left the stage. In a speech in September 1970 he warned that chaos might ensue if proper provision were not made. The position today is that a collective presidency exists for both the League of Communists and for the Yugoslav Federal Republic. During the last few years under Tito's guidance, a group of men representing all the republics and provinces of Yugoslavia—most of whom are veterans from the partisan days—have been taking the day-to-day decisions of government, and efforts have been made to give them experience also in the conduct of foreign affairs. The men who will succeed Tito are all experienced party leaders with a long record of loyalty to the concept of Yugoslavia. Behind them stands not only the regular army of over a quarter-of-a-million, but also a mass defence organisation in which every citizen over 18 years takes part. These facts should be sufficient to guarantee that in the immediate aftermath of Tito's relinquishing control there will be no problems either of internal unity or of external aggression.

Although Mr. Brezhnev and his elderly comrades in the Kremlin may like to see a pro-Soviet government in Belgrade, and although the Croat *émigrés* in Western Europe will seize every opportunity to create problems within Yugoslavia, I think that the forces of unity will be stronger than those of disintegration. Already there are signs that with Tito's illness occurring at a time when the world situation is disturbed, the instinctive loyalty of the Yugoslavs to the concept of brotherhood and unity is stronger than the nationalist differences which, in easier times, give rise to bickering and tension. There are reports of a rush amongst young people to enrol in the League of Communists, and even amongst those who have been classed as dissidents there is a feeling that this is the time for national unity. How long this mood will last depends partly upon the development of the economy during the next few years—and this is something which the Yugoslavs alone cannot decide. It is therefore interesting to note that after two years of fruitless negotiation between Yugoslavia and the Common Market, the E.E.C. Foreign Ministers met within days of the first announcement of the President's illness, and instructed their negotiators to reach an agreement with the Yugoslavs within two weeks.

The Yugoslav economy has become closely integrated with that of Western Europe since the economic reforms of 1965, when Yugoslavia entered 'the international division of labour'. This implied exposing the previously protected Yugoslav economy to international competition, in the hope that this would act as a spur to greater efficiency. It also implied freer movement across the frontiers both of Yugoslav workers seeking

work abroad, and of Western tourists entering Yugoslavia. It was also hoped that by liberalising the regulations regarding partnership agreements with foreign firms, and the importation of foreign capital, an injection of Western technology and business efficiency would give the Yugoslav enterprises a much-needed shot in the arm. All these measures have worked to some extent, but at a heavy cost. Although invisible earnings from workers abroad, and from transport and tourist services, have helped to reduce the trade deficit, there has been a vast increase in imports from the West—of capital goods, raw materials and consumer goods. Foreign loan repayments now amount to $1,800 million per year. Exports to E.E.C. countries pay for only 35% of imports.

The news of Tito's illness changed the attitude of the E.E.C. countries to the negotiations which had been dragging out for the last two years; to try and find a way in which the Yugoslavs could export more of their commodities to the Common Market in order to pay for the imports which they need to sustain their drive for industrial growth. Yugoslavia has had a very impressive record in industrial growth during the last few years. Last year the rate was almost 8%. Unless Yugoslavia can continue to develop its economy it will be impossible to raise the standard of living of its citizens who live in the former Turkish areas, south of the dividing line between the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and the former Ottoman Empire. This line follows approximately the rivers Sava and Danube. South of that line for almost five hundred years the Ottoman Turks ruled, and the economy was neglected. North of this line, under Austro-Hungarian rule, industrialisation began in the 19th century.

This historic divide corresponds to the line which separates those parts of Yugoslavia which have an income per capita roughly corresponding to that of Italy, and those parts of the country where the income per capita is closer to that of the Middle East. Reinforcing this economic inequality there are differences in culture, language, literacy, and ways of life. The average Muslim Albanian inhabitant of Kosovo would perhaps be more at home in Damascus than in Western Europe; whereas the peoples of Croatia and Slovenia, with a long history of association with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and with a strong Roman Catholic religious tradition, feel more akin to the peoples of Austria and Southern Germany than to their compatriots in the far south of Yugoslavia. Although all the Yugoslav peoples have benefitted greatly from the development of industry during the period since the Second World War, the gap in income per capita has actually grown during the last three decades. If one can imagine a situation in the United Kingdom where the peoples of Northern Britain had a difference in living standards of 1: 6 compared with those in the South, and also spoke a different language and had a different religious tradition, one can realise the enormity of the problem which the Yugoslavs face. In the short-run I am sure that Yugoslavia will survive the problems of the transference of authority to the new collective leadership, but eventually the old problems will rise to the surface and there will be considerable strains imposed on those people who, in the next few years, must take

over the running of the country from the leader who has acted as the rallying point for Yugoslav unity. It is at this point that the possibilities of disruption by outside forces will find their opportunity. At this point I would like to quote one of Britain's former Ambassadors in Belgrade, Sir Duncan Wilson, who has had long experience in the diplomatic service in Peking, Moscow and Belgrade. He ends his book *Tito's Yugoslavia* with the following sentence:

> Long may the peoples of Yugoslavia flourish in brotherhood and unity, and in increasing prosperity and freedom.

It is very much in the interests of the West that Yugoslavia survives as a strong, united country. The speculations in the Western press about the possibilities of external disruption by either an invasion by the Red Army or by *emigré* extremists exploiting the differences between the Yugoslav peoples, have in my view been greatly exaggerated. I do not think it is likely that there will be an invasion from the East; I do not think that the *emigré* nationalists will succeed in creating chaos in Yugoslavia; and I prophesy that the world community will realise that the preservation of a non-aligned and viable Yugoslav state is in the best interests of European peace.

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The April issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Korea* by K. W. Watkins (held over from the March issue), *Belfast Initiative* by James Molyneaux, J.P., M.P., *Political Conflict and the British Police Tradition* by Robert Reiner and *A Sense of Ireland* by Nick Malone.

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT

by J. I. H. Owen, O.B.E.

LAST year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation celebrated its thirtieth birthday and that it was able to do so is a matter for self-congratulation. Some have argued, however, that peace would have been maintained without the formation of the alliance in 1949 and that the emergence of two super-power blocks brought about, perhaps, by such alliances, tends to make relations between the East and West more difficult than might otherwise have been the case. Two such power blocks also tend to reduce the flexibility of thought and manoeuvre. It can further be said that NATO did little to prevent the Soviet Union invading Hungary in the late fifties, Czechoslovakia in the late sixties and Afghanistan in the late seventies. Whatever the merits, the emergence of China as a super-power cannot fail to have an effect on the face-to-face diplomacy of the last thirty years.

Be that as it may, the fact is that peace has been preserved and the majority of the Western democracies have flourished under the protection of NATO. The alliance today is stronger than those who created it might have foreseen, but there are a number of weaknesses. Greece and Turkey are not exactly friendly; Portugal is fighting for democratic survival; Italy and, to a lesser extent, France have a communist problem. The Warsaw Pact, too, has its problems. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania do not always sit too easily around the table with other Warsaw Pact nations. Now the Soviet Union has Afghanistan on its hands and she cannot fail to be looking over her shoulders at China.

In the early days of NATO and entirely due to the efforts of the United States, we enjoyed a clear superiority in nuclear weapons. NATO strategy was based on the 'trip wire concept', which meant that the primary role of the NATO ground forces in Europe was to act as a trigger for nuclear retaliation against the Warsaw Pact in the event of attack. Now, however, the military balance between the East and the West is a matter for concern. While no two sets of figures on the balance ever seem to be the same—because of a difference in view as to which forces should be included in the calculation—there is little doubt that the Soviet Union has now reached nuclear parity with the United States. NATO's nuclear deterrent no longer carries the same dominant weight in the deterrent balance and this places a higher value, and thus a question mark, on NATO's conventional military capabilities. Although technologically NATO is in advance of Warsaw Pact countries and, although, given enough time, NATO's manpower pool is greater than that of the Eastern block, the fact remains that the Warsaw Pact powers have considerable numerical and material superiority over those of NATO.

In Europe, both the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are organised and equipped for mobile warfare, but the numerical tank superiority of the

Eastern block forces cannot be questioned—some 21,000 tanks against some 7,000 in NATO. This superiority in armour also extends to aircraft and combat ready divisions. However, the equation is not as straightforward as it seems at first. The record of the Middle East war in 1973 shows that modern tanks and aircraft were vulnerable to the high technology of infantry weapons. During the opening phases of that war, the Arab infantry demonstrated their recently acquired ability to stop tanks with wire-guided missiles. The infantry, always a force to be reckoned with, had acquired a new dimension. There have always been anti-air and, particularly, anti-tank weapons in the hands of the infantry, but the accuracy and effectiveness of these relatively new short range missiles has had a profound effect upon the use of armour and, to a similar extent, use of close support aircraft, including armed helicopters.

Although the Warsaw Pact strategists probably visualise the early use of nuclear weapons in any conflict that may occur in Europe and are equipped for it, the presence of strong conventional forces in the West can be counted upon to delay the terrible moment when the nuclear forces have to be unleashed. Strong conventional forces in NATO not only have the effect of delaying the nuclear holocaust, but they also release the Western leaders from having no alternative but to press the button as soon as the first Warsaw Pact soldier crosses the Iron Curtain in anger. In addition, however, strong conventional forces on one side and not on the other make military adventures such as the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan all the easier.

Until the late forties, the Russians have always considered their infantry to be the main combatant arm. Since then, however, the growth of their armoured forces has caused the infantry to move into second place. Nevertheless, there are about one million infantry in the three million men of the Warsaw Pact armies (see table A). So far as the West is concerned (and including France), there are about 800,000 infantry out of 2,700,000 men in the NATO armies (see table B).

Looking to the future, one of the more pressing problems for the NATO allies might be that of manpower. The falling birthrate, particularly in those countries with all professional forces (Canada, Luxembourg, UK and USA), the falling birthrate of the sixties will make matters worse in the eighties. Additionally, the Soviet bloc conscript serves two years, whilst military service in most European nations varies in length between eight and twenty-four months. In a defensive battle, such as that which NATO may have to fight, infantry will play a crucial and fundamental part and, if their numbers are going to drop, it is more important than ever to ensure that they have the best possible weapons with which to fight.

The Soviet Union has been the arsenal of the Eastern block since its inception in May 1945 and has either sold equipment to the satellite states or permitted them to build Soviet pattern equipment under licence. In the West, it is politically and economically difficult for countries, particularly those with large indigenous armament industries, to abandon

national developments in favour of those of other countries. Indeed, it can be argued that it is unwise to do so. Complete standardisation can not only damage national arms industries by curbing technical ingenuity but could also simplify life for the enemy by limiting the variety of weapons and making it easier, for example, for him to jam one standard missile system. The really important thing is to ensure that all systems are either compatible and inter-operable or, if standardised, are the best available irrespective of national pressures. However, this is easier said than done as can be seen from the two following examples.

To date, the West has developed some ten vehicle-launched and eight hand-held missiles, plus numerous rockets for infantry use. Many of the missiles have almost identical capabilities. The Franco-German Hot, the US Tow and the British Swingfire are very similar; the German Cobra, the US Dragon, the Franco-German Milan and the Italian Mosquito are all designed for one-man operation. Major industrial countries will continue to develop their high technology industries so sophisticated infantry weapons are likely to increase in variety and complexity. But, if mobility and interflank reinforcement are to remain the NATO policy, more international co-operation in arms production will be vital, for multi-weapon stockpiles are wasteful financially and in training time, and are vulnerable to attack or sabotage.

Another problem is how to achieve such a level of co-operation and national unselfishness that the best weapon from the soldier's point of view is chosen and a political compromise avoided. The rifle and its ammunition are a case in point. When in 1945 the British set up their ideal small arms calibre panel, they were under the impression that they would be developing information mutually with the USA. In 1947, when they visited the USA with the results of their tests, they learned for the first time of the US T65 cartridge and the T25 rifle. The competitive demonstration in 1950 between the T65 cartridge (later to become the 7.62mm (NATO) round) and the British .280 in or 7mm round were held using the US T25 rifle and the British designed EM2 (Bull pup) rifle. Although the British EM2 rifle out-performed the T25, the excellent performance of the ballistically superior .280 in cartridge at longer ranges went unnoticed. Finally, due to overwhelming pressure from the USA, the T65 was adopted as NATO standard in December 1953 and the British finally abandoned their EM2 rifle and the .280 in cartridge in favour of the 7.62mm x 51mm cartridge and the Belgian FN rifle.

Now another competition for a new rifle and ammunition is being run, this time by NATO, and the result will be of long-lasting significance to all armies in the alliance, for there is every reason to suppose that the new choice will be the NATO infantryman's basic weapon for at least the next two decades. If the wrong choice is made, soldiers will have to live with it for many years. Whether the soldier's needs will be given the right priority in this is open to question.

What the soldier needs in any conflict, and which is consistent with his very strong and natural desire to survive, is the capability to kill or

TABLE A
NATO infantry

Country	*Estimated strengths*	*Conscription (months)*
Belgium	12,000	8–10
Canada	8,000	Voluntary
Denmark	7,500	9
Germany (West)	65,000	15
Greece	56,000	24
Italy	75,000	12
Luxembourg	600	Voluntary
Netherlands	14,000	14
Norway	5,500	12
Portugal	18,000	15–24
Turkey	175,000	20
UK	54,000	Voluntary
USA	225,000	Voluntary
France	75,000	12
	790,600	

Percentage of infantry in the NATO armies—25%.

TABLE B
Warsaw Pact infantry

Country	*Estimated strengths*	*Conscription (months)*
Bulgaria	45,000	24
Czechoslovakia	35,000	24
Germany (East)	55,000	18
Hungary	30,000	24
Poland	55,000	24
Romania	55,000	16
USSR	680,000	24
	955,000	

Percentage of infantry in the Warsaw Pact armies—33%.

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incapacitate as many of his adversaries as he must. So far as the infantry soldier is concerned, the main weapon in his survival kit is a rifle. With his rifle he must, at best, shoot to kill and, at worst, be able to shoot to hit and maim and, in order to do so successfully, the rifle must have certain characteristics.

Since World War II, the infantryman has been calling for a shorter, handier weapon and a lighter load, though with scant success until recently. Now that infantry ride into battle in helicopters or APCs and seem to spend much of their active spells in urban conflict, their cry has been almost universally answered. Weapons, such as the modern rifles

(and LMGs), with their lensatic or telescopic sights, have reached such a stage of development that their ability, technically, to hit a target accurately would be difficult to better. The trouble is that, due to human error or lack of skill, few soldiers can do full justice to the high technical standards offered by the weapons. Alternative solutions have to be found and these include the firing of bursts, though controlled bursts, to restrict the spread of fire and reduce waste of ammunition, or salvo firing, by means of multiple barrels, or multiple projectiles fired through one barrel.

So far as ammunition is concerned, it is worth noting that 60% of hits on the moving man at 300m are likely to be extremity hits. However, the improvements to ammunition, now believed to be possible, could rate a higher percentage of the 60% hits incapacitating. Thus, if the lethality of the rifle in the hands of the soldier (that is, his ability to kill) is assumed unlikely to improve, other than by a very small margin, the most promising avenue to follow will be that of improving the wound ballistics. In terms of lethality, bullet design can improve the effective hit ratios, but there will be no great improvement if body armour is worn more than it is at present as it will continue to afford protection to the wearer unless wound ballistics are developed further. There are other matters to be taken into account in the attempt to achieve the right weapon, such as the handling of the weapon, its range, the ammunition, the sighting arrangements, training, maintenance and, naturally, cost.

In simple terms, the higher the velocity, the greater the shock effect upon the human body when hit. On the other hand, the larger the bullet, the greater the impact of velocity and thus the greater the wound effect. There are other factors in the complicated equation of wound effectiveness for it is an unpleasant subject and not an easy one on which to be precise. Suffice it to say that the British .303 in Mk 7 bullets give a very severe wound, while some of the latterday high velocity small calibre bullets will not do so, unless the effect such as yaw and break-up can be engineered. In short, a conventional small calibre bullet can normally be expected to be less effective than its bigger calibre brother.

One current trend, especially in the NATO forces, is for the military authorities to accept a reduction in range, particularly in the effective range of the rifle. This (if the expression can be excused) is a short-sighted policy. Time and again, wars and other conflicts require an infantry soldier to have the ability to engage targets at over 400m. It would be foolish to assume that this need will not arise again, especially when the enemy can deploy overwhelming numbers of infantry. In any case, the ability to shoot well and hit a target at longer ranges enhances the ability to kill at shorter ranges. As sighting devices for use by night as well as by day improve, so the need to engage the enemy sooner, and thus, at greater ranges increases. The question of numbers cannot be ignored by NATO vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact countries or by the Soviet Union vis-à-vis China; the argument for range and better ammunition, likewise, cannot be ignored. It is thus vital to select the best weapon (or weapon type)

and ammunition for the task and to avoid a political compromise. This is not easy, but that is no excuse for getting it wrong.

So, as NATO enters its fourth decade, there seems to be a slightly increased awareness of this. For example, the President Carter inspired Long Term Defence Programme (1977) may redress a few of NATO's more obvious deficiencies, and the Independent European Programme Group is encouraging less inertia and a growing enthusiasm for increased co-operation in arms design and procurement in Europe and across the Atlantic in both directions. A fillip will be given to all this by the latest Soviet activities in Afghanistan, the new danger to our oil supplies and trade in the area and the growing threat to Yugoslavia.

If the overall balance is not getting better, we in NATO seem to be showing some resolve at last in preventing things getting worse. It must not be forgotten though that the Russians enjoy internal lines of communication and, as they proved beyond doubt at the end of 1979, they can not only move thousands of troops quickly by air and road, but they can also take the West by surprise. They have far more troops on the NATO and Chinese borders than are necessary for defence and they may no longer believe, for example, that the USA would support Europe should the Warsaw Pact decide to attack NATO's southern flank. Our resolve must, therefore, be translated into positive thinking and early action if the Warsaw Pact threat is to be contained and a world war prevented.

[Major-General J. I. H. Owen, O.B.E., F.B.I.M., retired from the Royal Marines in 1973 after 32 years' service. Latterly, while serving, he attended the Royal College of Defence Studies after which he commanded the UK Commando Forces. He is editor of *Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the World* and other related books.]

CAN CHARITY COME IN FROM THE COLD?

by G. Laurence Harbottle

CHARITY means to most people providing the poor with food or money. The Elizabethans first gave charity statutory form and Lord Macnaghten in 1891 interpreted that as the relief of poverty, the advancement of education and religion and other purposes beneficial to the community. Although every aspect of the definition and the Elizabethan and subsequent laws have been debated and repeatedly interpreted by the Courts it is of course the last part of the phrasing which gives scope to the development of the law or its restriction. The process used to keep pace with social development but recently the law has lagged behind in providing structures for a concept of charity which has substantially changed during the last thirty years.

Our present law is still largely Victorian. It originated as the reign moved towards certainty, prosperity and safety, the Industrial Revolution completed its period of most active change and the owners of the industrial wealth deriving from it began to recognise and fear the industrial squalor from and by which it was created. The poor were a continual presence, keeping the rich warm and fed and observing a comfort they did not share and it was from a patrician viewpoint that new thought was given to the nature of charity. Some would say it derived from a new concern with social welfare and some that it was born of fear and conformist religion. It is hard to accept Victorians as they saw themselves.

The Charity Commissioners were appointed in 1853 and for over a century afterwards any development in the law relating to charities was at least affected by the Commission. Then little substantial change took place until the Nathan Committee after The Second World War led to the passing of the Charities Act 1960. Without making fundamental changes in the law that Act altered much of its operation and reconstituted the Charity Commission. At about the same time the Recreational Charities Act of 1958 declared that recreational and leisure facilities for social welfare were to be accepted as charitable. Notionally this altered no part of the law and was simply declaratory but in fact it contained an indication of a new attitude to charities and the Nathan Committee, in its comprehensive and radical report, made the point even more clearly.

These Acts were succeeded by the expansive sixties when new generations came to question many aspects of the social condition in which they found themselves. This affected the entire industrial world and was not limited to any country but here the accepted view of society and its behaviour changed radically. The charities dealing with the Arts were as much involved as those concerned with social matters and the importance of the period derives from the general acceptance of new forms of enlightened social activity, typical of which are the international relief organisations such as Oxfam and War on Want and others con-

cerned with justice and freedom such as Amnesty International. These new forms do not fit easily into the mould made for Elizabethan, Victorian and early 20th Century charity; even the descriptions in speech alter and the asylums, crippleages, poorhouses and orphanages become mental hospitals and fostering. Change in the law however was slow and often reluctant, and followed long after fashionable social thought and the paths being opened by the new organisations remained difficult and even dangerous. Deprivation is not a national phenomenon and is not confined to a limited part of the world and these organisations found that they could only achieve their purposes by means which were frankly outspoken and frequently required political aid, methods or propaganda. While many might condemn, the impact probably was not much different from that of the Salvation Army on religious charities a century ago.

The impetus for renewed thought came, therefore, as in charity it properly should, from need and the process of change and the new organisations, whether officially charities or not, met directly the view of the law taken by the Courts and its reflection from the Charity Commission.

The last legal step which we need consider here was the Committee established by the National Council of Social Service in 1974, under the Chairmanship of Lord Goodman. That Committee took two years to produce a report which crystallised establishment thinking and came to conclusions of surprising timidity—surprising only when you consider the wealth of experience and knowledge of its members. It was however dignified by a minority report from Ben Whitaker which contradicts most of the fundamental conclusions of the Committee, and obtains its main relevance from his statement of its direction to 'present needs rather than the past history of charities'. He asks for the legal concept of charity to develop with the ever changing requirements of society. The main Report itself makes a few suggestions, mostly regarding the better working of the historical methods and, while obviously one must take one's choice as to the kind of Report one wants, Lord Goodman and the other members seemed to want no more than that. The preface almost claims it as a virtue. This approach however has done its damage and is now relied upon by the establishment which it bolstered, to justify conventional thought as an accepted process. The danger would become greatly magnified if it were enshrined in legislation.

The 1969 Report of the Charity Commission says perfectly clearly, 'we are concerned simply with the law of charity . . .'. That is of course the case but it is not the reason for which the Charity Commission was established. It has become true and the Commission now seems to exist largely to embalm the law. This means that changed needs cannot easily be recognised and the occasional disasters to which dishonest people bring voluntary organisations cannot usually be anticipated.

The Charity Commission is staffed by the Civil Service and has all the virtues and defects of that Service but it operates like (in the fashionable word) a 'quango' and is remote from public response. It does not see

itself either legally or practically as an organisation which ought to make new law and its main activity therefore becomes the regulation of a registration system and the prevention of registration of charities which seem to go beyond the conventional. It is hardly proper to complain about an organisation which carries out its legal duty and only that but it is apparent that a force for reasoned change is lacking if you limit the Charity Commission to interpretation and audit procedures. It does not in any way encourage or assist in the registration of charities and it seems to stand four-square with the Inland Revenue whose general interest of course is to collect taxes and not to exercise its powers in the interests of social welfare. Indeed despite its own firm subjective views, its behaves very like a creature of the Treasury and Home Office.

As the post-war realisation of the need for new charitable forms grew in maturity, the revival of the Arts, achieved largely with Arts Council co-operation during the fifties, was broadening into less conventional fields. Organisations interested in social welfare were discovering new fields of useful and progressive activity for new necessity and that only political approaches could smooth their way and provide their finance while in the Arts there was growing doubt about old-fashioned artistic methods and many artists sought new art forms and methods of expression which had to their minds more purpose in the community and therefore more relevance to social welfare. They too found a need for political support and either political finance or finance obtained by political action. For the twentieth century at least, it was novel to claim charitable status for a social benefit effected politically and the demarcation between politics and charitable activity with political support was hotly debated.

All manner of argument develops from trying to use existing law to control or interpret new forms.

One of the recent minor aspects of the problem becomes apparent from the discussion regarding the nature of trustees and their rights and duties. The Victorian trustee was bound to be an amateur because he was the rich bringing relief to the poor but in this century with new purposes many people found a need for the trustee to be the worker in the field and that meant the professional. The law does not permit the simple remuneration of a trustee in that capacity but it does allow reasonable payment to a trustee for doing specific work for a charity if the Trust Deed itself permits that. The Charity Commission objects to this because it claims that the paid trustee may no longer have the public good in mind but merely his own advantage; the Goodman Committee follows this line. It seems that the fear is often directed, not at the payment but at the circumstance of the community charities where payment is both necessary and usual; if the Commission would direct itself to established charities in other fields it would observe that many have Trustees who are remunerated habitually. Most obviously the Colleges of major Universities and places of higher education, usually exempt from registration with the Charity Commissioners, could not continue in their present form if they were not controlled by Fellows and teaching members of



the academic body. I refer to this point as a minor one and so it may seem but it is a fair example of the broader problem and of a failure to recognise change or, more particularly, an attempt to restore that which has been changed.

To return to the larger matter of politics, it is apparent that organisations interested in social welfare have to be concerned from time to time in the political arena. Ben Whitaker again comments 'the days of confining charities to pouring soup into faulty old bottles should be consigned to the past' and points out that the only effective way financially and from an organisational point of view is very often to campaign for a change in the law. Bringing aid to those less able to defend themselves seems an obvious exercise of charitable purpose and there are in fact many cases of established charities which are accustomed to campaigning pretty freely and seem to be accepted due to habit or seniority. Many religious charities are established for the very purpose of campaigning and it is perhaps the religious context alone which sanctifies the activity in their cases. Although any reasonable person may be anxious about permitting an organisation which has no purpose except politics to become a charity, to make decisions about which side in a conflict you choose to feed or which morality your religion advocates, very often requires considerable political sophistication and will imply a political result.

A third area of concern derives from the existence of very simple devices which provide a cloak of charity for commercial activity. The usual system is to incorporate a Company with a commercial purpose and for it to covenant to pay all its profits to a charity. If the Company is not a close company it will avoid tax on the profits passed over and the tax paid on the covenanted payments will be recovered by the charity, which accordingly ends up in possession of the commercial Company's profit, tax free. That device is properly and usefully available to numerous worthy charities and many may even depend upon it but it can be misused if the charity is in fact the servant of the commercial purpose. It is not true that a charitable origin or purpose alone is a safeguard. It is important also to consider whether there is, in a proper circumstance, a fiscal advantage in the form of charity now used. The advantage is not as substantial as some believe. It does confer certain freedom from rates and taxes but naturally freedom from half or all the rates on a building will only be a substantial advantage if the buildings occupied are themselves substantial. In many cases the freedom from tax on the profits of a charity may be irrelevant, especially if the charity has expenditure paid for out of gifts and no earned income. The question at the moment therefore is how to increase the benefits to charity without simply depriving the Revenue of funds or creating the American evil, which has become apparent since the War, of huge funds lying dormant in charitable hands only because of the tax advantage to the donor.

The need therefore is not only for the recognition of new charitable purposes and new charitable methods but also a need to assess worth and achievement. In all these respects the Charity Commission falls short,

although its original establishment was intended to be directed specifically to these questions as well as being a mere administrative act. Once a charity is registered as such, whether because it volunteers or compulsorily, unless there is a possibility of fraud or the charity itself asks for help, the Charity Commission is largely powerless to control or direct the way in which the charity carries on its affairs. It has powers of audit and enquiry but they are limited in extent and of little use unless something has already gone wrong. That of course is too late.

For a long time I have assumed that a right conclusion to many of these questions might be found by substituting some simple changes in Revenue law for the whole concept of charity, using a more flexible definition which would be adaptable to modern needs and continuously adaptable. I now doubt if this is easily possible. Revenue law can, too easily, be changed and changed again by political whim, and flexibility itself can render charities susceptible to control by the very political influences which they themselves have to fight or court. I am therefore driven back to the belief that some form of permanent Tribunal not unlike the Charity Commission in concept but most unlike it in constitution and powers is still necessary. Indeed, I would like to get away from the word 'charity' because I believe it is much misinterpreted and has too much special history attached to it but that is something of a semantic irrelevance and, although it may be interesting to find an appropriate word which describes purposes which seem laudable, I do not think it is particularly useful.

It is necessary then to consider the kind of Tribunal which might be appropriate even if it is insufficient to do that in the context of ideal organisations. The need must shape the organisation as it did for the Victorians in 1853. The negative comments I have already made may provide an indication which is useful and so may the observation of the success or failure of organisations of similar intent, dealing regularly with the fostering of activities with objects which are not wholly utilitarian.

On the negative side, I have asked for the removal of Civil Service quasi-political control and I have suggested that we are now in a position of inflexibility, paying too much attention to the legal past. If we remove that control we must not adopt a solution which removes either independence or the now, largely theoretical, obligation of response which should exist for the Civil Service; we clearly aspire to a body which is appointed, representative and yet flexible and independent. That is, in the first and third cases, organisations as various as the State trading Corporations such as the NCB, British Rail and the Steel Board and the Corporations for social service such as the Arts Council and other bodies dealing with the welfare and the mind or body. The latter ought to be the nearest to hand for this purpose, but observing their present condition, it is hard to advocate their adoption; almost all show characteristics of such an unrepresentative nature that both second and third requirements are immediately denied. It may then be desirable to question the need for

representation and it is certain that true democracy is not going to be imported. Nevertheless a method of appointment, paying regard to knowledge and aspiration rather than an ability to comply, must be found or we are repeating the existing Commission and, no doubt, achieving little by abolishing or even reorganising it. The organisation needed should flow from its controllers, or be so efficient as to appoint them successfully which is unfortunately an unlikely outcome. In fact, methods of appointment and representation should be servants of knowledge and flexibility without casting away the whole history of legal precedent. If we seek true novelty we must adopt the answer which I say that I have already rejected, and make fiscal reforms sufficient only to ensure exemption from taxes and rates. My rejection came from the wider need to monitor the definitions used and the use to which they are put, and that argues a new Commission under any name. Flexibility, however, as a continuous process needs informed minds who recognise social need and respect new demands and, while impervious to pressure, conservative restriction and habit, can adapt with regularity and discretion.

We ask a lot and I think we therefore must ask it of paid professionals with adequate advisers as informed as themselves who are not only administrators. I do not think that the governmentally appointed Arts organisations provide a good precedent, especially when the activity has become extensive or costly and their record has too often appeared to lead to random results without any indigenous basis. Oddly, considering its role in the present close control of charitable activity, particularly in Scotland where the Charity Commissioners do not operate, there may be some virtue in looking at the Inland Revenue. Local Inspectors of integrity, although regularly rotated often possessing a real degree of local understanding, responsible to a professional Board and provided with substantial technical and administrative support, seem to suggest a structure more appropriate than most.

Perhaps we should consider the appointment for limited periods of a Charity Commission, a New Charities Board, a National Charity Council, name it as you will, of some five people — professionals, with charity experience or experience of social welfare. Their appointors might be an unpaid electoral body, composed of practitioners in the charitable field, meeting once a year (or canvassed once a year) who might for instance comprise a group of organisers of major charities. Then divide the country into two national areas, Scotland and Wales, and some eight or nine other sections with a Charity Assessor in charge of each. Their job, backed by a full administrative staff, with support from staff experienced in social welfare, accountancy and law, would be to decide upon the needs to be served to justify any new charity and the extent to which the old charities were fulfilling need. All charities would need renewable licences and no licence would last more than five years. All the Assessors would meet quarterly to consider their respective activities and probably the members of the Board would join them.

Both Assessors and Board would seek such paid or unpaid specialist

help and advice as they needed beyond their administrative staff but the staff would be chosen for its ability to give both. The Board might need a Director, who would no doubt claim the title of Director-General before long, but a paid Chairman elected from their number would be better; personality in all these things matters more than function but the method of appointment may create the function. No doubt Government will claim the task of appointment on specious grounds of democracy but in fact what is needed and what I have tried to indicate is a thinking and caring appointor instead of a department of government with yet another task to shift from one tray to another. There is something to be said for all public appointments being made by a special appointments board but that too would need appointing; the fact that there may be a dozen sensible possibilities does not diminish the importance of finding one of them.

If we have here one form to consider, form is not the real subject of discussion. Anything which freed charity from its present prison of legal precedent, without opening the door to abuse, would be justified. I believe the present structure to be worse than mechanically imperfect and that no large proportion of the Nation is aware of the fact; the present law of charity and the present brief, powers and habit of the Charity Commission are in need of radical alteration. A system, making a positive contribution to the welfare of humanity without needing to seek constant legal definition or definition before purpose at any time, must be something worth achieving and with the will can be achieved.

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BRAZIL'S REMARKABLE HOUSING MARKET

by Tom Murphy

HOW does a middle or working class family finance its housing needs in a 70% inflationary economy? Viewed in terms of conventional notions of down payment, mortgage and interest the private financing of personal housing is logically impossible in such a situation. Yet salary earners in Brazil—a country which faced a 70%-plus inflation rate in 1979 and probably the same for 1980—are buying houses and apartments in record numbers.

This is done principally through a complicated form of hocus pocus known as the *Sistema de Financiamento Habitacional* (National Housing Finance System), which is administered by the *Banco Nacional de Habitação* (BNH—the National Housing Bank), a labyrinthian bureaucracy that administers mind-boggling sums of money each year.

Brazil's mortgage loan system closely follows the indexing practices which characterize other sectors of the economy. As in the United States, for example, the prospective buyer is obliged to make a sizeable down payment, in most cases equal to 20% of the total value of the property he intends to purchase. He then borrows the other 80% from the BNH through a private intermediary. The money is paid back in periods ranging from eight to 25 years.

Thus a Cr$1,000,000 (about £15,000) property is sold with a Cr$200,000 (£3,000) down payment. The prospective home owner then borrows Cr$800,000 (£12,000). The value of his monthly instalment (which for this size loan would probably run for 15 years) is calculated according to a complex formula which accounts for interest, amortization, the timing of amortization and the gross value of the property. According to BNH tables, the monthly payment on a 15 year loan of Cr$800,000 is Cr$12,500, about £190; not an unreasonable sum. So far the system makes sense—from the point of view of the buyer. He continues to pay Cr$12,500 for an entire year at which time his mortgage value is 'corrected', i.e., the monthly rate goes up according to the previous year's level of inflation. With 70% inflation, a Cr$12,500 mortgage payment will increase to Cr$21,000. At the same time, however, his salary will be 'corrected' at the same rate so that his total mortgage payment maintains the same 'weight' within his family budget. Meanwhile, the cruzeiro (Brazil's unit of currency) has been devalued with respect to the pound so that Cr$21,000 is now worth about £190. The mortgage holder is happy. His payment is reasonable and his salary increases in accordance with the increase in the value of his mortgage.

The system still makes sense. However, a little arithmetic reveals the following paradox: the borrower's total yearly payment doesn't even compensate for the effects of inflation against his loan. Paying Cr$12,500 a month for 12 months equals Cr$150,000 for the year: the action of inflation during that same year, however, would demand a great deal more on

a Cr$800,000 loan in order to compensate for the effects of a 70% overall increase in prices. Thus, a private individual loaning Cr$800,000 to another private individual is going to want more than Cr$560,000 in interest payments during the year just to compensate him for the action of inflation on the lump sum of Cr$800,000. In fact, this is precisely what private banks in Brazil demand from their commercial customers. The arithmetic further reveals that, in order to compensate the loan agency for Cr$560,000 worth of inflation, the borrower would have to pay a little more than Cr$46,000 a month (about £700 per month at present values) and he wouldn't even be touching the principal.

Where does the rest of the money come from? The short answer is: from the BNH, which pays off the loan agent in cash immediately. Private banks, in other words, are mere intermediaries when it comes to housing loans in Brazil. In exchange for their services in handling individual cases they receive compensation from the housing bank. But it's the BNH itself which actually assumes responsibility for the loans.

From where, then, does the money actually come? The housing bank can afford to support the financing of both public and private housing because its sources of revenue are also 'corrected' in the same manner as everyone else's. And those sources include a great deal more than just the monthly payments of Brazilian mortgage holders.

Indeed, the bank's financial resources are truly astounding. In 1978, for example, the BNH administered a fund totalling Cr$610 billion (about £14 billion at the exchange rate for mid-1978) of which Cr$206 billion (about £4.5 billion) came from the nation's huge unemployment fund and Cr$286 billion (about £6.5 billion) from total savings account deposits. The rest, a small portion of the total (about £3 billion), came from other forms of investment, and finally, from the actual mortgage payments which are made by purchasers of loans. Savings accounts and the unemployment fund, then, are the backbone of the system. Virtually all of the resources of both types of investment are under the control of the BNH. The bank's, and the nation's, housing loan programme is heavily dependent on the flux of money in and out of the two types of savings funds.

When there is high unemployment, therefore, the housing loan market will tighten in consequence. A decline in the rate of savings has a similar effect. This, in fact, is what happened in early 1978. A decline in the rate of savings at that time preoccupied housing officials so much that they persuaded financial authorities to adopt a series of measures to make savings accounts more attractive.

What is most striking about the system—it's inner logic, as it were—is the fact that its two great sources of funds, the unemployment deposits and savings deposits, replenish themselves through the same mechanism of 'monetary correction' which inflates the value of everything from salaries to the price of coffee. In other words, what borrowers cannot provide in the form of interest payments because, under the present system to do so would be disastrous to the middle class, is provided by means of monetary correction elsewhere in the economy. The money actually comes

from the Central Bank, the institution which 'magically' creates money by 'correcting' virtually all forms of bank deposits.

The existence of a self-perpetuating Cr$600 billion fund (more than Cr$1 trillion in 1979) does not, however, mean that the housing bank can solve all of the nation's housing problems at the wave of a magic mortgage. Marketing bottlenecks are common in Brazil. For example, the inability of real estate agents to provide financing for ageing but vacant apartment buildings, which no longer qualified for top-priority 'new' properties loans, caused a stir in the construction industry in 1978 which was only resolved when the government agreed to prolong the period during which a building could legally be considered 'new'.

Similar problems crop up every year for prospective buyers of genuinely used property. An effort was made in 1978 by the Federal Savings Bank to rectify this situation by creating a natural means of unlocking hidden housing resources through a housing exchange programme. Exchanges, authorities felt, would help eliminate the need for straight cash downpayments. The programme foundered because the BNH could not supply enough cash for the residual value of traded properties. The policy continues to be to first 'set aside enough money for new housing, since new housing is what cuts down on overall demand, not recycled old housing.'

The biggest problem, however, continues to be the inability of the bank to devise programmes to benefit the poor.

Interior Minister Mario Andreazza, whose ministerial competence includes statutory control over the BNH, admits that current policies will not be able to solve the nation's housing shortage problem in the immediate future. The key problem—even in an economy where cash is created by fiat—is, of course, money. The BNH is forced to set priorities for scarce resources and, since the economic environment is so inflationary and since, under the circumstances, only the government can manage the vast sums involved, housing funds in Brazil are obtained through government credit allocation rather than the market mechanism.

So, the question for poor people is: 'How much credit is going to be allocated to *us*?'

Andreazza's frank answer is: 'More than ever before, but it's still not going to be enough.'

Even the normally ebullient Andreazza admitted in a recent speech that the problem is virtually insurmountable during the life of the present administration, which ends in 1985. 'From 1975 to 1985', he said, 'Brazil's population will increase by 22 million which implies a demand for at least four million new units of housing. The problem is serious, not only because of new demand but also because we have got to attend to the needs of the 70% of the urban population which earns three minimum salaries or less'. (The minimum salary is currently Cr$2,900 per month—about £45.) Andreazza's solution to the four million housing units question is to build one million new units of 'popular housing' a year for the next five years.

Two problems remain: one, in an even more recent statement Andreazza admitted that the 1979 goal will be only 50% fulfilled at best; and two,

even if housing authorities succeed in keeping up with increased demand (with credit that is even more heavily subsidized than that which is granted to the middle class) they will still not have solved the problem of current backlog in supply.

According to a Brazilian Geographic and Statistical Institute study, Brazil is still suffering from a seven million unit shortfall in standard housing, i.e., seven million families are living in sub-standard or over-crowded housing units or, in many cases, have no housing at all.

Part of the annual housing deficiency is met by private builders, of course, who service the needs of Brazil's still small middle class. But the great mass of Brazilian wage earners must rely on public housing if they are to achieve 'legal standard' norms. Another IBGE report estimates that fully 75% of São Paulo residents earn five or fewer minimum salaries per month; in Rio de Janeiro the figure is 82% and even higher in other Brazilian cities.

Most of the shortfall, then, must be met by government built and/or financed housing. But the effort to speed up delivery of new units has been painfully slow. It took 10 years (1964 to 1974) to build one million units, then four years to build another one million. In 1978 a total of 250,000 new units of popular housing were delivered and the government hopes to double that figure for 1979, but the BNH is still far short of its one million a year goal.

To help the wage earner cope with the high cost of housing the BNH is undertaking two kinds of development programme: one is designed to ease the financial burden, the other to reduce construction costs and create a Brazilian mass housing style. The new financing plan relies to some extent on taking from Pedro (the middle class) and giving to Paulo (the working poor) but it also relies on giving to Paulo now and taking from him later. The BNH's task under the new scheme is simply a matter of moving more mortgage financing funds into the low salaried categories and then offering various forms of payment and interest abatement combined with longer term financing. Amortization periods would go up to 25 years and down payments might dwindle to practically nothing for buyers in the five minimum salaries or less range.

The internal debate with respect to the new BNH financing mechanisms for the poor, particularly the extremely poor, is not over. One group, led by Andreazza himself, would like the one minimum salary wage earner to pay no more than 10% of his monthly earnings to the unemployment fund and to mortgage payments. Since the unemployment fund takes 8% of every wage earner's pay cheque only 2% is left over for housing. With a Cr$2,900 minimum wage the housing payment for this class of mortgage holders would be barely Cr$58, slightly less than £1. According to the plan's backers the payment would be psychological, a device for stimulating pride in ownership, rather than remunerative for the system. The cost difference, of course, would be made up by the BNH, which would take funds from other mortgage revenues (Pedro) to support subsidized financing for the poor (Paulo).

Finally, the Andreazza group would like to structure mortgage payments for the working poor so that real values are extremely low during the initial period of repayment but then increase later on. 'The theory', according to one BNH researcher, 'is that your earning power increases as you grow older. But in Brazil this is somewhat doubtful.'

Other policy-makers, led by monetarists in the central bank and the planning ministry, would prefer simply to finance housing for the poor from general revenues (also Pedro) so that the inflationary impact of the subsidies could be more effectively reviewed from year to year.

As of early 1980 it seems likely that the Andreazza approach will be adopted by the administration of President-General João Baptista Figueiredo. Andreazza's stock rose when his long-time bureaucratic ally, former Brazilian Finance Minister Antônio Delfim Netto, was appointed planning minister by President Figueiredo in August, 1979. Not only is Delfim a strong advocate of easy credit and rapid expansion of means of payment, his appointment was also a sign that monetarists throughout the administration had been dealt a serious blow by the president. The monetarist leader, Mario Henrique Simonsen, was pushed out of planning by President Figueiredo to make room for Delfim, who appointed his own supporters into other important positions, including the presidency of the central bank.

As a sidelight, housing officials are also looking for ways to cut costs for their own construction projects, virtually all of which are designed for low-income mortgagers.

Uruguayan architect Luis Garcia Pardo won a 1978 BNH sponsored design contest with his proposed structural ceramic 'popular' housing model. Garcia argued that his design would save 50% on current mass housing construction costs for 100 or more unit tracks. Total construction costs were under £5,000 for the unit, about four times less per square metre than the average cost in the city of São Paulo.

The use of pyramid shaped blocks was one aspect of the unit's curious design. Said sociologist Adilson Tavares Adilson after viewing the structure, 'we've been fighting for this idea for three years and now it's finally being implemented. After 6,000 years of civil construction we're finally back to the pyramid!'

[Thomas Murphy is Rio News Editor of *Latin America Daily Post*.]

GOOD-HUMOURED LIBERAL

by John Elsom

JO Grimond's *Memoirs* are novel. They seem to have gone straight from his dictaphone to the bookshops without any intervening hand or mind, a feat which, if repeatable, would dispense with the whole editorial profession and make the supposed streamlining at *The Times* seem a mere shifting of desks. His book would be the despair of a copy editor. He does not merely ramble: he goes around in circles, backtracks, forwardtracks, heads off in one direction only to be seized by a marvellous view in another. He gets little facts wrong: the Liberal Party did not campaign under the slogan, 'Which twin is the Toni'. He makes the familiar slips of logic and syntax: he did not become 'engaged to his wife, Laura Bonham Carter, on the road South from Dalnawillan', because she was not his wife at the time. It comes as no surprise when he tells us that his study is always in a mess.

Grimond also must have dispensed with the advice of friends. He must be surrounded by publishers and journalists who could have made useful suggestions. Perhaps, in the style of Nelson, he turned a blind ear. If so, he shut out bad, as well as good, advice. Friends can be a nuisance to autobiographers. They can too easily be used to prompt the memory and tidy up the story, whereas what a person forgets can be as significant a clue to character as what is remembered. Nobody should expect historical objectivity from memoirs.

Nor did Grimond accept commercial or political promptings. A publisher hell-bent on profit would have asked him for more intimate disclosures. Grimond tells us almost nothing about the Thorpe saga, while his sketches of friends and acquaintances are warm and friendly, noting their quirks but not their follies, their slips sometimes but not their sins. Political historians will be maddened by what he does not disclose. He does not provide a coherent account of his leadership of the Liberal Party from 1956-1967, although he can be usefully precise on certain details. He is particularly careful to describe the causes for his opposition to the Lib-Lab pact, although he is casually vague about his discussions with Tony Benn when, as the result of the pact, he represented the Liberal side on energy matters.

Liberal supporters, looking for an overall view of British politics since the war and a statesmanlike vision of the future, will find little in the *Memoirs* that Grimond (and others) have not said elsewhere, more coherently and at greater length; and they may also miss what Grimond of all people would never provide, an assessment of his personal impact. Grimond plays down his own role in the Liberal revival and he is also over-modest in other matters. He correctly points out that Clement Davies was attracted to the European ideal after the war and that Arthur Holt was a firm supporter of what became the EEC; but it was Grimond

who bore the brunt of the patient advocacy, at times when the European idea was most ridiculed and when membership could have done Britain and Europe most good. He walked quietly and bravely towards the sound of gunfire, taking his small band of parliamentary supporters, for the most part, with him—without counting how many new followers would gather on the way and without bothering about the consequences (electorally or in other ways) if things went wrong.

Absent from his *Memoirs* is that most typical feature of political autobiographies, self-glorification. Vanity is not a passion particularly confined to politicians, but they do sometimes seem to pursue it with more professional zeal. The groomed public face comes between us and the private one, so that even the warts are presented as beauty spots. In political memoirs, there is always a thin dividing line between putting the record straight and the re-writing of history. The photos of families, the descriptions of meetings, the presentation of key events, the side-swipes at contemporaries and the statesmanlike postures all lead the reader to believe that powerful men, having relinquished or lost the favourable verdict of the electorate, are seeking a second opinion.

Grimond's book does not give that impression. He is not kissing newborn babies. He would be the despair of a PR agency, for he does not bother with tidying up his image. A forceful opponent of the old boys' network and of government patronage, he nevertheless conveys the impression of having lived within a highly privileged world in which the question as to whether offspring should be sent to Eton or St. Paul's looms large. His dropping of names would seem from anybody else like name-dropping. Above all, his book and his career stand out as a reproach to those who believe in managerial politics. He has a patrician disdain for the pedantry of politics (as of copy-editing)—an unforced dislike for the paraphernalia of the corporate state, the tables of statistics, the verbose directives from government departments, the cheerless charity and the inhuman demands. Grimond must have seemed to many colleagues an incurable dilettante, full of charm and bright ideas, but incapable of knuckling down to the hard grind of government. Iain Macleod once condescendingly suggested that Grimond, if he'd have belonged to the right party, would have made a capable Junior Minister. He was surely wrong. Grimond would have made a poor Junior Minister, too impatient and critical; but with his ability to see the wood rather than the trees, his coolness in a crisis, his readiness to question cherished beliefs and his powers to persuade, he might have been an outstanding Senior Minister. Was he, as many Liberals believe, the best Prime Minister we never had?

'Get yourself a leader,' the headmistress of a local adult education college once said to me scornfully while I was campaigning for the Liberals (under Grimond) as a Parliamentary candidate. That remark stuck in my mind, because I was so firmly convinced that Grimond was an excellent leader for the Liberal Party. In retrospect, one can see how completely Grimond went against the grain of political fashion. Butskellism bored him and he was infuriated beyond normal levels of tolerance

by the Wilson-Heath exchanges. When he gave up the leadership, it was interpreted in the press as a gesture of despair in the Liberal Party; but it seems to have been a private decision. He was as steadfast as a plain MP as he had been as chief spokesman, and in the one party crisis since the late 1950s, when it seemed as if the party really would fall to pieces, he picked up the reins again with an assurance which calmed all Liberal nerves.

Thorpe had resigned. The party was divided between those who felt that he had been hounded out of office and those who believed that he should have gone before. Furthermore, the previous Liberal Party Assembly had taken the untried step, for British politics, of insisting that future party leaders should be elected through the party as a whole, rather than just through the parliamentary group; and all political commentators believed that a party election under these circumstances would be disastrous. Grimond took over as temporary leader; and his speech to the Manchester conference, at which David Steel was elected, was a masterpiece of good humour and common sense. From that moment on, I felt that the party would survive, despite the trials ahead which David Steel (and Jeremy Thorpe) would have to face; and the genuinely confident Margate Assembly in 1979 was as much a tribute to Grimond's leadership at that crucial time, as it was to Steel, who afterwards had steered the party through the Lib-Lab pact to a general election in which many had assumed that the Liberals would be trounced.

Grimond was a good Liberal leader by instinct rather than design. He did not, to begin with, over-value leadership. He could rally the troops well enough, but he never gave the fatal impression that all Britain needed was a strong Leader—which would have destroyed his (and the Liberal Party's) credibility at a stroke, as well as being fundamentally illiberal. And yet how great the temptation must have been after Orpington to parade himself as a man of destiny! During the upward swings of the Liberal revival, he never allowed optimism to run away with him, while, in the downward slides, he never seemed to give way to gloom. To a volatile party, he represented stability but not conservatism; and he rarely encouraged the Liberals to delude themselves about their real political strength. They could do that without encouragement.

It will become more difficult in time to say exactly why Grimond was a good leader, as we lose touch with the climate of opinion in the 1960s. His views already seem alternately reactionary and farsighted, pragmatic and utopian; but his ideas by themselves tell less than half the story, for even when we disagreed with Grimond, we could respond with intense sympathy to the feelings which lay behind the apparent wrongheadedness. I have sniped at the untidiness of his book, but I do not think that it reflects a confused mind. On the contrary, it reveals somebody so assured of his values that he does not need external order to keep himself in check. Grimond is the exact opposite of someone who, surrounded by filing cabinets and pocket computers, still cannot make up his mind. During the 1960s, amid so much bombast and confusion, Grimond stood

out as someone who would not be fooled by panaceas or tricked into believing that the latest grand scheme for the regeneration of Britain would actually work.

His reaction to Wilson's white-hot technological revolution was markedly similar to Steel's scathing remarks in Margate about how Margaret Thatcher stood on a nuclear reactor to prove that it was safe. Grimond's *Memoirs* are full of quietly deflationary remarks, which are the most attractive feature of his literary, as of his political, style. They range from his involvement in the D-Day landings ('I had no sooner landed than I was knocked down by a motor cycle') to his observations about the British conduct in war; to weightier and more political matters. Alone among the political leaders of the 1960s, he seemed to retain perspective on three awkward concepts—government, parliament and democracy.

He was sceptical of governments which tried, or pretended to try, to do too much. This was partly for good Liberal reasons—the dislike of totalitarianism (covert or overt), the faith in individual initiative, the desire for personal freedom, the fear of patronage; but to these, he added a personal hatred of pomposity. About Lord Attlee he writes admiringly, of how, after an official dinner, Attlee 'left to catch the Green Line bus to Cherry Cottage. Seldom can a man have been less concerned about "face" '. He also recognised that over-ambitious governments failed to do those jobs well which only governments can do—notably the limiting of the powers of one section of the population over another.

But with his scepticism of government, he does not make exaggerated claims for the House of Commons. He never pretends that the House of Commons can be anything more than a check on the executive and a means by which the government can be made aware of the grievances of the constituencies. He does not therefore pander to the fantasies which envisage that individual back-bench members should be brought more centrally into the business of governing, either through an over-extensive use of parliamentary committees or by inventing a new range of minor official posts. He would, no doubt, see this idea as a device whereby the independence of MPs, doubtful enough at the best of times, can be more effectively stifled by the bribes of small office.

Nor would he see such a move as an extension of democracy. A passionate libertarian, who has fought all his life not only for a fairer electoral system but also for such measures as co-ownership in industry, Grimond is nevertheless not so starry-eyed about ballot-box democracy that he pretends that the complex transactional basis of society can be simplified into one universally applicable formula. Sound money is for him as important as a sound electoral system in maintaining the good faith through which societies function.

That kind of understanding lays Grimond open to the charge of deviousness from those populists who chanted 'Power to the People' under the Liberal banner; and also distinguishes him from Tony Benn's

plans for workers' control, although it is interesting to note that, in his *Memoirs*, he supports the use of referenda as a temporary substitute for a fair electoral system. Behind his carefully qualified and precisely used definitions of 'government', 'parliament' and 'democracy', lies an affectionate concern to preserve what are now clichaically termed community values.

Grimond has far too patrician an air to fit the normal picture of a community politician; and he would be the last person to suggest that the road to power is paved with scandalously neglected sidewalks. He is not a Jones the Vote nor a Cllr. Knott from Hammersmith. But through his *Memoirs* and indeed his parliamentary career, there runs an unforced love and concern for his constituency, Orkney and Shetlands, with whose interests he has become so identified. His constituency is responsible for many of the digressions in the book: he so enjoys talking about the characters, the changing attitudes, the economic problems and opportunities of the Shetlands, the wild birds, the agriculture and the difficulties of getting from island to island. These descriptive passages are delightful to read, unless one is too impatient to get back to the national and international scene; and curiously enough, Grimond makes one feel slightly guilty for such impatience. It is as if we had succumbed to the corruption of the age, by undervaluing the real world of how people live and earn their keep and by overvaluing the manipulations of power at Westminster.

That perhaps is the secret of his appeal. I started to read his *Memoirs* as some kind of respite from a feeling of deep unease, almost despair, caused by the Anthony Blunt affair and the revelations contained in Andrew Boyle's *The Climate of Treason*. It may have been naive to experience such distress. I do not know what secrets, if any, crucial to national security were betrayed by Blunt; nor how widespread the conspiracy was. It was simply that Blunt's presence, his status in our society, even his appearance, were of the kind which, since childhood, I have been accustomed, even conditioned, to treat with respect. I do not think that this is snobbery or, if so, it is far removed from the traditional wells and springs of class snobbery. Blunt seemed (as he still does) a calm, thoughtful, knowledgeable man, whose comparatively privileged background had given him the opportunity to reflect with depth and sensitivity about values and concepts which too easily get forgotten in the struggle for survival. He seemed akin to the Cambridge dons who had taught me; and what alarmed me most of all was not that such a man should reject British society so fundamentally, but that he should endorse a society, Stalinist Russia no less, whose values were no better than those of fascist Germany which he detested. Of course, the climate of opinion in the 1930s was different from that of today. Of course, it was more tempting then to ignore the pogroms and the repressions, the crippling restrictions upon freedom, the grotesque and primitive posturings of Stalin, not yet exposed as the proletarian czar; but someone with Blunt's apparent sophistication, his scepticism and awareness of history, must surely have been inclined to pause, to wonder whether all the horror

stories trickling across the frontier were mere Western propaganda, to question and thus to withhold his support for the regime.

He did not; and by not doing so, he betrayed not Britain but those humane values which the best part of British intellectual society continued to espouse during the dark days of British imperial militancy and which partly redeemed the worst arrogances of the Raj. Bertrand Russell was violently anti-West, but he was not fooled by Stalin either; and he would have been incapable of Blunt's duplicity.

Blunt must have been seduced by communist theory and perhaps, in the E. M. Forster vein, by loyalty to his intimate circle of friends. There is some remote similarity between the faces of Blunt and Grimond, both patrician, both leaned, lined and handsome; both sceptical, both, in different ways, reliable and commanding. But whereas Blunt's eyes nowadays seem exceptionally hooded and reserved, understandably so, Grimond's retain a good-humour and honesty. I do not wish to read too much into a detail which is so banally what one would expect from their different careers and lives; but I suspect that Grimond's temperament derives from his surmounting a psychological hurdle which has tripped up many other admirable men, including Blunt.

Grimond has stayed on good terms with his childhood and his past. The opening chapters of his *Memoirs* describe with much affection but little sentimentality what St. Andrews was like when he was a boy, its serenity and resistance to change, its neighbourliness and somewhat puritanical propriety. It is indeed still a lovely town, well evoked by Grimond; but it must have been hard for an ambitious adolescent not to dismiss it as merely quaint, with its horse-drawn cabs at a time when most other places had evolved to taxis. Apart from such oddities, there is the inquisitiveness of a small community, its prying and local heroes and villains.

Games seem most to have expressed the domestic happiness of his childhood. The family that plays together stays together. If golf was a natural love, other amusements surrounded the Grimond family; and Jo Grimond seems, from his *Memoirs*, to have grown up singularly free from the neuroses and tensions which bedevil most lives. He does not pretend that he is someone which he is not, which is why he can afford to leave his *Memoirs* in such a rough, unpolished state. He does not need to polish up his image to be loved by the public at large, having been denied love in his childhood. He need not conceal his cantankerousness or foibles, or disguise in any way his humanity. Such genuineness is rare in all walks of life, but most of all, perhaps, in politics. For this reason, when he expressed Liberal views—and it is interesting to notice that he never had any doubts about being a Liberal—he did so with singular authority. He breathed fire into the barely glowing ashes of the Liberal Party; and encouraged a flame which has grown and spread after his resignation as leader, without yet perhaps reaching the proportions of a forest fire. That may still come.

IBSEN, STRINDBERG AND THE SEX WAR

by Charles Marowitz

WHAT is frightening in Strindberg and most exemplified in *The Father* is the assumption, ingrained and unquestioned, that women have a primordial mastery over men; that men live, function and survive only at the behest of women, and that because of this craven dependence, men must despise the tyranny under which they live. Ibsen's view, despite the fact that in *Hedda Gabler* he depicted a similar 'colonial' relationship between Tesman and his bride, is that man's veneration of woman can lift her to a higher plain where she dominates not through her own power, but by means of the deluded imagination of her male idolators. In short, Ibsen retained his naïveté about women throughout his life whereas Strindberg congenitally understood that if there is any spell cast, it is the spell that woman casts over men—and not the other way round.

This insight into the true nature of the sexes is fundamental to the work of any writer, for his basic attitudes towards life and society depend largely on where he sees himself in relation to the opposite sex. In a writer like Tennessee Williams, where the idolization of women is constant, there is a bedrock assumption that whatever the peregrinations of male characters, they are always subject to the influence emanating from a female centre—and that all drama represents the coming-to-terms with the consequences of that all-pervasive influence. Amanda Wingfield, the monster-mother in *The Glass Menagerie,* Blanche du Bois in *Streetcar Named Desire,* Maggie the 'cat' of *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof* all determine the actions of the men who are drawn into their webs. Without their inexorable influence, no dramatic conflicts would have arisen. They are the centrifugal authority which threatens, wheedles, commands and tyrannizes. The dramas they evoke are all responses to the unquestioned power they exert on the lives and social conditions of their menfolk. This is what places Williams in the Strindberg camp. He acknowledges the true seat of power and writes from that awareness. Arthur Miller, on the other hand, proceeds from a 19th century, basically Jewish conception of the woman's role in which she is seen as the Supporting Figure—mother, lover, companion, provider. All the wife of his Salesman can do at the end of the day is apologize for being unable to shed tears, the implicit assumption being that that is the most that could be expected of her. Her powers over Willy Loman and the brood are almost non-existent. She cannot combat the social structure which demands Willy's demise as an obsolete member of a system which insists upon utility. She cannot dismantle the fantasy bequeathed to her sons by Willy and the American Ethic for which he lived. She is as powerless a figure in *Death of a Salesman* as the mother in *All My Sons.* Miller's universe is entirely patriarchal and in it, women have their place but not the power to shape and determine crucial events. As with Ibsen, who is Miller's mentor and abiding literary influence, a woman is a social corollary to Man and defined almost entirely sociologically. There is never

a hint of the fact that the driving force behind all conflicts and calamities is the unrelieved tension that one sex constantly insinuates against the other. The malevolence is always located in some other realm where harm ensues because of collisions between capital and labour, class antagonisms or opposing social values.

The measure of Ibsen's naïveté is that he actually propagandized for the liberation of women—never realizing that in the metaphysical realm which conditions inter-relationships more strategically than politics or ideology, woman was always the master, and that flimsy social classifications such as wife, mistress, companion or whore, were only disguises adopted by The Goddess to enable her to control her environment more effectively. The woman's fundamental role is as Ruler—no matter what her social labels, and Strindberg grasped this fact which is why in *The Father*, Laura, who hasn't the power to spend the household-money without keeping strict accounts or determining the future tuition of her daughter without first obtaining permission, is still the overriding power in the home—commanding the allegiance of the daughter, dominating the old nurse, (whose traditional allegiance should be to The Captain), brainwashing the resident doctor whom she has engineered into his position, manipulating her Pastor-brother so that even the sway of the Church is brought under her banner, and infiltrating and ultimately overpowering the resistance of a husband who dared to question that her 'intelligence' was 'equal to her will.' What The Captain didn't realize was that when a woman's will is indomitable, it doesn't matter who is the more intelligent because once the mind becomes the captive of the will, the nature of its thoughts no longer matter. Throughout the play, the Captain realizes he is fighting against insuperable odds; that there is a deadly female predestination which is careering him towards a pre-ordained end and nothing and no one can deter it. That is what makes the play a tragedy. A terrible outcome is inevitable; the *Eumenides* embodied in Laura is unswervable and yet the father gives battle, enters the fray, risks all. It is the doomed heroism of an Oedipus or a Sisyphus.

The power of Ibsen's Hedda is a kind of annuity awarded the character by a benevolent author who never realizes that her own stocks-and-shares are greater than anything he can ever bestow. It is because her power is *conceded* by Ibsen that it rings false. Had Strindberg written the play, he would have realized that Hedda's power was innate and therefore unconquerable. In Strindberg's dispensation, the shot that rang out in the final scene would have downed Brack or Tesman, as Hedda's previous bullet had downed Eilert Loevborg. Strindberg had the sense to realize that The Goddess never sacrifices herself. She always arranges the sacrifices of others for her own aggrandizement. A woman caught in a social dilemma, threatened with scandal and a life of sexual dependence on a small-town magistrate may well take her own life. But a Strindbergian Hedda would have realized that what she had got Loevborg to do through creative manipulation, could just as easily be duplicated in Brack or her husband. She would never have felt threatened by Thea Elvstead's colla-

boration with her husband in recreating Eilert Loevborg's life-work, for she would have known that no matter what books are painfully re-assembled by flawed scholars and jumped-up housekeepers, the sovereignty of a woman's character, who is able to inspire suicide in a man who wasn't even an ex-lover, is a much greater achievement. For Ibsen, Loevborg's posthumous work-of-art was more significant than the daemonic power of Hedda Gabler to order events. Strindberg would have realized immediately that no artifact is more important than strength-of-character, and that the spectacle of one strong woman asserting her superiority is worth twenty thousand social treatises.

Strindberg's work is the testament of a man who was burned by the conflagrations of love and desire; Ibsen's, a cool appraisal by someone who never got beyond the necking-stage or the furtive one-night stand.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE POST-IMPRESSIONISTS

by Cyril Fradan

> . . . in the seventeenth century there was Rembrandt, and he's still with us today, and nobody can improve on him, whereas seventeenth century technology now looks very crude to us. Or take the great inventions of the 1870s: we now think nothing at all of them, but has there been any advance on *Anna Karenina* which was written at the same time? (Solzhenitsyn *First Circle* Translated by M. Guybon, 1968.)

> To admire an old picture is to pour sentiment into a funeral urn . . . (F. T. Marinetti *La Fondazione e Manifesto del Futurismo* 1908.)

ALL praise to the organisers of the vast exhibition, The Post-Impressionists, at the Royal Academy of Arts, London for the wide choice of works and for the admirable documentation which accompanies them. The range of style, subject-matter and quality, all co-existing between the years 1880 and 1912, and not exhausting all the then contemporaneous approaches to painting, has prompted the form which this article will take. The semblance of the contemporary art world is already discernible by the turn of the century and indeed, all the seeds of the developments up to our own day are already sown. Realising that owing to geographical distance few readers of *Contemporary Review* will be able to visit Burlington House, I thought it might be more rewarding to examine some general issues implicit in the exhibition rather than deal with specific works on display; and so, within the brief format at my disposal, I shall try to discuss such questions as: How should one paint? What should one paint? Painting, Politics and Modernity.

How one should paint was no problem to painters in oil from the van Eycks to Courbet. There was a long and unbroken tradition in which the technique could be used for any forms from the broadest effect to the most filigree detail. The approach was tonal—i.e. light-values predominated in creating the illusion of form. Shadows were painted transparently and lights built up opaquely. Local colours were often indicated by further transparent or semi-transparent glazes. The skill required was laboriously learnt and not to be imitated by the casual amateur.

Technical advances in optics and colour-theory began to influence painters by the mid-nineteenth century. Impressionism, Pointillism and Divisionism could never have come about without them. Coupled with the 'broken colour' of these theories came the concept of *alla prima* painting: not the slow construction of the old school but the direct application from the manufacturers' tubes with the intention of completing the work as 'spontaneously' as possible. An 'impression' could begin to be the justification for fudging on the part of the artist. The immediate effects could often seem attractive and the painter no longer had to worry about different qualities of linseed oil, or mastics, or painting fat on lean or a number of other mysteries. Hence the long-term results were often the

complete loss of *éclat* and vitality in the materials as the oil content dried and yellowed. Most works painted in oil over the last century actually gain from the luminosity of colour reproduction on glossy paper, the originals being muddy.

Worse, though, is that *alla prima* seems to make oil painting an easy process which may be well within reach of any amateur. More and more untrained people have come to see a means of indulgent self-expression in the medium—and the manufacturers have not been unhappy with the resultant level of sales.

So it was that the immediacy of the material, applied by brush or palette-knife or hand, could gain in importance and eventually become an independent aim to the detriment of the image. The corollary is that the image, no matter how crudely conceived and executed, could be justified on expressionistic grounds.

The question of 'What you paint' is much more important. It necessarily swallows up the question of 'How you paint'. Any mark made on a surface may, with sufficient sophistry, be made to seem important, all the more so if it be an accepted symbol or in any way 'figurative'. It may be analysed aesthetically, politically, religiously, historically etc. etc. Theorists probably stood behind the Lascaux artist as he limned his bison on the cave walls—there were no doubt orthodoxies to be respected even then. Even under such circumstances the artist's activity has generally been solitary and he must be his own first critic. The scope of his work may well be circumscribed by outside pressures. His assertion of independence, should he value it, starts the moment a second pair of eyes shares his re-created experience.

The 'Reality' of the optical experience of the external world served as source-material from Giotto onwards to the end of the nineteenth century. It was open to interpretation and to selection, but was as fundamental to a Realist as to a Symbolist. The theories which gained ascendancy during the period of the present exhibition laid the foundation for the gradual banning of figuration or 'illusionism' from orthodox 'Modern Art'. Here are two quotations, divided by sixty years, which indicate a point of departure and arrival:

> It is well to remember that a picture, before becoming a battle-horse, a nude woman or some anecdote, is essentially a plane surface covered with colours put together in certain order. (Maurice Denis, *Définition du Neotraditionisme* 1890.)

> The painter no longer approached the easel with an image in his mind; he went up to it with material in his hand to do something to that other piece of material in front of him. The image would be the result of this encounter. (Harold Rosenberg, *The American Action Painters* 1952.)

The artist, seeking liberty, seemed to find it, at least for the kind of artefacts he wanted to produce, by the turn of the century. Each succeeding movement, and many co-existing, claimed to have found *the* answer. It is intriguing to note how soon libertarian movements, once convinced of their righteousness, become dogmatic and intolerant. What happened in

the art milieux was a reflection of the fragmentation among political groups —Socialists, Marxists, Anarchists, Nihilists etc. It is interesting to note that Freud, who was to demonstrate later that we cannot free ourselves from the past but only come to terms with its effects, was a student in Paris in 1885; four years earlier, the Anarchists, having broken from the Working Mens International, held their own first International in that city.

I would like to quote a selection of extracts from the main period we are considering and a few later ones as a kind of follow-through. Their lack of modesty is remarkable.

Firstly three Symbolists:

Gauguin (*Diverses Choses* 1886-7):

> They (the Impressionists) heed only the eye and neglect the mysterious centres of thought, so falling into merely scientific reasoning. . . When they speak of their art, what is it? A purely superficial art, full of affectations and purely material. There is no thought there.

G-Albert Aurier (*'Le Symbolisme en Peinture'* 1891):

> The artist must necessarily avoid, very carefully, the cosmetic elements in art: concrete truth, illusionism, trompe l'oeil. By so doing he will avoid his paintings giving a deceitful impression of nature, acting on the onlooker as if it were nature itself, that is, without being evocative, or, if I may be allowed a rough neologism, not 'Ideistic'.

Maurice Denis (*'De Gauguin et de Van Gogh au Classicisme'* 1909):

> We have substituted the theory of 'equivalence' or of the 'symbol' for the idea of 'Nature seen through a temperament'. (Emile Zola's *Definition of Art C.F.*) The emotions and spiritual states which any spectacle evokes in the artist, arouse symbols or plastic equivalents in his imagination.

The Fellows of the Rose-Croix were very definite about the subjects permitted to the members of the Order. They favoured the Catholic Ideal, Mysticism, Legend, Myth etc. A whole list of rejected subjects included: History, patriotic and military painting, rustic scenes and landscapes (unless in the style of Poussin) and many other categories.

The Futurists, with their Manifesti like melodramatic operatic libretti, offer an *embarras de richesse* of extravagant claims. Here are a few chosen from Marinetti's *Manifesto of 1914*:

> All forms of imitation must be despised, all forms of originality glorified: All subjects previously used must be swept aside in order to express our whirling life of steel, of pride, of frenzy and of speed. We combat the false claims of the Secessionists and Independents that they belong to the Future. There can be no painting unless one starts from an absolutely modern sensation. . .

Alas; All of them dated, Futurists, Secessionists, Independents and all:

> High-hearted youth comes not again —
> Nor old heart's wisdom yet to know
> The sighs that mock me as I go.
>
> James Joyce, *Bahnhofstrasse* 1927.

I shall quote but two more in this section. The first is by Arshile Gorky on Cubism in 1931: 'The Twentieth century, what activity, what restless, nervous energy! Has there, in six centuries, been a better art than Cubism?'

The second is the combined effort of Adolph Gottlieb and Mark Rothko in 1943: 'This world of the imagination is fancy-free and violently opposed to common sense.'

Le dogme est mort! Vive le dogme!

From early on in the nineteenth century artists have been actively involved in politics and committed to ideals both of the Left and the Right — sometimes against their will. They have been afflicted by a megalomania that, ever since cave-painting, their images exert an irresistible magic power and that they can therefore affect politics in a potent way. Some rulers seem to share this view but, when they really have to impose their will, they would rather turn to the army or the police. Art may be used for propaganda for Church or State or Anarchist, but it is always the follower, not the originator of ideologies outside of the field of aesthetics.

Although many of the Impressionists and other artists fought in 1870 not one of them produced a work such as Delacroix's *Liberty leading the People* of 1830.

With few exceptions they and their successors, from the Post-Impressionists onwards, stemmed from the middle-classes. Over more than a hundred years a vociferous and bitter battle has been raged against the *bourgeoisie* amongst whom they found their critics and apologists, and, above all, the private dealers who sold their paintings to private individuals of the same class. It is only a class which has leisure and income surplus to daily necessities which can permit itself the luxury of acquiring art. If this class be not the maligned 'middle', what is it? What hypocrisy to decry those who have supported them. What are the alternatives other than Church or State? What is the nature of artistic freedom behind the Iron Curtain today, or in impoverished peasant economies? Censorship and suppression are much stronger where power is a state monopoly.

It was Napoleon III himself who acted the *Deus ex Machina* in 1866 and gave orders for the *Salon des Refusés* to be organised. It wasn't the paintings which were shown then or later which caused his downfall in 1870.

Later regimes were not as kind.

Hitler, in opening the Great Exhibition of German Art in Munich 1937, said:

> 'Works of art which cannot be understood in themselves, but need pretentious instructions to justify their existence . . . will no longer find their way to the German people. . . For the artist does not create for the artist, but, like everyone else, he creates for the people.'

Ten years later Vladimir Kemenov, writing in VOKS Bulletin (Moscow), produced an essay I should dearly like to reproduce in full. Here, however,

is a short extract:

> As opposed to decadent bourgeois art, critically hiding its reactionary class nature behind phrases such as 'pure art' and 'art for art's sake', Soviet artists openly espouse the ideas of Bolshevism, expressing the advanced ideas of the Soviet people. . . As opposed to decadent bourgeois art with its anti-humanism, Soviet artists present Socialist Humanism—with profound sympathy for that part of humanity under the capitalist system which cripples and degrades men. . . Soviet art is advancing along the true path indicated by the genius of Stalin.

In both of these extracts the subjectivity and individualism so dear to Western artists are given a collective orientation and their work guided by the insight of those two noted humanists and aesthetes, Hitler and Stalin. More seriously, for the Radical artists, both fascist and communist accuse them of being tools of the *bourgeoisie*. To add a further insult, insinuations have been made that the CIA helped to promote Abstract Expressionism on the grounds that non-figurative art was non-political art. (Eva Cockcroft, *Artforum* June 1974). So they are tools of the reactionaries after all!

When the powerful artists' craft-union, the guild, under the aegis of the newly-formed Royal Academy in France, in the seventeenth century, created a closed shop so that only their members were permitted to sell within the walls of the major cities, the dissidents then sold their wares outside the walls. Fortunately, the guild's powers were not nation-wide. Since the breakdown of that system 'western' artists have been served by all the freedom of the market and evermore sophisticated sales-techniques. A powerful industry, involving enormous sums of money, has developed since patrons stopped buying or commissioning from the artist in his studio. The extension of the market through the creation of a multiplicity of eccentric styles which perplex the potential buyer of a speculatively produced artefact has brought about a complex system of occupations whose prime function is to re-assure him that his investment is safe and justified. This system starts with the gallery and then ramifies into all the different catagories of promoters and publicists—daily papers, glossy magazines, books, investment councillors and auction-houses. Some of these hope to earn renown even surpassing that for which the artist longs. All of them expect to make money. No wonder that ART is so costly.

Unlike jewellery and bronze sculpture, painting has no scrap value. The materials cannot be re-cycled and the canvas or panel is worth nothing much. Marketable value lies in persuading that minute proportion of the world's population which is interested in ART, that the concept expressed (especially in abstract art) be worth the price once it appears with the right signature. With any luck the artist might be dead and rarity can be added to the attractions.

Why should it be that artistic activities, said to be the true expression of our age, should need so much justification and explanation? How do the apologists try to evaluate the works? A very influential collector of avant-garde works told me that the only criterion needed was that some-

one had thought up an idea and externalised it—if only in documentary form. On this basis one can readily grasp why Carl André's bricks in the Tate Gallery received so much critical acclaim—are they not equal to the brick-built cathedral of Albi?

Pity the influential critic when faced with the evaluation of such works. Examples abound of perplexed critics, determined in their own minds that no artist should ever be considered so unworthy as to fling pots of paint, trying to extricate themselves from the predicament through the expression of their own 'poetic fantasy.' Here is but one example:

> Ever since Seurat painters have known that certain angles—certain deviations from the horizontal—correspond to specific emotional states. There is an angle which recurs over and over in Caro. It measures about 105 degrees, and in all the books it is the standard way of keeping the lines open and saying 'Yes' to life. It is by doing this, in the work, that Caro has found metaphors for just about everything from the pure festivity of 'Month of May' (1963) to the suggestion, in 'After Summer' (1968) that the whole earth is about to open up and a completely new universe come into being. It is something that belongs to the 1960s, and could not have been done earlier; the time and the man are one. (John Russell, *Sunday Times*).

This is clearly not art for the masses. Art for the masses is always propagandist: political, religious or commercial. It is also figurative although it might make use of some accepted symbols and emblems like the Cross, the Swastika, Hammer and Sickle, Clenched Fist and the myriad trademarks of the commercial world.

Art, in the sense that it can deeply move anyone, or arouse his analytical or critical interest in the artefact itself, is and always will be, a minority interest. To believe otherwise is to join Marie Antoinette in her Hameau. The real threat of the artist to any authoritarian régime lies not so much in the nature of the work he produces as in the implicit assumption of his liberty to think in an unorthodox way.

My main criticism of the last century lies not in the multiplicity of creative styles; it is of the arrogance and pretensions of the prophets of each new ideology.

The concept of 'modernity' seems to have been much influenced by Marxist dialectics (no peaceful co-existence of old and new orders) and historicism. David Watkin, in *Morality and Architecture* (1977), describes it as:

> . . . the morally insinuating and widely disseminated argument that modern architecture exercises some unassailable claim over us since it is not a 'style' which we are free to like or dislike as we choose, but it is the expression of some unchallengeable 'need' or requirement inherent in the twentieth century with which we must conform.

What applies to the Mother of the Arts applies equally to the offspring.

To compound the matter, this society, which resorts to Freudian and similar analysis, has been browbeaten into ignoring and decrying its artistic heritage up to the turn of the century and beyond. Yesterday's style is

about as far back as you need look, just to know what no longer may be done. The resultant historical ignorance has allowed for many pastiche revivals to be heralded as original innovation and for the elevation to major art 'discoveries' of some component parts of former painting. Examples of the latter would be passages in Frans Hals and action-painting, or a comparison of the kind of patterns formed by the engraved lines in works such as those by Piranesi and their magnified version in Bridget Riley. This is really confusing the spark with the flame. Not everyone with a tinder-box is also Prometheus.

In spite of all Historic Imperatives figurative art has survived alongside of abstract art and has found a market not necessarily more liberal or more reactionary than others. Need we continue to believe that the only true artistic doctrine for the twentieth century be that of abstraction? Let us be free to create and criticise but to avoid the dogma of Final Solutions. Evaluation? I shall conclude with this opinion of Edward Lucie-Smith's in the *Sunday Times*:

> In Paris, there was also a number of artists working in white on white. It was as if, and is as if, one of the ways in which the work of art survives today is to approach the condition of nothingness, of non-existence, as closely as it can, to balance on the frontier of nullity.

Have all the fine and furious words of radical modernists brought us to nullity?

MINIMISING INTERNATIONAL MISERY

by Harry B. Orriss

MAN'S inhumanity to man; the experience of two world wars this century; multi-directional migration on a mounting scale: — all this and much more led to the establishment (in 1922) of International Social Services, an organisation bridging the frontiers of time and misery.

Embryonically set up in the aftermath of world war one, ISS is a voluntary non-sectarian, highly professional social welfare body, functioning through a network of national agencies to respond to a complex plethora of family needs in a contracting world of expanding migration.

Around 100,000 families and individuals are assisted annually by ISS in more than a hundred countries; people with problems which only international co-operation can solve. Such entangled problems as bigamy, desertion, divorce, separation, abandonment, sickness, disablement, loss of contact, non-support, loneliness, unhappiness — the whole gamut of human and social need in a fraught world, paradoxically pitted by a messy mixture of international co-operation and conflict, and by individual cruelty and selfishness on the one hand and compassion and selfless concern on the other.

Such international service could, and does, only work by disregarding and subjugating the obstructions and perversities of nationality, race, creed, party politics and political systems.

Only by such expediency and discounting lesser principles can the supreme principle in international social work of serving the human condition be accomplished. In a sense, means must come second to ends, otherwise the whole noble concept of serving mankind internationally would never have got off the ground in the first place; much less, have developed so tellingly as it has.

ISS works with social agencies in countries with different languages, cultures, laws, customs, political systems, standards, value judgements, and so on; but usually within fairly generally accepted casework principles.

The professional thrust is on the person or family requiring across-frontiers help, subject to the guiding principle that the client's difficulties and needs can be answered or minimised only via international social welfare collaboration.

ISS might be said to be a catalyst for multi-country relationships, enabling national social welfare organisations, often vastly different in type, method and emphasis, and their social and welfare workers to obtain missing parts of data, or pieces of the situation 'jigsaw' only to be located and put together from other lands.

For their part, ISS social workers are skilled in international communication, with knowledge and experience of social and family structures, religious customs, aspirations and patterns of life and living, laws and socio-political systems. In this way, data is exchanged and interpreted,

mission teams set up, sometimes painfully slowly, and eventually hopefully a picture of the overall situation is created.

Thus international social work and casework are translated into positive action at the local level by ISS units, whose work includes counselling clients and local agencies: sometimes to 'cure', at others to ameliorate — better still, to prevent international problem cases arising.

In its role of catalyst or honest broker, ISS assists the local social worker to comprehend and evaluate the total problem and to understand the special features, facets and factors implicit in international social work. Nation-branches constitute a part of the national welfare structure, whose statutes must correspond with the aims and aspirations prescribed by ISS international statutes. Subject to these generalities, branches may adapt and adopt programmes and professional endeavour in the international context to their particular and differing national needs.

ISS Great Britain is founded by Government grant, charitable trusts and fund-raising activities. Its president, Sir Robert Black, wrote as follows in the foreword to the Branch's 1976 Annual Report:

> We have weathered the economic gales and the financial high seas of another difficult year. Throughout its course, we have dealt with an increasing load of cases and have maintained our traditionally high level of work. Our executive staff do wonders, and could add further to these wonders, if more financial resources were available. I gladly pay tribute to them all and to the skilled and experienced leadership of our Director, Winifred Rouse.

GPs, social workers, nurses, health visitors, voluntary workers and all ministering to the human condition, can hardly fail to profit, with their clients, for some detailed knowledge of the existence and scope of ISS. It could be likened to a microcosm of the United Nations, founded in the early years of the abortive League of Nations, to help with the complex social and socio-legal problems which may be faced by people who move from one cultural background to another. Such inter-country work, in 1976, is summarised in the annual report as help given

> to people beset by misfortunes far from their home-countries or caught in the tangles of international bureaucracy. . . The emphasis we place on the fact that our social workers are 'professionals' is sometimes misunderstood. It means no more—and no less—than that our workers have gone through a selection and training process so that there is a better-than-average chance that they are suitable for the work and even rather good at it. In addition, they have available to them information resources and the co-operation of overseas colleagues as tools to use in their task of helping people whose problems are international.

A high ratio of cases in 1976 concerned children. One example: a girl of ten with a very unsettled early life. Though she couldn't care for her, her mother declined to release her for adoption. So she was placed with good foster parents who become very fond of her. The foster father was moved to central Africa by his firm and ISS Great Britain were asked by the local social services department here to investigate the feasibility of suitable supervision and help for the family if they took the child with them. Difficulties foreseen for the girl were deemed likely to be less traumatic than removing her from people she had come to love. The African correspondent did good local work, and although at first all went

well, the political situation in the African country worsened, militating against the father's work, the children's schooling and stability of life itself. The correspondent gave ISS GB a full report on the complex and deteriorating situation. With her help, the child was able to stay with the foster-parents until their tour of duty was over and they came back to Britain.

In the Foreign Marriage Advisory Service sector, help, advice and support was given to 155 people who approached the British branch in 1976, involving people wishing to marry partners of a different race, nationality or culture.

Sadly, refugees are a growth sector, with more and more people being displaced or leaving their own shores voluntarily in a mass-migration, as at present with the Vietnamese. Again, many ISS cases were people who had endured great hardship in prison camps, some of them uprooted in early youth, others having had daunting experiences on their escape routes to freedom.

ISS GB, with the General Secretariat in Geneva, other national ISS Units and some Correspondents, is co-operating in a study of certain legal and social issues arising when persons and families are trapped between countries. The study is concentrating particularly on the plight of children.

The report poses a number of questions requiring answers, as for example: do the preferred child-rearing practices necessarily promote the development of an adult who can creatively respond to the opportunities and frustrations of the society which facilitates them? Are the principles underlying the action and advice of child welfare workers and the decisions of the judiciary consistent within a country? How far does international consistency exist? How far could it exist when there are wide variations in social and family organisation? What values operate when a person from one country makes a decision over children caught between cultures with different values?

Certainly our own fraught field of child-care would benefit no less than many other lands from replies to these profound questions. On the initiative of Dr. Bagley, Reader in Sociology at the University of Surrey, a discussion between himself, a representative of the British Association of Social Workers and ISS is covering the results of inter-country adoptions in Great Britain.

The research has three aims: to review the practice of inter-country adoption, with special reference to problems of placing foreign-born babies and children with British adoptive parents; to follow up the group of Hong Kong children placed with British adopters by ISS in the Sixties and to compare adjustment of such adopted children with the adjustment of white and mixed-race children of similar age, born and adopted within Britain.

During 1976, ISS GB had even more requests than before to trace missing relatives, often from elderly parents without contact with their children for years. The Children's Act of 1975 evoked many more inquiries

from once adoptees wishing to trace their natural parents, believing them to have gone abroad. Such cases present special difficulties in Britain itself and, with much greater reason, in overseas searchings. It may be argued that the 1975 act in this respect merely extended to the rest of the UK what Scottish law has allowed for many decades.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that ISS covers most of the full gamut of human and social need, subject to the indigenous obstacles, restrictions and contractions of the laws, customs and above all, political systems of individual countries.

Further information on ISS may be obtained from: Miss W. I. Rouse, Director, ISS of Great Britain, 39 Brixton Road, London, SW9 6DD. Tel: 01-735 8941.

[Harry D. Orriss, a Member of the Institute of Social Welfare, has had experience in Social Work and Municipal Administration].

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

TREASON IN THE THIRTIES

The Climate of Treason. Andrew Boyle. Hutchinson. £8.95.

Some years ago I damaged (temporarily) a valued friendship by saying in a review 'few men alive could have written this book, fewer still would have cared to write it'. I have no desire to repeat the experience in the case of Andrew Boyle, a friend of long standing whose biographies of Cheshire, Norman, Reith, Brendan Bracken and Erskine Childers provide a splendid corpus. One cannot easily point to a writer of contemporary life stories who can claim a better one.

Nevertheless one is bound to ask whether *The Climate of Treason* was worth writing. In the end my answer is an unequivocal 'yes'. But there are at least two large qualifications to be entered.

Lord Annan has pointed out in *The Times Literary Supplement* a number of minor mistakes. I myself am mentioned in one paragraph. There is room however for four clear mistakes and two other wrong implications. The most obvious is the description of Sir Nicholas Henderson as a former Oxford pupil of mine. In fact he was an undergraduate at Hertford, while I was a don at Christ Church. None of this matters in itself. Nor does it matter that Andrew Boyle informs us that if Guy Burgess had been elected to Pop at Eton, he would have had a room of his own. It is fairly well known that every boy at Eton had a room of his own, unless he was in College from the moment he entered the school. One is left nonetheless with a faint uncertainty about the more important facts.

More significantly one is left wondering whether the title *The Climate of Treason* is applied appropriately to the Cambridge of the thirties. Certainly the Cambridge of that period produced several remarkable spies who must be called traitors for want of a better word (Sir Roger Casement was hanged for treason from a different point of view). Leaving out the fifth man, a rather shadowy figure in these pages and a vaguely indicated selection of undesignated treacherous figures, one is left with four men of outstanding talent who by any ordinary standard betrayed their country. Of these three, Burgess, Maclean and Philby were all 'drinkers' in a big way, whether or not we choose to apply the word alcoholic to them in a technical sense. Their sexual adventures make sorry reading. It is hard to see them finishing their lives without disaster to themselves and others. Can their extraordinary, and as we must think lamentable, antics be attributed to the climate prevalent in their time at Cambridge? I find that difficult, though not quite impossible.

I was an Oxford tutor during the thirties. I joined the Labour Party in 1936. I was in close contact with the Labour Club of undergraduates during the years before the war. The leading members were communists. My young friend, Philip Toynbee, was a communist President of the Oxford Union. I was elected with a record majority for the Cowley and Iffley ward for the Oxford City Council. My colleague in the election, who did not quite get elected, was the communist organiser Abe Lazarus. It would be hard to argue that Cambridge in the thirties was more Marxist than Oxford, yet as far as I know we did not produce any traitors. (If we did, they have not been exposed).

Andrew Boyle's book makes compulsive reading and tells me all sorts of things which I did not know previously. It is therefore a triumph of investi-

gation in the sense of extricating much that would otherwise have remained hidden. I do not feel that the inaccuracies spoil the drama, though they may damage the validity of his conclusions about the Cambridge of the relevant period.

Since his book appeared, Professor Blunt has been laid nakedly before our excited gaze. If we are zealous for truth, we must give Andrew Boyle credit for this irrefutable revelation. Professor Blunt, unlike the trio mentioned earlier, is a man who has rendered public service of the highest quality and won the devotion of countless students. It is incredibly hard to say anything about him which is not either patronising or cruel. In a later edition Andrew Boyle will have the difficult task, his capacity for investigation possibly satiated, of attempting a fair estimate of this astonishing man. In the meanwhile Andrew Boyle has given us a wonderful 'read' and for that alone we must be grateful.

FRANK LONGFORD

CLASS OBSESSION

Social Mobility and Class Structure. J. H. Goldthorpe. Oxford University Press. £12 (hardback); £4.95 (paperback).

Origins and Destinations, Family, Class and Education in Modern Britain. A. H. Halsey, A. F. Heath and J. M. Ridge. Oxford University Press. £11 (hardback); £4.95 (paperback).

It should be made clear at the outset that these two books have not only been written by Prof. Halsey and Dr. Goldthorpe but also by a team of associates, whose names are freely acknowledged in the prefaces. Research in this field is obviously widespread and international. Moreover I am sorry to say that Goldthorpe's bibliography includes over 130 related books, including Alfred Marshall and Karl Marx, though the index gives only two short mentions to Marshall and over 40 to Marx. The Social Mobility Group at Nuffield College, Oxford appears to have supplied the finance, assisted by the Social Science Research Council.

Before commenting on the methods, merit and style of the two books, I will quote the last words from Dr. Goldthorpe's conclusions. 'There is no half-way house: the only choice for egalitarians is whether they are prepared to relax their efforts and accept the real possibility that their ideal of *an open society* may actually recede or whether they are ready to continue the struggle for this ideal, taking whatever strategic opportunities the current political situation may offer and recognising that the potential for *class conflict* is in fact the potential for the social change that they wish to see accomplished.'

Prof. Halsey's conclusions are much the same, albeit stated less starkly, though in stilted language: they both use the phrase 'open society' in a manner that would startle Sir Karl Popper. They both believe with fellow Socialists like Richard Hoggart and Neil Kinnock that education should be used as a main tool for social engineering and the reconstruction of our society. Apart from well-known books, such as Tawney's *Equality* and Michael Young's *The Rise of the Meritocracy,* there are scores of books on *Social Mobility and the Class Structure.* Dr. Goldthorpe makes his position clear: Again I quote: 'In the British case, as a result of the commitment to parliamentarism and also perhaps of the influence of Christian socialism and of Fabian elitism, ethical socialists have failed to appreciate sufficiently that they need the working class, not merely as the object of their solicitude, but as the social vehicle through whose action, electoral and *otherwise,* their ideals have by far the best proba-

bility of being realised' . . . and later 'To this extent we would agree with Marx: that if class society is to be ended—or even radically modified—this can only be through conflict between classes in one form or another'.

Unfortunately Prof. Halsey drags these politico-economic arguments into his otherwise interesting analysis of our educational structure. If one is sceptical of the classification of the human material, jobs and occupations, as I am; if one is critical of the methods used and what they supply as a theoretical basis, it is no wonder that the style of presentation, which includes the prose style, can only be understood by those in the sociology business.

I must confess that in 1926 I wrote what Prof. Halsey has called a pioneer study in this field, entitled *Social Progress and Educational Waste*. But 54 years ago the majority of children left school at 14 and did not receive a secondary education. I was concerned with *'selection* by differentiation not by elimination.' In 1980 there are half-a-dozen different types of secondary education, public and private and a school-leaving age of 16. You cannot make people equal by education; the most you can do by a series of financial steps is to provide an approximate equality of access to alternative methods of secondary and higher education. I worked with the late Eleanor Rathbone to secure children's allowances paid to the mother and with Lady Allen to increase provision of nursery schools.

Prof. Halsey is unhappy that his 'political arithmetic of education' has belied his hopes of a 'more open society'. The careful analysis of data collected from interviews in 1922 with more than 10,000 men between the ages of 20 and 64 proves a relative inequality of achievement. I am not greatly surprised. It is, however, a mistake to blame what are called *the middle class* (groups III, IV and V in Halsey's classification) for taking advantage of their opportunities. Admittedly children from working class families are handicapped by poor examination results, as Prof. Halsey admits, but he then devotes many pages to what he calls 'the cultural differences between the social classes,' 'although no clear and agreed definition of cultural capital is to be found in standard use among the writers we have cited.'

In effect, the problem of selection has shifted from '11 plus' to '16 plus' and there is now general agreement among educators that the age group 16 to 19 needs fresh attention. Indeed there are now over 100 Sixth Form Colleges and from my observation they are highly successful in meeting a new need: incidentally their origin and development are due to local education authority independence, as were many other successful experiments in education. If educationalists would spend more time devising curricula suited to the different needs of people of differing abilities and secondly would assist working class and one-parent families with early-childhood education, the problems of class and social mobility might still mesmerize sociologists, but equality of opportunity would become more of a reality.

KENNETH LINDSAY

EMMA HARDY

The First Mrs. Thomas Hardy. Denys Kay-Robinson. Macmillan. £7.95.

Less any should fear that there is an insufficiency of material relating to Thomas Hardy's first wife, Emma, that is either available or unexplored after Robert Gittings' three fine biographical volumes, the last covering the life of Hardy's second wife, Florence, it should be said at once that Mr. Kay-Robinson's study is fully justified, and is, moreover, pleasantly complementary

to the Gittings' work. The differences in his treatment are threefold: he has less access to documented fact than Dr. Gittings enjoyed, since he covers an earlier epoch, and since most of the Emma papers have been destroyed; he is more adventurously psychological in his approach, and relates the Hardy poems to the lives of Hardy, Emma and Florence (and other love-objects) in a continuous thematic argumentation; and, finally, he is more partisan in his apology for Emma's tribulations and behaviour, to the detriment of the characters of both Hardy and Florence. It would not be excessive to state that he is a passionate advocate of her cause: there is a byway of literary research in which the defence or prosecution of an ambiguous person, such as Syrie Maugham, is conducted with retrospective partiality. Dr. Gittings had already gone far in Emma's rehabilitation, and now Mr. Kay-Robinson fights every circumstance that diminishes her. He well-nigh demolishes the most-cherished legends—the staircase built so that Hardy could avoid Emma, and Emma's appeal to Richard Garnett at the British Museum to prevent the publication of *Jude the Obscure*. Although one does not wish to appear to enter the lists, he makes little of the neglect and meannesses to which Florence, in turn, was subjected, although he dwells with gusto on Florence's calumnies of Emma, and her excision of what was most favourable to Emma from her 'biography' of Hardy, which was really written, of course, by Hardy himself.

What matters about Emma Hardy, *sub specie aeternitatis*, is those aspects of her which Hardy inserted in his novels, and, above all, the ironic turning-point of the Hardy/Emma/Florence situation, whereby upon Emma's death and Florence's installation at the Max Gate household—into which in any case she had already been infiltrated—Hardy launched into a late outpouring of expiative poetry devoted to his 'late espousèd saint.' Dr. Gittings is more inclined to ascribe Hardy's guilt to his neglect of Emma's last illness and 'unexpected' death, but Mr. Kay-Robinson argues for Hardy's anguished re-appraisal of the whole marriage. It has been thought that the love between Emma and Hardy had been extinct for some twenty years, but it is Mr. Kay-Robinson's contention, worked out through sensitive and unstrained reference to the poems, that 'at the bottom of the chasm waters of love still flowed', and that 'in his soul he never turned away from Emma.' The value of Mr. Kay-Robinson's interpretation of the poems goes beyond the biographical.

MOLLY TIBBS

MORE ON OSCAR WILDE

Oscar Wilde: A Memoir. Theodore Wratislaw. The Eighteen Nineties Society. £7.65.

Theodore Wratislaw, whatever his merits as a poet, was no writer of prose, but it is the matter rather than the manner of this essay, written forty-seven years ago, which justifies its long-delayed publication; for, as Sir John Betjeman says in his characteristically evocative Foreword, in it we are afforded 'a last streak of sunlight'—the sunlight of a golden week-end in the summer of 1893, which Wratislaw spent as the guest of Oscar Wilde at the house which he had taken beside the Thames, at Goring. It was, for a shy young poet of twenty-two, a consummately exciting experience, for Wilde was then at the peak of his success, but the expedition seems to have been ill-wished from the start. Due to an unfortunate combination of malevolent circumstances, Wratislaw had, as he dolefully recounts, no appropriate summer clothing available and had to set

forth accoutred in tall hat and tail-coat, which made him painfully self-conscious. Further misfortune ensued. On his way to Paddington on the Saturday morning, he had his hair shampooed and, foolishly leaning out of the window of his third-class railway compartment in order to let the wind dry it, caught an appalling cold, which was to blight what should have been an idyllic pastoral.

All this is amusing, but what is positively fascinating are the novel glimpses of Wilde. We see him, raimented all in eye-catching white, greeting his visitor on Goring platform: a happy picture to set in contrast to the more widely recorded and dreary vignette of Oscar in fetters on Clapham Junction platform, a mere two years later. We witness the extraordinary display of spoilt-child petulance over a plate of teatime biscuits; and after tea as he and his guest stroll down the restricted prospect of a leaf-girt alley in Goring or Pangbourne woods, we hear him telling Wratislaw, with, one is tempted to hazard, Celtic feyness, 'That is as far as I ever wish to see in life'. If it were, as Wratislaw came with hindsight to suspect, a flash of second-sight, a modicum of less supernatural foresight would have served his unhappy host better.

Wratislaw recalls Wilde's enormous consumption of breakfast sausages, followed by an equally enormous self-dousing with white lilac scent, and the epigrams and comments on his own writing and that of his contemporaries, delivered over post-prandial hock and seltzer. On the Sunday, Wratislaw was savaged by Oscar's eight-year-old son, Cyril, on the inflammatory issue of Home Rule. The visit ended as inauspiciously as it had begun, with Wratislaw leaving a pair of new gloves behind in the homeward bound train. With exquisite infelicity, Wratislaw gratefully dedicated to Wilde a poem inspired by the sight of some magnificent beds of pansies!

The book, charmingly produced, its magenta binding delicately sprayed with attractive period designs in gold, its text attended by a useful Introduction and dutiful amplificatory notes by Professor Karl Beckson, add an amusing informative and previously unpublished little chapter to the biography of one of the most celebrated of all the makers of the nineties.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

AN ARMY VET'S PIONEER DISCOVERIES

The Several Lives of a Victorian Vet. Jean Ware and Hugh Hunt. Bachman & Turner. £6.95.

We seem to have a passion for exhuming Victorian worthies. The latest, Dr. Griffith Evans, was an Indian Army vet. surgeon credited with being the first to diagnose anthrax bacilli in sick horses and to isolate the blood parasite trypanosome, which killed horses and caused sleeping sickness in man—a theory initially rejected by his superiors.

A farmer's son born near Towyn, West Wales, in 1835, he duly enrolled as a young student at the Royal Veterinary College, Camden Town, graduated top of the list, then joined the Royal Horse Artillery and was drafted to Canada with his battery at the time of the American Civil War. Eager to be a medico as well as vet, he combined regimental duties with afternoon studies at Montreal's McGill University, earned his M.D., and made a startling discovery.

Fellow anatomy students, expected to buy corpses for dissection with their own money, bought bodies of negro slaves, smuggled in from the U.S. in casks labelled 'Groceries', because they were cheaper. Some even snatched bodies

at night from local cemeteries as they were preserved in the cold Canadian climate. One student recoiled from a body laid out for dissection, exclaiming in horror: 'Good God! That is my aunt! Her son is down at the chemical lecture and will be up here soon!', and nearly fainted. 'Dissect the skin off the face,' urged another—and this was done. In another case 'Griff' had to deal with, five students had exhumed the bodies of a man and younger woman and the two families wanted them returned without publicity, which took some discreet arranging. Revelation of customs so different from our own enhance the interest of this book.

'I take a real pleasure in overcoming difficulties' Griff confessed. He schemed to get to Washington and ask President Lincoln for permission to visit the Northern Federal Army's Field Hospitals on the 'Appotomax River.' This was a daring interview, for Britain at the time was considered friendly to the South, supplying it with arms. It enabled Griff to see something of the front line battle area.

His grand-daughter Jean Ware, co-author with her journalist husband, bases the book mainly on family memories, diaries, investigations at the University of Wales and elsewhere, and love letters found in an old trunk. He never smoked or drank liquor, she states. When he fell and broke a leg in youth and the ambulance man offered him brandy he poured it over the grass, shouting 'Alcohol is poison!' When his wife wrote him in India saying she had got a little tipsy on elderberry wine given her as she was cold he wrote back damning it. Instead she should have drunk hot water with lemon juice and *sat in a bath with hot water between her thighs.* When she enthused about a visit to Nazi Germany he, at 98, and stone deaf, at once dictated a list of articles and books she should read as corrective background. At his 100th birthday celebration attended by massed family and leaders of his profession, with telegrams from George V and Lloyd George, he amazed all at his bedside by orating for half an hour in a voice that could be heard out in the road.

His jottings on service in India, notably his clinical researches and the Maharajah of Kashmir's durbar for his son's child-marriage, compensate for minor scrapbooky ones elsewhere that could have been cut. But then his ghost would have been furious. . .

TREVOR ALLEN

PROSPECTS FOR THE FAITH

Fire in the Fireplace. Charles E. Hummel. Mowbrays. £4.95.

What are the prospects for Christianity in the next decade? There are two main ways of contemplating the situation—Christianity as a faith and Christianity as an organisation in the church. An American scholar, Professor Hummel of Barrington College, Rhode Island, looks at the development of the 'charismatic movement' not so much as an independent event but as the fire that is smouldering and exploding on the open fireplace of the church in many parts of the world.

Charismatic has to do with 'the Spirit'. It always has been a 'spiritual' experience from the days of the first Pentecost to the most recent outburst of 'charism' in a students' prayer meeting. 'Without the experience of spiritual gifts', says Professor Hummel, 'the body of Christ cannot grow strong . . . the Christian community needs the full range of charisms to fulfil its mission in the world . . . for without them grace soon becomes status, gift becomes office, ministry becomes bureaucracy, body of Christ becomes institution'.

What signs are there of this spiritual renewal? There may be outbursts of fire in the fireplace, a new warmth spreading through the various organisations of the church but are there any signs of burning up the old ways and giving birth to new ones? Let us recognise the achievements of the charismatics—a new power in preaching, the recovery of the ministry of healing, the arrival of speaking 'in tongues' and a new revival in public worship and in the exposition of the scriptures, the power of prayer, the recovery of 'community' and the readiness to 'share' by living together in 'community'.

The challenge of the eighties to the charismatics movement is the translation of all this potential power into the cold hearth of the churches' 'front rooms'. The last decade failed sadly in its attempts at union. All the devoted people who led those attempts are now dead or retired. Can they be replaced by a generation who have the spark and fire of the charismatics? This is the united church we are expecteding in the eighties. Unless *charism* can be translated into the ledgers and the literature of a reborn church we can go on hoping for the best but failing to get it.

CECIL NORTHCOTT

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Times Guide to the European Parliament (Times Books. £12.50). This new and admirable companion to the long established and reliable volume, *The Times Guide to the House of Commons*, has been written and edited by David Wood, European Political Editor, and Alan Wood, the Head of the newspaper's Parliamentary Staff. It includes the election statistics for each of the nine member states, together with accounts of the campaigns in each country, particular coverage being given to those in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. In this first direct election to the European Parliament, Mr. Wood points out that, out of 180 million electors, 110.9 million voted. In the United Kingdom, of course, the percentage for 78 seats was down to 32%. The volume too contains the Party Manifestos in Britain and also deals with the party groupings in the new Parliament. Most states adopted a list system of voting and the editors give particulars and the names of those so elected, and within their party groupings. More detail is given to the Eire results where the voting system was a regional list with four constituencies and seats allotted on PR. Northern Ireland used the single transferable vote in multi-member constituencies. The rest of the United Kingdom voted, of course, by simple majority; and this volume gives detailed results and polling in respect of each constituency. There is also a section which gives biographical information of all members of the Parliament, together with their photographs. The editors point out that the only real executive powers of the European Parliament are the right to dismiss the Commission and to amend or reject the Community's Budget. It is encouraging that the Parliament is asserting itself and has rejected the Budget, and obliging the Commission to recognise its authority in this respect.

Semiotics of Poetry (Methuen. £4.50). In this extraordinary and rarefied discourse on the poetic sign, Professor Michael Riffaterre (of Columbia University) explores the manner in which poetry expresses its significance by indirection, and in

which a poem is its own witness. His illustrative texts are drawn from nineteenth and twentieth century French poets, whose obscurer passages he unravels with considerable brio, although he claims that his methodology may equally be applied to all Western literature. His approach, a hybrid of practical criticism, aesthetics and semantics, couched in a tortured, neologistic style which murders concepts of other disciplines — e.g. 'The usual detour around the repressed matrix, being made of separate, distinct ungrammaticalities, looks like a series of inappropriate, twisted wordings, so that the poem may be regarded as a generalized, all-encompassing, all-contaminating catachresis,' — ensures that his audience will not be general.

R. W.-E.

Before Kampuchea, Prelude to Tragedy (George Allen & Unwin. £5.95). The author, Dr. Milton Osborne, is a Senior Research Fellow in International Relations at the Australian University in Canberra. Between 1959-61, he was with the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh. He returned in 1966 studying the impact of French rule upon that country in the nineteenth century. He stayed for a year and then paid visits thereafter until 1971. He became intensely interested in contemporary Cambodia, came to know a great deal about local conditions and most particularly the corrupt and inert state of the government. This book is basically about the year 1966 which Dr. Osborne regards as the turning point seen against the background of the previous decade. Prince Sihanouk was losing his grip, and 'reluctant to take broad policy decisions'. His break with the United States and his 'slow shift towards a policy of open friendship with the Vietnamese Communists' had no hope of being successful, the domestic economy was in ruins and the army resentful at being neglected. Sihanouk himself was looking more and more to the right. His overthrow in 1971 was, in the author's opinion, almost inevitable. There followed the war until 1975 and the Pol Pot regime that followed. 1966 was the prelude to tragedy, and Dr. Osborne argues this case with much effect. He tells it against his own experiences travelling through the country and meeting leading figures of varying persuasions. It is a tragic story of apparent national disintegration culminating in disaster and the tragedy we now read so much about. So little is known about the old Cambodia during these fateful years among the general public that this study should be widely read.

The Israeli Mind (Cassell. £5.95). In his latest book on the Middle East, John Laffan draws a graphic and appreciative picture of the Israelis and their homeland. Within this close knit society, he points also to the diversities within it. He has useful chapters on the Kibbutznik, communities which go back to the earliest days of Zionist colonisation. There is also the growing divergence between the secular and the rabbinate as to the character of the state. On the other hand the author shows the country's almost united determination to defy the Arabs. He concludes that 'Israelis understand Arabs better than Arabs understand Israelis'. If this is so, Israel would understand better the Palestinian question and the Arabs' claim to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Mr. Laffan does not here deal with the background to the Arabs' case adequately. On the other hand the book does gives a vivid general account of the Israelis' way of life, cultured, tough and determined, with a remarkable confidence in themselves and their future.

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CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

115th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

APRIL 1980

CANADA: ELECTION 1980

Tom Riley

BELFAST INITIATIVE

James H. Molyneaux, J.P., M.P.

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© 1980 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H G. Leates Ltd , 45/47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex U S Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd , 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N Y 10022 Second-class postage paid at New York, NY Annual subscription (including postage)· U K. £9.50, U S A. and Canada $30 00. Rates for all other countries on application Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S and Canada; extra costs given on request. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

April 1980 Vol. 236 No. 1371

CANADA: ELECTION '80: A NEW DIRECTION OR THE SAME DIRECTION ?

by Tom Riley

IN assessing Canada in light of the elections it is first necessary to look at the actual results across the country and what this means. The Liberals were swept back to power in the February 18th, 1980 election returning former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau who only three months ago had announced his resignation as leader of the Liberal Party and his decision to step down from politics altogether. The defeat of the Conservative Government over their Budget on December 13th, 1979 changed all that and Mr. Trudeau decided to stay on. As a result the Liberals won 146 seats, the Conservatives 103 and the New Democratic Party, Canada's socialist party, 32.

The Liberal victory was really won in Ontario for though they gained a few seats in the Maritime provinces it was in Ontario that the decisive role was played. There the Liberals took 52 seats as opposed to 32 in the 1979 election. Though they increased their seats in Quebec from 67 to 73, wiping out the five seats held by the Social Credit Party, this was to be expected in that province as it has consistently been a Liberal stronghold this century with the exception of 1958, when former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker captured over 50 seats. The Liberal gains started on election night in Newfoundland where they took a seat away from the New Democratic Party and then proceeded on through Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec and then Ontario, but when it came to Manitoba in western Canada the tide stopped and the Liberals only got two seats (as in 1979) but from that point onwards to the west coast they have no representation whatsoever, losing their one seat in British Columbia (won by a narrow majority in 1979) to the Conservatives. The western representation then became split up between the Conservatives and the NDP, with the NDP taking 27 seats from Manitoba while in the East they lost three seats. The Conservatives took 51 seats in the West including all 21 seats in the province. An analysis of the NDP gains shows that they took 10 seats from the Conservatives, 8 of these in the West, which is an interesting aspect of this election as the NDP traditionally have taken votes from the Liberals.

In the West I see this increased support for the NDP as a reflection of the strong anti-Liberal feeling that exists in the prairie provinces and on the west coast. The NDP also increased the percentage of their popular

vote to 19.8%, an increase of 1.8% from the last election. The Conservatives dropped only 2.8% to 33% while the Liberals increased their popular vote by only 2%. These figures suggest that the victory was perhaps not as overwhelming as has been suggested.

Part of the percentages for the Liberals come from the huge majorities they won in the Province of Quebec. A quick look down the list of candidates elected in Quebec shows huge majorities of 30,000, 20,000, 21,000 and other such figures. In the overall popular vote in Quebec the Liberals polled 1,927,654 votes, the Conservatives polled 358,096 votes while the NDP polled 255,088. This represents a 1,569,558 majority for the Liberals over the Conservatives. The Federal totals show that of 10,819,842 votes cast the Liberals polled 4,749,886 votes while the Conservatives polled 3,568,361 votes a majority of 1,118,525 for the Liberals, a figure less than the majority in Quebec. It shows the huge majorities the Conservatives stacked up in the West. In Ontario the Liberals polled a majority of only 216,831 votes over the Conservatives and it was this swing vote combined with the huge Quebec majorities which spelled defeat for the Conservatives.

One other interesting sidelight is that the Conservatives were the only political party to elect members from every province though they have only one member from Quebec.

I go into this in some detail as it is important for two major reasons: one, it has brought about the opinion and speculation that the country has become polarized and that there is no one Party which truly represents the nation as a whole: and two, as the Liberals are faced with now naming a Cabinet they literally have no one to appoint from the Commons, west of the Manitoba River. This means the Prime Minister will have to appoint westerners from the Senate to his Cabinet in the same way Prime Minister Clark had to name one Senator from Quebec to the Justice portfolio and another to the Senate, representing Quebec, in order to have a Quebec voice in the Cabinet. He also named both the MPs elected from that province in 1979 to the Cabinet. Traditionally every province in Canada has been represented on a proportional basis but in recent years this has become more difficult.

The challenge for the new Prime Minister is to develop a way of representing the interests of all Canadians and ensuring that the interests of the various regions are well and truly served. In fact, when analyzing the results, it is seen that Mr. Trudeau does not have a mandate to speak to the West as they so universally rejected him. It is perhaps, then, a possibility that his position is going to be weaker than ever though in this election he took more seats than in any of the five elections he has fought since 1968.

Former Prime Minister Clark when he was defeated had served only nine months as Prime Minister, the shortest term of office for any elected Canadian Prime Minister. The question asked most by observers is what brought about this defeat. I see the defeat resulting from two basic mistakes made by the Conservatives in their term of office. The first was a

problem of public relations. When the Conservatives were elected last May they waited over two weeks before taking power and then delayed nearly five months before convening Parliament. During this period the Conservatives hardly publicized to the general public (especially to those voters who had put them in office) what they were doing to make substantial changes or how they were going about working to make life easier or better for Canadians. For people would have wanted to know that the Government was doing something! The problem became a basic lack of communication between those who govern and the governed. As a result, when the controversial matter of moving the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem came up this was instantly jumped upon and became an issue in place of a lack of issues the Conservatives themselves were not creating. The Prime Minister himself came to be seen as indecisive after appointing a special ambassador, former Conservative leader Robert Stanfield, to look into the situation, a reversal from his original stand that he was going to go ahead and make the move. It was commented upon that in his original decision he did not weigh sufficiently the response of the business community and Arab interests in Canada.

The second mistake, though this might be easy to say in retrospect, was that the Conservatives stubbornly went ahead and ruled in Parliament as if they had a majority. This notion was perhaps laudable on the part of Mr. Clark, who was taking a strong leadership role, I am sure, though ignoring the political realities. Because Mr. Trudeau had announced his decision to resign the Conservatives then became careless and in bringing in their budget did not take into account the reactions of the other political parties. The Liberals and NDPs combined to defeat them and seemed to take them by surprise. Party leaders laboured under the impression, as did a lot of people, that an election was out of the question until the Liberals elected a new leader. But the proposed 18 cents a gallon excise on petrol, heavily opposed by the NDP, became their downfall as the Social Credit, who had given their support prior to this in non-confidence motions, abstained and thus the NDP and the Liberals brought about the conservative defeat. The political realities were lost sight of as the polls at that time showed the Liberals with a commanding lead over the Conservatives and the NDP with a substantial increase (up to 23% according to the Gallup Poll in November).

These two things are just examples of the image projected by Mr. Clark. Though the reality is perhaps far from the truth, it nonetheless became the image he was stuck with. From the beginning he was 'Joe Who', and then he became 'Joe the Stumbler', etc.

Though many observers realized he was in actual fact quite astute, this was not the impression he communicated at first or, at least, it was not the impression conveyed by the media. In the end the media came to realize he had a lot more stature than they had originally given him credit for but by this time it was too late. Mr. Clark was stuck with the role of Mr. Indecisive. Typical of this were the cruel Joe Clark jokes which were circulated widely.

Coupled with this was a successful gambit taken up by the Liberals in the campaign which was to downplay the role of Mr. Trudeau, who, in unusual Trudeau style, read from carefully prepared speeches and only appeared a couple of times a day to carefully selected audiences and gave very few media interviews (an attitude which infuriated the press who were predicting a Conservative win because, in their view, no one could possibly want Mr. Trudeau back). On top of this the Liberals grabbed on to the 18 cents a gallon increase in excise tax proposed by the Conservatives, who said they would go ahead with it if elected. The Liberals made it clear that in the winter time with inflation as it was, the Conservatives were determined to make them all poorer and then aimed their message at commuters (of which there are many in the large metropolitan cities), farmers and fishermen.

It is apparent that the Liberals also were determined to let the anti-Clark feeling play on itself by not letting Mr. Trudeau get into a confrontation or be over visible or vocal; thus voters would not be reminded of why they kicked him out last May.

The other line played by the Liberals was to try and position Mr. Trudeau as the man to deal with international affairs in these times of deepening world crisis and to portray Mr. Clark as a man who was uncertain of what role to play or a man who would not be listened to. Again, this is actually quite fascinating and here also Mr. Clark showed his ambivalence. For on the question of the Olympics and Afghanistan he was the first western leader to support President Carter's proposed boycott of the Olympics while Trudeau at first opposed such a move and then later reversed it and said he would support a boycott if it was part of an overall package of sanctions, and if a majority of nations supported such a move. When Canadian Ambassador Ken Taylor helped get the six American diplomats out of Teheran a former Liberal minister got up and said it was a good thing he was a Liberal appointee as it showed how well Liberals could handle sensitive issues (an incredible statement considering Mr. Taylor is a career diplomat and not a political appointee). However, Mr. Clark and his supporters, instead of using this in a political way, chose to take a non-partisan attitude and proceeded to make little comment on the whole affair even after it was revealed that Mr. Trudeau had been briefed on the situation as far back as last December, and had tried to goad Mr. Clark in the House of Commons into letting slip the existence of the Americans in the Canadian embassy. So, instead of speaking up loudly and clearly, and publicizing their handling of the situation, it was let slip by despite the fact that it became apparent some section of public opinion was turning in their favour over Mr. Taylor's laudable actions.

On their defeated budget it was generally recognized in the business community that this was a good and necessary budget, that Canadians had to come to grips with the rise in world oil prices and the need to tighten their belts. But no matter the necessity of such stern economic measures, it is apparent that in the Maritimes and Ontario there were enough voters who did not like the prospect and so turned against the

Conservatives.

I mention just some of these issues at length as they are all issues which the Liberals now face. The question of Sovereignty Association and the Quebec referendum was the one national issue of concern to all Canadians which did not come up in the campaign. Even here the two leaders do radically differ with former Prime Minister Clark preferring to take a non-confrontation attitude with Quebec (or more specifically the *Parti Quebeçois* and *René Levesque*).

However, the issues of the campaign are very much the issues of the future—the attempt to reach an agreement with Alberta over the rise in oil prices, the budget, inflation, the Olympic boycott, Canada's role with the U.S. and Federal-Provincial relations, in particular the bringing home of the Constitution from Westminster.

The two most crucial issues are going to be over the rise in oil and the referendum. From the start Premier Lougheed has said he will not accept less than the four dollars a barrel and four dollars and fifty cents increase per barrel, initiated every six months until 1983, that he worked out with Mr. Clark. Mr. Trudeau has said he favours a 3 dollars increase (approximately) per barrel and this is anathema to Albertans and immediately sets the scene for a confrontation between Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Lougheed. To get his way on this Mr. Trudeau would have to use extraordinary constitutional powers and this would only serve to highlight once again the Federal-Provincial tensions and disagreements. It is a difficult situation for Mr. Trudeau to face, considering he does not have any representation west of Manitoba. Mr. Lougheed has already said he has a contingency plan if the Liberals try to go ahead and impose their proposed oil increases.

Clause Ryan, Liberal leader in Quebec, sees the re-election of Mr. Trudeau as good for Quebec and the best person to deal with the referendum. He also sees Mr. Trudeau as a better person to handle international affairs. Yet this is really only 'politics talking".

In the final analysis the problems faced by the Conservatives going into the '80s are the same problems now facing the Liberals and I think Canadians will find in the long run that there will not be that much change. Mr. Clark had proposed substantial changes in the Parliamentary style of Government, including the creation of more Parliamentary Committees to call civil servants to accountability and to make documents freely available to Parliament, thus giving more power to the backbencher and bringing back the control of the civil service to Parliament itself. He had also advocated a Freedom of Information Bill with review to the courts in the event of an applicant being denied information. The Liberals are not inclined to this position and have made no statements on any other Parliamentary reforms. On the question of judicial review in information disputes the furthest Mr. Trudeau would go was to say that he will introduce a Bill without such a clause and leave it to the House of Commons to debate the pros and cons. This, perhaps, is the one area of substantial difference where there would have been radical changes under the Conser-

vatives, but in the areas of the economy and Federal-Provincial relations Mr. Clark might in the future be vindicated on the positions he took.

The last point I would make is that Mr. Trudeau has said he will resign sometime in the life of this Parliament and possibly in two to four years. It actually gives him a lot of power as he never again has to face the electorate and thus is not accountable to them. It will be interesting to observe what he will do with this power.

The fascination with Mr. Trudeau in Canada and in other parts of the world continues because of his durability as a politician and his controversial nature. He has capped his career by being Canada's own Phoenix quickly rising from his own ashes, a defeated man, and now, in two short months, ensconced once again as Prime Minister. As to Mr. Clark, though he might have made some basic errors, he is not to be ignored. There are certain rumours in his Party saying he will be asked to resign, but that is standard gossip and speculation after an election. Mr. Clark seems fully intent on staying around and returning to power. At a young 40, he has more than enough time to accomplish this. I don't think we have heard the last of Mr. Clark.

[Tom Riley is a Canadian journalist, working from London.]

The May issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Apartheid* by the Rt. Hon. David Owen, M.P., *Indo-Chinese Refugees: Pawns of Power Politics* by Keith D. Suter, *The Politics in Crime* by Michael Layer and *Literature in the New Decade* by Martyn Goff.

BELFAST INITIATIVE

by James H. Molyneaux, J.P., M.P.

DURING the last two years of the Callaghan administration those of us pledged to maintain the Union had some cause to believe that, albeit slowly and painfully, the lessons of Ulster were being learned. We thought we saw, indeed we did see, some prospect of an end to the violence and instability that have rent our province asunder in the past decade.

Our new found hope lay in the more mature and responsible approach evident amongst members on both sides of the House of Commons to the Ulster question, and to the arrival at the Northern Ireland Office of a Secretary of State who, in the words of the *Daily Telegraph*, 'actually behaved as if he had the right to govern Northern Ireland.'

Roy Mason inherited a terrible atmosphere of anxiety and distrust, and had to contend, not only with IRA violence, but with a widespread and growing fear amongst Unionists that the British were engaged in a wholesale withdrawal from the province. By his constant assertion that the IRA wouldn't be allowed to win—and by the actions with which he backed his words—Roy Mason calmed the fears of Unionists, and obliged the IRA to admit that what they had interpreted as evidence of withdrawal were in fact merely the symptoms of a general economic recession. Suddenly, and for the first time, the tables were turned on the Provos!

Spurred on by his Conservative 'Shadow', the late Airey Neave, Mason time and again defied critics on his own side, and vigorously defended and upheld the actions and policies of the security forces. Confidence was increased at every level, and this in turn reflected in discernible improvements in the situation on the ground.

Politically, these improvements were cemented by the near unanimous decision of the House of Commons to correct the injustice of Ulster's under-representation in Parliament. The significance of this measure lay, not in the number of new seats to be created, but in the assurance thus given that—after ten years' anarchy and rebellion—Ulster's place within the United Kingdom was secure. Small wonder that the SDLP and the Dublin Government lobbied for Mason's removal, and viewed the possible election of a Conservative Government with no greater enthusiasm. For throughout this time our efforts to stabilise the situation in Northern Ireland were fully supported by the Conservative Opposition. Moreover, in the run-up to the General Election we were given assurances that, if elected, the Thatcher team would pursue a policy broadly similar to that which they supported under Labour.

Those assurances of Conservative intentions were not of a vague or imprecise kind. As a result of his long experience of the affairs of Northern Ireland, Airey Neave had a clear appreciation of the difficulties that would confront a new Conservative team. He was equally clear as to how those difficulties should be met. The Neave approach was reflected in the Con-

servative Manifesto—in the commitment to uphold and defend the Union, to defeat terrorism, and in the absence of devolved government, to establish one or more regional councils with responsibility for a wide range of local services.

Ulster Unionists approved the Neave/Thatcher plan for local government reform as one capable of providing Ulster with stable local democracy. And we were happy that, given the size of the new Government's majority, they would be free to give effect to that plan without horse trading of any kind.

But it was seemingly not to be, and the reader will understand when I say that the high hopes and expectations with which many in Ulster greeted Mrs. Thatcher's victory last May have been cruelly dispelled by events since. For as surely as the Conservative Party in Opposition contributed to the restoration of some measure of confidence amongst the Unionist community, so in Government they have acted decisively to destroy it.

The present search for a 'settlement' testifies to the failure or refusal of this Government and its advisers to learn anything at all from the errors and disasters over which their predecessors presided, and gives succour and encouragement only to the men of violence who at times during the past ten years have been comforted and sustained by the belief that eventually, and with the right mix of physical and political pressure brought to bear, Britain's resolve to defend Ulster could and would be broken. By parading a variety of 'options' on future arrangements for the government of the province, the Secretary of State, Mr. Atkins, has confirmed the IRA and their political allies in their conviction that Ulster's constitutional position is once more subject to doubt and up for grabs.

I do not suppose or suggest that it was with any such intention that Mr. Atkins convened the constitutional conference. It is nevertheless the inevitable effect, and the only certain consequence will be an escalation of the terrorist campaign.

Critics of my Party of course point to the continuing bloodshed as reason why we should be at the Stormont talks. But neither the Secretary of State nor the leaders of any of the parties attending would pretend, even for a moment, that the IRA will be in any way influenced or impressed by any 'solution' on which they might agree. My colleagues and I are of the conviction that no agreement is possible between the parties, and we are equally clear that it is the very search for a 'solution' which ensures the continuation and worsening of the problem.

Certainly I think it fair to say that the quest for a political solution has become synonymous, at least in Unionist eyes, with the attempts of successive governments to free themselves of their obligations to the people of our province. Trickery and deception, cowardice and incompetence have been the dominant characteristics of British Government initiatives on Ulster, and I regret that the same is true of the proceedings presently teetering on the brink of collapse under the chairmanship of Mr. Atkins.

Like so many before him, the Secretary of State has engaged in a search

for consensus, and we in the Ulster Unionist Party could not lend ourselves to this further cruel deception of our people. For it is cruel, and it is a deception, to pretend that some agreement can be reached, and some form of government cobbled together, to form common ground between the five sixths of our people (including many thousands of Roman Catholics) who wish to remain within the U.K., and approximately one sixth who wish to be submerged in an Irish Republic. On this 'which nation?' issue compromise simply is not possible.

That indeed is the lesson of the last ten years, and those who seek now to re-open wounds that were largely healed, to re-awaken fears and anxieties that have been assuaged, do a great disservice, not only to Ulster, but to Mrs. Thatcher and the Conservative Party also.

We joined with them in the last Parliament to resist proposals for devolution in Scotland and Wales which were prejudicial to the unity of the Kingdom. We were comforted and encouraged then by Mrs. Thatcher's strenuous efforts to reassert the role of the Conservative Party as 'the Party of the Union'.

Nowhere more than in Ulster is the Union under fire. When the Conservatives rediscover their Unionist principles they will find we will match them, and support them, all the way.

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KOREA—A DIVIDED NATION

by K. W. Watkins

THE sheer physical beauty of the Korean peninsula led men to bestow on it the name of 'The Land of the Morning Calm'. Tragically the history of its people, especially during the last century, has been one of strife and suffering. So much has this been the case that a brief examination of Korean history must precede any attempt to assess the present situation, let alone a consideration of possible future developments.

The Koreans are descendants of several Mongolian tribal groups which migrated from Manchuria in prehistoric times and were early fused into a separate homogeneous race with traits quite distinct from either the Chinese or Japanese. Crucial among these is a language, a Ural-Altaic tongue that has more in common with Turkic, Finnish or Hungarian than any purely Asian tongue. Until the end of the 15th century, Korean could be written down only in Chinese characters clumsily adapted to represesent sounds rather than to serve as picture-symbols as they do in Chinese. At that time, an enlightened monarch (Sejong the Great, 1397-1450), appointed a royal commision which devised an efficient 24-symbol phonetic alphabet, the simplicity and practicality of which has assisted Korea in modern times in achieving the high literacy rate of 88.4%.

In land area Korea is nearly equal to Great Britain or the state of Minnesota in the U.S. It lies between 33 and 43 north latitude—the latitudes of California and Spain—and between 124 and 131 longitude. The peninsula is approximately 1,000 kilometres long and 216 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. It is bordered by Manchuria and Siberia in the north, with the Amnok (Yalu) and Tuman rivers serving as a boundary. To the West mainland China lies across the Yellow Sea, to the East is the East Sea and the Japanese archipelago. The narrow Korean Strait, separating Korea from Japan, is 206 kilometres at its narrowest. Today North Korea (the Communist People's Democratic Republic) comprises 122,000 square kilometres, while the South (the Republic of Korea) comprises 98,000 square kilometres.

The earliest historical records date back to the Three Kingdoms period (57 B.C.-676 A.D.). The three were Koguryo (37 B.C.-668 A.D.) in southern Manchuria and northern Korea; Paekche (18 B.C.-660 A.D.) around the Han River basin; and Silla (57 B.C.-936 A.D.) in the south along the Nagdong River. In 668 A.D. Silla conquered and absorbed the other two, beginning a brief 'Golden Age' under the impetus of Buddhism, imported from India, and Confucianism which, along with many technological skills, was brought in from China. However, decentralisation of power resulted in the rapid fragmentation of Silla and a new dynasty called Koryo, from which the modern name of the country was derived, arose in the 10th century.

Koryo was faced with constant incursions from Tartars and Mongols from the north. In 1213 the Golden Horde of Kublai Khan swept over

the peninsula. Although the actual Mongol occupation was rather brief, Korea remained a vassal state of the Mongol empire for several centuries. Indeed the fall of the dynasty in the 1390s was caused by a reaction against Mongol domination of the royal court, as well as against Buddhist influence on politics.

The new dynasty, the Yi (1392-1910) was one of the longest in world history, but it too had trouble with foreign invaders. During the last decade of the 16th century, two separate invasions were launched from Japan by the warlord Hideyoshi, inflicting enormous damage. Then during the following half century, there were several incursions by the Manchus, who were in the process of taking over China. These traumatic experiences caused Korea to close her borders and to enter a state of extreme isolationism for several centuries. It was this policy that led to the country being given the name of 'The Hermit Kingdom'. But from the mid-19th century onwards the decadent and backward Yi dynasty was unable to resist the external pressures and, as a result of her geographical position, Korea became a cockpit for mounting geo-political rivalries. The protagonists were Japan, Russia and a declining Chinese empire, together with the commercial rivalries among the industrially more advanced nations.

As early as June 1871 the U.S. bombarded the Korean coast in order to impose a Treaty 'for the protection of mariners'. In 1882 Britain signed a treaty with Korea and followed this by occupying Port Hamilton in 1885. She subsequently withdrew in 1887. At this stage Korea was largely under the influence of an ever-weakening China. Indeed both American and British policy can only be understood in the light of their attitudes towards China. But other forces were at work, chief among them the emergence of Japan and the eastern drive and consolidation of Tsarist Russia. 1894 witnessed two key events. The first was the Tong Hak rebellion which was an anti-feudal peasant uprising led by a religious sect. Japan intervened and helped to establish a puppet government in Seoul which then asked Tokyo for military help. The second event was, quite naturally, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 in which China was heavily defeated and which marked the beginning of a process of Japanese take-over.

From 1895 to 1904 it was Russo-Japanese rivalry over Korea that was predominant. Britain, for European and global reasons, pursued a policy which culminated in the signing of the Anglo-Japenese Alliance of 1902. America, concerned above all with China, concentrated on the 'Open Door Policy'. Japan's decisive defeat of Russia in the 1904-05 war gave her virtually a free hand in Korea. Britain was concentrating on a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The U.S. signed a secret protocol with Japan on 29 July, 1905 whereby she recognised Japan's special interests in Korea. In return the Japanese renounced all rights in the Philippines. From 1905 to 1907 there were further sporadic peasant revolts in Korea but these were suppressed by the Japanese. Finally, in 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

Korea's experience as a Japanese colony was something which burnt itself into the Korean national spirit. Not only was she militarily occupied

and economically dominated but she was also subjected to an attempt to obliterate Korean nationality by forbidding the use of the language, even for individual names. The scars of these experiences remain to complicate the relations between the two nations, relations which were only normalised in 1966.

In 1919, after the end of the First World War, the Koreans, in their optimism and innocence, believed that Wilsonian principles and the establishment of the League of Nations would ensure their return to national independence. They started with passive resistance. The outcome was 7,000 killed, 46,000 wounded and 49,000 jailed. Only then did they try guerilla tactics which were too late and totally unsuccessful. At that stage American concern, together with Japan, was with the new Bolshevik menace in the U.S.S.R. From then until the end of the Second World War Korea was a source of raw materials, cheap labour (tens of thousands of Koreans being transferred to Japan) and, above all, the pathway for the Japanese invasions of Manchuria and China.

The defeat of Japan in 1945 did not bring the Koreans the freedom they had so long hoped for, and been promised. The Allies had made an arrangement whereby Japanese troops south of the 38th Parallel should surrender to the Americans whilst those north of the Parallel should surrender to Russia which had entered the war against Japan just nine days before. This had been viewed by the U.S. as a temporary arrangement of military convenience. The Russians had different objectives. As in the case of Poland where the Soviets had created the so-called Lublin government in opposition to the Polish government-in-exile, which happened to be London based, Moscow, from the first days, began to place Comintern-trained Koreans in the key positions in the northern part of the peninsula. In the southern half, the Americans laid down that there was to be open political activity for all and that the U.S. was in Korea simply to hold the ring while Koreans themselves sorted out their own political destiny. The aims were irreconcilable. Two U.S.-Soviet meetings in March, 1946 and May 1947, failed utterly to work out the proposed trusteeship or any other approach to a peninsula-long administration. In late 1947 the United Nations established a U.N. Committee for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which sought to hold elections in 1948. In the South these took place and resulted in the creation of the Republic of Korea under the Presidency of Syngman Rhee. The Russians barred the U.N. representatives from the North and set up the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under the leadership of Kim Il Sung. Total confrontation between the two Koreas became a seemingly intractable reality.

On the morning of Sunday, 25th June, 1950, the armed forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea crossed the parallel in three columns and descended on Seoul. The U.S. had done little or nothing in the creation of a South Korean military machine; the Soviet Union had done its formidable best for the Communist North. Russian T-34 tanks spearheaded the ground assault, Russian combat aircraft flew cover, and Russian artillery laid down support fire. Only a 16-nation United Nations

military force saved the Republic of Korea in the South. By the autumn, the North Korean columns had been all but wiped out and the U.N. forces were on the Yalu River, the immemorial frontier between Korea and Manchuria. In October, regular troops of the People's Republic of China, with no warning, crossed the Yalu and engaged the U.N. forces. The most savage fighting see-sawed up and down the peninsula, mainly round the 38th Parallel, until the middle of 1951, when cease-fire talks began. From two more years of negotiation and sporadic fighting there finally emerged a formal armistice, which brought the peninsula's basic situation right back to where it had been when the North Koreans invaded in 1950. From this stage, indeed if not from 1948 or earlier, any analysis has to be conducted in terms of two totally different sovereign states.

As a Communist state, the North has a centrally planned economy. Despite occupying the part of the peninsula which contains most of the mineral resources it is heavily in dept internationally. On the other hand it has, since the Sino-Soviet split, displayed great skill in playing off Moscow against Peking to its own considerable advantage in obtaining trade credits, military hardware and technological assistance. But the nature of the North Korean regime can best be illustrated by citing examples from its own publications and activities.

If there was a 'cult of the individual' in Stalin's Russia and then a virtual deification of 'Chairman Mao' in China, it is difficult to find words to describe the adoration of Kim Il Sung which takes place in North Korea. For example, in the daily *Pyongyang Times* it is possible to read such statements as: [1]

> The world revolutionary people hold our respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il Sung in great reverence. They look up to him as the 'greatest Marxist-Leninist' and as the 'outstanding leader of the times who creates history'.
> Marshall Kim Il Sung is the sun shattering all that are outdated and illuminating the path to the building of socialism and communism in the midst of a fierce struggle between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces in our era of tempest, the era of struggle, when the tide of revolution rises like a flood. He is a radiant beacon giving hope, courage and confidence to the oppressed people.
> The red sun shines brightly not only over the Korean peninsula but also over all other parts of the world. . . .
> In whatever storms we will defend and protect our leader with our lives and remain loyal to him for ever from generation to generation.
> We will attend our leader for thousands upon thousands of years! —Following the path indicated by him we will greet the day of national reunification. Marching along this path we will build up a socialist and communist paradise in our country.

The poetry matches the prose. Two short extracts will suffice.

> TRUE LOVE FOR THE PEOPLE[2]
> There is no love like the love of President Kim Il Sung
> Never to fade or fail
> Till into the fold of the peace of the masses
> He has gathered us all.
>
> Oh, let us heed the voice of Kim Il Sung
> Oh, may we never roam

Till safe we rest on his loving breast
In the dear heavenly home.

THE BLESSED DIAMOND[3]
Marshal Kim Il Sung is our diamond
In him we hide, in him we learn,
A shelter in the time of storm,
Secure whatever ill betide
A shelter in the time of storm.

O rock divine, O refuge dear
A castle in the time of storm,
Be thou our helper ever near
A shelter in the time of storm.

Such effusions appear annually in their thousands. For one reared in a Christian tradition there might be a temptation to soften laughter with a certain sad sympathy if it were not for other things. For example, even in the teaching of elementary arithmetic to little children one can find such questions as: 'The People's Army killed three Yankee soldiers and two more. How many did they kill?' At the level of family life there operates the so-called '5-unit household surveillance system' under which every five households is supervised by a trusted party member (called a 'public relations man'). It is, however, in the field of foreign policy, that it is necessary to note the position of the North Korean government.

In November, 1974, a U.N. patrol in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the North and the South discovered an infiltration tunnel running 1,200 metres under the South's positions. It was large enough to accommodate division-size troops and heavy equipment, and for this purpose was equipped with a narrow-gauge railway line and other refinements. A second tunnel was discovered the following year. Observers of the Korean situation speculated that there might be as many as a dozen. Although the South permitted inspection by international journalists some had difficulty in accepting the evidence of their own eyes. However, Kim Il Sung himself put the matter beyond doubt when he admitted to a group of Japanese delegates to the Japan-North Korea Diplomatic Normalization Association that the North had built them (8th May, 1975).

With the end of the fighting in Vietnam the North Korea regime assessed the new situation. Speaking in Bucharest on 24th May, 1975, Kim Il Sung declared:

> Now that the imperialists have been driven out of the Far East, the public in all countries is increasingly directing its attention towards Korea, and thinks that the next breaking of a colonial puppet regime will take place in South Korea.

At the same time Prince Sianouk, speaking in Peking, declared:

> After Vietnam, Korea will be next.

Even the acrobatic Sianouk did not foresee Afghanistan!

It is against this background that one has to assess the achievements and weaknesses of South Korea.

It is scarcely too harsh a judgement to suggest that under the Presidency of Syngman Rhee from 1948 onwards the government in South Korea was both inefficient and corrupt. Having survived the Korean War it faced

overwhelming devastation, economic paralysis and social break-up. Having no answers the government grew ever more despotic and arbitrary. The end came in April 1960. Following the national elections, rigged with grosser clumsiness than usual, a chain-reaction of student demonstration, faculty and popular support, and military neutrality or outright sympathy, Rhee was forced into a last exile. The new administration was led by Chang Myon as Prime Minister and Yun Po Sun as a largely ceremonial President. Economic conditions worsened as banks withheld credits, workers struck as readily as students took to the streets, the police force disintegrated (seen from all sides as the malificent instrument of the Rhee regime), crime rocketed and the new government failed to govern.

On 16th May, 1961, a group of young army colonels, with Major-General Park Chung Hee as their catalyst and centre, promulgated a Supreme Council for National Reconstruction as the nation's governing organ. Why this fate for liberal democracy in South Korea? The answer given by a leading Korean scholar, Professor Kim Se Jin is:[4]

> In 1948 the Korean people adopted pure textbook democracy as the foundation for their nation. Their expectations were for a well-functioning system that remains elusive even for developed Western nations. They also failed to take into account the many socio-economic and political prerequisites for liberal democracy; a high degree of political socialisation, strong middle class, and a wide acceptance of an egalitarian philosophy, among other things. Nor did they fully understand how political decisions and policies are made through bargaining and compromising.
>
> In fact, when the government failed to deliver what the populace expected in terms of the administration of justice or articulation of public interests and demands, frustration and outrage were the result.

Few people in May, 1961, would have wagered that President Park, as he was to become, would play a decisive role in Korean history until his murder in 1979, let alone have anticipated the economic and political changes which were to take place in the Republic of Korea.

During the last few years knowledge of the so-called South Korean economic miracle has become somewhat more widespread. During the eight years 1954 to 1961, per capita GNP grew from a mere 70 to 83 dollars. By 1977 per capita income had reached nearly 800 dollars and by 1981 should reach 1,500 dollars. According to United Nations figures, income distribution compares with that of Social-Democratic Sweden. With a modern, growing steel, chemical, ship-building and automobile industry the Republic of Korea has, in one generation, passed from being an underdeveloped country, to being a developing country and should, by 1990, have become a developed country. All this has been achieved in a country which had a triple burden of a heavy defence programme, the need to accumulate capital and the necessity of attempting to satisfy the more immediate and pressing of the people's expectations. Whilst foreign investment has helped, particularly that from the U.S. and Japan, against that has to be measured the fact that the country possesses hardly any minerals and not a drop of oil. Work, an export drive and a highly educated labour force have been key determinants. Not least there has been the impact of a fierce national pride, coupled with an awareness of the threat which lies

north of the DMZ.

It was in the political field that there was both confusion about, and criticism of, the Park years. Writing in 1976 of existing Freedom in Korea, a senior and distinguished British journalist defined them as follows: [5]

> They are, of course, freedom to worship and freedom to live a private life. Freedom to choose one's food, dress, house, career or job, to set up on one's own, to move without a permit within the country—and to go abroad so far as foreign exchange allows.
>
> Liberty to bring up children one's own way, so that they do not extol the comrade leader above their parents at nursery school age. There is even freedom to dance to rock music and grow one's hair long, though these signs of sapped moral fibre worry the authorities.

But there was no Freedom either to establish Marxist organisations or to engage in Marxist propaganda and publication. Anyone who regards the existence of a legally functioning Communist Party as a condition of democracy would, by definition, have classified the Republic of Korea as an unfree society. Park frequently defended this position. For example, at a press conference on 15th January, 1976, he declared:

> They want us to scrap our anti-Communist system, don't they? They want us to scrap the anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law. They want us to let them do whatever they like in the Republic of Korea.

Yet the problem was more complicated and in essence insoluble. On the one hand there are the classical communist tactics of working through religious, labour and social organisations as part of their campaign to undermine an existing government. On the other there are those who, whilst not being communists, wish to make strong criticism of government policy and to achieve major changes in the system, including constitutional ones.

Park, himself, fought and won three Presidential elections conducted on the basis of a popular vote. In 1963 he won with 46.6% of the votes against 45.1% for the major opposition candidate Yun Po Sun. In 1967 he defeated the same opponent by 51.6% to 40.9%. In 1971 he received 54.0% against 46.0% for a new opponent Kim Tae-jung. Yet in 1972 it was Park who was responsible for the introduction of the new Yushin Constitution which, to be fair, was later endorsed heavily in a national referendum.

The Yushin Constitution placed The National Conference for Unification at the apex of the government structure. It is composed of 2,000 to 5,000 delegates elected directly by the people for a six-year term of office. It elects the President and one third of the uni-cameral National Assembly —the other two-thirds of the Assembly being elected by direct universal suffrage from among competing party candidates for six-year terms. The other third of the Assembly is elected by the National Conference for Unification on the recommendation of the President. The introduction of Emergency Laws forbidding criticism of the Constitution and attempts to change it not only strengthened Park's position but became a source of friction.

History will level the charge of authoritarianism against Park but it will also concede the economic miracle, an absence of personal corruption, a fierce patriotism and a passionate desire to re-unite the Korean peninsula on a non-communist basis. Will it judge him to have been an Asian de

Gaulle with the same loyalties and sense of history but with the insuperable problem of the Communist North?

The murder of Park has created a new situation but possibly not of the magnitude that some people believe. One can forecast with confidence that the Yushin Constitution will be revised and that there will be a return to direct Presidential elections. To mark the inauguration of President Choi, 1,616 prisoners were pardoned. One can anticipate a degree of liberalisation of the political system. Yet the problem of the Kim Il Sung regime will not disappear. There will be differences of opinion and debate but the tendency to close ranks will be overwhelmingly stronger.

There are still enormously difficult technical as well as political problems to be resolved. So many people seem to have the naive idea that you can simply sit down and write or even revise a constitution. They fail to understand that the first and much more difficult task is to secure agreement on how the country is actually to be governed in future. After all the writing of a constitution is merely the legal expression of prior agreement on the system of government to be adopted. What is encouraging is the smoothness and maturity with which the main institutions of government and of society at large, including in particular the military, have continued to function.

It needs to be added that the Korean economy is not isolated from the present world difficulties. On the contrary Korea is more vulnerable than most states to the impact of the oil crisis and to having tariffs raised against her exports. On 12th January, 1980, the Korean government devalued the Won by 19.8%. This was clearly a response to a fall in GNP growth to 7.1% in 1979—a very poor figure by Korean standards and one which the government hopes to correct by a renewal of export-led growth.

To draw conclusions in the sense of making forecasts is both difficult and rash, not least when large areas of the world, including advanced industrial democracies, are in a state of turmoil. It is possibly better to recall and stress the importance of Korean pride in their ancient culture, their memories of past injustice and suffering, not least as a result of the Korean War and as manifested at the funeral of President Park, their appreciation of the magnitude of their achievements during the last two decades.

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1 *Pyongyang Times*, 15 April, 1973.
2 *Pyongyang Times*, 18 August, 1979.
3 *Pyongyang Times*, 18 August, 1979.
4 *Government Politics of Korea*, by Kim Se Jin; Research Institute on Korean Affairs, Maryland, U.S., 1971, pp 72-73.
5 Roy Lewis (formerly, before retirement, leader-writer on the London *Times* and its Commonwealth Consultant.) See *The Tablet*, 28th August, 1976.

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EASTER: AN HISTORICAL REFLECTION

by The Very Rev. Robert Milburn

THERE are certain decisive events occurring in the course of history after which things can never be quite the same as they were before. Pre-eminent among such events, on any reckoning, must be accounted the Resurrection of Christ alluded to, in an oblique and casual manner, by the Roman historian Tacitus. Tacitus, like Suetonius a few years later, has occasion to note that the emperor Nero, in an attempt to divert popular hostility from himself after a disastrous fire, selected the Christians to serve as scapegoats. The Christians were newcomers to Rome and, by reason of a distinctive life-style, had made themselves unpopular and easily slandered as 'guilty of abominations'. Tacitus comments on their origin: — 'Christus, from whom their name is derived, was executed at the hands of the procurator Pontius Pilate in the reign of Tiberius. Checked for the moment, this pernicious superstition again broke out, not only in Judaea, the source of the evil, but even in Rome.' This 'check', and the subsequent 'breaking out again' represent the testimony of the cultured pagan world to the crucifixion and the subsequent resurrection of Christ, in or just around the year 30 A.D.

The remarkable thing is that, after the appalling catastrophe of Christ's death, there should be any followers left who had the heart not merely to mourn in secret but robustly to proclaim their faith in his risen life and abiding presence. However diverse in form and perhaps in value, the early Christian documents are united in displaying as the heart of their message the motto 'Christ being risen from the dead dieth no more', with its corollary of hope for each individual man. It is difficult to see how this mood of optimism could have arisen without some impressive, indeed, exceptional, course of events having the power to convert a disillusioned band of Galilean peasants and *petit-bourgeois* into a widespread Church ready to proclaim 'Whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's.'

It was not unknown, two thousand years ago in Palestine, for bold leaders with political or religious pretensions to gather round them a little group of followers and proclaim that they alone held the secret of life as against the pompous established order of the High Priests or the scornful brutality of Roman soldiers serving in a strange land. Two such petty local leaders, mentioned in a speech attributed to Gamaliel in the Acts of the Apostles as also in Josephus' *Antiquities,* were Theudas and Judas of Gamala. Theudas 'gave himself out to be somebody', four hundred followers backed his claim to be the Lord's Anointed or the 'prophet like unto Moses' or whatever he chose to call himself but, sadly, so we read, 'he was slain and all, as many as obeyed him, were dispersed and came to naught.' Judas of Gamala, as head of a somewhat larger rising, suffered the same fate. 'He also perished and all, as many as obeyed him, were scattered abroad', to disappear from the fading page of history. The followers of Jesus were scattered abroad also when he was arrested and

led up the slopes of Golgotha, bearing his cross. Some of them appear to have returned to Galilee in the hope that they would escape notice by taking up once more their simple, rustic crafts. Others, very reasonably, hid within locked rooms in Jerusalem and trusted that, in the general commotion of the Passover festival, people would forget about them. 'They were dispersed and came to naught', just like the followers of the unfortunate Theudas. Yet the Christians were, within a year or two, established as an active, widespread and even quite influential body of men. In default of any historical records it would be hard to imagine what could possibly account for such a transformation. However, records of a sort do exist, the oldest being St. Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. This letter, recently pronounced by the electronic brain to be genuinely Pauline, was written in 54 or 55 A.D. so that when Paul recounts that Christ died, was buried and then raised, he is alluding not to some far-off, misty imaginings drawn from the rhythmic pattern of the seasons but to events which could be checked by the recollections of people still in their early middle age.

Paul offers a list of Christ's re-appearances which he had himself taken from an earlier, official compilation. The appearances are five in number: first to Peter, then to the Twelve, then to 'above five hundred brethren at once', then to James, finally to 'all the apostles'. Of these incidents, three have a counterpart in the narratives at the end of the four Gospels while the appearances to James and to the five hundred are lacking from that source. Paul adds that finally he was privileged to receive just such a vision of the risen Lord, which caused a complete change in his way of life and left him in no doubt whatever that, in face of every difficulty and trial, he must to the end of his days proclaim the good news vouchsafed to him. Whether St. Paul's experience was of precisely the same nature as the group of visions perceived by others a year or two earlier can never be known for certain. Paul imagined it so to be, and he based his claim to apostolic authority on the ground that he had seen 'Jesus the Lord'. But he refrains from exact description and the memorable account of the light and the voice and Paul's temporary blindness occurs not in the Letters but in the secondary narrative of the Acts of the Apostles, which attempts to clarify and interpret. In so doing, the author of Acts is moving across from bare, scientific chronicling towards the narrative or, if the language of painting may be employed, the impressionist style. There is no reason why the word 'legendary' should not be used to describe this style if by 'legend' is intended not something 'spurious' or 'doubtful' but a bright and memorable summing-up of complex reality.

History, as Hume remarked, is a collection of facts which are multiplying without end and if they are to be made intelligible they must in some way be abridged. In this abridgement, this separation of the relevant from the unimportant, lies one of the historian's never-ending problems, the companion necessity being a power to draw out the personal or, if the word be allowed, spiritual significance that underlies phenomena, that is to say, when these phenomena advance beyond the point where they can be weighed or measured or logically demonstrated. Scientific chronicling tends to deploy facts devoid of meaning. The impressionist style or 'legen-

dary' form of narative offers any amount of meaning but may lose sight of everyday realities and degenerate into speculative fiction, just as the portrait-painter's art consists in finding the happy mean between photographic realism and unchastened caricature in his attempt to communicate the deepest possible level of truth about his subject.

The Gospel writers composed their treatises at a period when the tradition of events was still fresh but the need for clear, compressed, pictorial instruction was paramount. The common denominator of brute fact receives therefore enough embellishment to make unprofitable the attempt to squeeze the four narratives into a precisely coherent whole. But the message admits of no doubt. It is a message of triumphant appearances of the risen Lord which no longer left room for hesitation concerning the age-long question whether the inmost nature of things consists of white squares on a black background or black, intruding squares superimposed on white, 'Whether 'tis ampler joy divinelier lit Or homeless night without'.

It is, of course, characteristic of nearly everything really worth proving that it is not susceptible of proof, and no one can assuredly demonstrate that the disciples did not misinterpret the evidence of their senses. What can be affirmed by reference to St. Paul's list of events and to the generally consistent manner in which the Gospel-writers handle their given material is that the appearances, however they are to be explained in terms of psychology or philosophy, were compressed in time, intensely surprising and decisive in their influence on character and life. The point has to be made that, in any event, these appearances of the Lord go beyond the sudden, indeed disconcerting, intimations of immortality sometimes offered to persons of quick perception. Marcel Proust recalls how trifles such as the taste of a 'little Madeleine' cake dipped in tea or the sensation beneath his feet of irregular paving stones recalling those in the baptistery of St. Mark's, Venice, suddenly drew him out of the ever-rolling stream of time and gave assurance that the vicissitudes of life are things utterly indifferent, and its seemingly short and fugitive span no more than a contemptible illusion. In closely similar language Tennyson records that, by constant quiet repetition of his name, he slipped out of individual consciousness into a state of boundless being wherein death was a 'laughable impossibility'. The Gospel-writers, on the other hand, unite in their witness that the visions which they record, whether made to individuals or to groups, were far more robust and personal. Whatever ghosts may be, St. Luke for one had no high opinion of them and he strains the resources of thought and language to the uttermost in trying to declare that the Apostles were wrong in supposing 'that they had seen a spirit'. Christ is therefore made to display his hands and his feet and, in face of continuing puzzlement, to eat a portion of boiled fish—a circumstance which, taken literally and in isolation, accords ill with the conception of a spiritual body.

The second element present within the Gospel tradition of the post-Resurrection events that moulded the Christian Church into life is the

empty tomb. Found in concise but unmistakable form in St. Mark's record as published about 67 A.D., it receives from Matthew and Luke, some fifteen years later, additional touches of colour which include an earthquake. The whole episode causes embarrassment to the straiter sort of New Testament critics. Ever since William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* was written, visions, particularly if referred to in terms of 'telepathy' or 'collective hallucination', have become respectable enough, but the empty tomb defies reason and imagination alike. Yet, as things stand, it is brought in not as an optional extra or picturesque detail but as the culmination of the Gospel. The original form of Mark's narrative, before it became encumbered in the later manuscripts with a hotchpotch of details drawn from other sources, exhibits the author's customary dramatic power. Three women arrive at the tomb, early and unobtrusively, to anoint the body as a tribute of respect, but are amazed to discover the stone rolled back and a 'young man in a white robe' (that is, an angel and not a gardener or any casual passer-by), seated inside the tomb. The women receive a command to go and inform the band of Christ's followers 'He is risen, He is no longer here.' Clearly they will go back and gossip freely enough in good time, but for the moment they rush out of the tomb trembling with amazement and St. Mark allows the curtain to fall as they crouch, mute and helpless, in the face of mystery.

The natural twentieth-century response to the whole episode is to regard it as, at best, a symbol of the confidence which filled the minds of the earliest Churchmen as the result of visionary experiences in which they sensed the presence of their Lord. But certain difficulties insist on declaring themselves. It is, in the first place, unlikely to the point of impossibility that the tomb of Jesus would have been utterly neglected. If Mary Magdelene and her friends felt obliged to bring spices on the third day, others in the subsequent moments of comparative triumph must feel impelled to make a similar pilgrimage. For that was the manner of the times. When, for instance, St. Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, met a martyr's death in the year 156 A.D. and his body was burnt in the market-place, his friends—so runs the eyewitness account—'took up his bones more valuable than precious stones and put them in a proper resting-place. There the Lord will permit us to come together each year to celebrate the birthday of his martyrdom with gladness and joy'. It is hard to suppose that early Christians would thus honour the body of an obscure bishop while neglecting that of Christ. Yet there is more to it than that. The first Christians were mostly of Jewish descent but they had many violent enemies among their compatriots. All that these opponents had to do, in order to show up any talk about Christ's resurrection from an emptied tomb as utterly ridiculous, was to produce the body or point to where it lay, but this they failed to do. In the reign of George I the Reverend Thomas Woolston was deprived of his fellowship at Cambridge and afterwards imprisoned for maintaining that the disciples bribed the Roman soldiers and removed Jesus' body from the tomb. This idea, with minor modifications, reappears at various points in history, but the answer to it is that given, once and for all, by Origen in the third century when he remarked that men do not

POLITICAL CONFLICT AND THE BRITISH POLICE TRADITION

by Robert Reiner

IN the June 27, 1979 Commons Debate on public order, Mr. Whitelaw echoed the conventional faith that the British police have uniquely mastered the secret of preserving domestic peace and harmony. Yet in the last five years two demonstrators (Kevin Gately and Blair Peach) have died, the first such deaths for over 50 years, and a formidable battle-roll of turbulent and violent confrontations has mounted up—Red Lion Square, Lewisham, Ladywood, Notting Hill, Grunwick, and most recently Leicester and Southall. Meanwhile the virtual civil war in Northern Ireland continues to simmer, providing a testing ground for the British state's technique of political control. What was the secret of the British police's past success in the maintenance of public order? Are we heading towards a more dangerous period of increasing confrontation?

With characteristic forthrightness, Sir Robert Mark once articulated the crowd control strategy of the Metropolitan Police: 'The real art of policing a free society or a democracy is to win by appearing to lose.' Their secret weapon was not water cannon, tear gas, or rubber bullets, but public sympathy. To this end, the Metropolitan Police had trained an especially comely horse—the 'Brigitte Bardot' of police horses—to collapse, feigning death, at a word of command. This was guaranteed to win the support of the animal-loving British public.

Despite this revelation of a blatant confidence trick, the media can generally be relied upon to present the police point of view of conflicts. Jack Dromey and Graham Taylor in *Grunwick: The Workers' Story* relate how a burly, white-haired policeman (the Dixon image?) was seen by some pickets to fall writhing on the ground, clutching his legs and stomach, while other police watched impassively. The pickets tried to help him, but were told by an inspector that he'd be all right. They then noticed that the policeman was directly in line with a TV camera sticking out of an upstairs window. The meaning became clear when the same performance was repeated later, and duly appeared on that night's news. At Southall the newspapers trotted out the police allegations that outside agitators had caused the trouble. It was subsequently revealed that out of more than 300 arrested, only two live outside the area. On the day following the demonstration, several papers reported that a rowdy mob had besieged the hospital where injured police were being treated. *The Sun* claimed to have got this story from Scotland Yard, although the press office said it had only informed them about a *peaceful* demonstration. Hospital staff, however, later denied that even a peaceful demonstration had occurred.

The careful and calculated concern with appearances as a means of

maintaining public sympathy and order goes back to the very start of the modern British police. Preserving public order and containing threats to the social status quo was the essential reason for the establishment of professional police forces in the early 19th century. The standard histories, for example Reith and Critchley, regard the development of modern police forces as a neutral, technically efficient mechanism for the service of the public, opposed only by obscurantism and vested interest. As Reith put it, the new police was the solution evolved by authority to prevent the realisation of its fear that 'government, order and sanity would all be blotted out together'. But the establishment of the police was clearly related to the class and political conflicts of the period, and those who opposed the innovation of professional policing were far from irrational.

The role of the police in controlling crowds and riots was central to their formation. Some historians deny this by arguing that Peel did not mention riot control in his speech proposing the Metropolitan Police bill in 1829, and that 'never had the possibility of an insurrection in England seemed more remote than at the time when the new Police Bill was carried' (Halevy). It is true that Peel's argument stressed the protection of property from theft, but he had been pressing for police reform for some years, largely because of concern at the inadequacy of existing means of riot control. Furthermore, the extension of professional police forces to the provinces (in the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act, the 1839 County Police Act and the 1856 County and Borough Police Act) was explicitly related to such disorders as the 1831 Bristol Reform Bill riot and the Chartist troubles in Birmingham and elsewhere in 1839.

Prior to the establishment of professional police, the means available to the authorities for controlling disturbances was either some form of citizen force (such as parish constables, militia, Yeomanry) or resort to the army. However, these methods became increasingly unsatisfactory from the point of view of the propertied and governing classes in the early 18th century. With the development of industrial capitalism and the growth of towns, relationships between the classes altered and the social meaning of riot and crime was transformed. Before the 19th century riots were not necessarily seen as a threat to the social order *per se*. Within what Silver has called 'cultures of riotous protest', they functioned as a means of proto-democracy, drawing attention to grievances. As Hobsbawm argued in *Primitive Rebels*:

> Provided that the ruler did his duty, the populace was prepared to defend him with enthusiasm. But if he did not, it rioted until he did. This mechanism was perfectly understood by both sides, and caused no political problems beyond a little occasional destruction of property... Since the riots were not directed against the social system, public order could remain surprisingly lax by modern standards.

The movements of the early 19th century—Luddism, the first stirrings of trade unionism, the demand for political reform culminating in Chartism—all were perceived by the propertied class as a more funda-

mental threat to the emerging social order of capitalist industrialism. Lurking behind them was the spectre of revolution, the terror which had been manifest in France. The new social order required new methods of control. The problem of riot was only one aspect of the more general task of subjugating and incorporating the lower orders, the 'dangerous classes', into the disciplines of capitalist organisation. The tradition of workers keeping part of the goods they handled as wages in kind had to be redefined as pilfering to solidify the institution of the money wage. The personal property of the urban bourgeoisie had to be protected at public expense for they lacked the security which geography, private retainers and the personal social bonds between rural classes gave to wealthy landowners. The leisure pursuits of the working class had to be regimented to the rhythms of factory life. Finally, any resistance to these trends had to be suppressed in ways which were effective but did not exacerbate tensions.

Traditional means of peace-keeping were not up to the task. The old parish constables were unreliable and often sympathised with the masses rather than the masters. The Yeomanry, a cavalry force composed of small landowners, was if anything over-enthusiastic in the suppression of riots. But the direct enrolment of the propertied in social control threatened the peaceful relations between classes which were essential for a stable industrial economy. As Chadwick argued at the time: 'the animosities created or increased, and rendered permanent by arming master against servant, neighbour against neighbour, by triumph on one side and failure on the other, were even more deplorable than the outrages actually committed. . . The necessity for such painful and demoralising conflicts between connected persons should be avoided by providing a trained and independent force for action in such emergencies.' The army had often played such a role. But while it was successful in coping with serious insurrectionary situations, it could not supply the needs of continuous domestic pacification. Reliance on the army meant drastic alternation between no intervention and the use of deadly force. As Enoch Powell recently put it, the army is 'a killing machine' which can act 'at the moment when authority in the state judges that order can no longer be maintained or restored by other means'. It was to supply these other means that professional, bureaucratically organised police forces were developed in the early 19th century.

The police were given what Storch has called 'an omnibus mandate'. The prevention of crime, 'the great end' to which Rowan and Mayne (the Metropolitan Police's first Commissioners) said 'every effort of the police is to be directed', meant a strategy of continuous patrol and surveillance. From the start this was directed especially at working-class areas, the famous police axiom of guarding St. James by watching St. Giles.

From the point of view of controlling crowds and riot the gain was twofold. First, continuous penetration of civil society was a source of intelligence which meant that potential disorder could be anticipated.

Second, when the police faced disturbances, they did so not as a military force or a posse of social superiors, but as the embodiment of a law that was represented as above and beyond class. They were not direct instruments of the ruling class, but the protectors of the public against crime and the affable bobbies who provided a host of social services. As Silver puts it in his seminal essay 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society', they 'seemed to separate the assertion of "constitutional" authority from that of social and economic dominance'.

This at any rate was the image which Peel and the police commissioners sought to convey to the public. But putting this over to the working-class proved to be an uphill struggle. In Engels' words of 1845: 'Because the English Bourgeois finds himself reproduced in his law . . . the policeman's truncheon . . . has for him a wonderfully soothing power. But for the working man quite otherwise!' Textbook histories imply that resistance to the police lasted only a few years. The 1833 inquest verdict of 'justifiable homicide' on the killing of a policeman at a London political meeting is often quoted, but the implication given that such hostility was short-lived. In fact violent working-class opposition to the police continued for some decades. In his important article, 'The Plague of Blue Locusts', Storch cites several cases of full-scale rioting against the police in Northern towns in the 1840s and 50s. Miller's vivid analysis of music-hall songs and other elements of working-class culture shows the continuation of a tradition of suspicion and resentment after the police had acquired a grudging acceptance as a necessary, inescapable evil. The aphorism 'if you want to know the time ask a policeman' today conveys a message of benign public service. In the 19th century it referred to the habit of policemen relieving drunken gentlemen of their watches, thus making themselves the only possessors of such instruments in poor areas.

The technique adopted by Peel, Rowan and Mayne to mollify opposition to the new police (which initially spread well beyond the working-class) was to establish a regime of tight bureaucratic discipline to ensure that policemen acted with full procedural regularity, subordinating personal feelings to legal requirements. Selection, training and control were strictly exercised to make policemen models of civility and restraint. These steps were all part of a deliberate strategy of presenting the policemen as the incarnation of impersonal authority, the agent of the *law* not a government or class. As a journal of the 1850s put it, the police officer was 'stiff, calm and inexorable . . . an *institution* rather than a man'.

The Metropolitan Commissioners used this image to develop the technique of handling demonstrations by restrained power. The police were to control crowds with the minimum of arms (usually only truncheons). Instead they were to rely on strength of numbers, the mobility and co-ordination inculcated by effective drilling, and above all their legitimacy as representatives of an impartial authority. The policeman was insulated from partisan politics, and not even given the vote until 1887. A journalist summed it up thus in the 1860s: 'they know nothing of politics; the man in blue always preserves his neutral tint . . . the good old cause of order is

the only side the policeman supports.'

Although working-class reservations continued, and there were controversial clashes such as the 'Bloody Sunday' of 1887 in Trafalgar Square (for parallels with Southall see *New Society,* 24 May 1979), by the end of the 19th century the police had demonstrated their capabilities as a force for maintaining public order. The army was used to an ever decreasing extent in riot control. The exception to this picture of domestic pacification was the intensity of conflict with the nascent trade-union movement, and the harsh treatment of the suffragettes in the years before the first world war. There were many occasions when allegations of police brutality were made by strikers (e.g. the Liverpool Dock Strike of 1911) and troops were often called out. Paradoxically, the last use of troops in an industrial dispute was in 1919 during the Liverpool police strike! The 1926 General Strike is often regarded as one of the shining examples of the English police force's capacity for relatively amicable handling of disturbances, and the football match between strikers and police has become legendary (less frequently mentioned is the scuffle following the match when police searched a striker's house).

During the 1930s the intensity of public order problems increased for the police. In the early years these mainly concerned the National Unemployed Workers' Movement and the hunger marches it organised. There were frequent, well-substantiated accusations of police brutality and harassment. Forty years before the supposed innovation of flying pickets, flying police in an aeroplane were used to control the marches in Glamorgan. (Mutual support of police forces in political and industrial disputes dates back to the origins of the modern police. From the 1830s Metropolitan Police units were frequently sent far afield to deal with riots.)

From the end of 1933 to the outbreak of war, the main source of public order problems was the rise of the British Union of Fascists. In the wake of the famous Cable Street battle of 1936 when a counter-force of the Left and Jewish residents succeeded in halting a Mosleyite march, the government passed the currently controversial Public Order Act. This was partly directed against the BUF in the clauses which prohibited the wearing of uniforms for political purposes and para-military associations. The sections which are currently under discussion, however, are those regulating public processions, including the power of Chief Constables to suggest the banning of marches (subject to the Home Secretary's approval).

There are many aspects of the 1930s conflicts which parallel present problems with the National Front. Accusations of police bias against the left in favour of the fascists were rife. Jewish organisations bitterly contrasted what they saw as police laggardliness is prosecuting anti-semitic attacks with police enthusiasm for protecting the 'democratic' rights of the fascists against demonstrators. Recent historians have questioned these allegations. Skidelsky in his biography of Mosley, for example, claims they are 'left-wing mythology . . . with not the slightest evidence'. The police were not 'pro-fascist or pro-socialist, but pro-police'

and their concern was to preserve 'public order with the least expenditure of time and manpower'. Stevenson and Cook, in the most comprehensive study of the period, *The Slump*, tend to support this view. But their own evidence controverts their conclusion. For example, they document the extent of police surveillance of the NUWM, showing that there was a Special Branch informer in its inner circles, while there was no parallel infiltration of the BUF. The police frequently baton-charged NUWM marches, but there are no comparable cases of brutality against the fascists. The police refused to intervene when Mosley's stewards beat up hecklers at the infamous 1934 Olympia meeting, while a few months later in Glamorgan they trespassed on a left-wing meeting protesting the Incitement to Disaffection Bill. Nonetheless, the passage of the Public Order Act was clearly intended to restrict the activities of the BUF, and in the late 30s it was invoked several times to stop fascist marches. It was similarly used on several occasions in the late 1940s to ban Mosleyite marches.

Since then the Act has been invoked less frequently. Indeed in recent years there has been criticism of the police for not banning NF marches, for example in 1977 in Lewisham. In current debates the police frequently give the impression that their reluctance to use the Public Order Act is because a ban on marches has to be a *blanket* ban on all demonstrations. In fact this is not so. The Act specifies that bans can be made either on 'all public processions' *or* 'any class of public procession'. The police can single out either particular political groups (as in the 1961 ban on the Committee of 100) or specific areas (as in the 1963 ban on processions in the East End). Their reluctance to do so is based on their decision to present a non-partisan stance of neutrality to left and right and is not due to restrictions in the law. The consequence of this choice is that they in effect protect provocative NF marches against anti-racial counter-demonstrations.

Although they have never acted with kid gloves, there is no doubt that the British police have maintained a tradition of containing demonstrations with minimum force when contrasted with the experience of other countries. During the world-wide student and anti-Vietnam war marches of the 1960s, for example, when riot-helmeted police backed up by water-cannon, tear-gas and armour appeared in most capital cities, the famous October 27, 1968 Grosvenor Square demonstration seemed to confirm the virtues of the relatively benign British approach.

The United States has the dubious distinction of the worst record of police violence. Every year in the 1950s and 60s, over 200 citizens were killed by police, and in the 70s the annual number has been well over 300. (The death rate for blacks was nine times higher than that for whites). By contrast, on average about 100 policemen are murdered. Between 1967 and 1973, 233 people were killed in civil disturbances (the proportion killed by the police is not known). A study by James Q. Wilson found that 5% of blacks (representing 1 million people) and 2% of whites (4 million people) claim to have been unjustifiably beaten by police

at least once. The most comprehensive observational study of police work, conducted by Albert Reiss for the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, reported in 1971 that the police used unnecessary force in 3% of all encounters with citizens. This amounts to hundreds of thousands of cases a year.

As Wilbur Miller's path-breaking comparative history of the New York and London police shows, the American cop's tendency to brutality goes back to the origins of the force. The conventional explanation has it that violence is as American as apple pie. But Miller demonstrates that in the 1830s and 40s, when urban police forces were being established, it was Britain, not the U.S. which was riven by profound social and political conflict. America, prior to the start of mass immigration, was relatively harmonious, 'a self-governing people' as Harriet Martineau put it. We have seen that the London Metropolitan Police Commissioners strove to ensure the acceptability of the new force in the teeth of intense class conflict by developing a tightly disciplined organisation symbolising impersonal legal authority. In America, by contrast, control of the police was entrusted to the democratic political process and became a creature of partisan politics. The authority of the policeman rested not on his symbolising an abstract legal order, but his personal command of each encounter. As mass immigration built up a social volcano in American cities, respectable WASPs were prepared to condone violent suppression of disorder among the 'dangerous classes'. Walt Whitman, for example, praised the violent suppression of an 1871 clash between Protestant and Catholic Irish. 'The New York police looked and behaved splendidly; no fuss, few words, but *action*.' The consequence was a tradition of police violence. As Miller sums it up, in the late 19th century 'while London was moving away from violent repression, New York was setting a pattern of violence — the bayonet and cartridge would become familiar instruments of American riot control'.

In the decade since the 1960s ghetto riots and anti-war demonstrations, the American police have been tooling up for intensified repression. *The Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove,* a study by the Centre for Research on Criminal Justice, documents a massive increase in expenditure and research on control technology. As the stimulus of Vietnam for the military-industrial complex disappeared, the corporations have brought the war back home and a new police-industrial complex has emerged. Para-military squads have been set up in many forces, the prototype being the Los Angeles Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) unit. The philosophy of these groups was expressed by one SWAT instructor: 'Those people out there—the radicals, the revolutionaries, and the cop haters—are damned good at using shotguns, bombs or setting up ambushes, so we've got to be better at what we do.' Originally trained by the Marines, and equipped with massive firepower, the tactics of SWAT were demonstrated in 1975 when they literally roasted the members of the Symbionese Liberation Army inside a house in a Los Angeles suburb.

Similar para-military units, specialising in riot control, exist in many

other police forces. In Western Germany, each State police force has a riot section, the *Bereitschaftspolizei.* All police recruits spend two years in this. They are equipped on military lines with water cannon, armoured vehicles like half-tracks, and firearms. They carry long batons and riot shields in public order situations, and wear steel helmets with visors. In recent years, squads of *Mobileneinatz-kommandos* have been formed to cope with tougher situations, with more sophisticated weapons and training. At Federal level, the Border Guard, until the 1956 creation of a new German army a substitute for the military, has become an internal security force. It is structured on army lines, with the men living in barracks. They are armed with military equipment, trained in crowd control, and since 1972 can be used at any time as a police reserve. After the Munich tragedy of 1972 a special crack unit was formed within the Border Guard, which carried out the successful Mogadishu operation. In recent years there has been an escalation in the quantity of police weaponry, both deadly and 'non-lethal', and the courts have relaxed the stringency of the criteria governing their use. The ostensible justification has been the threat of urban terrorism, but as Sebastian Cobler has shown, plans for such developments existed before Baader or Meinhof had ever been heard of.

These units are paralleled by similar bodies in most industrial countries, for example the French CRS, Italian Carabinieri, Belgian Gendarmerie, Dutch Marechaussee and Japanese Kidotai. While all have access to firearms, the initial resort is to 'non-lethal' weaponry. As Ackroyd, Margolis, Rosenhead and Shallice show in *The Technology of Political Control,* the problem in developing such weapons (many of which originated in Northern Ireland) is to maximise effectiveness, i.e. the capacity to inflict pain, within the public relations constraints of avoiding the *appearance* of brutality. Names are crucial. 'Rubber bullet', for example, suggests something with all the deadly ferocity of a mushy pea. In fact several people have been killed or blinded by them in Northern Ireland. Part of the problem is to guard against misuse in action. Rubber bullets are supposed to be fired at the ground in front of rioters so that they lose some momentum. But they have been shot directly at crowds at point-blank range, and been strengthened by the illicit insertion of electric batteries. No weapon which is effective can be reliably non-lethal. As a team of American Army scientists once remarked, the only non-lethal weapon would be a marshmallow dropped by parachute. From the state's point of view the problem is to develop weapons which sound less lethal than they are, and an American National Science Foundation Report has listed some recent innovations. These include: 'squawk boxes' emitting spooky noises, 'instant banana' which makes roads slippery, 'instant mud' with the reverse effect, and 'stench'—a grenade which gives off a foul smell. (Some experts object to this as likely to cause ridicule.)

So far, not much of this *Star Wars* style riot control has appeared in England. But there are many signs of a trend in police policy away from traditional restraints. It is hard to remember the shock which greeted the bringing out of riot-shields at Lewisham and Notting Hill in 1977 (replacing

the traditional dust-bin lids as used at the 1976 Notting Hill carnival). But shields, strengthened helmets and other protective equipment are now regular sights. The Police Federation has called for more effective protection like riot helmets. The anxieties of front-line policemen are understandable, and many are impatient with the argument that unprotected, unarmed policemen gain public sympathy. As the *Police Review* booklet *Public Order and the Police* says, 'to carry this argument to its logical extreme it would be even better to have masses of injured officers, while a few attractive policewomen being killed would have the maximum effect'. However, the line between defensive and offensive equipment is thin. The same booklet continues: 'riot shields, strengthened helmets and goggles are only the beginning; the question of long staves and firearms must soon be considered'. It quotes an anonymous officer's solution to rioting mobs: 'All you have to do is spray them—spray them with machine guns'. Helmets and other 'protective' equipment can be used offensively, as at Grunwick where they were used in lieu of truncheons.

Many elements within the force are alarmed at current trends. After Lewisham, Leicester and Southall the Police Federation magazine carried editorials urging the government to 'ban the bloody marches'. This was on the grounds of the harm done to community relations by the NF as well as the personal safety of police and public. John Alderson, the far-sighted Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, has expressed concern at the way the police are coming to be identified with racist groups through protecting their marches. But the police have been reluctant to make a *political* decision about these issues, and only contemplate banning marches on public order grounds. They have sheltered behind a rhetoric of even-handedness to left and right. Police Federation Chairman Jim Jardine, for example, has argued for an end to provocative marches in these terms: 'Why should one group of crackpot extremists for the sake of publicity and to stir up racial tension, be able to issue what is virtually an invitation to other groups of crackpots to a public punch up, with the police starting and ending as the Aunt Sallies?'

In the meantime, preparations are continuing to increase the police force's readiness to act toughly. At this year's Police Federation Conference, one speaker warned that people who attend demonstrations must expect to get hurt and 'shouldn't come whining'. Riot control training has become so 'realistic' and intensive that at the 1978 Federation Conference demands were made to tone it down because of the extent of injuries inflicted on policemen. It was revealed that 12 officers were making claims for injuries sustained in riot practice, and one was taking legal action. The Metropolitan Special Patrol Group, founded in 1965 to provide a mobile reserve to supplement hard-pressed areas in ordinary policing, is becoming a *de facto* riot squad, with notorious consequences at Red Lion Square, Grunwick, Southall and elsewhere. The review of it promised by Mr. Whitelaw is welcome, though no substitute for the necessary independent enquiry.

While the immediate stimulus for stiffening the state's capacity to

THE POPULATION BOMB TICKS ON

by John A. Loraine

SOME optimistic writers have recently talked of the population explosion 'petering out'. Such complacency is, of course, quite unwarranted. As of 1980 the global population scenario remains a fascinating admixture of hope and stress. But it must be stressed that numbers are still soaring and that during this year the excess of births over deaths is likely to be well over 70 million, considerably in excess of the combined dead in the First and Second World Wars, similar to the current population of countries such as Nigeria, Pakistan and Mexico.

The global population has now topped the 4,300 million mark. The overall growth rate (1.7 per cent per annum), although down on the figure of 2 per cent for 1970, has not altered appreciably during the past 12 months; and the UN projection for 2000 AD is still in excess of 6,000 million. The forecast for Africa is for an increase from 460 to 830 million, for Asia from 2,500 to 3,590 million, for Latin America from 350 to 600 million. Rates of increase in the developed world will, of course, be appreciably slower—in Europe from 480 to 520 million in 20 years, in the USSR from 260 to 310 million, in the USA from 220 to 260 million, in Japan from 115 to 130 million, in Australia from 14 to 18 million.

In 2000 AD the most populous country in the world will be China with numbers close to or exceeding 1,200 million. India is likely to have passed the 1,000 million mark, even if her birth control programme recovers from the *dégringolade* of the Indira Gandhi Government's State of Emergency in the mid Seventies. Two Third World countries—Indonesia and Brazil—are expected to house more than 200 million people by 2000 AD and in some others—Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Mexico are examples—numbers will be between 100 and 200 million.

Almost a fifth of the world's population live in what has been termed the 'Asian arc', sweeping from the Bay of Bengal to Asia Minor and including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. All the countries in this area have birth rates ranging between 34 and 50 per 1,000 population; in all of them the percentage of people under 15 years of age exceeds 40 (the exception is India with 34) and this provides a massive inbuilt dynamic for future population growth.

Some relatively small Third World countries are scheduled to show spectacular population rises between now and the end of the century. For example, Algeria and Morocco could increase from 19 to 38 million, Ghana from 11 to 21, Tanzania from 17 to 33, Saudi Arabia from 8 to 15, Syria from 8.5 to 16, Nicaragua from 2.5 to 5.0, Ecuador from 8 to 15, Bolivia from 5 to 9, Peru from 17 to 30. However, in spite of these daunting figures the story is not one of unreserved gloom. Fertility declines continue in a number of developing countries. China remains the outstanding example with an estimated birth rate at or about 20 per 1,000 and an annual growth rate (1.2 per cent per annum) not too dissimilar

from that of some industralised countries like Canada, New Zealand, Spain and Ireland. At the Fifth National Peoples Congress in 1978 the Chairman Hua Kuo-feng made a statement of high salience when he declaimed that China's annual population growth rate would have to be cut to 1 per cent by 1981. To achieve this goal, couples in urban communes should now be urged to adopt the one child norm; the whole 'planned birth programme' spearheaded by the Pill and liberal abortion, would be given an immediate shot in the arm and would have to be prosecuted *à toute outrance*.

The Singaporean population policy—backed by fiscal disincentives against large families, active discrimination *à propos* education in the presence of high reproductive activity, eclectic birth control services and official encouragement of the Women's Liberation Movement—continues to prosper. The birth rate in 1979 was 17 per 1,000 population, the rate of increase hovering about 1 per cent per annum and the projection for 2000 AD encompassing an increase of only 700,000. Birth rates of below 20 per 1,000 elsewhere in the Third World were reported from Cyprus (19), Hong Kong (18), Barbados (19), Guadelope (17) and Martinique (14). Other Third World countries—South Korea, Taiwan, the Bahamas, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Chile—were reporting rates between 20 and 25 per 1,000. Fertility also decreased in Indonesia (birth rate now 35 per 1,000), in Thailand (32), Malaysia (31), and Guyana (27). Between 1975 and 1978 the average fertility rate of Mexican women fell from 6 to 5. Nevertheless the total population of that country is projected to rise from 67 to 132 million over the next 20 years.

The lowest population growth rates in the world are in Europe. At least six countries—Switzerland, the two Germanies, Austria, Luxembourg and the UK—are now in negative population growth although in the last mentioned a slight surge in birth rates has been taking place during the past 12 months. The lowest fertility in the world in 1979 (birth rate 10 per 1,000 population) is in Federal Germany. The Government is unhappy about this trend and in a recent television programme a well known demographer was induced to comment that 'beneath the blankets we are a dying people.'

Europe is also the earth's most 'elderly' continent with 12 per cent of its denizens aged 64 years and over. The country with the highest proportion of old people in 1979 was the German Democratic Republic (16 per cent over 64 years) closely followed at a figure of 15 per cent by Sweden, Austria and Federal Germany.

It must never be forgotten, however, that the most pronounced increases in elderly people between now and 2000 AD are scheduled to take place in Third World rather than industrialised countries. Within that area the most striking changes in age composition will occur in Asia and Latin America. In the next 20 years, over 60s in South Asia are expected to increase by 137 million (150 per cent); in Latin America, over 60s are forecast to rise from 16.3 to 41 million and over 80s from 1.2 to 2.6 million.

In previous writings I have continually stressed the all pervasive nature of the global population dilemma. In *The Death of Tomorrow,* I dubbed overpopulation, that 'strange malady of modern life', the most tangled crisis which the world had ever faced. In industrialised countries it was having baneful environmental influences. It contributed to the pall of pollution over big cities, to the contamination of rivers, lakes and whole seas, to the littering of the earth's surface with all manner of detritus. It had a pivotal role in the depletion of precious and non renewable resources (of which oil is currently the most egregious example) and the surge of human numbers was a major factor in forcing the inflationary spiral ever upwards. In Third World cities human misery, degradation and the trappings of tragedy flowed from excessive urbanization with the proliferation of shanty towns like cancerous growths on the face of the earth. Global famines followed the lodestar of overpopulation; so did conditions conducive to the outbreak of armed conflict both within and between nation states. How we deal with this problem in the next 20 years is likely to affect mankind's future for several generations.

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LEARGAS AR EIRINN: LONDON FESTIVAL OF THE IRISH ARTS

by Rosalind Wade

A CASUAL suggestion that an 'Irish month' might prove to be a useful cultural and financial venture led to the comprehensive display of Irish arts and handicrafts which eventully spread its tentacles over London in more than forty theatres, galleries and concert halls, presenting nearly one hundred individual events. These have ranged from a practical display of hand-weaving at the Arts Advisory Council to traditional music at the Albert Hall and the Irish ballet company at Sadlers Wells, as well as a number of art exhibitions, among the most important of which is *The Delighted Eye* at Earlham Street Gallery.

The Festival which began with such modest aspirations soon qualified for government and commercial grants on both sides of the Irish Channel amounting to more than £100,000. What can be claimed as the overall aim of such a costly, even unwieldy programme? It is, we are told, to impress upon English audiences the excellence and variety of Arts activities in the Irish Republic as well as Northern Ireland and, as some leading Irish spokesmen have explained, to assist the Irish themselves to re-establish their own identity in a wider context than the 'provincialism' in which some of them appear to rejoice; in fact, to break out of the Irish 'myth' of faintly coy and comic characters who talk in a deliciously rich idiom and break into song at the slightest provocation.

In all these objectives the Festival is seen to have succeeded admirably; and only the physical distance between events, and the profusion of them, will impede a complete sampling of all that is offered.

Inevitably, the theatre presentations have received the widest publicity and may be said to present the most striking elucidation of the Irish point of view.

Officially, the Festival's first major event was the opening of Hugh Leonard's play, *A Life*, directed by Joe Dowling, at the Old Vic Theatre, seen here for the first time and soon to re-appear on Broadway. It is Hugh Leonard's twenty-first play and many of these, so universally acclaimed in the United States, should surely have been successful in England. *A Life* was one of the successes of last year's Dublin Festival. It follows the fortunes of Drumm, a minor character from a previous play, *Da*, into a dominating role. Drumm is a small civil servant, incompatibly married to bird-brained Dolly, and well aware of his own insignificance in the overall scheme of things. However, there is an even more adequate justification for his mood of disillusionment—his doctor has just diagnosed terminal cancer. Being of a file-keeping, account-entering mentality Drumm decides to make an inventory of his life in terms of profit and loss. It proves to be a daunting undertaking. Little of importance has occurred to punctuate the passing years but for a beginning he decides to revisit the home of the

woman, Mary Kearns, who, but for his own youthful ineptitdue, might have become his wife. Mary has grown blowsy and complacent in her undemanding domestic routine yet she is still shrewd and kindly. At first she is devastated at the news of Drumm's illness yet all too soon the old areas of conflict are revived. Accepting copious 'drams' to dull the realities of a six year old rift, Drumm can feel easy with her only in patches and with her husband, Lars, scarcely at all. The Kearns are by no means dissatisfied with the narrow range of their activities and soon become irked by the blanket implication of failure and bloody-mindedness. They are, on the whole, quite lively participants in local affairs. But when Dolly joins in the debate the extent of her own mental limitations become frighteningly plain. Emotionally, Drumm has atrophied in her company and the possibility of any change or improvement is far in the past.

Few people have sufficient courage to attempt such a fearless appraisal of the long sequence of trivia and non-events which comprise the average life; and looking back is in any case blurred by inaccuracies of recollection. In *A Life*, the past is conveyed through a series of flash-backs, during which the middle-aged quartette remains in shadow, while their youthful prototypes act out the elation and frustration of earlier days. What emerges is by no means reassuring. For the irrefutable contention seems to be that a wrong road one embarked upon cannot be retraced. Also, that the life-style of the individual is governed by his or her intellectual capacity. A depressing theme? Perhaps. Yet, in Hugh Leonard's handling it is shot through with subtle and at times boisterous humour in which every character reacts convincingly. These are the same people who have inhabited Hugh Leonard's own consciousness from his childhood years onwards, as may be seen from his recently published autobiography, *Home Before Night.*

A Life is essentially a universal play cutting across nationality and environment, destined, it is hoped, for a wider audience. A more general aspect of the Festival's message can be discovered at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, where some of the main films are shown and readings and seminars held. In the Concourse gallery leading to the theatre, an exhibition of photographs titled *No Country for Old Men* demonstrates a varied aspect of Irish life and history from tragic poverty to the grave beauty of old and new architecture.

The declared objective of this exhibition is to fill in the social background which has inspired the cultural events included in the Festival. In the last twenty years Eire has changed more fundamentally than any other E.E.C. country. One important point is that the Irish Republic has a predominantly young population. Thus, Rock music has a large part to play, particularly in the South, and modern light and heavy industries unobtrusively replace many traditional hand skills. Video, diagrams, strip cartoons and photographs combine to present a picture of the hub of life in Ireland which contains quite a few surprises.

Also at the Institute is the play, *The Risen People* by James Plunkett, presented by the Project Arts Centre and directed by Jim Sheridan. It is

history rather than propaganda, based on a largely forgotten episode in 1913 when ordinary, uninvolved men and women became trapped by the dispute between the Federated Union of Employers and the Labour Leader, Jim Larkin. The unwieldy size of the dilemma is capsulated on a street corner where a symbolic single solder and policemen serve for an entire force. Dilapidated prams are trundled off and on: at the pawnbroker small possessions are pledged and redeemed with monotonous regularity. Choral outbursts: rough-house scrapping and clamorous shouting from the back of the auditorium indicate the degree of neuroticism engendered by a claustrophobic way of life.

Sticking together is all important, and the comrade who takes a job as night watchman must be disciplined because otherwise, as someone says, 'we don't know who we're fighting.' Yet effective as some of these gimmicks may be, it is the quiet moments of *The Risen People* which are the most convincing; the melodious 'keening' of wives and mothers; the grey-haired woman who announces with little surprise that she is once again pregnant. These and others like them are the scenes which highlight the dilemma of a society innocent of contraceptives and devoid of the most basic refinements of day-to-day living, and where the best hope of feeding the children is to send them by steamer to the 'mainland'. By comparison, it does not greatly matter that the political and religious message of *The Risen People* often appears divided and confused.

It is perhaps unexpected that one of the Festival's most unabashed examples of political propaganda can be seen in *Otherwise Kill Me* directed by Andy Hinds at 'lunch-time' theatre at the Soho Poly. Here there is neither singing nor audience involvement, but a conventionally straightforward short drama resting on a single instrument of suspense—will the I.R.A. convict, serving out his sentence in an English prison, abandon his four weeks' old hunger strike in time for him to save his own life? His gesture is part of a campaign to obtain political prisoner status and transfer to a Belfast gaol. The small group of administrators who surround him are stereo-types, though convincing ones. Very soon, the futile gesture will be forgotten by all except the man's own friends. With its pace and coherence, *Otherwise Kill Me* remains in the mind not only as the Festival's most uncompromising contribution to the Irish-British controversy, but as a particularly sound and absorbing one act play.

For anyone who can negotiate the stairs to the third floor of Somerset House the exhibition *Irish Patchwork* will offer some reward with its varied exhibits, if only to explore a usually inaccessible corner of the famous mansion. Easier to negotiate is a remarkable small exhibition of photography on show at the Action Space Arts Centre. Here is a record of the ordinary people of Belfast queueing up for social security in half-bombed, rain-washed streets; throwing stones at the troops, and children sleeping three in a bed. Alongside, are pictures of very young soldiers, their expressions tense as they charge into a hostile situation or relax in comfortless recreation rooms as part of a seemingly endless routine in the Emergency, which has now lasted ten years.

DIRECTIONS OF DIVERSITY — WRITERS AT *A SENSE OF IRELAND*

by Nick Malone

THE literary programme of *A Sense of Ireland* must be one of the most unusual aspects of a festival ever staged. For five weeks nearly forty writers arrived at the National Poetry Centre or the Round House to read from their works or assist in dramatized versions accompanied by music.

What seems to be creating the most forceful literary renaissance in over fifty years in Ireland is disparity. A powerful, distinctly Irish tradition with cultural references to the present troubled situation is visibly emerging. The political conflict in the North and the social and cultural upheavals throughout the country have produced not movements and manifestos, but an enforced forging, from the conflicts and diffuseness, of new conditions for what is already an extraordinarily rich literary tradition.

An indication of this sudden upsurge is the remarkable growth of the Irish publishing industry, a selection of whose products was on display at the National Book League. Whilst some of the output requires greater refinement, a number of the books were really beautiful, most obviously *The Writers*, produced for the Festival by the O'Brien Press. Cramming 44 writers in 224 pages must involve a certain superficiality, but the photographs of each writer facing a short piece of unpublished work and the overall quality of production certainly helped to create the sense of colour and variety that has been a hallmark of the entire Festival. Requiring new work had one drawback to the representativeness of the volume, as a number of writers, notably Edna O'Brien and Derek Mahon, were apparently unable to contribute at this time. But this was a small price for a volume deliberately emphasising the highly contemporary nature of Irish literature, and certainly the difficulties of balance in so varied a cultural output, (particularly remembering the mixture included writers from both North and South), seemed to display very fair editing. The imaginative sensitivity with which Mike Bunn attempted to project his subjects in the photographs forced their memory back with surprise on actually seeing many of these writers in person. Sometimes this was through the unexpected—the isolation of certain characteristics in an image eclipsing others that become more apparent in movement. Generally, however, key elements in these writers were remarkably well caught—occasionally with the use of 'props': Kinsella by an ornate mask larger than himself, a Paul Durcan swallowed in shadow, most of the dramatists by sets or seating—but more normally common elements of the writer and work were caught by facial studies: the brooding introspection, for instance, of a mirrored Tom Paulin.

It would be unfair to leave Irish publishing without mentioning its courage and adventurousness. Some important results have arisen from

the efforts of frustrated writers—Neil Jordan's first story collection appeared through the Irish Writers' Co-operative. But it is in poetry that the most exciting developments seem to have taken place, most noticeably the Blackstaff Press with five recent Poetry Society recommendations, and Peter Fallon's Gallery Press which in ten years has become the finest poetry house in Ireland.

Occasionally one hears poetry read so well that one's entire perception of the craft is extended. When Paul Durcan, folded over his poems, almost sang 'The Drimoleague Blues' I realised that my own way of reading poetry had previously prevented the lines from properly working:

> Oh I know this mean town is not always mean
> And I know that you do not always mean what you mean
> And the meaning of meaning can both mean and not mean:
> But I mean to say; I mean to say;
> I've got the Drimoleague Blues, I've got the Drimoleague Blues,
> I've got the Drimoleague Blues so bad I can't move:
> Even if you were to plug in Drimoleague to every oil-well in Arabia—
> I'd still have the Drimoleague Blues.

A high musical quality seems characteristic of a lot of Irish poetry. This may be due to the co-existence of two traditions, a dual-language culture that heightens the awareness of word-sound in both. In spite of only 30% of the population being able to speak Irish (and considerably fewer using the language daily), Gaelic poetry seems to be undergoing a rapid expansion, owing to an increased opportunity for its expression. The periodical *Innti* has provided much impetus for this, a magazine founded ten years ago by Michael Davitt at University College, Cork, a centre of Irish cultural revival in the late '60s. Given initial support by Sean O'Riordain, the magazine represented a commitment to Gaelic that could span generations, enabling an entirely new force of young, non-retrospective writers to emerge. But a more important aspect of the Gaelic upsurge, and this seems particularly apparent in the pages of *Innti* itself if contrasted with a great deal of earlier Irish language poetry—is a deep concern to redefine a poetic tradition with references appropriate to a rapidly transforming society. The problem of expressing, without exploiting, a national culture has much precedence, noticeably demonstrated in the development of Brendan Behan and Flan O'Brien. One reaction of many recent Irish poets has been to write exclusively in Irish, in spite of a comparative dearth of literary criticism and an inevitably reduced readership. It's difficult for a non-Irish speaker to assess this work when in the words of the Festival's translation supplement: 'Irish can present some particular problems, especially for English translation, where the poetic quality of ordinary speech can be hopelessly exaggerated.' Nevertheless, hearing an evening of the Gaelic poems of Pearse Hutchinson, Tomas MacSiomoin, Michael O'Siadhaill and Michael Hartnett one certainly sensed what were obviously powerful onomatopoeic qualities in the language. The only poetry that seemed to translate particularly well, however, was the strongly visual work of Michael Hartnett. Since *A Farewell to English* (Gallery Books 1975), Hartnett has written almost exclusively in Gaelic, often dealing with common griefs—exile, loneliness, social isolation—through power-

ful, tortured images. In *The Retreat of Ita Cagney,* a nine-poem sequence on a bereaved common-law wife, the images burn through translation:

> I will put purple crepe and crimson crepe
> and white crepe on the shelf
> and watch candles cry
> *o salutaris hostia,*
> I will light the oil lamp till it burns
> like a scarlet apple
> and watch the candle grease
> upon the ledges interweave
> to ropes of ivory,
> I have not insulted God,
> I have insulted
> crombie coats and lace mantillas
> Sunday best and church collections
> and they declare my life a sinful act:

One of the recurrent motifs of Irish writing has been the 'land', its mythological power and historical associations as much as its physical beauty, frequently identified, both culturally and politically, with the struggle for independence. The complexities of this are particularly apparent in John Montague's *The Rough Field,* rendered with actors and music at the Round House. But what Irish writing has been forced to do by recent history is to create a language equal to a new kind of urban violence and its attendant death and squalor, or at least able to deal with the concomitant reappraisal that Ireland's recent social upheavals must involve.

The paths of those writers participating in the Festival have been diverse, ranging from the hilarious black humour of John Morrow's stories to the influence of recent American writing in the poetry of Peter Fallon. However two reactions seemed particularly apparent. One was a search for mythological, almost atavistic symbols of violence and grief, most noticeable in the *The North* poems of Seamus Heaney and *The Dead Kingdom* of John Montague:

> And can still believe in
> some mythic bristled beast
> flared nostrils, red in anger,
> who first threw up, where North
> crosses South, our bloody border.

The other, noticeable especially in Northern poets like Frank Ormsby and Tom Paulin, who have, one suspects, less access to the two cultures, is an uncompromising urban idiom of hard, cauterised language.

It was more than anything this diversity of writing that gave the Festival its vitality; not a homogeneous national culture but a redefinition of imaginative coherence in a number of ways.

[Nick Malone was a prizewinner in the 1979 National Poetry Competition. His first book, *The Burial of Crispin Pyke,* was published by the Workshop Press.]

POEM

THE COTTAGE AT *SAINT BENOÎT LA FORÊT*

Locals call it *sa petite maison*
where he drifts out of time and space;
nearby, the forest wheels solitude
and the weeds stay sun-scorched and weathered;
perhaps, he'll prune the rose-trees
when the vine-yards get juicy and green
and grapes look ready for picking ——
farm-steads and carpets of silence
surround him, *chien méchant*
and the familiar family toil,
swaying corn, binder and hay
and for the harvest
a string of fine days.
The wines are for home use only
but the cost of the corks—*mon dieu*
and the clinic—*c'est la blague, cher ami,*
the church 's too big for the place;
yet the dominant sky conquers all —
then an island echo of voices
explodes
'gainst phantoms of crickets
and horse-flies nervously buzzing;
There's the walk to stately Vienne
and to Chinon
where history once raged.

ALFRED LANDOR

Correspondence

THOUGHTS ABOUT FELIKS TOPOLSKI

Madam:

In an article by Cyril Fradan in the September issue of *Contemporary Review,** it has been said of Topolski's work that it reminds us of Daumier, Callot, Magnasco, Thackeray and others. . . What could be more splendid than this power of bringing to mind masters so great—and so unlike? Mr. Fradan also notes an essential community of mind among the masters and proceeds to an enquiry into their likenesses and contrasts. They represent so many different ways of looking at Man and interpreting him in irreconcilable ways. Why the compulsion to group these 'creators' together, the reader might ask?

Mr. Fradan's instinct for doing so has led him to see art as a kind of theatrical performance where each artist is given a role. Clearly, there can be no question of applying the contrast to the artistic methods. How much did the artists' resources and materials have in common? Very little, I should say. However, I should think that one ought to have very strong shoulders to bear the authority and responsibility of a monumental work such as Topolski's *Memoir of the Century.* I am surprised at Mr. Fradan's conclusion on the *Memoir:* 'It is the frieze of his (Topolski's) life pattern, some seventy years, to be read as quickly or as slowly as one walks by the chronology of the painting'.

Why *invent* a public for the work? Mr. Fradan is obviously not interested in what is implied and demands a 'meaning' in the *Memoir.* He has taken a lesser production (to my mind) such as Augustus John's portrait and seen in it nothing but 'a scribble of lines, interwoven and lively but not recognisable as an eye such as Ingres would have drawn.' To which one of Augustus John's portraits is Mr. Fradan referring? I believe it must be the old and dusty one which can be found lying hidden in a corner of Topolski's gallery. Anyway, he still proves my point because the portrait reveals John's audacity, vitality and zest for life.

In the *Memoir,* one could find several other works which create even better such a feeling of amazement. There is a panel of paintings under the heading 'The Present', and there figures a pompous-looking man in his sumptuous garb. Who is this self-satisfied man? One might say that his anatomy lies beneath the skin. On the contrary, it hangs on his structure like his clothes because, in the marionette, there is no room for the man.

Of course, Topolski draws at a fantastic speed. What Mr. Fradan seems to ignore is that some of the painter's drawings are mechanically done. Had he taken a closer look at the *Memoir,* he would have seen that the drawings undergo much revision when their essence is finally extracted and instilled into the paintings. He has hastily formed his judgement on the artist's work on the sole basis of some drawings. He is also prepared to see in the artist's output a renunciation of anatomy and perspective for the sake of visual appeal: '. . . even Westminster Abbey disappears as an identifiable background for the coronation scenes and such hints are almost non-existent in the continuing saga of his *Memoir.*' Surely, the focus must be on the crowd, the procession? In it, one can still recognise a great intelligence at work.

Mr. Fradan describes Topolski as 'the nervous dragon-fly eye flashing over the surface of the pond, flitting from attractive sparkle to alluring shade, hardly concerned with the trout below the ripples.' I have never had the

impression that Topolski's art strives for style in accuracy or the 'trout', as it is referred to by Mr. Fradan. For all his devotion to the *comédie humaine*, the painter has discovered that something could be made of people in a crowd.

Coming to the Belsen drawings, Mr. Fradan states rather naively that 'there is so little implicit feeling of horror' in them. We will not go into the circumstances of that fateful period of history. However, I still think that the drawings referred to capture the wretchedness and the helplessness of the concentration camps. And had Mr. Fradan the inclination and the patience to look at the panel facing the entrance to the *Memoir*, he would have seen a distillation of horror. Clearly, he misconceives the nature and gravity of the situation. He would have the artist represent the full-scale horror as though it would serve as a sort of vaccine against further danger and destruction in this world. The artist can influence the psychology of the individual but not in the way Mr. Fradan understands it.

Feliks Topolski has many talents. His humanity has matured in the pursuit of basic convictions about life. He is often called a satirist, a moralist, an anthropologist or an expressive draughtsman. However, it is when you come out of his gallery that the most important feature of the work strikes you. I am thinking of the unity which binds the pictures together. It conveys the charge of life as only real living can convey.

Yours faithfully,

REZKI ISSELNANE

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*Volume 235. No. 1364.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

Emma. Charlotte Brontë and Another Lady. Dent. £5.95. *Moviola.* Garson Kanin. Macmillan. £6.95. *A Married Man.* Piers Paul Read. Alison Press/ Secker & Warburg. £5.95. *A Durable Love.* Christopher Aston. Macmillan. £6.95. *Appeal to the Gods.* Bruce Allsopp. Routledge and Kegan Paul. £4.95. *The Glow.* Brooks Stanwood. Macdonald & Jane's. £5.95.

Several important writers have left unpublished 'fragments' among their posthumous papers and speculation as to how these might have developed provides an intriguing game. In a few cases, notably Jane Austen's *Sanditon,* publishers have commissioned an experienced novelist to complete the unfinished narrative. Now, we have *Emma,* Charlotte Brontë's two opening chapters for a novel set in a young ladies' seminary, grafted onto a voluminous and often sensational gothic romance by 'Another Lady'. Once again, the question arises, what is the exact purpose of the exercise and is it in any case worthwhile?

The circumstances surrounding Charlotte Brontë's part of the collaboration were rather strange. Following a distressingly uneven relationship with her publishers, and her marriage to Arthur Bell Nicholls, she began work on a new book. When she read the opening paragraphs to her husband he is reported to have complained that her critics would accuse her of repeating herself. Understandably, she wished to share her creative activity with a partner who was, nonetheless, unfitted to act as commentator. For, in fact, the brief opening—in which no reference occurs to the 'Emma' of the title—is capable and decisive so far as it goes. The characters—the amiable narrator, the pupils, the women who run the school and enigmatic Mr. Ellin who is the friend of one of them—stand out like figures on a landscape. There are also elements of a mystery—the true identity of the scholar, Matilda Fitzgibbon, introduced as an heiress but soon to be unmasked as a pauper.

At first Charlotte Brontë and the 'Lady' seem to move forward in harmony. But long before the revelation of Matilda's real name and circumstances, the narrative has become bogged down with false clues and sub-plots, to say nothing of the narrator's own extraneous romance. Lengthy passages of remembered conversations account for events which she could not herself have witnessed; and the re-running of so many scenes through this time-honoured technical device anticipates the denouement long before 'Another Lady's' grand finale. Night desecration of the family mausoleum, kidnappings and fortunes gone astray may add up to 'action', though surely not of the kind envisaged by Charlotte Brontë? And would she have concentrated so assiduously on a Cornish element in her story?

Improvisation of a different kind provides the basis of *Moviola,* a mammoth new novel about the cinema industry by the successful author and film director, Garson Kanin. The framework of the plot is simple. A blameless and idealistic young man, Guy Bareere, is in the clutches of a domineering tycoon known in the trade as 'Hareem Adani'. Guy's assignment is to visit the movie kingdom of the legendary Ben Farber and to negotiate purchase of the Farber film 'empire'. 'B.J.F.' is over ninety, yet still tenacious of life and so dedicated

to the business that his favourite after-dinner entertainment is to run old films. If Guy and Adani thought the deal would be a pushover, they were mistaken. Ben Farber plays along with their overtures, cunningly forcing up his price, while appearing to be amenable. Guy lives with the Farbers; is attracted to Ben's seventy year old wife and generally finds himself absorbed by the other personalities within the household. While being pestered and bullied by Adani on long distance telephone and conducting negotiations over endless cups of coffee a new and to him not unwelcome element creeps in. This is Ben Farber's account of the events which led him, from inauspicious beginnings as a Jewish immigrant, to become owner of a world famous studio. It is to Guy's credit that he sits out these marathon reminiscences with apparent enthusiasm. The regurgitation of squabbles and scandal among the stars appears to fascinate him: Fatty Arbuckle as the victim of character assassination; how Vivien Leigh came to play Scarlet O'Hara: Greta Garbo and her still born romance and so on. . . . Interwoven with show-biz gossip are the Farber family's domestic problems, less glamorous, yet more true to life. Sometimes Guy is the narrator, revealing his own moods and reactions; at others he is switched to being an observed character. Inevitably, this two-pronged approach results in a loss of pace. Even more irritating is a nagging uncertainty as to the degree of truth in some of the more unsavoury revelations. Very little, probably, with the exception of Marilyn Monroe's poignant 'success' story which spotlights the cruelly ephemeral way of life for those who helped to swell the bank balances of Hollywood tycoons.

Paul Piers Read sticks closer to reality—although not with noticeably better results. His new novel, *A Married Man,* is about politics with personal relationships relegated to second place. The chief character, John Strickland, is a reasonably successful barrister, product of a conventional education and married to Clara, an attractive, forceful woman who eats away at his independence. He could have continued in his rut;—weekends at the cottage, dinner parties and the company of his children—if he had not happened to read one of Tolstoy's short stories, which reminds him that the expected promise of his life has gone sour. As a result, he declares his intention of standing as Labour candidate in a by-election. Although outwardly giving him support, Clare has little sympathy with—as she sees it—a disruptive and time-wasting influence in their lives. The boredom and petty frustrations of marriage build up alarmingly. John Strickland feels the need for new companionships and stimulus, which he attempts to find first with a young friend of the family and later with Paula—the 'do-gooding' offshoot of a wealthy family. Paula is so frigid and repellent in her responses that sometimes, understandably, he wishes to end the liaison, but continues for want of an alternative. Abruptly, the tempo of this low-key study of idealism and disillusionment crescendos into tragedy. Clare and the husband of one of their closest friends are found murdered in the bedroom of the Stricklands' weekend cottage. Amid the turmoil of the funeral and inquest, Paula moves in to stake a permanent claim and organises a lavish 'society' wedding. And then this strangely unpredictable novel takes another U-turn. Paula is not 'faithful'. She has had an affair with a young criminal once defended by John on a robbery charge and paid him huge sums of money to undertake the double-killing. Whereupon, John sends her packing at the eleventh hour and decides to devote himself to his disarmingly attractive children and shun the limelight as much as possible, which includes, it is assumed, being a parliamentary candidate.

Appeal to the Gods is one of those aggravating novels which hover between

fantasy and reality. The central situation is a contemporary one—the fate of Stingles, an architecturally important mansion owned and administered by Crumm and Dot Coutts. Their harmlessly eccentric way of life is threatened by the National Coal Board's intention to begin open cast mining in the grounds. Shades of *The Skin Game,* but conditions are different now. A public enquiry precedes any attempt at drilling and this is the cue for village worthies to adopt time-hallowed stances of sturdy independence. Then there is a Japanese tycoon who also has designs on Stingles and so all is set for a rollicking confrontation between officialdom, big business and those who ask only to be left alone. An added complication is the purchase by Crumm of a set of Greek statues which are to be positioned in the grounds of Stingles, and it is here that the element of other-worldliness creeps in. For it seems likely that these inanimate objects wield the supernatural power of Gods. There could also be a Norse mythological influence at work in the person of Frikki, the Norwegian *au pair* girl, when she takes to rolling naked in the snow as a means of enslaving various admiring males. Certainly, she is not seen to be doing much in the way of household chores!

However, the plot has its serious side. Without official sanction a couple of Coal Board engineers make an exploratory drilling, releasing layers of sewage gas not far below the ground's surface. The result is a fairly damaging explosion. Predictably, the Coal Board officials are soon in full retreat: the Japanese offer is withdrawn and Frikki returns to Norway. Mysteriously, the statues disappear, and presumably life at Stingles will continue much as before. If the reader is left confused as to the author's intentions, this is the inevitable result of mixing mythology with the mundane realities of environmental speculation.

Much more rewarding is *A Durable Love,* in which Christopher Aston explores an interesting and unusual theme—a Lesbian relationship set in the first few years of the present century. Alice, or Alicia, addressed rather cloyingly by her friend as 'Lovey', is a successful teacher who has fallen deeply in love with a former pupil, Imogen (Gretchen). Her passionate devotion is fully reciprocated and despite conflicting family loyalties it seems clear that, for neither of them, any other attachment could obtrude. They share a bed and a host of interests, which include active participation in the Women's suffrage movement.

However, Alice is eventually courted by a worthy young man named Robert, rather patronisingly referred to as 'Rob' or 'dear boy'. He displays surprising tenacity in the face of Alice's rejection of his offer of marriage and in the end a compromise is reached, although a dubious one. Alicia agrees to a secret engagement on condition that her association with Imogen shall not be put at risk. To ensure this she founds the 'Trio' to which all three swear eternal allegiance. Only after many misunderstandings and playing Robert along in a thoroughly unprincipled manner, does Alicia agree to the marriage ceremony actually taking place and the 'trio' arrange to live together in a small new house in what is presumably the embryo of Hampstead Garden Suburb. Throughout, accounts of deviationist love-making remain allusive until the moment when Alicia and Robert are about to consummate their marriage. Then, in a dramatic scene, the two women stand naked together before Alicia reluctantly joins Robert in an adjoining room. The future for the 'trio' is left shrouded, which is a pity, for it would have been interesting to follow its fortunes into the decades of change and upheaval which lay immediately ahead.

And finally, a first novel from America by Brooks Stanwood. Although in general terms *The Glow* is a 'thriller', this study of a group of middle-aged health addicts provides suspense and characterisation far beyond the range of the average 'whodunit'. All seems normal enough when Peter and Jackie are inveigled into renting a luxurious apartment for a pepper-corn rent. The health fiends soon have the new arrivals 'jogging' and swimming and consuming vitamin reinforced food. But then small strangenesses begin to build up. First comes the discovery that members of the group are not middle-aged but octogenarian. Other odd things occur: unexplained disappearances and mysterious cellar doors leading to no one knows where. Jackie becomes suspicious —then scared. Had Peter heeded her warning the outcome might have been very different. Too late, the hideous truth emerges. These people have achieved longevity through the same bestial method practiced by a surviving though almost extinct savage tribe. Precisely what this was is finally revealed in a lengthy preamble by the arch villain. Even so, when it comes, the end is a blood curdling shock.

Also Received:

The Christmas Stories. Anthony Trollope. Edited by Betty Jane Breyer. Texas Christian University Press.

There is considerable value for the student of Anthony Trollope in this selection of his Christmas stories, providing as it does a clear indication of Trollope's approach to the Festive season. The sources from which these stories have been gathered also serve as a reminder of long defunct magazines and 'Supplements' willing to allocate generous space to a prolific and discursive author. Betty Jane Breyer's brief Introduction supplies the necessary information about Trollope, his career and the scope of his literary output.

Adam. David Bolt. Sidgwick and Jackson. £4.95.

This re-creation of the Adam and Eve story will please only those readers who are prepared to accept unadulterated fantasy. In *Adam,* David Bolt concentrates exclusively on what must generally be accepted as a poetic allegory. He does not seem to seek a practical explanation of what took place in the Garden of Eden, nor is it within the terms of his reference to do so. Instead, he takes the familiar story and re-creates it with a freshness and delicacy which is consistently pleasing. The present publication is a re-issue of the novel which first appeared in 1960.

Appalachee Red. Raymond Andrews. Melbourne House. £5.50.

Entertainingly illustrated with drawings by Benny Andrews, *Appalachee Red* is a remarkable example of bold, rapid narrative and determination to gain the maximum effect. The result is something of a punch-up between author and reader, but what emerges is very much to Raymond Andrews' credit. A first novel, *Appalachee Red* has been awarded the newly inaugurated James Baldwin prize.

Dominion. Pamela Ferguson. Cassell. £5.95.

As a fast moving and comprehensive survey of the ramifications of a family tobacco company, *Dominion* has much to recommend it—as much for the interesting narrative as for background information on a growing industry, following the death of Queen Victoria, after which smoking became respectable.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN MEDIA

The Powers That Be. David Halberstam. Chatto & Windus. £9.95.

This long book (736 pages of text) is presented as a dramatic report, from behind the scenes, which 'reveals' the influence of the American media on the making of American history. It is a fair enough description if one 'boggles' a little over the word 'reveals'. There are many revelations—trustworthy or tendentious—about individual personalities. Some of the sketches are worthy of a high-class novelist. But it would be difficult to find here any novel assessment of the actual influence of the media taken as a whole. We all prefer to be the hedgehog who knows one big thing to the fox who knows many little things. Mr. Halberstam is in no way a hedgehog.

The inside story of the Los Angeles Times is for me the most fascinating section if only because that ground is least known to me. But all that Mr. Halberstam has to say about CBS, Time Incorporated, The New York Times and above all The Washington Post is almost equally absorbing. The portraits for example of Philip Graham and Catharine Graham of the last-named paper make an unforgettable story on their own. Having myself written about John Kennedy, and writing currently about Richard Nixon, I inevitably tend to gauge the fairness or otherwise of the general treatment by that accorded to those two Presidents.

By this test Halberstam does not come out too well. He has never a good word to say for Nixon though he records the warm feelings towards him of leading figures in the world of the Los Angeles Times in early days. (They became more and more equivocal later.) But he positively gloats over John Kennedy's fantastic skill in exploiting television and the media generally for his purposes. 'Jack Kennedy was the first television President. He meshed politics and television with such charm and dispatch that the intellectual elite of the country enthusiastically applauded him. . . . Television loved him. He and the camera were born for each other. He was its first great political super star; as he made television bigger it made him bigger, etc. etc.' Kennedy's manipulation of the media is treated by Halberstam as altogether delightful. Nixon's attempts to follow suit (with no little success for quite a time) is treated as positively sinister. In his relations with the media generally he is portrayed as the unprovoked aggressor. It could be argued at least as plausibly that it was he who was the victim. He has often been referred to as 'paranoid' but in his dealings with the media he had plenty to be paranoid about. There is no sign that Halberstam realises his own bias.

Halberstam's previous best seller *The Brightest and the Best* was a tremendous tour de force in its passionate, heavily documented denunciation of the whole Viet-Nam adventure. The present work is 'unputdownable' for anyone interested in the topic under discussion who has plenty of time available. But it lacks a central theme. The simple message would appear to be that the coming of television has placed an overwhelming new power in the hands of the President. But of the three Presidents dealt with in detail here Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon the last two were ultimately destroyed by the media with television playing a major role. So the conclusion must be that television equips the President with a terrific new instrument which is just as likely to bring him disaster as triumph. Halberstam explains convincingly how Kennedy turned the lamentable episode of the Bay of Pigs to his own advantage. 'The

Bay of Pigs was a total disaster and completely Kennedy's fault but it was not a televised disaster. There were no cameras on the scene'. True no doubt but how would even Kennedy have coped with the televised aspects of Viet-Nam and Kennedy must be regarded as far better adapted to television than nine Presidents out of ten.

An immense abount of work—seven years of study indeed—has gone into this book and Halberstam had a first-hand experience of the media previously. His labours have certainly not been wasted though his findings are not likely to be accepted as the last word in any quarter. Where I happen to be able to check his personal assessments I find them too much affected by subjective attitudes. But I am reluctant on this account to discount the accuracy of his many 'revealing' anecdotes. They illustrate brilliantly his own view of the characters in question and in that sense deserve to be true.

FRANK LONGFORD

THE USE OF ENGLISH

The State of the Language. Leonard Michaels and Christopher Ricks. University of California Press. $14.95.

Language in Modern Literature. Jacob Korg. Harvester Press. £12.50.

The first of these is an imaginatively conceived and—for the most part—fascinating collection of short essays and poems by 63 diverse hands—novelists and critics, linguists and philosophers, politicians and lawyers drawn from both sides of the Atlantic. It is in large measure the brain child of Mary-ellen Himell of the San Francisco branch of the English Speaking Union, and no less than 14 of the contributors teach at the University of California, including the joint-editor Leonard Michaels. And one of the best pieces is on California Language though by David Lodge of Birmingham, England.

Indeed the West coast emphasis obtrudes: Yiddish English, Russian English and Machinespeak are here, Chinese, Gujarati and (more than once) Black English. 'The Irish predicament' is here too (is 'predicament' the *mot juste*? why not 'exploitation'?) but it too is an essay by a professor at California. This is not to cavil, except with the title: it ought to read *The State of the Language, in London and Berkeley.* Otherwise, we need contributions by representatives of those nations whose 35 million exiles stopped before they reached the Golden Gate and made the language of Pabst and Budweiser, of Granite City, Illinois and Bismarck, North Dakota also—in its strange ways—English.

There is much here to praise. The book does not replace Fowler, as a guide to usage, unless you plan to live in Marin County. It does not replace Eric Partridge although Sean McConville's *Prison Language* would form a useful appendix to Partridge. There is one consistently good section of essays on the language of the media, including pieces by Frederick Raphael on the language of television and Marina Vaizey on art language, and a splendid series of reprints of his radio talks by Dennis Donoghue, with useful practical hints on the methods of radio communication. There is a model essay by Enoch Powell on the Parliamentary style of yesterday and today, involving the analysis of speeches by Gladstone, Campbell Bannerman, Aneurin Bevan and Edward Heath—all of whom emerge scathed and scarred. By contrast Ian Robinson on 'Parliamentary Expressions' is disappointing. There are, in other words, nuggets here, in what makes a good bedside book of *divertissements.*

What is missing, unfortunately, is depth. The assumption is that England and California speak the same language, but there is enough here to raise queries. There is nothing here on that dimension Alistair Cooke has made his own, of nation speaking to nation. There is nothing here on Horwill's world

of Anglo-American usage. Randolph Quirk's essay on Gangbangsprache is arresting and amusing but what of Scots and Welsh, Geordies and Cornish? After 25 years of sustained radio and television English, what of regional speech in the Mother Country, and the social implications for the culture of the 'end' of Oxford English? Quentin Skinner's essay here is in fact a commentary on Raymond Williams *Keywords* but neither Williams nor Hoggart is here. The book represents an interesting notion and is in parts stimulating and in parts irritating. But for one essay alone the book is worth the money: Margaret Doody's splendid and appropriate scorn for the new Anglican liturgy. Will Dr. Runcie please note?

Jacob Korg's *Language in Modern Literature* is the first in a series of studies designed to clarify literary developments over the last 75 years. His theme is the scale of literary experimentation in the years between 1910 and 1930, when many writers broke away from the conventional language of the past to explore new worlds of experience and to devise new experimental ways of communicating. Professor Korg looks at the work of T. S. Eliot, Gertrude Stein, Ezra Pound, T. E. Hulme, e. e. cummings and William Carlos Williams. He is not afraid to tackle the impact on language of developments in art and music, and to assess the place of Futurist and Dada imagery. There are many illuminating references here, as in *Alice in Wonderland's* dependence on a game of cards and *Through the Looking-Glass's* parallels with a game of chess. The book is especially good on Joyce and the language of *Finnegan's Wake*. This is a valuable handbook and it confirms the thesis that there is but one language, and that since World War I it has been remarkably inventive and adaptable.

ESMOND WRIGHT

THE SPACE BETWEEN THE WORDS

Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structural Criticism. Edited by Josué V. Harari. Methuen. £4.95, hardback £11.95.

All fifteen contributors to *Textual Strategies* are eminent scholars in the Anglo-American and French schools of literary criticism in its modern, interdisciplinary mode. Mr. Harari, in his admirable introduction, 'Critical Factions/Critical Fictions', provides indispensable clues to the mainstream forms of knowledge brought to bear on structuralist and post-structuralist literary and linguistic analysis. He maps the area covered by its most influential practitioners, showing the ground held, in the argument from cultural relevancy, by a long line of thinkers from Michel Foucault, Sartre's successor at the Collège de France, to Michel Serres, primarily a philosopher of science at the Sorbonne and The John Hopkins Universities. They have challenged traditional strategies employed in critical discourse in its relationship to power and knowledge and to politics and science. Each essay in the book is an example of a particular writer's method of working at a specific problem in textual criticism. Some, like those of Jacques Derrida and Edward Said, review a broad sweep of results arrived at after many similar enterprises. Thus, there are papers indicating the theoretical grounds of post-structural theses, by Roland Barthes, Paul de Man and, to some extent, Joseph Riddel. Then there are projects undertaken as work in progress by René Girard, Eugenio Donato, Louis Marin, Gilles Deleuze, Neil Hertz, Gérard Genette, Eugène Vance and Michel Riffaterre. Finally, the 'Directions for Further Research' and a description of the contributors' own published works leave no doubt that some of the most lively, original minds in Europe and America are addressing themselves to the 'problematic' of textual study. Several papers appear here for the first time;

others are translated from the French. A comprehensive bibliography shows the prevalence of French thought in the post-structuralist literary field; but it gives evidence, too, that American scholarship has flourished as equal partner in later stages of the discourse. Mr. Harari disclaims any intention of devising a comprehensive or even unified anthology of post-structuralist writing. But he has made an exceedingly workmanlike collection of individual statements.

A more general acceptance of the theoretical position amongst scholars and, indeed, amongst readers generally, could be inhibited by the prevalence of alien terminology. Little of the jargon intrudes here, however, and the freshness and vigour of many of the essays is perhaps their greatest charm. Edward Said writes singularly lucid, straightforward prose and he is not alone. Many literary critics mistrust, not without sound reasons, the insertion of scientific terminology into critical discourse. Some of the objections could be the result of long-held reluctance to abandon the notion of a work of art as a finite object. As if in response to a moral and aesthetic imperative, the cultural and personal determinants of an author's vision have often been deliberately disregarded, even by those critics who have assimilated into their own practice the tenets of New Criticism, best known in the work of the Americans, Yvor Winters and Northrop Frye. From Wilde and Pater to Richards and Leavis, a close, exclusive concentration on text for text's sake has been the rule. It is exactly this view which writers in *Textual Strategies* attack. The forms of evaluation here proposed uncover, even in Wilde and Pater themselves and certainly, nearer our own time, in Empson and T. S. Eliot, strata of significance which belie the usual interpretations of their writing. Paul de Man, in his paper called 'Semiology and Rhetoric', gives an instructive account of his close reading of Marcel Proust. Undeniably, he says, close reading is imperative: but the external, referential and public effects of literary language must be reconciled with the author's (and the reader's) internal, formal and private structures. He gives an illuminating account of the inadequate terms of reference deployed in New Criticism, the poverty of its cultural reach. The isolation to which texts are liable can draw their teeth and destroy the author's message.

There is no precisely similar set of strategies to be found in this anthology. Any working formula would negate the creative literary enterprise. But a convergence occurs between many of the individual statements because they are informed by the same underlying linguistic and philosophical structures: those of phenomenology and structuralism. Phenomenology, the method of enquiry devised by the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl, takes philosophy to begin from an exact attention to one's mental processes, particularly intellectual operations, specifically excluding all beliefs about their cause, consequences and wider significance. The resulting description, Husserl believed, provides a composite picture of the objective, logical elements in thought that are common to different minds, such as negation and contradiction: a revelation of the mind's conceptual endowment. Phenomenology does not, therefore, employ empirical techniques but relies on pure reasoning, unassisted by experience. Objections to this theory include doubts about the existence of innate conceptual endowment and about the feasibility of proving it. But structuralists in linguistics and the social sciences depend on a phenomenological base for their analysis of language and other modes of human behaviour. They are concerned with such basic structures of thought as can be held to underly and generate all forms of social action, especially communication. To Claude Levi-Strauss, the outstanding theorist in the social sciences, a social structure is not a web of relationships abstracted from concrete instances but a model, refer-

able to fundamental tendencies. The notion of kinship and the taboos, such as incest, deriving from it are to him among the most powerful of motivations.

What, then, has the phenomenological backing of structuralism to do with literary criticism? One evident link is that the strongest themes in literature have always been those dealing with the deepest human predicaments. The post-structuralists whose work is collected here have advanced deeply into structuralist territory, bringing to light cultural and linguistic features of behaviour that impinge on the Husserl and Levi-Strauss models and are touched closely by insights from other disciplines, especially history. They show, in their several ways, that it is precisely through language by sign, utterance and text that cultural influences are transmitted. Their concern is how beliefs are disseminated and absorbed: on what assumptions the accepted criteria for thought, especially scholarly thought, are built up. A crucial objection to their position is, again, that of the feasibility of trying to escape being themselves subject to the thought-generative processes, since, in their own terms, these are unavoidable. Necessarily, then, language and literature have everything to do with underlying structures. As a discipline, literature urgently requires and is complementary to the expertise of contributors from other areas of study and not only those of cognate forms. If the whole web of culture is at issue, there is no possible case for the exclusion of any form of human endeavour. Outdated struggles for intellectual supremacy between them have no conceivable function. But the singular attribute of the literary critic is that he 'decodes' or 'deconstructs' the surface meaning of words, furthering the dialectical relationship between text and culture. Thus, to Edward Said, criticism proper should 'help shape the process of human history'. He brings the text out of its traditional isolation, away from the strict exclusion of its social and historical implications and of the author's person and status, all of which divert attention from the text's real power. To say that a text is 'only a text', says Edward Said, 'is not only naive, it is worldly blind'. Paradoxically, contemporary criticism 'achieved its methodological independence by forfeiting an active situation in the world'.

There is a range of startling, if not highly controversial, themes in *Textual Strategies,* directly towards an indictment of habitual assumptions about the 'history of ideas'. Michel Serres and Louis Marin both discuss the modalities of social domination, Serres by a structuring of the 'algebra' of La Fontaine's fable, 'The Wolf and the Lamb', and Marin by a deconstruction of a parable of Pascal. Both call in question the very structure of language in its persuasive impact on historical ideas. In La Fontaine, 'the reason of the strongest is always the best'. Is this the moral La Fontaine intended to convey? Not so, says Serres, as careful decoding may show. In Pascal's 'castaway mistaken for the lost king', is a narrative conveying moral and political exhortation on many levels connected with the acquisition of power. To deconstruct the form of a text is not to destroy the work itself, for that would make a nonsense of the critical activity. It is rather to induce an awareness of unquestioning beliefs and hidden assumptions which the reader brings to his intake of sign and symbol. Once basic concepts and the signs expressing them are challenged, even 'exact' sciences may be seen to have proliferated conventions rather than truly irreducible conclusions. Critical strategies like these are perhaps the least likely to gain acceptance, containing as they do the seeds of far-reaching radical dissent. But no reader can fail to be impressed and delighted by Edward Said's account of his discovery, in eleventh century Arabic texts, of the varied levels of interpretation, some of them cabbalistic, undergone by the

Koran at the hands of linguists and moralists alike. As a contribution to worldly discourse, *Textual Strategies* contains true examples of the critical process in action.

BETTY ABEL

CHARLES CURRAN AND THE BBC

A Seamless Robe: Broadcasting Philosophy and Practice. Sir Charles Curran. Collins. £8.95.

The importance of this book has not been diminished by the death, early in January, of its author, Charles Curran. Nor, alas, has it been increased. It was never more than a record, set down by a man of conscience, intellect and integrity of the day-to-day operations of a great British institution, the British Broadcasting Corporation, during the twenty-one years when Charles Curran was, first an administrator within the Corporation and eventually, from 1969 to 1977, its Director-General.

For the whole of that lifetime his concern was to ensure that this huge communications machine worked with maximum efficiency without losing any of its freedoms to the political forces which sought to usurp them, and without abandoning its standards to the advertisers who hoped to use it to make their personal fortunes. His job, and he himself saw and recognised it, was not to inspire but to preserve. He was not, therefore, one of the great Director-Generals—not a Reith, nor a Haley nor a Hugh Greene, because he never seemed to understand, as they did, that the great function performed by the British Broadcasting Corporation, and never tackled by its apparent commercial equivalent, the Independent Broadcasting Authority, was the creation of programmes. He was not a programme but an organising man and he never worked in or understood television. Perhaps it is a loss, not only to broadcasting but to the millions throughout the world who are affected by the tone of what they hear on their radios and see on their television screens that, during these years when the power of broadcasting has grown so enormously that a main spokesman of its values, the Director-General of the BBC, should not have been a man who represented what the corporation stood for. This was its capacity, in my view unique, to combine within its programme staff the qualities of creative energy with a personal acceptance of the social responsibilities which any position within the television industry gave him so that, in the work of the corporation, the producer himself was the ultimate judge of the social behaviour which ruled his and the corporation's activities. In effect, the producer *was* this Corporation. Sir Charles Curran's admirable book may have recorded the remarkable achievement, but never seems to understand or celebrate it.

GRACE WYNDHAM GOLDIE

A SAINT IN ECUADOR

A Saint Among Savages. Rosemary Kingsland. Collins. £6.95.

There have been many books about primitive Amazon tribes, rarely one with as arresting a story as this. It is understandable that a U.S. woman missionary should wish to visit the Nicaraguan jungle country where her brother, with four expedition companions, had been killed by a savage tribe, the Aucas or Wagrani; but that she should be moved to befriend and live among them seems the extreme of Christian charity.

Rachel Saint went out to Tiwaeno with the widow of one of the slain four, who returned to America after two years. Alone, Rachel stayed on for most

of another eighteen because she had met a Wagrani woman, Dayuma, who had fled from the tribe as a young girl, shocked by the brutal inter-tribal and family feuds and killings. With Dayuma as guide she penetrated into the jungle fastness, fell for the people, resolved to live among them and serve them.

They were a jealously guarded tribe fiercely hostile to intruders. Yet, surprisingly, they accepted her, saying 'She is our sister, this is her home.' She said of the experience: 'Before I could come in Dayuma asked them, then came out to fetch me back with her. She guided me in, and I am here with her protection and friendship.' But she admitted: 'I get frightened like anyone else. I know, better than most, what a terrible weapon a barbed spear can be. It can be a slow and agonizing way to die. Sometimes I dream about such a death, and wake shaking in the night . . . But, you see, although I am afraid of dying, I don't fear death itself, and this is my great comfort.' She virtually adopted Dayuma's young son, who was given an American college education to temper his native instincts with civilised living.

Miss Kingsland, a skilled London journalist, first went to Ecuador on a quest for El Dorado sponsored by the *Sunday Telegraph*. She heard about Miss Saint from explorer-photographer John Wright—whose vivid colour photos illustrate this well-produced book—and returned there to probe her story and write it, she says, in an unbiased, straight-forward way. She gives a graphic account of Miss Saint's courageous life there, her abounding faith, Wagrani habits, witch-doctored customs, Andes background, and leaves her in Quito, the capital, earnestly translating the New Testament into native dialect.

TREVOR ALLEN

SHORTER REVIEWS

Tito's Yugoslavia. (Cambridge University Press. £12.00). This study by Sir Duncan Wilson is particularly valuable at a time when Yugoslavia faces the future without Tito. The author, who is Master of Corpus College, Cambridge, has had a long and distinguished career in the British Foreign Service, particularly in Communist countries, including appointments as Ambassador to Yugoslavia 1964-8 and to the USSR 1964-71. He writes with much distinction, objectivity and clarity on the political, economic and international history of the country since the days of the Partisans and the rise of Tito. After the break with Stalin in 1948, Tito developed the Yugoslav road to socialism, which rejected the centralised bureaucratic state role of the USSR. Sir Duncan outlines the development of socialist self-management, devolution of administration among the constituent republics and the stabilising and co-ordinating role of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The process has not been without crises resolved by Tito. His 'style of leadership has in fact been mainly from behind, with long delayed but firm interventions at crucial points'. It is 'far the most liberal of communist countries'. As to the future, there is a collective leadership drawn from the different republics. Sir Duncan concludes 'that the present internal system of Yugoslavia rests on a fairly solid and adaptable basis of institution and habit, whatever troubles may lie ahead in a combination of economic and "national" crises.' After Tito, relations with the Soviet Union are the most likely to be affected, but 'unless the present balance of East-West power is changed soon and

drastically in favour of the East, the internal structure and external position of Yugoslavia could remain for some years at least on a reasonably firm basis.'

The Illustrated Family Hymnbook (Macdonald & Jane's. £6.95). This is a delightful, though rather tantalising, volume of hymns, together with tunes and illustrations, collected by the editor, Tony Jasper. The selection consists of more than 70 popular hymns, stretching from the eighteenth century until the present time. By 'popular' hymns, the editor sees 'popularity as meaning, in the context of this collection, material which has been seen to be true and reflective of Christian expression and the way people feel'. The main Christian festivals and seasons of the year are represented by only a few hymns. This is probably right in an anthology of this size. Nonetheless there are many favourites, such as 'While Shepherds Watch their Flocks by Night' and 'Hark the Herald Angels Sing', which are sadly missed. On the other hand, there are many well known hymns included both from England and America. Further, Mr. Jasper has included a few rock and folk hymns from the sixties. One of his main problems has been the selection of tunes. His general approach has been to choose one which has the widest use among Christian denominations. No doubt many readers would include other hymns and other tunes. On the other hand this selection contains a great deal which should please most people. The volume is beautifully produced.

Diplomatic Handbook (Longman. £2.95, paperback). This useful volume by Mr. R. G. Feltham is intended to 'provide a concise but comprehensive source of information for those embarking on an international — and particularly a diplomatic — career.' It could attract a wider readership. It covers diplomatic procedure, privileges, practice, the organisation of the foreign service and summarises the principal international bodies and organisations. There is a brief section on the highly controversial subject of international law. The book includes an Appendix on entertaining. Some of it, for example on how to reply to a social invitation and the service of wines, is so elementary and established as not to need inclusion in this volume. Greater space could then have been devoted to much more pressing subjects. In this new third edition, the author has, inter alia, largely rewritten the section of four pages on the European Community. It is a useful summary, although on the subject of the European Parliament he should have made clear its power in fact to reject the Community's Budget, and not merely propose changes and 'amend it in certain details'. The main criticism of the volume is that it attempts too much in too little space. Even so, a bibliography should have been included.

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© 1980 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H G Leates Ltd , 45/47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex U.S. Mailing Agent Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd , 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £9 50, U.S.A. and Canada $30.00 Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada, extra costs given on request. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 **incorporating The Fortnightly**

May 1980 **Vol. 236** **No. 1372**

APARTHEID

by the Rt. Hon. Dr. David Owen, M.P.

THE special emphasis given over the last few years to Human Rights in International Affairs is not mere naïve moral posturing, as its worried critics on the extreme right and left depict. It is a much more powerful and even aggressive policy than it is commonly given credit for. It strikes at the very root of Communist or Fascist ideology. It is in some senses, as its critics often fear, an interference in internal affairs. But to be effective it must be seen to operate indiscriminately against totalitarianism of the Right as well as the Left and be totally uncompromising over racialism both within the country that espouses the doctrine of human rights as well as in that country's relations with other states.

There are inconsistencies in our approach, also gross violations which are ignored. Racialism exists in many parts of the world, including Britain. It is, however, over South Africa that the West faces a major challenge over the next decade to its credibility in espousing a policy of Human Rights. For apartheid represents the development of the most institutionalised, overt and publicised form of racialism in the world. Until apartheid is changed there is no chance whatever of countries who would in other respects be South Africa's natural allies, and who before 1948 were its allies, operating in concert with them in Africa or in the world. It is a paranoid distortion of the facts to depict South Africa as a lone bastion against Communism. By practising apartheid the South African Government is feeding Communism and offering it the most fertile breeding ground albeit forced entirely underground. I have never wavered from my firm belief that a democratic non-violent solution to the problems of Southern Africa is still possible. The negotiated ceasefire, the transitional period and the recent fair and free election in Zimbabwe are a vindication of 3½ years of almost constant negotiating by black and white politicians in many countries who refused to bow to a variety of racialist fixes which would never have ended the violence.

It will need radical reform, not gradualism, now to dismantle apartheid. The change must be rapid since it has been artificially held back for so many decades. Although as a physician I am an evolutionist, I hesitate to use that term lest it gives comfort to those who believe that peaceful change can be stretched over a timescale that is no longer realistic. History shows that evolutionary change has frequently been marked and even accelerated by violence. The challenge to South Africa is to exert the will, the courage

and the leadership to anticipate events, to act decisively and boldly now rather than be forced to react in the midst of savage violence. The reformists need not despair when they find themselves divided on the correct tactics to adopt; both inside and outside South Africa. To devise a strategy of reform which will bring about peaceful change in South Africa is going to be a massive task requiring political skill and human ingenuity. It involves knitting together both the politics of power and the politics of protest; studying and understanding why the most strident adherents of apartheid resist any change, whether the ending of academic segregation, the Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act or job reservation.

Mr. Harry Oppenheimer has stated his view that 'economic prosperity and growth, together with the maintenance of individual freedom, are linked in any country with the maintenance of private enterprise, with its techniques and administrative methods as the main—though not necessarily the sole—form of economic organisation'. He warned that the private enterprise system 'is based on white experience and ways of thought and not on the traditions and customs of Black Africa . . . .' The problem therefore as he identified it was 'to equip blacks to compete on equal terms in a system which does not derive from their own cultural background'. Many Black South Africans however see the private enterprise system itself as inextricably linked with apartheid and oppose them both. There has been a very considerable shift towards a Marxist analysis amongst the Black leaders inside South Africa. They need persuading that people with the same resolve to see the ending of apartheid can hold diametrically different views on the role of private enterprise. It can no longer be taken for granted that common ground can be found on the hitherto accepted view that no group in or outside South Africa should make the unchanged maintenance, or the total overthrow of the private enterprise system, a precondition for the ending of apartheid. It is not enough merely to mitigate or end social apartheid. Economic apartheid is even more divisive, buttressed by migrant labour and the Pass laws, nor can it be smoothed over by the creation of a small black middle class.

The South African Prime Minister has talked of a constellation of free and independent states in Southern Africa and there has been much talk from other Ministers in South Africa over the last year of the need for change and the dire consequences of inaction. This has met a predictable rearguard action from the diehard Nationalists. Many countries around South Africa are economically linked and to varying degrees dependent on its economy. There is considerable mutual interest and scope for co-operation. But none of its neighbours, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana or even further afield Malawi has shown any intention of formally joining a constellation of states. Instead, some have been prepared to make considerable economic sacrifices to remain free to criticise South Africa's internal policies. Zimbabwe will, like Mozambique, not be enticed into such a constellation. If Namibia does not achieve international recognition South Africa may suck it into some form of dependent constellation with the existing homelands. But even this is doubtful; the internal leaders in

Namibia want international recognition for their country and would realise that joining such a constellation would hinder that objective.

The economic links that history, geography, railways and circumstance in Southern Africa have bequeathed to Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho simply cannot be ignored in any discussions over Western economic sanctions. At the 1979 Inkatha Conference Gatsha Buthelezi said 'My exiled brothers, even the African National Congress Executives, disagree with me on this disinvestment issue. They seem to see it as a make or break issue. I do not see it as a make or break issue. To me it is an issue on which we can disagree without this disagreement amounting to us within South Africa being seen as opting out of the struggle.' There are other facts and conflicting arguments which have to be faced up to in any discussion about external economic pressure. The black community benefits economically from a high level of foreign investment and faster growth, but the benefit has been, and it looks as if it will continue to be, disproportionately shared between white and black. The maintenance of economic strength allows the Government to satisfy the materialistic aspirations of whites and thereby it can buttress the status quo. To call for higher wages for blacks and the ending of racial discrimination in industry while denying to industry the necessary capital inflow is to handicap those who have the will to achieve it.

Since rational debate has failed over many decades to induce change in apartheid, many who refuse to countenance violence feel the only pressure open to them is one which could demonstrably affect people's material prosperity. There is nothing particularly surprising in this argument; most elections are predominantly decided by a hardheaded assessment by the individual elector of what he feels is in his own and the family's economic self-interest. The recent publication by the British Council of Churches, *Political Change in South Africa: Britain's Responsibility*, is an example of how the debate has shifted. They comment that

> Decades of close economic relationships and the intensified pressure exerted upon British firms in the last five years have failed to produce significant political change. The policy of building on our economic connections has not produced adequate progress towards the desired objective. It is now time to commit ourselves more fully by adopting the alternative, more difficult, policy of ending those connections by adopting a policy of disengagement.

In 1977 the decisive shift in Britain's foreign policy was finally made. We decided that when faced by an inevitable choice, our interest would henceforth lie with Black Africa. Sensing the build-up of international pressure to apply economic sanctions, the British Government in November 1977 formally stated in Parliament that it recognised the dangers of Britain's current economic dependence on South Africa and that it was determined to start on the difficult path of reducing Britain's economic profile and commitment. But in 1977, 1978 and 1979 when I was Foreign Secretary, Britain resisted, with France, Germany and the US, attempts in the Security Council for mandatory economic measures mainly in relation to Namibia and Zimbabwe. The measure we came closest to accepting was a mandatory ban on all Government support for promotion and new investment

in South Africa. We hoped instead by persuasion and pressure for progress over what we saw as the two priority issues; negotiated settlements for Zimbabwe and Namibia. We felt that progress in these neighbouring countries in ending minority rule by negotiation would help to achieve the dismantling of apartheid within South Africa itself.

The September 1978 shift in the South African Government's attitude over Namibia followed by in 1979 the deployment of South African troops in Zimbabwe in support of the internal settlement led to increasing doubts as to whether mandatory Security Council action could long be delayed. However, the attempt at negotiations rightly continued and at Lusaka during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in August 1979 the new British Government accepted that they could not continue to advocate recognition of Bishop Muzorewa's Government and instead changed their pre-election rhetoric and committed themselves to convene an all party conference following broadly the same approach as that in the Anglo-American plan of 1977 with its emphasis on a negotiated ceasefire and an independent transitional administration. Success at the Lancaster House Conference in December 1979 meant that the February 1980 elections took place under British authority with a Commonwealth Monitoring Force and Commonwealth observers. The task now is to obtain South African acceptance of the UN proposals for Namibia, buttressed by a demilitarised zone on the Angola border. When the shock of Robert Mugabe's victory has worn off and as South Africa establishes a working relationship with Zimbabwe it may be that the South Africans will be prepared to risk a SWAPO victory in Namibia on the basis that the longer they wait the more the DTA's electoral appeal, like Bishop Muzorewa's, will be eroded. New elections and international recognition could as with Zimbabwe bring a stability to Namibia which is strongly in South Africa's national interest. If South Africa blocks progress in 1980 because it fears a SWAPO victory then pressure for economic sanctions will become irresistible.

The potential impact of international economic sanctions is considerable, yet to date their practical implementation has been very mixed. Sanctions against Rhodesia have certainly demonstrated an ability to hold the international community to a political principle for 15 years. Their impact though not as decisive as the guerrilla fighting has been considerable, despite widespread circumvention made so much easier by South Africa's continued financial and military support. The US advocacy of economic sanctions against Iran over the US hostages is also an interesting portent of the future as was their willingness to go ahead despite failing to win Security Council endorsement. Western politicians and bureaucrats still cling desperately to an increasingly unreal view of a world in which sanctions would flout the supposedly free and unfettered world market. In fact there is already massive interference with free trade in defiance of GATT and in the absence of mandatory UN sanctions.

Despite Multilateral Trade Negotiations market forces are increasingly interfered with by tariffs, quotas, overt and covert protectionism on political

as well as economic grounds. The embargoing of crude oil to South Africa has been OPEC policy, though frequently breached, for some years. Even the Shah, while supplying oil, strongly pressed South Africa to accept a UN settlement for Namibia in 1977 and 1978. Then, in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini stopped all further supplies. Nigeria also has taken retaliatory action for some years, initially the diversion of oil to South Africa, but more recently on wider grounds. Even the present British Government asserts it will not supply North Sea oil directly or indirectly to South Africa.

So far, economic sanctions by mandatory UN decisions on South Africa have been avoided by the veto power of the three Western Security Council permanent members. The Communist countries and the Third World are united and EEC countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy and Ireland have lesser economic interests and are moving towards the Scandinavian position for example on investment. If further economic sanctions are introduced it will probably be as much a reaction to external or internal events as part of a grand strategy to induce reform. None of the Western countries who trade to any sizeable extent with South Africa will wish to take any action which will reduce their own exports and affect jobs or the standard of living of their own electors. Yet political and economic international pressures are being mobilised by African and other Third World countries against Western interests.

The balance of economic argument is all the time tilting against South Africa. From now on no wise American or French President or British Prime Minister will ever rule out agreeing to mandatory economic sanctions in certain circumstances. The passing of the mandatory arms embargo in November 1977 was strongly influenced by the circumstances surrounding the death of Steve Biko. In the aftermath of his death, the UN went through the crucial Chapter VII barrier in relation to South Africa itself when it determined that, having regard to the policies of the South African Government, the acquisition by South Africa of arms related material constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security.

By 1977, President Giscard d'Estaing had chosen Africa as priority area in much the same way as General de Gaulle had switched priorities to supporting the Arab world in relation to Israel in the 1960s. France had no wish to become isolated and exposed over their continued supply of arms where the US and Britain already had a voluntary embargo. France had been developing an important political and economic dialogue with many African countries, hitherto outside their sphere of influence, and begun to realise that they could no longer continue to sell arms without reducing their political influence in Africa. The tougher stand was reinforced in 1979 by the French refusal to allow visas for the South African rugby team. The Federal Republic of Germany, wanting to expand their trade outlets everywhere, has also deepened its economic links with Black Africa and does not wish to be outflanked politically by the DDR, now as active in Africa as Cuba economically, politically and militarily.

France and Germany, not being as dependent on South African trade as the United Kingdom, are less at risk when revising their attitude in the

UN to a Chapter VII determination and economic sanctions. The US Senate, traditionally sympathetic to South Africa, is also shifting under domestic and international pressures. Nigeria is now a very important oil supplier to the US. Other countries, Iran, Iraq and even Saudi Arabia, are likely to become more involved in the international debate over apartheid. The Senate would not resist for long the demands of a US President for economic realism in their trade with South Africa. It would be economic suicide for Britain to veto alone, for it would lead to unacceptable political and moral isolation.

Only if apartheid is being seen to be dismantled will Britain, France and the United States have the political justification to resist calls for economic sanctions. It is argued by some in South Africa that none of this matters; sanctions are coming anyhow, and that the arms embargo is being overcome by indigenous manufacture, while South Africa's coal resources can circumvent any oil embargo. All this is in part true, but each time the adaptation will be undertaken at a price and South Africa's unemployment, despite gold, is causing concern. The Non-aligned and Third World countries are building up their collective unity. Some feel strongly about the Palestinian issue, others over Apartheid but they are increasingly acting in concert over both issues in all international forums.

At present South Africa has benefited massively from the amazing increase in gold prices. Gold revenue will allow the South African Government, if they wished, to improve substantially the economic and social circumstances of the black population, as the South African economy is shielded from world recession. Gold sales represent well over a third of South Africa's foreign earnings. Yet the political vulnerability of the South African economy to any change in the price or role gold plays in the international monetary system is immense. One of the great ironies of the world capitalist economy is that the Soviet Union and South Africa benefit most from increases in gold price. Since France and OPEC hold large gold reserves the resistance to attempts to reduce the importance of gold is very strong. Perhaps a more radical OPEC attitude to the role of gold in the world monetary system may emerge.

Only three years ago it was a fundamental tenet of faith that the IMF and the World Bank operated wholly free of any political influence. This no longer applies. Most recently, specifically in Nicaragua and elsewhere, political criteria have been applied to influence World Bank loan policies. This IMF change has not come from the Third World but from Western politicians, particularly in the US State Department, rightly no longer prepared to accept that economic and monetary matters can proceed in total isolation from foreign policy objectives in relation to human freedom and rights.

Against increasing international pressures what are the possibilities of rapidly changing apartheid? What significance should be attached to Dr. Koornhof's recent statements? 'Apartheid as you know it and come to know of it in the United States of America, is dying in South Africa. We are in a period of reformation'. Or his frank admission that 'one of the basic

economic problems facing South Africa is the impossibility of reconciling, in the absence of large inflows of invested capital, high economic growth with the maintenance of equilibrium in the balance of payments.' Rationally, the basis for a negotiation of mutual benefit for black and white exists within the perimeters of these two statements. The Government's apparent readiness to review the security law and the Prime Minister, P. W. Botha's visit to Soweto last year are all signs of potential movement. Some liberal opinion in South Africa appears to have no doubt about the significance of Dr. Koornhof's remarks. The Blacks are deeply sceptical, seeing the changes as purely cosmetic.

The real question is whether, more by inadvertence, a brick will be removed in the process of cosmetic reform which will bring down the whole superstructure of apartheid. I do not believe the present Government is involved in fundamental change but the momentum once started may be impossible to check. A major black interest is to exploit the present movement for change constructively and to work for greater unity and avoid an inner black power struggle which the whites will gratefully exploit. White interests have been protected in the sense that change has been delayed elsewhere in Africa by a policy of divide and rule amongst black leaders. It is strongly a Western self-interest that change inside South Africa proceeds peacefully and that its economic investment is not lost through revolution.

Britain is uniquely vulnerable economically and this stems from its long history of political and economic involvement in Southern Africa. Only direct negotiations can solve the issues, negotiations between white and black South Africans. A Government to Government dialogue involving the Western Five nations over Namibia has provided a useful framework for progress, but it is very hard to see similar negotiations contributing to dismantling apartheid inside South Africa. Western Governments have rightly rejected the present Homelands policy, since it involves them directly in the question of the recognition of Statehood. In forming future policy Western countries should listen carefully to the views of the differing black leaders in South Africa. Dr. Motlana said in an interview in May 1978 on the Homelands policy 'Independence for Transkei and Bophuthatswana is a fraudulent manoeuvre to deceive us into accepting little pieces of desert as independent states. To us Black, South Africa is our fatherland, the whole of South Africa, and no subterfuge will change that . . . I am a South African. I am not a Motswana'.

We who already have universal suffrage will always find it immensely difficult in the present world climate of opinion to advocate anything less. Whereas Britain has a long history of ensuring minority representation as part of decolonisation, a restricted franchise became impossible for us to justify in Zimbabwe in 1977. While Zimbabwe could have become independent on an initially restricted franchise any time in the 1960s and even in 1972, by 1977 world opinion influenced by black opinion would not accept any limitation. Zimbabwe, however, is not the same as South Africa. Circumstances in South Africa are unique. A bargain may be struck in

negotiations if undertaken early enough between black and white South Africans which will itself be unique. But only direct negotiations will determine that, and we in the West would be unwise to take a firm view as to what is required, short of asking for negotiations and hoping for agreement.

The world will want evidence of a real change of heart from the South African Government. The realities are that the South African Government will continue to operate against a complex background of world events. The pressures are mounting. History it is claimed is on the side of those who advocate violence and revolution. For those who believe in reason and who refuse to despair the task is to defy that trend and to bring peace through negotiations to Southern Africa. There is not much time left before violence will emerge as the major determinant of the pace of the inevitable change.

The above article is derived from the 14th Anniversary Academic Freedom Lecture delivered to the University of Witwatersrand in September 1979 and has been brought up to date to cover the period leading up to the Zimbabwe elections.

[Dr. David Owen, Labour Member of Parliament for Plymouth, Devonport, was Foreign Secretary 1977-1979 and is now Opposition Spokesman on Energy. Publications include *Human Rights* (Jonathan Cape 1978).]

The June issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Pakistan: the Sword and the Book* by John Biggs-Davison, M.P., *The Politics in Crime (and Vice Versa)* by Michael Laver (held over from the May issue), *Poetry in the Eighties* by Howard Sergeant and *Unemployment and Medicine in the 1980s* by John A. Loraine.

INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES: PAWNS OF POWER POLITICS

by Keith D. Suter

> They simply laid on beds in the camp clinic wrapped in cold wet towels, their emaciated bodies and expressionless faces showing the ravages of malaria and complete exhaustion. A small child, typical of thousands, sat with spindly arms and legs and an enormous pot-belly, tell-tale signs of acute malnourishment. A man with pneumonia wheezed audibly. The face of a teenage boy was so heavily swollen with infection it had ceased to look human.
>
> I have travelled extensively in Asia and have seen some very, very sick people. But nowhere have I seen such sickness and such total, pathetic misery on the faces of human beings....

BADEN Teague, an Australian Senator, was horrified—like so many other western observers—when visiting Indo-Chinese refugee camps in Thailand. The Indo-Chinese nightmare which began when Japan invaded in World War II is continuing.

The Indo-Chinese refugee issue is one in which virtually no country or group of officials, emerges with a good record. That is about the only generalisation which can be made about the refugee issue; for it involves such a wide variety of people and motives. Throughout recent Indo-Chinese history the theme in all governmental policies has been one of governments being guided by their own narrow national instincts rather than a humane concern for the refugees themselves.

This writer visited South Vietnam in 1974. The American presence had declined considerably and people expected an eventual victory by the Provisional Revolutionary Government. No one predicted the rapid collapse which took place in March/April 1975. For 1975 was, in retrospect merely another turning point in Indo-Chinese military history. The long awaited era of liberation did not bring the peace and joy which so many had anticipated. It was another starting point for refugees.

The first major post World War II exodus took place in 1954. Under the terms of the Geneva Agreements, the French Expeditionary Corps was regrouped south of the 17th parallel. About 800,000 followed them south (including about 500,000 Catholics). In international law terms these may or may not have been 'refugees' as such (a refugee being a person who flees one country to another) since opinion remains disputed over whether Vietnam itself became two sovereign nations.

Some of these people left Vietnam entirely. 60,000 in the mid 1950s left for France. France now has about 80,000 Vietnamese, many with dual French and Vietnamese citizenship. Almost all have been absorbed into French Society. (A group of about 400 elderly non-French speaking people remained well into the 1970s as a Vietnamese community at Sainte-Livrade-sur-Lot).

During the war many millions of Vietnamese became displaced persons (that is forced to leave their places of residence but who did not leave

Vietnam). At My Lai—the scene of the 1968 massacre—the present writer in 1974 interviewed persons who, by living in a highly contested area, were forced to roam over the province looking for a stable place. Vietnam, of course, suffered the most intense aerial bombardment in world history, as well as being subjected to 'defoliant' campaigns and 'free-fire zones' all of which forced people to move from their traditional areas of living. The total change of locations will never be known—but could be as high as half Vietnam's total population.

The US defeat in 1975 represented the second exodus. Most escaped via US transports and included senior South Vietnamese personnel, affluent businessmen and junior personnel who were employed at US establishments. The affluent ones, or those who had friends high up in the US Government, had little difficulty in adjusting to their new way of life (mostly in the US). Indeed, their close connections with US personnel in South Vietnam had enabled them to learn US mores and values. Other Vietnamese refugees had a much tougher time. Their arrival in the US was unpleasant and they were made to feel unwelcome by an odd mixture of left-wing opponents to the war, others who wanted to forget all about the war, and racists. There was also alarm about the potential threats to public health and unemployment (at that time about nine million Americans were unemployed). These fears were reinforced by reports of the unwillingness of other nations (such as Britain, Australia and Western Europeans) to accept more than a total of a few thousand. However, when in the US in 1978, this writer was told that most 1975 refugees had now settled down and the community had turned its attention to other concerns. About 133,000 Vietnamese from the 1975 exodus now live in the US (US authorities had earmarked 400,000 as ones deserving special exodus treatment) and so one wonders what would have been the impact on US society if the total number had arrived.

Meanwhile other events were creating refugees. Prince Sihanouk, the colourful Cambodian ruler since 1953, was deposed by the US backed Marshall Lon Nol in 1970, who declared the Khmer Republic. Cambodia lurched abruptly from neutrality in the Vietnam War to a pro-US position. Prince Sihanouk, meanwhile, in exile in Peking, formed the Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK) under the auspices of the Communist National Front of Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge). The Khmer Rouge defeated the Lon Nol regime in April 1975. Prince Sihanouk bounced back into Kampuchea (the new name for Cambodia) but only as the nominal ruler. Power resided with Pol Pot, Secretary General of the Communist Party.

The new Government initiated a reign of terror unsurpassed in recent world history. The full extent of this terror was heavily disputed by western supporters of the Khmer Rouge (such as Noam Chomsky) in the period 1975 to about 1978. But it is now clear that this was in fact a time of terror. It was directed at all 'intellectuals', public officials and people living in cities. For example, only 50 doctors survived. Phnom Penh, the capital (one of Asia's most attractive cities) had its population reduced

from 1,500,000 to 30,000 and its buildings reduced to wrecks. Between 1975 and 1978 the total population was reduced from seven million to five million people.

Some Kampucheans fled into Thailand. The total involved was 940,000. Thailand has several problems. It is itself very poor. It is already politically unstable. The refugees (both from Pol Pot and from the Vietnamese) have fought among themselves in refugee camps. There have been allegations that some supporters of Pol Pot (or whoever has now succeeded him) are using Thailand as an operations base from which to launch attacks on Kampuchea's new rulers, thereby inciting Vietnamese 'hot-pursuits' raids in retaliation. Meanwhile, the proposed 300,000 person 'temporary transit centre' at Khao i Dang will be larger than any city in Kampuchea. Thailand is also looking after 60,000 Laotian refugees.

The ethnic Vietnamese community in Kampuchea was singled out for murder. Between April 1975 and October 1978, 260,000 Vietnamese managed to flee into South Vietnam. All were in need of medical attention. 80 per cent of them were suffering from severe malnutrition. The Vietnamese had been persecuted originally by Lon Nol and, ironically, the policy's execution was expanded under Pol Pot. The policy ended with Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in December, 1978.

While in South Vietnam in 1974, this author was told of US allegations that if the PRG took over there would be a massive bloodbath, in which the PRG would settle many old scores. The potential victims ranged from the 20,000 'round eyes' (orphans of US, Australian and other Non-Vietnamese troops who had left without their children) to South Vietnamese officials. No bloodbath took place. Indeed the new rulers were perhaps too tolerant of prevailing values and economic arrangements.

Life was not easy in the newly reunified country. The US had promised at the 1973 Paris Conference to pay $3.5 billion in reconstruction aid. No money has been paid. While some western non-government organisations tried to get western donations, the response was meagre. People wanted to forget Vietnam.

The new rulers had underestimated the problems of converting the nation into a land of harmony and prosperity. A whole generation had, after all, grown up accustomed to peddling drugs, black market money and women. They know no other trade. The land itself is still ravaged by the war and unexploded ordnance still exists for unwary farmers.

Vietnam has one of the worst refugee problems in the world. Into Vietnam has fled the ethnic Vietnamese formerly resident in Kampuchea. They have been joined, ironically, by native Kampucheans who believed that Vietnam would be safer than Pol Pot's rule. During 1979 a famine broke out, rivalling Biafra and Bangladesh; a by-product of the war's destruction, lack of rice planting, and the inefficiency of the new Heng Samrin Government. Allegations have also been made that Heng Samrin has prevented some supplies from reaching Kampucheans as a way of starving Pol Pot's supporters. Many Kampucheans fled into Thailand or

Vietnam. The total Kampucheans in Vietnam approached one million.

From 1975 to 1978 a small number of rich Vietnamese fled Vietnam, usually by sea. The coastline is nearly 2,000 kilometres long and cannot be patrolled adequately by the navy. It is near busy sea lanes and so by pre-arrangement these people bribed their way out of Vietnam in small fishing craft and then on to ocean going vessels. (The going price was about US $3,000). No estimate was apparently made of the number involved but it did not amount to a major exodus. More importantly, the ethnic Chinese (the Hoa) started fleeing from Vietnam in 1978. The Chinese are found all over Asia and, like the stereotyped western Jew, are often portrayed as tricky businessmen. About 1.5 million lived in Vietnam; one major pocket being in the North, near the Chinese border, and the other in Cholon, a sub-city of Saigon (Ho Chi Minh city). The Cholon Hoa were traders under the Vietnamese, French and American rulers. They were said to control about 80% of South Vietnam's trade by the early 1970s. Even after the 1975 PRG victory, Chinese traders lived as a privileged class, operating a profitable black market in scarce commodities (sometimes their rice prices were 10 times the official price) and they refused to invest their profit in joint enterprises with the State. The new rulers were slow to crackdown on these syndicates. It is possible that the Government was motivated by a concern to avoid a 'bloodbath', but it is also possible that some officials and Party cadres are corrupt and so are receiving money from the Syndicates. (One must wonder, then, just how far up the ladder does the corruption extend?)

The 1975 change of rulers encouraged some of them to buy their way out. However, most remained thinking that their economic power was too great for the new rulers to challenge them head-on. By March 1978 it was clear to the new rulers that their economic and social reforms were hindered by the Hoa's trafficking and other economic activities. The March 1978 crackdown on 'capitalist business activities' in the South applied equally to all Vietnamese people but, owing to their economic preponderance, the blow fell heaviest on Vietnamese of Chinese origin. Additionally, the Hoa detected, not unnaturally, a growing resentment among Vietnamese, who saw them as hindering their economic progress. While it is true that the Hoa businessmen were undermining the new economic policies, they cannot be blamed alone. The lack of foreign aid, the war's destruction and the Government's fetish for Soviet type economic planning (not the world's most efficient) were all important factors in the country's problems.

The Hoa put to sea or went North into China, depending on where they lived. About 260,000 Hoa went into South China. The Peking Government has probably the best Asian record for resettling refugees (largely because they are Chinese). The camps' conditions are, by contrast with other Asian refugee camps, much healthier, food more plentiful and the political environment more secure. It is notable, however that most Southern Hoa travelled by boat not to China but to capitalist countries like Thailand and Malaysia; ideology prevailed over ethnicity. Peking may

also be reluctant to accept what would represent an 'economic fifth column' tampering with China's centralist economy.

During late 1978 yet another Vietnamese exodus started. The political and economic situation had declined so drastically that even ethnic Vietnamese decided it was time to go. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam on February 17, 1979 was another incentive for many. Although Vietnam still had forces in Kampuchea, it managed to beat China (not before it senselessly destroyed the country's most sacred shrine: the Grotto in which Ho Chi Minh lived in 1941). The invasion (which could yet be repeated) convinced some Vietnamese that peace was still denied to their country. They were also fleeing conscription to serve in labour battalions to rebuild Kampuchea, or in Vietnam's 'new economic zones'. It is significant that few boat people speak English or French, thereby indicating that they are not of high economic or social origin. Some had gold or durable consumer goods with which to bribe their way out. Others were fishermen who took their boats. (While the Vietnamese Government has benefited from the 'departures tax', it is losing by the fishing boats being used — fishing is a traditional industry and a key element in the current Five Year Plan and yet the exodus has gravely damaged the industry).

The Government, like all the others covered in this article, was unclear what should be done about the refugees. Its navy is unable to prevent all the vessels from leaving. It has not made, however, any effort to induce the refugees to return, even though the more skilled would be of use in rebuilding the country. Originally it seemed to regard the refugees as fewer mouths to feed and the ones who bribed their way out in effect put extra money into circulation. It also reduced the administrative load of 're-educating' people who were bound to be impervious to the new views (their willingness to risk the sea voyage shows their determination not to accept Hanoi's views).

Thus, the 'Boat People' were born. As noted earlier, the 'Boat People' had existed since the PRG takeover in 1975 but the western mass media only noticed them when the trickle became a flood. The western mass media's involvement in this saga has been significant, though haphazard. Some radio stations (such as the BBC Overseas Service and Voice of America) have for years broadcast to Vietnam and told the people that life was better outside communist control, thereby enticing desperate people to escape. They have also, in effect, warned potential mariners of the inhospitable journey and arrival they face. Pirates, passing ships which refuse to stop for them, primitive transit camps and indeterminate periods where comfortable bureaucrats decide their ultimate country of residence for them, are all threats. The mass media have also played a double game in reporting the boat people. On the one hand, they have carried stories of rape, pillage and murder (RPM in journalese). They have emphasised the plight of children (most of the boat people have been children). They have aroused a sympathetic reaction to these victims, half of whom die without reaching land, and castigated the lack of appropriate actions by Governments (Asian and Western) and the United Nations.

On the other hand, they have also aroused strong negative reactions. Their coverage has, in Australia for example, given the impression that Australia is being invaded by Asian hordes (a potent Australian nightmare for 150 years); when in fact the total is 2,011—small compared with, for instance, the total Australians killed on the roads each year. They have carried stories of piracy by Indo-Chinese desperate to get a boat. They have criticised 'queue jumpers' who are leaping ahead of other refugees in Asian camps by sailing to Australia. They have carried stories of wily oriental gentlemen buying their exit visas (and recalling that these were the same people who traded at great profit with all sides in the Vietnamese war). Most importantly their intense focusing on the 'Boat People', while excluding all the other desperate refugee situations around the world, has significant political overtones. It is an alternative to the non-existent 'blood bath' they wrongly predicted. It is a way of retrospectively justifying western involvement in Vietnam by showing the evil nature of the communist rulers. It conforms to the western mass media's approach of being pro-US and anti-Soviet.

The 'Boat People' will, when the dust settles, be seen as amongst the bravest (or most foolhardy) people ever to sail in history. A voyage to Australia), for instance, is 2,000 km. longer than Captain Bligh's 1789 voyage of 6,000 km. from the Pacific to Timor (commonly considered one of the greatest feats of navigation). The boats are often river/coastal vessels and not designed for ocean voyages. Navigational facilities are crude (compasses and school atlases) and most of the 'crew' have never been on an ocean before—let alone along the Australian route which is one of the world's most turbulent. By some estimates, about 50 per cent die at sea. This figure includes boats washed ashore on Indonesia's deserted islands or Australia's desolate North coast. To arrive on land, then, is often only to convert the risk of death to the certainty of death in isolation. To commit piracy by stealing the boats (and sometimes the crew) is also a brave action since sailors are tough people.

All the world's governments wish the Indo-Chinese did not exist. No Government has adopted a consistent policy towards them. The first reaction during 1975-1977, was that there was no problem and if there were one, then it should be left to the nations where the refugees landed. During 1978 the number of Indo-Chinese boat people (that is, omitting the refugees who travelled overland into Thailand or China) leapt from 22,000 to 106,000. The input was too large for local Asian nations and so there was a growing recognition that it should be 'internationalized', with major western countries taking an increased number. In July 1979 a UN conference in Geneva failed to urge western governments to increase their intakes substantially. (Exactly 41 years earlier, an international conference at nearby Evian in France failed to approve significant measures to help Nazi Germany's Jews.)

Australia's record is better than many others (Japan has, for instance, accepted only three). But considering Australia's role as the US's junior partner in the Vietnam war, it has a moral responsibility for some of the

present turmoil. Indeed, it fought the war to save Vietnam from communism but is unwilling now to accept Vietnamese who have risked their lives escaping from it. In early 1975, when he was Opposition Leader, the present Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, was calling for the admission of thousands of refugees. The Labour Government ignored him. Since being in office, Mr. Fraser's record has not been much better than Labour's. During the 1977 Federal Election campaign, the Liberal Country Party Minister for Immigration warned boat people that they could not necessarily expect to be permitted to stay in Australia (just where he would send them he did not explain since only the Antarctic would be their next land fall). Fortunately the threat has not been carried out. The Labour Party and trade unions have, if anything been more miserly towards the refugees. Some unions have indicated their unwillingness to have refugees as members (in effect barring them from some trades) because they are too eager to work, they do not like the strikes and do not take 'sickies'. At a time when Australia's unemployment rate is at its highest for 50 years, it is notable that the refugees have less difficulty in finding employment (albeit menial) than young school leavers. With a Federal Election due by December 1980, all politicians are hoping that groups do not raise the refugee issue.

Britain very wisely kept out of the war, militarily, though refused to oppose western involvement in it. It has accepted about 2,000 Indo-Chinese refugees. At one point it seemed that British vessels would break one of the laws of the sea's fundamental provisions, namely refusing to help a vessel in distress, for fear of absorbing responsibility for looking after refugees. Its work in Hong Kong has helped redeem its traditional reputation for looking after refugees. British non-governmental appeals have however raised less money than Australia's. There are now more refugees in Asia than at any time since 1945. There is no quick or easy solution to the refugee issue. This article has tried to show how the 'issue' in fact consists of several issues, any one of which could be resolved but which would still leave others to resolve. Merely to insist, for instance, that Vietnam stops expelling people—which is a standard western line—will do little to entice the Vietnamese refugees to return. They risked death to escape and are unwilling to go back on the basis of promises made under duress by Hanoi.

Indo-Chinese refugees will be like the Palestinians—a major problem for decades to come. As a political gambit, they are not allowed to carry out actions (like rice planting) in countries which have only accepted them 'temporarily'. These traditionally hard-working and inventive people are not going to sit back idly in poverty, living off charity, waiting for bureaucrats to decide their fate. They have gone to a great deal of trouble to escape death. They will not now succumb to death through inaction.

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THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL

by R. J. A. Wilson

DESPITE the considerable amount written about the political and social effects of the recent resurgence of Islam, less attention has been given to its economic implications; yet from the developmental point of view these are of paramount significance. Many non-Muslims are of course vaguely aware of the Islamic abhorrence of usury, but few realise the extent to which Koranic teaching is concerned with the economic sphere, and how it affects virtually all aspects of everyday life. For the Muslim believer, his religion offers not only spiritual guidance like most of the other great world religions, but also very specific directives concerning materialistic questions. Mohamed himself was a law giver as well as a prophet, and although in Islam, as in Christianity, there are divisions about how literal an interpretation should be given to the holy writings, no practising Muslim can by definition ignore what the Koran says.

In the Islamic world it is impossible to draw the kind of distinction between civil law and the demands of religion which is usually made in the west. The Koran is particularly concerned with the family as a unit, and relationships within it, and few Moslem countries have dared to pass legislation which might be seen to conflict with Islamic teaching in this sensitive, yet fundamental, area. Attempts to secularise the legal framework along western lines have prompted considerable opposition, as was dramatically illustrated in Iran under the Shah, while apart from in Marxist South Yemen, all attempts to impose a socialistic or communistic framework have also failed. It was without doubt the recognition of the inherent conflict between the precepts of Islam and socialism that led Nasser and his supporters amongst Egypt's intelligentsia to search for a form of 'Arab socialism', a concept which the Baathists in Syria and Iraq have also tried, without much success in either ideological or practical terms, to espouse.

Few religions would seek to justify inegalitarian distributions of income, especially if the poor actually suffer hardship as a result, yet in the majority of Islamic countries, income disparities are much more pronounced than those found in the West. Even in the oil-rich Gulf states, which boast the highest per capita income levels in the world, it is the small minority of property owning citizens who benefit most from the new wealth, while the non-citizen immigrants, who comprise most of the workforce, frequently live only marginally better off than they would in their poverty-striken countries of origin. As most of these immigrants are from Muslim countries, with Pakistanis doing many of the menial labouring jobs, while Palestinians and Egyptians predominate in junior administrative grades, the tolerance of enormous income inequalities, and

the discriminatory treatment towards non-citizens, may seem surprising, and certainly it shows a lack of altruism as far as co-religionists are concerned.

Although according to Islamic teaching, existing property rights are to be respected, which would do little to ameliorate the current situation in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Muslim world as far as income disparities are concerned, Islamic law does provide several mechanisms which can help produce a more egalitarian distribution of wealth in longer term. The inheritance laws, explicitly spelt out in the Koran, are undoubtedly the major means of distributing wealth, as all children are entitled to a share in their parents' wealth in accordance with a set formula:

> A male shall inherit twice as much as a female. If there be more than two girls, they shall have two-thirds of the inheritance; but if there be only one, she shall inherit the half. Parents shall inherit a sixth each, if the deceased have a child; but if he leaves no children and his parents be his heirs, his mother shall have a third . . . You shall inherit the half of your wives' estate if they die childless. If they leave children, a quarter of the estate shall be yours . . . Your wives shall inherit one quarter of your estate if you die childless. If you leave children, they shall inherit one eighth.[1]

Clearly under these inheritance laws, the large fortunes that some have acquired in recent years as a result of the oil boom will soon get dissipated, especially as families in the Muslim world are large, while life expectancy remains short, and children can inherit most of a father's wealth on his death rather than on his widow's death.

As in the western world, divorce also tends to dissipate family fortunes in Islamic countries, especially as wives are allowed to keep the dowries which they were given on marriage, together with any wealth they have inherited from their own families. In wealthy but devout families, it is customary for wives and husbands to keep their finances separate, and women often keep their own independent bank accounts rather than share in a joint account. It is not only in the United States that banks exist which cater solely for women, such institutions are also found in supposedly male-dominated Saudi Arabia.

Inheritance and divorce laws of course primarily affect accumulated wealth rather than the distribution of current income, but in most Islamic countries, as in the west, the tax system embodies a redistributive element. The Muslim religion is much more explicit than Christianity on tax matters, and under the Sharia (Islamic Law) all believers have to pay an annual levy on income, known as the Zakat, but non-Muslims, even those working in Islamic countries, are exempt. In practice it is only in Saudi Arabia however that the Zakat is rigorously enforced, as there it is applied on all earnings, including profits and capital gains as well as wages, salaries and income from self-employment. Companies as well as individuals are liable to the tax, including Saudi interests in non-Saudi companies, and the company income is normally calculated on the basis of paid up capital plus reserves plus annual revenue, but less annual running costs, and less the cost of fixed assets and depreciation.

The Zakat is levied at a flat rate of 2.5 per cent per year regardless of incomes level, which implies that the rich of course pay more than the

poor, but there is no progressive element as understood in the west, nor are there subtleties such as tax thresholds, or increasing marginal rates of tax, which would result in taxes rising proportionately with income. Thus everyone is liable to some extent, but although the contributions of the poor are insignificant from the revenue point of view, it means the whole society of income earners contributes to the tax, which gives the entire community an interest in how the revenue is spent, and promotes a sense of solidarity that is felt when people are contributing towards a worthwhile cause. The emphasis is on the giving, and the poor who contribute are particularly blessed, as their sacrifice is the greatest. The Saudi practice at present is for the state to collect only half of the tax receipts from individuals and private companies, as the contributors themselves are asked to distribute the remainder personally to the poor and the needy, an obligation that most believers keep. It is only public companies that are currently liable to the full rate.

The revenue from the Zakat is specifically designated for social services with the needs of the poor particularly in mind, and the contributors in an Islamic state can be certain that the money will be used for these purposes as the government has little freedom of manoeuvre over how religious taxes are spent. Other state needs such as defence are provided by separate taxes, and at present most military expnditure is met from oil royalties. In the event of a holy war, an Islamic state can impose an additional tax known as a Jihad, such as Saudi Arabia imposed in 1973 during the October War with Israel. This was introduced not primarily because of the need to raise revenue, but to enable believers to show their solidarity with what was seen almost as a holy crusade against the Infidel, although in practice, the tax, like the war itself, was short lived.

Although the Zakat is a religious tax, its proceeds are seldom used to build or maintain holy buildings such as mosques, as revenue for these purposes is raised through rent on land which the church owns (Waqf land). Since the beginnings of Islam, but especially during Ottoman times, land was often either granted to church by the state, or bequeathed by private individuals, especially the unmarried and childless couples. Traditionally much of the revenue which the mosques obtained by renting out land for agricultural purposes also went to help the poor and the needy, especially in Iran, which meant the church itself played a significant role in income distribution, reducing the demands on the state.

The need for government-run social security systems in Muslim societies is further reduced by the obligations imposed on believers towards their families. Ageing parents usually live with or nearby their children, eliminating the need for special old people's homes, while the affluent will not only provide for their own children's general welfare and education, but also that of nephews, nieces, and perhaps even cousins. Indeed a prime motivation for the accumulation of wealth in Muslim society is not the pursuit of materialism for its own sake, or for individual pleasure, as in the west, but to enable the beneficiary to practice largesse. A rich man's worth is not judged in terms of the goods he possesses, but

in terms of the gifts and donations he is able to make, and the support given to his immediate family and more distant relatives.

The absence of a desire to accumulate material goods for self-indulgence does not imply any lack of incentive in Muslim society for individuals to better themselves; it is merely that this betterment must be defined in social rather than personal terms. As Maxime Rodinson points out in his penetrating study of *Islam and Capitalism*,[3] there is nothing inherent in Islam which precludes the emergence of entrepreneurs, and the long periods of stagnation in Muslim society cannot be blamed on religious dictates, but rather on a combination of uncertain political conditions and severe income fluctuations, the latter being inevitable in predominantly primary producing societies existing in an extreme climatic environment. There are many historical instances of successful and prosperous Muslim societies, ranging from those located at Cordova and Granada in Spain from the eighth century which produced such splendid art, to that found in Isfahan in Iran in the seventeenth century, when this bustling Asian metropolis boasted more skilled craftsmen and artisans than any European city at that time, including even Paris, then the west's most populous urban area.

Nevertheless there appears to be some aversion to risk taking in contemporary Muslim society as far as business ventures are concerned, and it has been left to the state to play the major role in industrial development, even in countries which are far from socialist such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Several factors may explain this aversion, including the realisation that because of family obligations an entrepreneur may be risking the future of those whose interests he is supposed to protect, and not merely himself. There is an unwillingness to take long-term chances, which manifests itself in the apparent preference for investment in property and land rather than industrial enterprises, where the potential returns are slower in coming, and often more uncertain in any case. It can be argued however that this is the result of a lack of knowledge of modern manufacturing techniques in societies still largely dependent on primary production, rather than because of anything written in the Koran, which is of course silent on technological questions. Some early believers were against any innovation which would change the techniques of production prevalent at the time of the Prophet, but as Islamic thinking is essentially rational, such conservatism, which has no support in the Sharia, was soon abandoned.

It is frequently alleged that Muslim societies are more fatalistic than those of the west, although if this is the case it does not necessarily have any effect on the propensity for risk-taking. However Islamic law can affect insurance against risk, as in Saudi Arabia insurance companies are forbidden from registering locally, as it is believed that man should not seek to protect himself from the will of Allah. In spite of this there are around twenty insurance companies which are believed to be under a Saudi ownership majority, all registered in other centres around the world from Hong Kong to Zurich, but covering risks quite openly within

the kingdom. Thus in the one area where there could be a conflict between Islamic law and modern business practice, the legal constraints do not appear to be in reality to present much of a problem. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the authorities have as yet not interfered in insurance matters.

Of potentially greater economic significances are Islamic laws on usury, which have important implications for development finance. These laws affect banking practice, especially in Saudi Arabia, where the central bank[3] is forbidden by royal decree from taking or granting interest. This ban applies only to its dealings with Moslems however, as the bank is prepared to accept interest on assets held in non-Moslem countries, including western government securities. Similar flexibility is allowed with commercial banking practice, as a distinction is made between personal loans, on which no interest is payable, and business loans, on which a service charge is levied. Thus in practice the law distinguishes between personal borrowing to cover private needs, and business customers who borrow so that they can make profits. Despite this flexibility it would be wrong to conclude that Islamic usury law had little effect on monetary and credit policy, but its effect on economic activity in general is, perhaps surprisingly, favourable rather than detrimental. Interest rates are not used as an instrument of monetary policy as much as in the west, and service charges on loans are seldom changed. This results in a greater climate of monetary stability, which undoubtedly encourages local investors, as they can predict with confidence the cost of their borrowing. Although monetarists like Milton Friedman would certainly not feel at home in Saudi Arabia, the system which the Riyadh authorities manage does have its merits.

Most of the major Islamic oil exporting states have been extremely conservative in their financial practices, and apart from the United Arab Emirates, have sought to avoid attracting any fringe financial operators, despite their need for specialist financial skills and ambitious development plans are implemented. There is an abhorrence of sharp financial practice, and a general desire that local banking institutions should be under majority Islamic ownership and control rather than foreign domination, although the motivation here may be nationalistic as much as religious. Gains made from the provision of financial services are seen as legitimate, but any rewards resulting from the exploitation of local ignorance, or profits at the expense of the poor, are viewed with contempt.

There are as yet few specifically Islamic development institutions, although in the financial sphere the International Association of Islamic Banks is becoming more active in trying to pressurise financial institutions incorporated in Islamic countries, or under majority Muslim ownership, to adhere to religious principles. Recently this organisation has even become active in European financial centres, particularly London, where over forty Muslim banks are represented. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was the main instigator of this association which has for several years maintained offices in Jeddah and Cairo, and it has recently encouraged

the opening of new institutions pledged to operate on Islamic principles. Twelve such institutions were operating in 1979, including three each in Egypt and Pakistan, and one each in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Jordan, Bahrain, Dubai and Kuwait. Another fourteen are expected to be opened this year, from Agadir in Morocco to Libya, and all confer together through the Union of Islamic Banks, which only Islamic banks can join, unlike the Association which is open to banks operating on customary western lines.

The fundamental objection that members of the Union of Islamic Banks have to western banking is what they see as the one-sided nature of the risk taking, as it is the borrower who takes the risk, not the lender. In order to share the risk, it is therefore seen as preferable for a bank to take an equity stake in the business it is supporting rather than lending with interest.

There is little doubt that there will be increasing debate amongst both Muslims and non-Muslims in the years ahead of the economic principles espoused by Islam. Some of the new Muslim political leadership, including Iran's new president, are well versed in Islamic economic teaching; in fact Hassan Bani-Sadr has written a book on the subject, *The Economics of Unity*,[4] and is one of the chief advocates of Muslims trying to conduct their commercial dealings in accordance with their beliefs. The message of Islam may date back fourteen hundred years, but in the view of many Muslims it can be made as relevant today as it was in its early years, and the fact that it pre-dates both capitalism and communism, yet is more widely discussed than ever, is seen as proof of its durability. For those who share a common faith and adhere to the teaching of the Koran in their social practice, it is only natural that they should desire to extend this practice into the economic sphere, so that all their relationships are conducted along harmonious lines.

Notes:

1. *The Koran.* Translation by N. J. Dawood, Penguin Books, 1956, pp.355-356.
2. First published by Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1966. English translation by Brian Pearce published by Penguin Books, 1977.
3. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (S.A.M.A.) founded in 1952 and based in Riyadh.
4. Written when Bani-Sadr was at The Sorbonne, and available only in Farsi and French.

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LITERATURE IN THE NEW DECADE

by Martyn Goff, O.B.E.

THE decade just ended has seen the emergence of Arts sponsorship on a scale of some significance, though nowhere near what can be found in the United States; or indeed what Norman St. John Stevas has been calling for. What matters, however, is that in this sponsorship Literature is the poor brother. In the same way the Arts Council of Great Britain has begun to receive during the Seventies substantial sums of money: its Literature Department has been blessed with barely 1% of these sums.

Let us take sponsorship first. Literature appears not to have the *réclame*, and so, by deduction, the PR image of opera, drama, dance and painting, almost always in that order. Opera not only ensures a Press larger than anything except the Tutankhamen-type show, but also means that the chairman's wife, and the chairman's wife's friends, will have the offer of free seats for the performance. This may sound a trite advantage but it is one that has led a number of wives to urge their boss husbands to support anything from *Don Carlos* to *Cosi Fan Tutti* (before any such wife should reach for the phone to speak to her husband's libel lawyer, I hasten to add that I am using hypothetical cases!). Theatre and the dance share this advantage to some degree. Painting only means an invitation to the opening.

This is not only the conventional view but what really happens. Yet, as Booker McConnell have shown with their £10,000 Prize for the best novel of the year, considerable publicity may be secured by the sponsoring firm even when the object of sponsorship is a book rather than an opera production. Booker McConnell spend just over £20,000 p.a. on their Prize (winner plus judges' fees, plus dinner, plus administration); but for this rightly receive a great deal of publicity. Their concern for the future of the novel, which is sincere, and their generous treatment of the winner, result in good coverage on television and radio and in all the more serious sections of the press.

Booker McConnell were preceded by W. H. Smith and followed by Whitbreads, while Wolfsons also contribute a large prize. In all three cases it is doubtful whether a greater return in publicity could have been secured by the same sums being expended on the other arts. This must also be the experience of Lloyds Bank which supports Children's Book Week and the School Bookshop Association and has supported Book Tokens for university students. Since they have been increasing their donations to the book world while backing other arts as well, this would appear to underline value for money in the support of Literature.

The Arts Council's failure to match its support of opera, music and drama when helping Literature would appear to be due to a number of causes. First, there is history: the Literature Panel originally only assisted Poetry. By the time it became a fully-fledged Department, treating Poetry

and Prose, the other Arts had a head start. Such inequalities are rarely corrected. But there are, of course, other factors. Literature has no major bodies like Covent Garden or the National Theatre to support. There is a feeling that somehow the Public Library system is a state support for Literature. Finally, there are commercial publishers who seem to be successful. Why can't they subsidise the less profitable branches of Literature like first novels, books of poetry and belles lettres? But if that were a valid argument, then one might ask why the commercial theatre doesn't support the Royal Shakespeare Company?

The Public Library argument is stronger, although by no means conclusive since public libraries do not exist to support Literature, let alone its less commercial branches. Your local Library has no duty to buy and propagate first novels or slim volumes of poetry; and in these days of savage cuts has in fact less money to spend on precisely those categories of books. The Arts Council itself, when tackled via its Chairmen over the last five years, has always claimed that if it is brought viable schemes it will back them. It is, though, interesting to add that Lord Goodman felt that poor support for Literature was one of the few failures during his otherwise impressive command of the Council. Experience has shown that such support is not always forthcoming when schemes are presented.

The New Fiction Society was founded 5 years ago entirely with Arts Council money. It budgeted for around £30,000 p.a., believing that this was sufficient to get the idea of a non-profit-making book club for the more serious novel off the ground, and to keep it going while it collected 10,000 members. Expectations proved wildly optimistic. By 1978 it was costing £30 to secure each new member (this is calculated in terms of advertising and promotion costs). So the Society has stayed around the 2,000–2,500 member mark for want of an advertising budget, the £30,000 being needed just to keep it going. There may be good arguments for not going on with it at all; there simply cannot be for starving it of the extra funds it needs for development while at the same time saying: show us the schemes, we'll give you the money. Books in Progress is another scheme, nobly supported by the Arts Council in its first two years, but now threatened with death. This is a register of non-fiction and technical titles to try to prevent the wasteful duplication that so often occurs: three biographies of Isaac Rosenberg in the same year; five of Ruskin being written at this moment! *Books in Progress* might have saved time and money in each case. Where, then, is the extra money if the scheme is put forward?

The truth, I suspect, both in the case of sponsorship and of Arts Council support, is that Literature lacks the glamour of the other Arts; and has a tendency to deprecate itself. Modern technology keeps promising the end of the book (cf Dr. Christopher Evans' *The Mighty Micro* forecasting the beginning of the end of the book by 1990. It is nicely ironic that he needed to write a book to make the forecast!) 'The Novel is Dead' or 'Is the Novel Dying?' is a not infrequent Sunday newspaper headline. I have yet to see 'Opera is Dead' or 'Is Painting Dying?'. Each new Art form has brought Cassandra prophecies about existing ones. Photography was to kill pain-

ting; the gramophone, live music; the cinema, the theatre; and television, radio. But painting, live music, the theatre and radio are all alive and thriving pretty well. Equally, books, and particularly books containing Literature, will be around for a long time to come. They have inestimable and unrivalled advantages.

The glamour surrounding books, and so writers, varies greatly in different countries. In an age of personalities, the temperamental prima donna or the wild living painter is likely to rate far more publicity than the lonely author. It is clearly more glamorous to go to Covent Garden to a première than to sit at home with a new novel on publication day. In France a writer may achieve the same sort of *réclame* as a person as a great conductor, but there will still be more glamour about the vernissage of a major painter than publication day for the author. None of this has anything to do with the value of the experience of the work of art. Sitting alone at home with a literary masterpiece may be far more uplifting or life-enhancing than attending a concert or play among a restless audience. But those responsible for subsidy cannot but feel, even sub-consciously, that what they hand out very publicly will redound more to their credit or their organisation than money quietly given to writers or publishers, librarians or even readers.

So while I do foresee and expect growing subsidy for the less commercial areas of Literature in the next ten years, it will still be nowhere in the class of support offered to the other Arts. We are unlikely to see major industrial firms pouring hundreds of thousands of pounds into books, as they do into sport or opera, even if we could prove that at the end of the day they will have enabled another Joyce or Proust to appear and grow to full stature; and we could never prove that in the first place.

To complete the down beat part of this survey and, by implication, to cry woe for the next decade, we must turn to publishing. Partly, and ironically, because of the strength of the £, all is not well with British publishing. Collins, we have recently learnt, lost nearly a million pounds in a year; Penguins half that sum. Much of these losses is due to the difficulty of competing in the rich Australian and South African markets when the dollar is weak and the £ strong. Some of it stems from a change in a traditional market agreement between the British and the Americans whereby the latter, who have a huge home market, largely left the field to the British in Commonwealth countries. This agreement was broken under pressure from the American government and, of course, at a particularly inopportune moment.

Now, if British publishers' markets are contracted, two things happen: first, they produce smaller print runs which means more expensive books which in turn are harder to export and sell at home. Secondly, they have less money to *invest* in literary ventures. Firms like Chatto & Windus, Jonathan Cape, André Deutsch and the main University Presses had for years been willing to back promising authors in the hope that they would one day produce books that made a little money. Such firms now have no extra bits of money for that purpose. At the same time the larger firms,

and in publishing as in all other industries the trend has been to larger units, to conglomerates and the like, accountants rather than old style publishers are in control. By their very training they tend to judge all projects in terms of cost-effectiveness, so out of the window go the future Proust or Joyce who would cost the firm much investment for many years. Your Ian Parsons or Jonathan Cape or Robert Lusty understood exactly that such investment might eventually produce masterpieces, commercially successful or not.

The likelihood for the 80's is that this movement to larger units will go on; while overseas markets are likely to suffer from increasing foreign competition—and not only American—however hard British publishers struggle. Backed by the Book Development Council branch of the Publishers Association, they do fight hard and professionally, too, but when there is world recession, all countries tend to spend less on academic and educational books, and in the cut-back to go to those countries producing the cheapest.

If Literature is not to be stifled by the decline of British publishing, then it is going to need help from outside the industry. Here the Arts Council has made a considerable difference, making possible the more esoteric novel, book of poetry or belles lettres by subsidising the author or the publisher or both. Many important books over the last decade would not have seen the light of day had the Arts Council not offered generous support in this way; and even a book of the stature of Quentin Bell's brilliant biography of Virginia Woolf needed such help. What is, then, clearly required is considerable expansion of this sort of subsidy and above all in the field of fiction where well known novelists who write for minority tastes are often not even selling 1,000 copies of each book; this despite library sales and national reputations among book people. The British public, it seems, will not buy fiction unless it is either of the best-selling variety—John le Carré, Graham Greene, Hammond Innes—or in paperback. Most serious publishers can give horrifying stories of tiny fiction sales.

Subsidy for writers and publishers is by no means the limit of the State's support, mostly via the Arts Council in the first place. It also subsidises the Poetry Society, various Literary Festivals, Writers in Schools, the National Book League and the New Fiction Society which I have already mentioned. It gives money to the Regional Arts Associations who in turn promote Literature in many ways, ranging from Literary Prizes to Community Bookshops to Poetry Readings. Local Government sporadically and spasmodically also helps Literature. It may be thin right across the country, but isolated examples like the three years of the Wandsworth Literary Prizes show what could be done if only those with responsibility would accept it. Here we are entering an era of leisure on a scale unknown in the past, yet Metropolitan Boroughs and County Councils are barely willing to do more than open another swimming pool or sports ground. Even Wandsworth, with a change of Government, is closing its marvellous Arts Centre (at the moment of writing there is a chance that it will be

saved by private individuals).

As always in such situations there are tiny breaks in the gloom. The Publishers Association has set up a very energetic and powerful Home Marketing Arm (Book Marketing Council). While its task is to ensure that the book is aggressively promoted and sold across the country, some of its inevitable and eventual success will benefit Literature. If publishers are more successful, they will again have money to invest in the more esoteric book. If booksellers are more successful, there will be more of them. If well-stocked bookshops are there, then they will also sell more worthwhile books, 'also' meaning that their main sales are bound to lie among the popular, the do-it-yourself instructive and the fashionable.

At the same moment the Booksellers Association has created a Booksellers Association Service House, backed by a Marketing Advisory Panel, which aims to help booksellers improve their standards of service and marketing, profitability and promotion. For reasons already adumbrated, Literature will benefit: for every 50 extra gardening books there will be five more books of poetry sold.

While these two organisations begin to have a real effect on the public's attitude to bookbuying, the National Book League, which for the past 55 years has tried to persuade more people to read books, will continue its work. Touring exhibitions, selected and annotated book lists, an answer service for book queries, levels of school book expenditure, the running of literary prizes including the Booker McConnell Prize, are all part of the NBL's operations. It is also allied to the School Bookshop Association which serves more than 5,000 tiny bookshops in schools in this country, tiny, indeed, but they already probably account for something in the region of a million pounds of *extra* books sold. What is more, those books are sold to children at a very impressionable moment of their lives, inculcating a priceless habit in an effortless manner. It will need a generation or two to see the full effect of this movement, but it could be very considerable.

Also on the horizon are ways in which some of the new media may actually promote the sales of books. The tremendous success of *The Forsyte Saga* or Kenneth Clark's *Civilisation* on television led to huge book sales, as did Attenborough's *Life on Earth*. Equally, programmes like Melvyn Bragg's *Read All About It* caused spurts in paperback sales of quite unlikely and minority titles. But this may only be a start. In America CBS have tied up with the Center for the Book, an organisation founded by The Library of Congress and modelled in part on the National Book League, so that when a prominent author is interviewed on television, lists of his work and/or books about it may be obtained from the Center by sending a stamped addressed envelope. The scheme is likely to be tried in the U.K. within the next few months.

Frank Delaney, in *Bookshelf*, a programme on Radio Four, has notched up a considerable audience for books and the book world. This success is just as likely as Melvyn Bragg's to encourage other, similar programmes. Meanwhile local radio has been very favourable to pre-recorded programmes of well-known authors being interviewed. In all these cases the

popular will inevitably take precedence over the elitist: a majority audience is being catered for. But in every case the more serious does get a look in.

If the foregoing examples only point the way to happier times for Literature, then surely it would not be unreasonable to expect technological innovations in printing to bring down the price of books considerably and counteract the way printing prices in the last few years have shot ahead even of general inflation. (British publishers are being compelled to print many of their books in Europe, in America and even in the Far East because of the prices pertaining in the U.K.). The paperback is still a mass medium of communication, but if we can fly to the moon, record one programme on videotape while watching another and reserve aircraft tickets across the world in seconds, then surely we can find ways of printing less than 10,000 paperback copies—the numbers required to make a little profit—so that the difficult first novel, the book of poetry or the biography of a minor figure in history can all be produced in a small edition, but still at a low price within the reach of everyone from schoolchild to old age pensioner.

Despite Dr. Evans, and almost everyone who earns a living from promoting the new technology, the book is likely to be as important a feature of life in 1990 as it was at the beginning of 1980. Literature, too, will survive. Of all forms of art, it is the most immediately accessible and the most portable; the most flexible and the most private. One person in a crowded room with a TV set or radio, hi-fi or tape recorder can trespass on everyone's attention. Every person in that same room can read a different book without disturbing his neighbour. Between covers are contained many of the glories of Man, from the Bible to Proust. The position is unlikely to change in the remaining decades of this century.

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MILITANT OR MALIGNANT?

by Paul Rose

THE hue and cry about the Militant faction within the Labour Party has given Fleet Street a field day. However, it is in itself neither new nor particularly newsworthy. Like all the other newly-scratched wounds that are beginning to fester in the Labour Party, the injury is self-inflicted and, to a large degree, psycho-somatic. Similar groups had as much, if not more, influence when I was active in the Young Socialists in the 1950s. Bans and proscriptions were thought necessary before and since. No one took much notice and the groups were consigned to Britain's political fringe as largely irrelevant.

The difference today is that the suppression of the so-called 'Underhill Report' has become a rallying cry for insecure right-wingers, while left-wingers can equally conveniently accuse their opponents of McCarthyism in initiating a witch-hunt. Both sides have selected the issue as one on which to make a stand and thereby elevated it into something out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance. Its real significance lies in the willingness of entrenched Tribunite and Manifesto militants with a small mind to enter into vigorous confrontation in the wake of electoral defeat after a fairly long period of relatively peaceful coexistence.

I well remember how the majority of positions in the Young Socialists were held by supporters of the Socialist Labour League—now the Revolutionary Workers Party. Decorated by Vanessa Redgrave and led by Gerry Healy, the would-be British Lenin. This group existed under various guises before marching into the wilderness under its own scarlet colours. Frequently termed the League of Militant Psychopaths by its detractors, its main targets were the other less holy Marxist groups which also influenced fringe elements in the Labour Party.

One of these, the International Socialists, drew its inspiration from Rosa Luxemburg in rejecting the concept of a Vanguard Party. Its prophet, Tony Cliff, even wrote her biography and its latter-day devotees have played a prominent role in the formation of the Anti-Nazi League. However, the most 'entryist' of these groups, loosely termed Marxist or Trotskyist, was the Fourth International faction which commanded support in Liverpool and Nottingham rather than in the scattered cells of the I.S. and the extended tentacles of the 'Lavender Hill mob' in the S.L.L. Indeed, the 'Grand old Duke of Clapham', Gerry Healy, who marched his light brigade into the Labour Party and out again, attracted the cannon fire right, left, in front and behind. For no one hates the Trotskyists more than the most influential of all Marxists, the Soviet-orientated Communists and their fellow-travellers who also inhabit sections of the Labour Party and the Trade Union Movement.

The sudden discovery of these forces has more to do with Conference resolutions on compulsory re-selection and the dominance of Tony Benn's supporters on the National Executive than with any real changes of cir-

cumstances. True, a few M.P.s are influenced by Militant and it attracts the loyalty of committed Young Socialists. It is allegedly strong in some big cities, but its real support is minimal compared to the other streams of thought in the Labour Movement. Like all such groups, it loses more of its Midwich Cuckoos to complete nervous political exhaustion and creeping respectability than it wins over to the coming revolution. It also has a positive influence in provoking relevant discussion, elevating theoretical and historical knowledge in a rather Philistine party and in providing devoted workers in many a vacuum.

Were it as strong as alleged in Manchester, for example, then it is indeed strange that the latest three Parliamentarians from that area are respectable local Councillors cast in a rather pedestrian mould. True, such groups make up what they lack in numbers in—dare I say it?—militancy. The poverty of thought on the part of Callaghan's pathetic henchmen and the alienation of real radicals from the Labour Party has left a vacuum. Were Roy Jenkins and others to pose a really radical alternative rather than a revamped Centre Party, the groundswell of support among the progressive and libertarian elements in Britain would swamp the Militants.

The latter are deeply rooted in factional, theoretical and indeed theological differences within the Communist Movement, as Stalin gradually annihilated every opposition tendency within the Soviet Union in the thirties. This is why its policies are an anachronism by half a century and why it cannot find any significant body of support by existing apart from the Labour Party. Its existence is less harmful than a witch hunt. The publication of the Report would be less harmful than the speculation and hysteria provoked by non-publication. Its tradition is as valid as the Christian Socialists, Social Democrats, Tribunites, Reformists and countless strands which together make up the British Labour Movement. Ideas should be fought by better ideas and it is a slur on the intelligence of the Labour Party membership to suggest that these fringe groups can hoodwink them into creating a Marxist State.

Even posing the hypothesis of a well-orchestrated Militant take-over, it would then be open to the opponents of the group to divide and challenge them in an open combat, the result of which is hardly at issue. Where local Parties become rotten boroughs and the opportunist politics of expediency, typified by the Wilson epoch, have provoked cynicism, these Militant or other similar groups have been provided with ideal conditions for development. Genuine Tribunites or Manifesto group members would do better to argue about objects, policies and strategies for the eighties, rather than indulge in a mud-slinging battle that does credit to neither, and damages the Labour Party as a whole.

Sensationalism on the one hand and a failure to acknowledge the reality of a well-documented phenomenon on the other are equally unbalanced reactions. There are enough demons to exorcise in the shape of Sir Keith Joseph or the invaders of Afghanistan, without becoming obsessed by small groups of dissident Marxists who have yet to gain the influence

obtained by the Communist Party in the Trade Unions and elsewhere. In any event, they provoke similarly intemperate attacks by Militant on the so-called Moderate Wing of the Party, branded as middle-class infiltrators by the guardians of Socialist purity attracted to these sectarian groupings.

Certainly, in grasping an understanding of the decline of freedom in the Soviet Union and in broadening an otherwise insular approach to politics; in stimulating a near-religious zeal among idealistic young people, the Militant group performed a service. That much of its subsequent analysis of world events is grotesquely distorted and the fact that disillusion may lead those same people to uninterested apathy is a balancing factor of no little significance but a risk libertarians and democrats should face in open political debate. Indeed, the most significant factor in these sectarian groupings is their high turn-over—life expectancy usually being about three years.

There are other ironies about the situation. Tony Benn calls for open government, yet opposes publication of the evidence. Militant itself is the opposite of libertarian with attitudes to vital social questions that make Mary Whitehouse appear permissive. The liberty it demands to organise within the Labour Party is strictly denied to those who join it. Indeed, I recall that the theological divide between its leader, Ted Grant, and the rival Healyites was based on a schism in International Trotskyism. The forerunners of Militant favoured the entry tactic and great world-shaking noises were made between those who favoured the F.L.N. or the M.N.A. in Algeria. Similar divisions on the Middle East, the Anti-Nazi League or the nature of the Soviet Union permeated the internecine life-style of these groups.

In a sense, they mirror the factionalism of the far right but, if the Tories can tolerate a Bow Group or a Monday Club then, in spite of the highly organised and disciplined structure, the Militant group can be tolerated by a healthy Labour Party. The problem may be that the Labour Party is not healthy and has failed to tap the latent discontent and radicalism among young people disenchanted with the existing political establishment.

The puritanical and out-dated slogans of those who argue that the Soviet Union is a 'degenerated Workers' State' requiring critical support and those who dub it 'State Capitalist' like Tony Cliff, are hardly the sorts of debate likely to attract massive interest. Only when they batten on an existing campaign in a parasitical fashion do they attract any widespread sympathy. Nevertheless, I have a sneaking affection for their simplistic and idealistic clinging to an ideological purity that harks back to the golden age of good causes when black and white were more recognisable than they are today.

This explains the attraction of Militant for devoted young Socialists and by the same token fails to inspire the mass of young people more likely to participate in broadly based movements like the Anti-Nazi League, Rock Against Racism or, in the heyday, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

Patrick Wintour, writing in the *New Statesman*, has the merit of chal-

lenging Militant upon its methods and policies rather than upon administrative methods. After all, constituency take-overs are not unknown by strange forces in Islington or elsewhere; while Labour M.P.s have been known to act as P.R. men for Franco, the Greek Colonels or King Hussein of Jordan and to receive payment for it. In such a broad party, these aberrations, painful as they are, may be inevitable.

The one sure way of bringing these divisions into the open is to change the electoral system to one where all such differences would face one another across the ballot box. Voters could express real preferences rather than choosing between, say, a Tribunite Socialist and a member of the Monday Club or a Jenkinsite and a liberal Tory or, indeed, any other permutation of two opponents. Nonetheless, the subject of electoral reform remains taboo among those on safe seats, propped up by weighty majorities.

Curiously, the sectarianism and self-made isolation of Militant is a more potent force in its destruction than a thousand reports on its activities. It remains a faction within a faction as the Labour Party Young Socialists holds its tiny 4,000 faithful and the Party's active support is slowly eroded. Like the French Socialists of the sixties, it poses a minimal threat to the Labour Party and the concern expressed by Labour's opponents is not only touching but counter-productive. The way to counter a once revolutionary and now irrelevant philosophy is to up-date one's own thinking and propagate it in an intelligent and attractive fashion. The Labour Party will not solve its problems by a witch hunt directed at those propagating ideas that have never attracted the Labour Movement, let alone the general public. It will solve its problems when it recognises the realities of 1980 rather than 1930 and puts forward solutions to the problems raised by the complexities of our modern inter-dependent industrial society. If ideas can only be defended by better ideas, the better ideas will have to be produced by careful analysis and thought. That is the task for those who currently prefer to throw mud at N.E.C. meetings rather than get out from their self-imposed political ghetto.

THE WILLIAMS REPORT: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK

by Antony Grey

WE govern ourselves oddly. When public debate about contentious social issues reaches a certain pitch, a committee is apt to be appointed to hear witnesses, sift the evidence and take stock. It is drawn from the ranks of the Good and the Great whose names are filed in Whitehall's Old Admiralty Building as being safe and suitable for such purposees. Its members are unpaid, of course. While they labour, which is often for some years, there is usually at least a partial let-up in public dissension. The Government of the day gains a breathing-space.

At length the committee report. Then all hell is let loose. The various contestants shout their heads off praising or abusing the report. Rarely if ever do any of them change sides or even shift their views a bit as a result of the committee's efforts at judicious appraisal. When the report is debated in Parliament all the speakers pay ritual tribute to the dedication, hard work and intelligence of the committee—and then most of them proceed to take not a jot of notice of its proposals and its reasons for them. The fact that it is the committee, and not the politicians and the press, who have heard the witnesses, read the documents and discussed the evidence does not deter politicians, press or anyone else from damning the report up hill and down dale if they don't like what it says. Then the whole thing is buried, usually for at least ten years—it is most exceptional for Governments to take swift action as a result of all this monumental labour.

This familiar pattern is already unfolding around *Williams on Obscenity and Film Censorship,* published early last December after three years' work. One may well wonder why anyone takes on the dreadful task of sitting on such a body anyway: and in Williams' case there was the added hazard of falling foul of the indefatigable and implacable Mrs. Mary Whitehouse, for whom there is no close season and who, not content with denouncing the committee's membership at the time of its appointment as 'loaded' (presumably because its chairman is a known humanist as well as being a distinguished philosopher: its members also included a judge, a retired chief constable, a headmistress and a bishop—though not an actress), is now hurling such epithets as 'arrogant' and 'biased' at it.

Mind you, the Williams Committee don't seem all that struck on Mrs. Whitehouse either. Duly credited by them with 'passionately held views on the erosion of standards over a wide area,' she pops up in their report claiming that murders have been committed by people because of films they have not seen, marriages broken up by pornography (but it was 'not practicable' for her to show the committee the 'large number' of letters she said she had received attesting to this), and that the Communists are 'pouring pornography into South Africa' to corrupt its—otherwise un-

tarnished?—society. Her pet pundit, Dr. John Court of the Australian Festival of Light, is rent into tiny shreds by the Williams Report in a demolition job so thorough that I very much doubt whether all the praying mantises of the Old Bailey corridors will ever succeed in putting him together again. Dr. Court's assertion that countries where pornography is easily available have a higher incidence of rape and other violent sex crimes than those where pornography is restricted is dissected by Williams and dismissed by them as incapable of surviving even as a plausible hypothesis. The Committee 'unhesitatingly reject the suggestion that the available statistical information for England and Wales lends any support at all to the argument that pornography acts as a stimulant to the commission of sexual violence.' Undismayed, Dr. Court has written to *The Times* undertaking to substantiate his claims.

Williams is intellectually rigorous. It is also lucidly written and a pleasure to read. Perusal of it is indispensable for anyone who wants to familiarise themselves with this particular landscape. Pornography is like sin—everybody is against it except (presumably) the several million people who sometimes read, see or hear it. Whatever else it stimulates, it does not usually stretch the intellect: the report comments on 'the total emptiness of almost all the material we are concerned with'; it is 'vacant and inexpressive'. Indeed, the committee felt that there was a sense in which this vacuousness enabled pornography to be used by some of their witnesses as a scapegoat: 'The tastelessness and depressing awfulness of pornography generally makes it easy for its detractors to attack it without fear of contradiction and to gain a sympathetic hearing for their description of its anti-social effects'. But 'to regard pornography as having a crucial or even a significant effect on essential social values is to get the problem out of proportion'.

In part I of their report the committee survey the existing laws relating to obscenity and film censorship and conclude that they are 'a mess'. The Obscene Publications Act of 1959—a conscious attempt at a compromise which would free serious literature from excessive legal hazards on grounds of morality and taste whilst curbing the circulation of pornography—has proved a defective instrument. The 'deprave and corrupt' test has in practice been taken by juries to mean 'offensive to current standards'. Practically all the committee's witnesses wanted it abolished. The 'public good defence' has in practice been used to enable 'expert' witnesses in court—where they are not allowed to testify as to the depraving and corrupting effect of the material in question—to defend items which have no pretensions to artistic or literary merit. Different tests of obscenity and indecency are applied by laws regulating the Customs and the Post Office and by common law. The Williams Committee conclude that 'the law is (so) scattered . . . that it is a complicated task even to piece together a statement of what the law is, let alone to wrestle with or resolve the inconsistencies and anomalies to which it gives rise'. They propose a new test: — that material should be restricted by law only when it is *offensive to reasonable people*. While this is superficially attractive,

it does not appear to me to resolve the difficulty of deciding who is a 'reasonable' person. Mrs. Whitehouse and I, for instance, without doubt have very widely differing opinions about our own and each other's reasonableness and what we find offensive. Presumably the decision as to which of us is most in tune with the abstract 'reasonable person' would rest with magistrates. If their decision were to be appealed up to the House of Lords, would their Lordships take a 'subjective' or an 'objective' view of reasonableness in this context? I cannot see that the Williams formula gets us out of this dilemma satisfactorily.

Much more daringly, they conclude that the written word should be entirely freed from legal restrictions. Films and pictorial matter obviously made a much greater impact on the committee. But I have some sympathy with those who asked, when the House of Lords debated the report in January, whether it is really possible to maintain that the written word is never harmful or offensive.

Williams, however, was primarily concerned with display. Rightly adopting the principle that in a democratic society, even indecent reading and viewing material (except for a limited category whose production involves children apparently aged under 16 or the causation of actual physical harm) should be available to those adults who desire it so long as it is not allowed to obtrude upon those who find it offensive, they propose that 'restrictions should apply to matter (other than the printed word) and to a performance whose unrestricted availability is offensive to reasonable people by reason of the manner in which it portrays, deals with or relates to violence, cruelty or horror, or sexual, faecal or urinary functions or genital organs'. They would limit sales of such material to premises having a separate entrance from the street to which persons aged under 18 are not admitted and which, apart from a prominent warning notice indicating the nature of the business, would be permitted no external display.

There is a difference, the committee subtly suggest, between indecent displays and displays of the indecent—it is the knowledge that far worse things may lurk between innocent covers which led them to formulate this proposal. But since it is virtually impossible to segregate 'hard-core' from 'soft' pornographic material, the effect of this scheme could be to remove the mass-circulation 'girlie mags' out of the High Street newsagents and to force them to be sold in restricted premises hugger-mugger with much more dubious items. Either their sales would drop catastrophically or else their 4 million regular monthly readership would be brought into much closer contact with 'the hard stuff'—rather as the would-be cannabis purchaser is forced by the present drugs laws to obtain supplies from the same people who are pushing heroin and cocaine. I very much doubt, in fact, whether the analogy with 'sweeping prostitution off the streets' which may well have been in the Williams Committee's mind is an apposite one, or if it justifies the concessions which they have made to those who seek to banish what they dislike in principle, whether or not its displayed parts are objectionable.

For films, Williams propose replacement of the present system of

national certification by the British Board of Film Censors supplemented by local authority action by a statutory national Film Examining Board set up to establish policy and criteria for film censorship which would be undertaken by a Chief Examiner of Films. A new category of restricted films, to which no one under 18 would be admitted, would enable the integration of explicitly sexual films and 'blue' cinema clubs into the general cinema circuits and the censorship system. Films should only be refused a certificate if they contain illegal material or are unacceptable because of the manner in which violence, sexual activity or crime is portrayed.

The Williams Committee were obviously shaken by some of the films which they viewed during the course of their enquiries. They felt it necessary 'to say to many people who express liberal sentiments about the principle of adult freedom to choose that we were totally unprepared for the sadistic material that some film makers are prepared to produce. . . . Some of the film sequences we saw seemed to have no purpose or justification other than to reinforce or sell the idea that it can be highly pleasurable to inflict injury, pain or humiliation (often in a sexual context) on others. Film, in our view, is a uniquely powerful instrument. . . .' While research has not demonstrated any convincing link between media violence and violence in society, that is (the committee think) due in part at least to the weakness of experimental research as a means of determining human motivations; so they consider that since violence is (unlike sex) itself harmful it is right to exercise caution in this respect.

The existing British Board of Film Censors is in practice, if not in its formal structure, independent of the film industry, the Government and local authorities. To replace it, as Williams suggests, by a new body to be set up by Act of Parliament, operating to criteria (whose nature the committee does not indicate) laid down in the statute, and partially paid for out of public funds, seems likely to lead to at least some loss of independence by the film censorship and to its subjection to ministerial caution—if not ultimately to outright political control.

My own belief is that *all* censorship is basically political, since it is the exercise of control over the dissemination of information by or to others. It is quite consistent to accept (as I do) that pornography is sometimes harmful whilst maintaining that censorship is almost always more socially harmful still. No freedom, however, can be total and unlimited. Anarchy, which does not mean (as is vulgarly thought) social chaos but a governmentless society, would only be possible given a human race consisting of totally virtuous and enlightened self-regulating beings. The Williams Committee find what they regard as a workable limiting factor in the 'harm condition', which they define as the principle that 'no conduct should be suppressed by law unless it can be shown to harm someone'. They seek to define 'harm' objectively rather than subjectively—that is, they would hold that apart from obvious effects such as tissue-damage, the harmful effect of any particular item requires demonstrating and cannot be assumed to be self-evident. On this ground they dismiss as un-

proven allegations of general, pervasive harms such as 'moral pollution', saying that 'to be the identifiable cause of harm is one thing, to be the expression of underlying ills in society is another'. (They were also unimpressed by claims that pornography is uplifting: 'Any committee enquiring into this kind of subject is likely to encounter a certain amount of humbug. Perhaps the most striking example of it that came our way was the pretence that present day commercial pornography represents some fulfilment of liberal and progressive hopes.')

Whilst firmly libertarian in their basic approach, the Williams Committee express some scepticism as to whether J. S. Mill-type arguments about the importance of preserving a free market place for ideas are altogether adequate nowadays—certainly where pornography is concerned.

But the fact that the market-place model is inadequate does not mean that one replaces it with monopoly and institutes censorship by the State or by worthy citizens. There should be a general presumption in favour of free expression because, as the committee says, 'censorship is in its nature a blunt and treacherous instrument'.

It is a pity that the committee, recognising as it does the dangers inherent in censorship, has reneged from the logic of its own argument in its anxiety to keep the type of films and publications which many people find offensive out of public view. Its analysis of the unsatisfactory state of the present law is excellent; so is its discussion of the principles upon which future changes should be based. It is when it addresses itself to practical proposals that the report (in my view) comes apart at the seams; yet it has given us a starting point for some fresh, and hopefully constructive, thinking.

To end on a note of qualified optimism, I do not entirely share the committee's apparent fear that a cultural Gresham's Law will ensure the triumph of the mindless and the tasteless. I believe that those who decry 'moral pollution' are fighting the wrong war with the wrong weapons. Because of its essential *irresponsibility*, I see censorship as a bigger menace than even hard-core pornography; but I believe that the cry for, and the consequently necessary battle against, censorship is a side-issue. If our culture is sick and our taste deplorable, it is because we are shirking the main issues: alienation, joylessness in the name of sanctity, the equation of sexuality with sin, the denial of individual responsibility in the name of dogma. These are all lost causes, and it is no wonder that the young turn away from their puritanical protagonists. The path away from violence and the trivialisation of sex in pornography leads through liberation, warmth, loving relationships, spontaneity—and, above all, self-esteem. Despite all the horror, cruelty, misery and filth in the world, I believe that human goodness will break through, even yet.

[Antony Grey was Secretary of the Homosexual Law Reform Society in the 1960s and has been Secretary of the Defence of Literature and the Arts Society. He is now a freelance writer and counsellor.]

JERUSALEM FROM 1967 TO 1978

by Edwin Samuel

JERUSALEM is a delightful city in which to live—a magnet which now attracts about a million visitors from all over the world throughout the year. They come in particular to visit the Old City inside its 400-year old walls and gates, its Temple area and exquisite mosques, its ancient Western ('Wailing') Wall and its many Christian sacred sites, churches, monasteries and convents. It is often said that the only city which can compare with Jerusalem in visual beauty is Venice: but Venice cannot compete with Jerusalem's 4,000 years of recorded history and its Holy Places of three great religions.

In 1918, Jerusalem was miserably poor, with a population of only 60,000. By 1948, after thirty years of British rule, its population had grown to 150,000, of whom 56 per cent were Jewish, 27 per cent Moslem and 17 per cent Christian. Today, in 1978, another thirty years later, it has a total population of 360,000, of whom 72 per cent are Jewish, 24 per cent are Moslem and only 4 per cent Christian.

Between 1948 and 1967, the City was split between Israel and Jordan, with a barbed wire fence and machine gun posts running north and south, effectively cutting it into two different worlds, as Berlin still is under Allied control on the western side and Russian control on the eastern side.

But in Jerusalem eleven years ago, as a result of the 1967 war, the barbed wire and machine gun posts were torn down. At once, thousands of Arabs from East Jerusalem poured into West Jerusalem to see its marvels. Thousands still come every morning to work in West Jerusalem, especially as building labourers; while thousands of Jews come to pray—and shop—in East Jerusalem. There is an occasional bomb explosion, but very little racial tension.

In 1967, the Municipal area was immediately trebled—from 9,500 to 27,500 acres. Many new Jewish suburbs have since been built north and south of the City. They would act as a defensive ring in the event of yet another war.

One of the first things that Sir Ronald Storrs did when he became Governor of the Jerusalem district in 1918, was to create a Pro-Jerusalem Society. He personally raised money for it in Britain: with the proceeds he began to restore its ancient walls and gates, its citadel and even to revive some of its traditional handicrafts. Between 1918 and 1926, he raised nearly two million pounds sterling. When he left to become Governor of Cyprus in 1926, the Society was wound up.

In 1965, nearly half a century later, Jerusalem's energetic Mayor, Teddy Kollek, established a similar organisation now known as The Jerusalem Foundation, but on a much larger scale. It has so far raised some £20 million pounds sterling with which to supplement the very small municipal revenue and the limited grants from the Central Government. Jerusalem is

not a commercial city like Tel Aviv, or an industrial city like Haifa, with large taxation bases. Most of Jerusalem's largest buildings were built for religious purposes and pay only one-third of the standard municipal rates.

The Jerusalem Foundation now has offices in four other countries with a total staff of forty in Jerusalem itself. Some of these are planners, others are architects. It organises no annual appeals but finds individual wealthy people and organisations (one-third not Jewish) who are prepared to underwrite the capital cost of setting up a large variety of projects. When they are completed, the cost of running them is usually taken over jointly by the Government of Israel and the Municipality of Jerusalem.

These projects can be grouped as follows:

Restoration of Historical Sites

First, the removal of hundreds of individual roof-top television aerials that were highly incongruous in the Old City. They have been replaced by a few central antennae.

Secondly, there have been many archaeological excavations and restorations, principally in the Jewish, Armenian and Moslem quarters of the Old City. These excavations have resulted in the discovery, among others, of the foundations of the long-lost Byzantine Nea ('new') church, hostel and library over 300 feet in length. The ruins of a German Crusader church—Sancta Maria — have also been found. Both of them are in the Jewish quarter of the Old City now being rebuilt after its destruction in 1948 by the Jordanians. A group of four old synagogues have also been rebuilt. The old alleys of the Jewish quarter are being maintained but the flats that abut on them are airy, with all modern facilities. Another old building that has been restored with the help of the Foundation is The Old Yishuv Court Museum. It shows what life was like in the Jewish quarter a hundred years ago.

Development of a cultural area south-west of the Jaffa Gate (outside the Old City)

This has included, first, the restoration of the Khan, an old camel caravanserai, and its use as a cultural centre and small municipal theatre. Secondly, the restoration of a continuous row of small houses originally built by Sir Moses Montefiore 118 years ago. It was the first attempt made to induce Jews to leave the security of the Old City (of which the Gates were closed by the Turkish authorities at night). Sir Moses also built a windmill to provide the residents with a source of income. The windmill is now a Montefiore museum, while the row of houses has been turned into nine flats to house distinguished guests of the City for periods up to three months at a time, such as artists, historians, musicians, novelists and photographers. Between the almshouses and the windmill a magnificent music centre has now been built where visiting musicians (for example, Isaac Stern) can encourage promising young Israeli music students. The Centre has a studio for small orchestras with elaborate recording and TV projection rooms.

Other buildings are now being restored in this southern area for a cine-

mathèque and film archives, as well as for the Jerusalem children's orchestra. All this is set in a new park.

The City Parks

The Jerusalem National Park has been planted around the outside of the Old City walls. All commercial buildings have been removed and the walls can once more be seen in their original splendour.

In addition, some eighty small neighbourhood gardens have been developed, of which fifteen are in the Arab quarters of East Jerusalem. These gardens cater for family picnicking, with playgrounds for children, and sports fields. Independence Park, on any public holiday, is made use of by a large number of families, many of them coming from outside the town.

Community Centres

In the old days, in the Jewish quarters, the synagogues served also as 'community centres'. But now, they are chiefly used for study by the aged ultra-Orthodox. The younger generations need something different and, so far, the Jerusalem Foundation has sponsored the building of ten experimental modern community centres: they are a resounding success. For the mothers, there are laundry and baby-sitting clubs, morning lessons in cooking, hairdressing, dressmaking and other crafts. There is a library and a cafeteria in each centre: two have their own swimming-pool.

One imaginative feature is the arrangements made to enable the children of large families to be looked after while the mothers are given probably their first worry-free holiday since their marriage: they come back rejuvenated.

Arabic Dramatic Group in East Jerusalem

This venture—sponsored by the Foundation—has also been an astonishing success. Young Arab volunteers produce plays in Arabic in Arab schools, community centres and the villages surrounding Jerusalem. The whole local Arab community (many of whom have never seen a play in their lives) turns out to watch, picnic and even participate.

The Jerusalem Foundation is now looking for sponsors to build a £1,500,000 Arabic Cultural Centre for Jerusalem.

The Jerusalem Committee

Municipal councils are usually parochial in outlook and dominated by local politics. For the past century Jerusalem has also followed this tradition. To circumvent undue pressures, Teddy Kollek, in 1969, set up the Jerusalem Committee composed of distinguished friends of the City, both in Israel and abroad. The Committee's members are invited periodically to Jerusalem to consider the Mayor's development proposals. As a result of the Committee's observations, some of the plans have been subsequently amended, postponed or withdrawn altogether. Those that are approved by the Committee can more easily be carried out in spite of local Jerusalem politics and Central Government doubts. The Committee now has ninety

members, of whom nearly three-quarters are not Jewish. The members come from some twenty different countries in Europe, the Americas, Asia, Africa and Australia. The members have met in Jerusalem in 1969, 1973, 1975 and 1978, serving without fee. Being independent, of high quality but with no real power, they are a kind of House of Lords for the City and have proved to be an extremely influential and helpful body.

One of the most intractable problems discussed at the Camp David summit meeting must undoubtedly have been the future status of Jerusalem. Many proposals for the control of Jerusalem have been made since World War I. Those launched between 1936 and 1947 are well set out in *Jerusalem, Bridging the Four Walls; A Geopolitical Perspective* (1977, Herzl Press, New York). The author, Professor Saul B. Cohen, is director of the graduate school of geography at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts. In this book he discusses the proposals made successively by Archer Cust (1936); the (Peel) Royal Commission (1937); the Woodhead Commission (1938); the World Jewish Agency (1937) by Morrison and Grady (1947) and by UNSCOP (the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine of 1947). Incidentally, the UNSCOP plan provided that Jerusalem should become an international zone.

The problem of Jerusalem is highly complex: it comprises at least four different questions: they are, national sovereignty; the administration of the Holy Places (sacred to three different world religions); municipal administration and the convenience of the inhabitants.

As regards the last, it is only fair to state that the majority of the inhabitants of Jerusalem—both Jewish and Arab—would prefer an open city without a barbed wire fence down the middle of it.

As regards municipal administration, proposals have been made by various people (including Professor Cohen himself) for a system of separate Jewish and Arab boroughs within a unified city on the lines of the borough system in use in both London and New York. This, however, cannot be operated in Jerusalem without whole-hearted acceptance by Arab leaders both in Jerusalem and elsewhere (particularly in Jordan). At present, the leading Arabs in Jerusalem have steadfastly refused to participate in the present Municipal Council.

The administration of the Holy Places arouses deep emotions. Even so, the Turkish Government decided, as far back as 1865, that everything should continue in future as it had in the past (the *Status quo ante*).

The Holy Places in Jerusalem today are handled with extreme caution. Moslem and Christian Holy Places are out-of-bounds to Israeli (Jewish) troops. There is a special unit of the Jerusalem district Israeli police force trained to maintain order in accordance with the *Status quo ante*. In the last resort, the matter is referred to a special section of the Israel Ministry for Religious Affairs.

Today, if any religious authority requires more formal control of its own Holy Places, for example, an international Moslem Council to supervise the Moslem shrines in Jerusalem, it should be possible to devise one. But when one comes to the Christian Holy Places (over which there are occas-

ional disputes between Christians), it is more difficult. The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine provided for a Holy Places' Commission to be set up to deal with all disputes over the Holy Places. However, France and Italy, both leading Catholic Powers, could not agree on who should be the chairman, so it was never set up. The absence of such a body to adjudicate on the rival claims of Moslems and Jews to the Wailing Wall led to the disastrous riots of 1929.

The basic problem, nevertheless, is one of national sovereignty. Although Jerusalem has been the capital of Israel since 1948, the major countries, such as the United States, Britain and France, do not recognise Jerusalem as Israel's capital and still keep their embassies in Tel Aviv. As the reunification of Jerusalem in 1967 was also the result of a war, even Israel's archaeological research and preservation in East Jerusalem is sometimes challenged as being contrary to international law.

To add to these complexities is Russia's discomfort at any increase in American influence in the Middle East. Israel is some 8,000 miles from the United States but only 800 miles from Russia. Although Russia was among the first countries to welcome the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 (and built a large embassy near Tel Aviv), it broke off diplomatic relations with Israel after the war of 1967. A few years ago, to make the position even worse, Egypt moved out of the Russian sphere of influence into the American orbit. In consequence, Russia now supports Egypt's political rivals—Syria, Iraq, Libya, etc., who regard Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977 as treachery to the United Arab Front against Israel.

Thus, it must be acknowledged that there is a great deal of political and religious unravelling to be done, both locally and internationally, before there can be any lasting peaceful change in the present status of the City of Jerusalem.

[The second Viscount Samuel (Edwin Herbert Samuel, 1898-1978), eldest son of the first Viscount who was formerly Sir Herbert Samuel and at one time leader of the Liberal party, had served the interests of Palestine and the Middle East throughout a long career in the Colonial Service and Public Administration. He was for several years Director of the Palestine Broadcasting Company and Senior Lecturer on British Institutions at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; also Principal of the Institute of Public Administration which he helped to found. After his retirement he devoted himself to authorship, publishing several volumes of short stories and a number of articles in a wide variety of magazines and periodicals. He was a regular contributor of *Contemporary Review*.]

GEORGE ELIOT'S WEDDING

by Rosalind Wade

THERE can be an advantage in the celebration of anniversaries. During 1980 the deaths of George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans) in 1880 and D. H. Lawrence in 1930 have provided useful opportunities for reassessment, although in the case of Lawrence speculation continued throughout his lifetime and beyond. By contrast, the acclaimed Victorian novelist has come in for very meagre biographical attention. The known facts of her life were not disputed and the only one to arouse controversy was her marriage to John Walter Cross in May 1880. Then, at the age of sixty-one, 'given away' by her unofficial step-son, Charles Lee Lewes, she made religious vows for the first and only time in her life.

Only eighteen months had passed since the death from cancer of her 'life-partner', George Henry Lewes. The man who for twenty-five years had structured her career and fuelled her intellect was speedily replaced by a handsome, wealthy, forty-year-old. It should have been an occasion for general rejoicing but was far from being anything of the kind. True, the Cross family were delighted; several devoted friends and members of the Lewes family offered loyal congratulations and the estranged brother, Isaac Pearson Evans, edged cautiously towards reconciliation. Yet the public and some acquaintances voiced harsh condemnation. Mary Gladstone noted in her journal 'George Eliot is married which is a crushing blow to me'. And Eliza Lynn Linton, that most volatile and vitriolic of literary commentators wrote that she had always regarded the marriage as:

> A crowning act of weakness in her (George Eliot's) life. It stultified and degraded her past and took from it that softening veil of poetry and quasi-sanctity which intense passion and unswerving constancy would have given it to the end.

It was left to Oscar Browning to provide a more objective analysis of the situation.

> The world which had forgiven her relations with Lewes on the ground that they rose from an overmastering devotion was shocked when it found that the affection which had caused such an act of sacrifice was capable of being succeeded by another equally strong.

Some murmurs of justification pointed out that above all else the novelist needed 'love'; that she had become accustomed to 'solitude *à deux*' and could not exist without the support of strong arms, in which case any relationship was better than none. In fact, the foremost novelist of her day was a strong person; otherwise she would scarcely have weathered the turmoil of her early years.

A rebel daughter, aware that filial duty debarred her from a fully professional career, she had rashly exposed her spirit to personal rebuff on two occasions: first by a girlhood 'rave' on the egotistical Dr. Brabant and later from her kindly Swiss landlord and teacher, Alexander D'Albert Durade.

When, in 1851, she began working for John Chapman on the *Westminster Review* she survived the hostile envy of his wife and mistress who

combined forces to scare away a dangerous rival. Yet she returned and during the tempestuous years at 142 The Strand carried through a formidable programme of literary and editorial work. Distinguished contributors to the *Review* and guests at the Chapmans' *salons* accepted her on equal terms, so that to underestimate her ability to survive would be misleading. Even before the end of the ill-starred 'affair' with Chapman she was consoled by a growing intimacy with Herbert Spencer, of which we have clear corroboration in his autobiography. Mary Ann Evans could not know that very soon his own psychological predicament would rebound on her. Herbert Spencer was not unique in preferring the safe harbourage of his mother's home to the responsibilities of marriage. His alibi had been that no woman could measure up to his intellectual requirements. When gossip bracketed his name with one who was entirely fitted to become his wife he withdrew, suavely, yet none the less brutally.

George Henry Lewes had been on the periphery of her life throughout her time on the *Review,* though there is little evidence that she showed any particular interest in him. Sometimes she admired his work, yet was often critical of his judgements and journalistic ability. About his appearance she was uncompromising, not surprisingly, for even his friends thought him over-ebullient and ugly. Later, she modified her opinion . . 'Lewes is better than he seems . . .' In fact, everyone who came to know him well acknowledged his charm and versatility. Yet nothing in these casual exchanges prepared friends and acquaintances for her departure with him to the Continent on July 20th 1854: anymore than for the event which led to the cryptic entry in her journal:

> May 6.—Married this day at 10.15 to John Walter Cross at St. George's, Hanover Square. Present, Charles, who gave me away, Mr. and Mrs. Druce, Mr. Hall, William, Mary, Eleanor, and Florence Cross. We went back to The Priory, where we signed our wills. Then we started for Dover, and arrived there a little after five o'clock.

She first met John Walter Cross in Rome in 1869. At that time, George Eliot had reached her zenith both as a woman and a writer. The impact she made on this much younger person can best be indicated by quoting a passage from his much reviled *Life of George Eliot,* which will be seen none the less to have its own value:

> It was during this journey that I, for the first time, saw my future wife at Rome. My eldest sister had married Mr. W. H. Bullock (now Mr. W. H. Hall), of Six-Mile Bottom, Cambridgeshire, and they were on their wedding journey at Rome, when they happened to meet Mr. and Mrs. Lewes by chance in the Pamfili Doria Gardens. They saw a good deal of one another, and when I arrived with my mother and another sister, we went by invitation to call at the Hotel Minerva, where Mr. Lewes had found rooms on their first arrival in Rome. I have a very vivid recollection of George Eliot sitting on a sofa with my mother by her side, entirely engrossed with her. Mr. Lewes entertained my sister and me on the other side of the room. But I was very anxious to hear also the conversation on the sofa, as I was better acquainted with George Eliot's books than with any other literature. And through the dimness of these fifteen years, and all that has happened in them, I still seem to hear, as I first heard them, the low, earnest, deep musical tones of her voice: I still seem to see the fine brows, with the abundant auburn-brown hair framing them, the long head broadening at the back, the grey-blue eyes, constantly changing in

> expression, but always with a very loving, almost deprecating, look at my mother, the finely-formed, thin, transparent hands, and a whole *Wesen*, that seemed in complete harmony with everything one expected to find in the author of *Romola*. The next day Mr. and Mrs. Lewes went on to Assisi and we to Naples, and we did not meet again till the following August at Weybridge.

It is obvious from a later comment that they discussed the novels in some detail, because he mentions her dismay when he said he found her novels 'sad'. This single-minded attention from one who had not been privy to the drudgery of creation must have been nectar even to a successful novelist.

George Henry Lewes was the author of a number of important books, including two novels, one of them praised by Charlotte Brontë. Having set Mary Ann Evans on the course of writing fiction under the famous pseudonym, there is evidence that he often 'advised' her more forcefully than was wise. The detailed discussion of plots and characters, combined with a veritable avalanche of business correspondence with John Blackwood, her publisher, must often have diminished her pleasure in the work. This is not to suggest that there was no benefit or satisfaction in the long association or that she failed to become 'attached' (her word) to the man who provided so much interest and enjoyment. It is to say that she was never in love with him but was powerfully attracted by John Walter Cross from the moment of their first meeting, after which the two households were constantly in touch although seldom, presumably, with the opportunity for *tête à tête*. Her letters to Cross over this period reveal a spontaneity lacking in the voluminous screeds which flowed from her pen to friends and literary associates. John Walter Cross was not the first man to step out of line with the generations or to find the aura of mature success far more compelling than anything offered by his own contemporaries.

For Mary Ann Evans, the association with Lewes had been an escape route, yet the price paid for it was high. Total alienation from her family was something she had not anticipated—or thought to ward off by a transparent misrepresentation:

> You will be surprised, I dare say and I hope not sorry, to learn that I have changed my name, and have someone to take care of me in the world. The event is not at all a sudden one, though it may appear sudden in its announcement to you. My husband has been known to me for several years, and I am well acquainted with his mind and character.

Her desire to maintain contact with the family at all costs betrayed her into an almost servile pleading with Isaac Evans for news of their sister, Chrissie, and her children, who were at the time gravely ill . . 'I try to hope that no news is good news but if you do not think it too troublesome to write, I shall be thankful to have that hope changed into certainty . . .' Yet Isaac remained implacable and one effect of the break was her growing determination to camouflage the irregular union with all the trappings of 'respectability'. Very soon the woman who had remarked of *Jane Eyre* that . . . 'All self-sacrifice is good but one would like it to be in a somewhat nobler cause than that of a diabolical law which chains a man body and soul to a putrefying carcase . . .' was writing and talking about the insolubility of marriage.

For George Henry Lewes there had been no comparable problem. A scientist rather than a 'believer', one would not have expected him to put too much value on a marriage certificate, although had his wife been willing he might well have appreciated a stable union. Yet since the law as it stood ruled out any possibility of divorce his alternative was to lead a solitary life or find a partner who, like himself, had little to lose.

But to return to the period immediately following his death. It was natural that George Eliot suffered shock and grief. In any case, the convention of the times insisted that she must be seen to be doing so. Yet very soon, according to gossip and recorded comment, Cross was calling and taking her to exhibitions and concerts. Some of her letters to him reveal an almost coquettish stance, but the one written on October 16th 1879, published for the first time in Volume 7 of Professor Gordon Haight's *The George Eliot Letters*, strikes a deeper note . . . 'Best loved and loving one, the sun it shines so cold, so cold when there are no eyes to look love on me. . . . Through everything else, dear tender one, there is the blessing of trusting in thy goodness . . .' and concluding . . . 'at this particular moment thy tender Beatrice'.

That the ghost of George Henry Lewes was easily laid is confirmed by the choice of the same hotel at Dover for the first night of the honeymoon and a continental route very similar to that taken in 1854 and later journeys. Milan and Venice were all enchantment to the honeymooners. Little is known of the personal adjustment necessary between two people of such widely different age and experience. John Walter Cross's own account of the holiday is unrevealing, and his references to the indisposition which attacked him while in Venice remained puzzling until Professor Haight's researches discovered that the illness was in fact a mental breakdown. We know that George Eliot was deeply perturbed and that she telegraphed for her brother-in-law, William Cross, to come at once to Venice. What happened after that to the relationship was not important. Her own rapidly deteriorating health allowed for only a brief period of married life in the newly equipped home in Cheyne Walk.

Her death in December 1880 must have come as a profound shock to John Walter Cross. His self appointed task was to prepare a memorial *Life* published in 1884 based on her letters, which he truncated and rearranged. As he himself explained, he does not know that

> *the particular method in which I have treated the letters has ever been adopted before. Each letter has been pruned of everything that seemed to me not relevant to my purpose—of everything that I thought my wife would wish to be omitted.*

Sad that the result was to bury beneath a torrent of correspondence the spirited woman so vividly remembered from her Fleet Street days.

QUARTERLY FILM REVIEW

by James Morton

THE films this last quarter have rather flattered to deceive. A new Clint Eastwood is always a big box office pull. A new John Huston is always to be welcomed by critics and public alike. The new Monty Python has been long awaited. Each is something of a disappointment. There has been one film, however, which is an almost unqualified successs. Having said that I would repeat my enthusiasm for the Peter Yates' film *Breaking Away*. Everyone I have met who has seen it has been charmed by it. Everyone reports ecstatic applause after the big set piece, the bicycle race. If you see no other film this year do see that. If you see two films, then *My Brilliant Career* should surely be the second one.

This beautifully photographed film is an adaption of an early autobiographical novel by journalist, union organiser, nurse, Miles Franklin. She initially wished to be a musician. This is the story of her early struggles in Possum Gully somewhere in the Australian outback. The daughter of the feckless father of a large family, she has the opportunity for better things when she is first invited to stay with her maternal grandmother; the lady lives in some style. Her second stroke of luck is when the local squire (Sam Neill) falls in love with her.

Initially the girl (wonderfully played by Judy Davis) cannot believe she will ever be attractive. This is one of the strengths of the film. We see her nourished and blossom minute by minute. It is possible that she might have settled to a domesticated life with Neill but his fortunes take a turn for the worse and at the same time her father fails to pay his mortgage. From the provincial glories of Five Bob Down she is more or less sold into slavery as the means of redeeming her father's mortgage. In fact she is obliged to teach the recalcitrant children of an immigrant Irish labourer who has placed his money wisely. They are by no means unkind to her, merely totally unfeeling. She continues to write and to teach the elder son. At the end of this film Neill returns, his estates saved, at least, temporarily. He asks Judy Davis to marry him and she declines.

I wonder whether this is in fact the weakness of the film. She so clearly hated her time with the Irish and enjoyed the social life of Five Bob Downs so much that this *volte face* doesn't completely come off. After all, she could have married, continued writing and tended the cattlehands' wives in childbirth concurrently. Nevertheless the film is one to mark down. It is one which occasionally niggles during the opening twenty minutes or so. It's a bit like *Elvira Madigan Goes To Alice Springs* from time to time, but the lasting effect is stunning.

John Huston's *Wise Blood* is a thoroughly interesting and often compelling story of half a dozen dangerous lunatics wandering abroad in

Macon, Georgia, home of the Bible belt. Based on an out of print novel by Flannery Connor, this is the tale of a soldier (Brad Douriff) demobbed after Vietnam who returns to find the old clapboard house of his mother boarded up; mother presumably dead, and so decides to set up the Church of Christ without Christ from the bonnet of a dilapidated motorcar, which is his pride and joy. He is a singularly unprepossessing young man who not surprisingly attracts only a limited itinerant congregation. Indeed he seems deliberately to discourage believers, a helpful huckster offers to take a collection for him but he declines this service and when the huckster sets up with a rival the 'false' preacher is summarily despatched by our hero who just runs him down.

In the meantime he has been befriended by the daughter(?) of a preacher who in a moment of religious fervour has thrown acid in his eyes. The daughter seeks to seduce Brad and indeed lives with him for a short time. The second surviving member of the congregation is a young man who is making a study of apes and who ends his part in the film by stealing the skin of a carnival ape. He then wanders round Macon trying to shake hands with people with the words 'Shake hands with Gonzo, King of the Jungle.' Since he carries out this exercise in the twilight it is not surprisingly rejected and he lumbers off prompt side. On balance this is really rather a shame because there is still a half hour of the film to go. Meanwhile, back in his motor car, Brad has decided to leave town. He is stopped by a Patrolman who boots the already dying car into a watery grave in the river. This seems to break our hero's already tenuous hold on reality and he blinds himself. He also takes to punishing himself by wearing wire around his chest and putting stones in his shoes. His landlady takes these things tolerantly but when she decides she must marry him he tries to catch pneumonia. He is found by some police, returned to her bosom but when she says he may stay even if he won't marry her he refuses to answer. Is he dead, in a catatonic trance, sleeping or merely sulking? We shall have to wait for the reissue of Miss Connor's book to find out.

What is the film all about? I have said before that Huston's tests high on loyalty and I *think Wise Blood* is about loyalty. It is certainly not about ecology. The pollution of the river by the car puts paid to that theory. It is not about happiness. The characters are the most miserable you could find. Far more miserable than those in *Fat City* which is something of a companion piece. It might be that Huston is becoming an American Bunuel. It might be a satire on the Bible belt. It is certainly very watchable.

More dangerous lunatics are abroad in Joan Tewkesbury's *Old Boyfriends*. This time they are called Tania Shire and Keith Carradine (son of John, brother of David). This is not quite a remake of that wonderful old Duvivier film *Carnet de Bal* but is based on the same search for times past. Ms. Shire who is a hospital worker and also some sort of patient sets out to look up her old boyfriends working back in time, from her varsity days to high school. Again she is in search of happiness and finds the man

who proposed to her and was rejected three times, now divorced. She moves in with him for a bit, is rejected by him and decides to humiliate a former boyfriend who once confiscated her panties on the school playground. The third and longest sequence is when she finds her other boyfriend is dead and only his younger brother (Mr. Carradine) is alive. Mr. Carradine has read, it would seem, Miss Connor's novels because he is almost catatonic. In what is described as role transference and replay type situation she manages to get him straight back into the mental hospital and herself narrowly avoids that fate through TRUE LOVE. That is because her first boyfriend (the rejected/ing one) redeems her. The film has at least a beginning, a middle and an end. Divided, quite deliberately into segments, it is something of a hybrid. Part road movie, part episode, it never quite works. Ms Shire, a Liza Minelli look alike, goes through the motions but one never actually feels involved. In fact it is really rather like a clever made-for-TV film in which one can leave to make some coffee or let the dog out. One might even take it for a run without missing too much.

The same rather applies to the latest Clint Eastwood vehicle, *Escape from Alcatraz,* in which he reenacts a true life escape which must have been incredible if only for the ineptitude of the guards who apparently take no notice of the use of an electric drill after lights out. The first half hour of the film is rivetting. The best sort of prison drama. Eastwood is brought to the island Alcatraz amidst a thunderstorm. His first few days in the prison, the black friend he makes in the library, the homosexual he provokes in the showers are all handsomely done. And then suddenly Eastwood and the film switch into automatic drive. The tension of the personal rivalries in the prison are gone. It is a routine escape drama done far better in *The Wooden Horse* and *The Great Escape.* One of the difficulties is that the escapes are featureless and we never learn anything about them. This may well be accurate. Prisoners do tend to become faceless but it doesn't make for good cinema. Even the final encounter with the homosexual who has been gunning for him from the first reel is a non-event. It is playing to packed houses, but Eastwood and Don Siegel, the director, did much better in *Dirty Harry* and *The Beguiled.*

Monthy Python's *Life of Brian* is the second narrative film by the television team. This time the eponymous hero is the child born in Bethlehem, not a dozen stables away from Jesus. He is constantly mistaken for a Saviour. There are one or two stunningly good visual jokes and some really schoolboy humour. In fact there's enough bad taste to offend almost everyone.

Silver Dream Racer stars fading pop idol David Essex as a motor cyclist bent on defeating evil ever-young Beau Bridges (son of Lloyd). Cristina Raines is the groupie who displays as much animation as the cleaning woman in a Tom and Jerry. Event the puffer on the commercials sounds disheartened. Unless you are a biker this one is eminently missable.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

AUDEN AND DAY-LEWIS

W. H. Auden—The Life of a Poet. Charles Osborne. Eyre Methuen. £7.95.
C. Day-Lewis—An English Literary Life. Sean Day-Lewis. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £12.50.

'Most poets' said Wystan Auden to an interviewer 'are bad characters, vain and selfish.' These biographies of two of the best-known English poets of the last half century provide some limited support for such a thesis. Auden is generally accepted as a great poet, Day-Lewis in spite of being poet-laureate, as a minor one. Auden was an active homosexual with one heterosexual departure. His 'affairs' were numerous, though he was happily associated with one particular man for many years. Day-Lewis was married twice. His first wife a generous mother-figure, his second greatly gifted and charming. He could write of himself: 'I don't approve the moral desperado inside me (I've had seven mistresses—statistic, not boast) and try to prevent him getting out, with only moderate success so far.' The statistic, says his son, was boosted by two or three during his second marriage. On the indications here 'seven mistresses' would seem to be an under-statement.

Both books make excellent reading, but there is a depth of complicated filial piety in that of Sean Day-Lewis which Osborne cannot rival. There has been prolonged controversy as to whether the latter should have written his book at all, in view of Auden's wishes. Here, on the face of it, I side with Osborne, but without much knowledge of the facts.

Neither book is a critical study of the poetry, though each throws light on the origins of many of the poems. They set our minds working on the moral, rather than the aesthetic values involved.

Both poets were on occasion supremely insensitive. Auden having spent the war in the security of America, presented himself at the end of it in London as a major in American uniform 'with a new American accent'. His effrontery was staggering. 'There was not a word from Uncle Sam Auden about what we had endured . . . there was not even a personal word of sympathy to a former friend about the discomforts of flying bombs and flying glass and trying to work while a whole building shook and swayed about one, under the impact of high explosive.'

Edmund Wilson describes the arrogant line that he took with Stephen Spender. 'Without showing the least embarrassment, he complained about the coldness of English houses, and of other hardships of life in England, and told them that London hadn't really been bombed. They were speechless with indignation having, they said, politely restrained themselves, when he explained to them the purpose of his mission, from remarking what a pity that he had had no personal experience of the psychological effects of bombing. He also assured them—being a homosexual chauvinist—that General Eisenhower was queer.'

The style of Day-Lewis's repudiation of his wife and mistress of nine years' standing (not to mention the lady who had borne a child by him) was not dissimilar, when he announced his intention to marry the young Jill Balcon: 'What was almost the worst thing to bear, for both Mary and me, was what appeared to be his complete change of personality towards us both after he

had struck us down', Rosamond recalled. 'He wore a triumphant smirk, and seemed convinced that he was completely justified. We both felt that we were nothing but obstacles in the way of his desires and determination. No kindness, no courtesy, sympathy or (apparently) conscience.'

His first wife said after his death that Cecil knew that she would always have had him back. But Rosamond Lehmann's heart was broken, though when he was dying she expressed herself ready to visit him. Must we excuse such callousness as the egotism of the artist? It is on record that both made and kept many friends.

Day-Lewis made a noble stoical death unassisted by the consolations of religion. The weeping women and the stiff upper-lipped men were no mean tribute. His death is beautifully described in these pages. Auden's death was perhaps a merciful release. He had taken quite early in life to various forms of drug and later on drink got hold of him in a big way. His first return to Oxford was a triumphant success, with under-graduates hanging on his words at the Cadena cafe and elsewhere. Later on he became a pathetic figure when he was given rooms in Christ Church and found it difficult to hold the attention of his colleagues with his familiar anecdotes.

Neither made much sense when he got near politics. Day-Lewis's 'communism' was a strange aberration, though no doubt it was sincere at the time. Auden quoted Johnson as saying 'the aim of writing is to enable readers a little better to enjoy life, or a little better to endure it'. By that test both poets emerged with honours.

FRANK LONGFORD

JUDGE SIRICA AND WATERGATE

To Set the Record Straight: The Break-in, the Tapes, the Conspirators, the Pardon. John J. Sirica. Norton. £9.25.

Watergate already seems a piece of distant history and a British reader might well ask why yet one more study of it is required. Each participant no doubt feels entitled to his 'piece of the action' and the financial rewards that go with its attendant fame. But if the 'villains' like John Dean and John Ehrlichman can make fortunes from their Watergate-based biographies and plays, why not a 'hero' like Judge Sirica?

His account—which could not appear until now because some law suits were still being heard until last spring—tells the story clearly and well even if without any new revelations. The Judge's own life story, in which he takes a proper pride, is that of a poor boy with little in the way of formal legal training who was rewarded aged 53 with a District of Columbia District Court judgeship by Eisenhower as part of a reward for Republican Party services. He had made his mark as a professional boxer and Jack Dempsey was best man at his wedding. He had come up through the rough-and-tumble police and criminal courts; at the age of 70 he was thrust into a big and frightening drama. He was aware of the awesome nature of the tasks that fell to him when Watergate broke and he does not hide the strain the trials imposed—they ran on for over 4 years and constituted one of the most important constitutional cases in American history; from the first indictments against a bizarre band of 'third-rate burglars' through a series of legal alterations over executive privilege to the final judgments rendered against the President's aides and assistants.

Sirica emerges as a warm and transparently honest man, aware of his own quick temper and determined to uphold the law, whatever the consequences

and worries over the searchlight of publicity. He admits that if Nixon had told his aides in 1972, on first hearing of the Watergate break-in, that the culprits should be found and punished, there would have been no Watergate affair, that Nixon's record as President in both foreign and domestic policy was highly creditable, and that indeed, given the scale of his electoral victory in November 1972, this 'bugging' of the opposition H.Q. was totally unnecessary. Nixon destroyed himself by his own zeal, and by what Sirica regards as his greed for power; and he encouraged or at least permitted his henchmen to transgress the law in their zeal on his behalf. From one angle, Nixon's only error was to defend his overzealous henchmen. Ike had not tried to 'cover up' for Sherman Adams and no vicuna tarnished the White House in his day. Judged by political rather than legal standards, it might even be asked: must not every senior politician do some covering up all the time? If not, his lieutenants will not work very hard for him. But Sirica is judge, not politician, and emerges as an admirable and worthy man. He saw himself as no mere referee but, in Felix Frankfurter's phrase as 'a functionary of Justice'. He imposed severe sentences and believed in 'just punishment for offences'. He was 'Maximum John'. He regretted the pardon that Gerald Ford gave Nixon —a pardon that, he believes, cost Ford the election in 1976 and put Jimmy Carter in the White House. It is all a sad and ugly story but the Italian-American judge on his lonely bench is a vivid and noble and endearing figure.

ESMOND WRIGHT

INSIDE STORY

The Last Edwardian at No. 10. An Impression of Harold Macmillan. George Hutchinson. Quartet Books. £6.50.

This short, well-written appreciation of Harold Macmillan is a model for 'impressionist' biographers, who wish to convey the essential character, the style and temperament of their subject. Brevity alone compels the author to be selective and in the case of Mr. Hutchinson selective from 'an overflowing canvas', as he admits in his Introduction. Hutchinson not only knew Macmillan well and liked him but he also had a unique knowledge of the inside working of the Conservative Party. How happy that he just outlived the publication of this widely admired book.

One valuable ingredient of these 150 pages is the verbatim reprint of Iain Macleod's famous article in the Spectator (Jan. 17, 1974) on the Douglas-Home succession. No historian can overlook the special relationship between Macmillan and Butler. Hutchinson refers to 'Macleod's rejoinder, intimately informed, outspoken and magisterial, to a book by Randolph Churchill, *The fight for the Tory Leadership*'. Was not Hutchinson the Managing Director of the Spectator in 1974? And did not Hutchinson write one of Macmillan's most stirring speeches on Europe, when he visited his old constituency of Stockton-on-Tees, April 1962? On page 84 he admits as much and adds 'I am not sure that I still agree with it?' One wonders whether Macmillan himself has reservations or second thoughts on this and other aspects of his policies.

It is, of course, far too early to assess Macmillan's place in history. While reviewing the sixth volume of his autobiography in this Journal, I wrote: 'What then of Mr. Macmillan's solid achievements? It is not enough to have kept one's party in power; it is of course remarkable to have written 2¼ million words in ten years after retirement. But how shall we place this man in the evolution of British politics, this man who lived through 50 years of changing history and was an active Member of Parliament and a social reformer in his

early years?' Hutchinson describes him not only as *The Last Edwardian at No. 10* but also as 'at heart a Whig, like some of the best of Conservatives.' I knew him in his early years when he wrote *The Middle Way* (1938) and some of us were establishing P.E.P. (Political and Economic Planning) which has its Jubilee next year; and then on and off until I visited him in King Edward's Hospital a few years ago. He then expressed to me, as apparently he did to Hutchinson, his frank views about the possibility of a *National Government.* In Macmillan's words as revealed by Hutchinson: 'Parliament is increasingly challenged by the bureaucracy, which is getting very strong and by the Trade Unions. The Trade Unions run the present government. Sooner or later, this battle will come to an issue, which reduces the importance of parties, so to speak. A paradox. What will parliament do.' In a word, Macmillan in his alert and interested retirement posed the right question. One has to ask him in return two questions: What would he be doing, if back in office? And secondly, Why did he not foresee these inevitable dilemmas?

Here we enter a speculative no-man's land. My own view is that Macmillan, like Lloyd George and Churchill before him, was a challenging and innovative Prime Minister, but clearly of lesser calibre, possibly because he was never a wartime Prime Minister. He created what might be called a *Macmillan Era,* partly because like Asquith, he put off the day of reckoning and attended to the greater details of politics, but also because in the words of his biographer: 'He continued to look forward with hope: hope founded by the insights of a cultivated mind and the instincts of a compassionate nature fortified by an understanding of the lessons of history and an ability to distinguish between the greater and the lesser objectives in the political direction of human affairs: in sum, one might say, the attributes—the equipment of statesmanship.'

The cynics will not agree with this roseate conclusion: they will say he was a cunning and ruthless politician, a ham performer on the stage of politics, that he initiated policies on finance, on Africa and Europe which have not stood the test of time. But this is a far too facile specimen of hindsight based on too narrow a period of time.

Harold Macmillan is still with us and remains a star on television and at many a University ceremony at Oxford. For me George Hutchinson is fair and I warmly commend his book.

KENNETH LINDSAY

THE WORK OF SOCIOBIOLOGY

Sociobiology: The Whisperings Within. David Barash. Souvenir Press. £6.50.

In the late 20th Century new specialities sprout like mushrooms. Ephemerality is the touchstone of some; others, propelled by an intrinsic momentum, carve a niche for themselves in contemporary history. Sociobiology, since the term was coined by Dr. Edward Wilson of Harvard University in 1975, is definitely in the latter category. It binds together a conglomeration of evolutionary theory based mainly on social Darwinism, and an ecological perspective; above all, it is concerned with attitudes and behaviour. The pioneering work in the speciality was conducted in animals. Now, as David Barash promulgates on the basis of a mass of information both substantive and speculative, it has a wide applicability to *homo sapiens.*

Early chapters review the current state of play of the literative *vis-à-vis* animals. They make an entertaining and often humorous saga. We read of alcoholic mice, of the nesting proclivities of lovebirds, of horses bred for war, of commercialised racoons (trained to deposit coins in a piggy bank), of lesbian

gulls, rapist ducks, homosexual worms, lecherous bullfrogs. The biology of the 'double standard' is a feature of the animal kingdom. Males are expected to be promiscuous, less discriminating sexually, philanderers *par excellence*. Infidelity in females is upbraided, subjected to invective and opprobrium, liable to end up in a summary dismissal from the planet.

Human analogies flow fast and free. The cuckolded husband is an object of pity and derision. Boys tend to be more active and aggressive than girls; unless, of course, the latter are exposed *in utero* to the male sex hormone, testosterone, in excessive quantities under which circumstances they become the archetypal 'tomboys' and are often brought to a doctor for advice. The 'nuclear family' the product of Judeo-Christian culture, is a relatively recent event and might well be an aberration. The 'weakness' of males, generally attributed to their carrying the vulnerable Y chromosome, may constitute natural selection in its purest form. Evolution is dubbed a tyrant, affecting both sexes in different ways, persistent, remorseless, taking no cognizance of freedom and individual choice.

The final chapter insists that a bridge exists between evolutionary biology and human behaviour. Criticisms of sociobiology—that it is racist and sexist, erodes the dignity of man, has a penchant for the preservation of the *status quo*, offers excuses for injustice and policies of *laissez-faire*—are unequivocably rejected. On the contrary its political, moral and ethical implications are picayune. Like other branches of science it must make its imprimatur on objective criteria alone.

Barash has produced a challenging and entertaining book. The lightness of style, the verbal dexterity obvious in the text should not be permitted to obscure the importance of the themes which he covers. Although an academic by training and inclination this is not the work of a 'desiccated calculating machine'. Instead it is a cogent, thought-provoking and readable account of a burgeoning speciality which will undoubtedly grow in stature in the decades which lie ahead.

JOHN A. LORAINE

THE FUTURE OF BIRTH CONTROL

The Politics of Contraception. Carl Djerassi. W. W. Norton & Co., New York & London. £6.50.

As regards the oral contraceptive Pill—undoubtedly one of the great medical discoveries of this century—two names have left their historical imprimatur. The first is Gregory Pincus, who performed much of the biological work in animals and then proceeded to clinical trials in Haiti, Puerto Rico and eventually worldwide. The second is the author of this work, Carl Djerassi, then working in Mexico with the industrial firm of Syntex, whose skill and innovative flair in the field of steroid biochemistry enabled him to synthesise the first human contraceptive.

Djerassi's comments on the future of birth control are therefore well worth noting. And in this book he provides a prognosis that can only be described as bleak. 'Lead times' for the development of new forms of contraception are inordinately long; public fears about side effects, particularly cancer, have received much attention from the media; funding for new ideas in this general field—research on the male pill, pregnancy vaccination, the fertility-regulating activities of plants—has been exiguous by any standards.

In a treatise exuding pessimism the Chinese exemplar is the only iridescent jewel in the crown. China is the world's supermarket *vis-à-vis* birth control;

the consumer has at his or her disposal almost every type of modern contraceptive hardware; more women are taking the Pill in China than in any other country in the world; indigenous manufacture of steroid contraceptives is generously supported. Unlike other Marxist countries—the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Cuba are examples—the overall Chinese approach to population is strongly anti-natalist. It is now generally agreed that since Mao founded the Peoples' Republic in 1948 one of the great demographic events in human history has taken place. Chinese propaganda has assiduously fostered the beliefs that marriage should be late and that the two child norm is *de rigueur*. The propaganda has been notably successful and by the mid 1980s the Chinese rate of population growth should be less than 1% per annum.

Djerassi's book is especially valuable in pinpointing the major disadvantages which accrue from the highly protectionist policies adopted by organisations like the US Food and Drugs Administration in relation to the testing of new contraceptives. The world is already grossly overpopulated; and in spite of a slight slowing in the overall rate of growth in the 1970s it is still likely to be asked to support numbers in excess of 10,000 million by the middle of the 21st century. Our attempts to conquer overpopulation, that most formidable of adversaries, should evoke in us our best and most imaginative responses; and amid such responses the thrust to discover new and more reliable methods of birth control must be paramount. Djerassi is appalled by our sluggishness and lack of imagination in this area and after reading his book it would be difficult to disagree with him. The speciality of reproductive biology badly needs a shot in the arm. If this book provides it, it will have more than served its purpose.

JOHN A. LORAINE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIEVAL DRAMATIC ART

The Medieval Theatre. Glynne Wickham. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £4.95 (paperback).

So many academic treatises on the theatre forget that the plays described are there to be acted that an appendix to Professor Wickham's book (rightly reprinted now for a larger audience) comes as what a once-familiar poet called 'a boon and a blessing to men'.

Prof. Wickham always remembers the debt owed to actors, designers, and directors who have animated so much for modern audiences. His appendix is a calendar of 20th century revivals of the Mystery Cycles and other major religious plays of the English Middle Ages. It is odd, in the period of *Jesus Christ Superstar,* to recall that, as late as 1909, Nugent Monck (the name is misspelt here) was arrested on a charge of violating the Blasphemy Law; he allowed Christ to appear on the stage in the production of a medieval Passion Play for the English Drama Society in London.

The list of later productions is long and splendid. One notes particularly the work of Dr. E. Martin Browne, who has been the king-post of religious drama in Britain. Nobody who was there can have forgotten the York Cycle before the ruins of St. Mary's Abbey during the Festival of Britain, 1951; on that June night, serene but with a hint of northern steel, the religious faith of the Middle Ages flowered again. More recently we have had the National Theatre's production (1977) of the Passion Plays from the York Cycle, at the Cottesloe.

In writing of the development of dramatic art in Europe between the 10th and 16th centuries, Professor Wickham moves from Byzantium to the remoter English villages. He has divided his book (most expertly and valuably) into three parts: the theatres of worship, of leisure and pleasure, and of commerce. Considering this complex task, performed with a scholar's clarity and ease, a reviewer has to behave like the Dickensian Mrs. Todgers, who went 'a-dodgin' among the tender bits with a fork'.

I went, with invariable chauvinism, to the references to my own county. Cornishmen, though (like the Welsh) naturally dramatic, suffered through the years from puritan distaste for the theatre. Ironically, one of the three great actors of the 19th century, Henry Irving, was brought up (as Johnny Brodribb) by his Penberthy aunt and uncle at Halsetown, near St. Ives. He would have read with appreciation these references to the Cornish 'rounds': Professor Wickham has himself produced The Life of St. Meriasek (*Beunans Meriasek*) at the University of Bristol; and there is a splendid picture of a scene, the building of Noah's Ark, from a 1969 production of the Cornish Cycle in St. Piran's Round, Perranporth, by the University Drama Department, under Neville Denny.

Richard Carew, in a charming note on the Cornish plays, said that the actors 'are prompted by one called the Ordinary, who followeth at their back with the book in his hand, and telleth them softly what they must pronounce aloud'. (This does not mean, as Professor Wickham explains, that the actors were not required to learn their parts).

Still, the Cornish plays are only incidental in a detailed survey of the bases of the medieval stage, a study of the liturgical and vernacular drama, and the dramatic games of villagers and nobility. Every page is quotable: a passage, for example, on the performances of women in the Middle Ages. Though they appeared rarely (not because it was thought shameful) there were such exceptions as the Chester Play of the Assumption of the Virgin allocated to 'the wives of the town'.

J. C. TREWIN

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Russian Empire: A Portrait in Photographs (Jonathan Cape. £9.95). Chloe Obolensky has brought together a very remarkable collection of nearly 500 photographs taken between 1855 and 1915, illustrative of Czarist Russia during those fateful years. It covers almost every aspect of life, including political, social, religious, cultural and economic conditions. As the author points out, so wide a range can only be introductory; nevertheless the impact is balanced and impressive. The volume also includes some interesting photographs of nineteenth century Moscow and St. Petersburg. The arrangement of the photographs has been generally arranged to form a tour of the Russian Empire from Moscow and St. Petersburg through to the Pacific Ocean and back. There is a substantial Introduction by the late Max Hayward who provides a valuable historical survey of the growth of the Russian Empire and the state of society during the period of these photographs. He concludes that in education and other fields, compared with mid-Victorian England, 'the Russia of the Czars was not as hopelessly benighted or resistant to change

as is often thought'. Even so, this volume serves to confirm that Czarist Russia was rotting inevitably towards revolution.

Diplomatic Bag (Hale. £7.95). Harold Eeeman spent a long career in the Swedish Diplomatic Service. Between 1936 and 1941 he served in Russia, and wrote an account of his life there in *Memories of a Diplomat, 1936-1941.* This new and agreeable volume covers the earliest part of his career, 'Memories of a Junior Diplomat 1920-1936'. During these years he served successively in Canada, Egypt, South Africa, Greece, Denmark and Finland. There is little of politics, although he makes the occasional comment. For example, he refers to apartheid; in spite of finding it in some degrees both distasteful and shocking, 'it seems to me, judging by results, far more sensible and humane than the premature "liberation" which has lately brought chaos to many prosperous African colonies'. This book is mainly about his social life the people he met, his own recreations, particularly sailing, and the places he visited. He is a keen observer, writing with wit, charm and perspicacity about a world fifty years ago, now almost forgotten.

Viking Art (George Allen & Unwin. £10.00). This authoritative study by Professor Ole Klindt-Jensen and Dr. David M. Wilson, now Director of the British Museum, was first published in 1966. The main purpose is to 'trace the history of Viking art from its beginnings in Pagan Scandinavia to its last flickering brilliancy in Christian Britain'. There are nearly 150 illustrations to support the text. The work is primarily concerned with the content of the art as it developed, and not so much with its interpretation. Nonetheless, the authors emphasise that 'the main influence in Viking art was the Scandinavian artistic tradition.' Foreign influences were present but 'were quickly submerged in it by a people sure of their taste.' The authors discuss briefly the studies in Viking art since 1966 and conclude generally that the advances made do not basically affect their own conclusions.

Cranborne Chase (Gollancz. £7.95). For many years, Desmond Hawkins has been intensely interested in this remote area of about 250,000 acres spread over Hampshire, Wiltshire and Dorset. It was a royal hunting ground in the Middle Ages and retained its rural character over the centuries, largely dominated by local custom and the great landed families. Based upon a great deal of historical study, an intimate personal knowledge of the area and meeting many people who live there in diverse walks of life, Mr. Hawkins has composed a delightful account of the many facets and characteristics of this little known region of rural England.

Literature and Western Man (Sphere Books. £2.25). This wide ranging study by J. B. Priestley was first published in 1960. The author was concerned to provide 'some account of Western Man, in terms of the literature he has created and enjoyed,' during the last five centuries. The work is now very usefully republished as an Abacus paperback.

The Wapshot Chronicle and The Wapshot Scandal (Harper and Rowe. Cloth. £6.95). These two celebrated novels by John Cheever are now republished in one hardback volume. They both centre round the fortunes and behaviour of the members of a New England family. This new edition should be widely welcomed.

ORBIS AND THE INTERNATIONAL POETRY SOCIETY

The magazine ORBIS has become the magazine of the International Poetry Society (President Christopher Fry).

Membership or Fellowship of the Society is open to anyone on an entirely non-political, non-racial basis. Full details are available from I.P.S. Headquarters at Youlgrave, Bakewell, Derbyshire.

Orbis prints poems by members, and articles and reviews by members and by distinguished guest writers. Recent contributors have included Harold Hobson (Drama Critic of the Sunday Times), Derek Stanford (Poetry Critic of Books and Bookmen), Cal Clothier (winner of the Guinness International Poetry Prize), Hugh McKinley (Literary Editor of the Athens Daily Post), and many others. It is a lively, handsome publication, read from New Zealand to Canada, from Malta to the West Indies, from Czechoslovakia to Iceland, from Italy to the United States.

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CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

115th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

JUNE 1980

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Contemporary Review

Incorporating The Fortnightly

June 1980 Vol. 236 No. 1373 Founded 1866

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Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

June 1980 Vol. 236 No. 1373

THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

by M. J. C. Vile

AS the primary elections of the 1980 campaign follow their preordained path to the National Conventions, the selection of the presidential candidates, the final battles between the chosen standard-bearers of the parties, and the presidential election itself in November, it is perhaps worthwhile standing aside somewhat from the daily account in the press of the changing fortunes of the candidates and their chances of gaining their party nomination, to ask what is the significance of this whole, long drawn-out process for America and for the world. Is the absence of any commanding figures on the presidential scene in the United States merely a matter of chance, or does it reflect something about the real nature of the presidency itself during the last quarter of the 20th century?

Given the problems which face the United States—inflation, the energy crisis, the challenge of the Soviet military action in Afghanistan, the situation in Iran and the Middle-East, and the natural position of the United States as the leader of the Western world, why is it that the current political debate is being conducted at such a level that it could be questioned whether there is any genuine debate on these issues at all? Even the two candidates who deliberately set out to inject some kind of issue-content into the campaign, John Anderson and Edward Kennedy, have failed miserably in their attempts. It is true, of course, that since James Bryce at the end of the 19th century described the Democratic and Republican parties as bottles bearing different labels but both of them empty, the non-ideological character of the American political parties compared with those of Europe, has been accepted doctrine. But the world, and America's place in it, has changed since Bryce wrote. The role and importance of government in economic and social affairs has changed. Indeed, the Depression of the 1930s led to the injection of more ideology into American politics, and the New Deal period showed a realignment of political allegiances which might have led, and at one time seemed likely to lead, to a more 'European' style of politics, with stronger national parties, a more 'issue-oriented' political system, and the development of closer links between the executive and legislative branches of government. And yet today the American political parties are if anything less 'ideological' than at the end of the last century, their organisation is far more fragmented,

and it is not uncommon for commentators to write about the 'decomposition' or the 'disintegration' of the party system.

The disintegration of the party system, if that is an accurate description of what has happened in the United States during the past half century, is a matter of great significance for the way in which the political system works. Political parties in Western representative systems of government perform vitally important functions. They select candidates for public office, they provide the mechanism through which public opinion is articulated and public choices are made, and they act as a two-way channel for the transmission of information about public opinion to the government and the reasons for government policy to the public. Most important of all perhaps, they are seen as a means of ensuring the necessary minimum degree of co-ordination between the various parts of the system of government, so that policies initiated by the executive are passed into law by the legislature and implemented by the bureaucracy. Political parties are, of course, not the only institutions which perform these functions. In particular radio, television and the press have come to exercise perhaps as important a role as the political parties in some Western systems of government, in the performance of these essential functions of government. Nevertheless, the media, although they may be essential channels of communication, cannot provide the coherence to the political system which political parties are supposed to provide, in the theories of representative government which have dominated Western thought since the mid-19th century. In the United States today it is doubtful whether any organisational structures exist to provide this necessary coherence to the political system.

What are the reasons then for the disintegration of the American party system? By the end of the 19th century a party system had been firmly established, based upon state, county and city political machines and their leaders, the bosses, who directed them. These machines were largely engaged in the business of selling jobs, contracts, and the other spoils of office, together with the provision of public assistance and other services to the electorate, in return for votes. The machines, feeding upon the needs of the immigrants in the large cities, established political organisations which were as tightly organised, and as effective, as any that have been created in modern authoritarian or totalitarian systems of government. Sometimes they were closely connected with the underworld, and their protection was enjoyed by criminals engaged in the whole range of illegal activities. The political bosses at the end of the 19th century, and well into the 20th century dominated the elections to the House of Representatives in their areas, and collectively played a decisive role in the selection of senatorial and presidential candidates in the 'smoke-filled rooms' in which these decisions were made.

This political system, with all its corruption, worked reasonably well in a period when the role of government was minimal and when State and local government performed most of the functions, other than foreign affairs and defence, which were expected of government. It provided the minimum degree of cohesion which was needed between the presidency,

the Congress, and the State and local politicians upon which both depended for their electoral success; but it was not a system which could provide the basis for strong government action at the national level in the sphere of economic and social policy, the need for which emerged as the consequences of industrialisation and urbanisation became apparent. In the 1930s Franklin Roosevelt, from a position of unprecedented prestige, attempted to forge a more disciplined and effective party on the base of the new grand coalition which had brought him to power, and which gave him his overwhelming victory in the presidential election of 1936. He attempted to intervene in the choice of democratic candidates for the Congressional elections of 1938, in order to secure the selection of supporters of his own policies, and to oppose the selection of his enemies. But he failed, and it can be argued that the Congressional election of 1938 exemplified the contradiction inherent in the attempt by Roosevelt to turn the Federal Government into an effective instrument for the economic and social control of the United States, upon the basis of a party system which could not sustain this exercise of Federal power. For Roosevelt's policies struck at the heart of the party system which had brought him to power. The Federal Social Security programmes, and the nationalisation of government through the development of Grants-in-Aid to State and local government, undermined the power base of the State and local machines. Furthermore, these political organisations were already beginning to reel under the effects of the system of primary elections which had been introduced at the beginning of the century specifically to break the power of the political bosses. The extension of primary elections from the field of State and local government offices, into the elections for senators and congressmen, and then into the selection of presidential candidates, destroyed the most important power of State and local political leaders, their ability to determine the selection of candidates in public offices. The gradual extension of presidential primaries has gone on until in 1980 over thirty States will select delegates to the National Conventions in this way. The spectacle of Mayor Jane Byrne publicly offering the support of Cook County to Senator Kennedy, and failing to deliver the vote to him, was the last, almost comic, gasp of the one political machine that, like a sick dinosaur, had survived into the late 20th century.

After the Second World War there was strong support, amongst American academics at least, for the idea of 'a more responsible two party system' which would have been much more like the British party system in the greater coherence of its organisation and structure. But the basis for such a system, requiring as it does a relatively high degree of ideological commitment amongst the electorate, did not exist in the United States. Since the death of Roosevelt there has been a rapid and continuous decline in the organisational strength of the political parties. A new style of politics has emerged in the United States based upon a whole variety of social groupings distinct from the business and labour groups which were so important to the running of the old system of political machines. Civil rights groups, consumer groups and minority groups of all kinds have

come to play an important part in the selection of candidates and the determination of policy issues which were once the preserve of the professional politician. The political parties, notably by the McGovern/Fraser reforms of the Democratic Party at the end of the 1960s, have adapted their roles and their procedures to meet the demands of the new system of group politics. The result has been to weaken even further the organisational structure of the parties, and to take away from the professionals what little power they had left to direct the policies and the electoral fortunes of their parties.

As a consequence, American politics has increasingly become a matter of individuals creating their own political organisations, running their own campaigns, and depending upon the extent to which they can project their personalities through the mass media. Candidates enlist the support of sections of the general public who are prepared to organise their campaigns, support them in the primaries, and carry them on to success in the election. From the point of view of 'democracy' this would seem to be a highly desirable development. It really is true that in the United States candidates for public office are chosen by 'the People.' It has been estimated that in the Presidential election of 1976 over 30 million American citizens participated to some degree in the process of selecting the candidates for the presidency. Compared with the British system of selecting candidates for public office, where small elite groups in the political parties secretly select their candidates without the participation of their own party members, let alone the general public, the American system is a model democratic procedure. But the price which has been paid for this is a high one. The candidate selected by the party, who may a few months later enter the White House as President, may be virtually unknown on the national political scene, may have had little or no contact with politicians throughout the country, or, indeed, may be positively objectionable to those members of his own political party with whom he will have to work closely once elected.

The separate route to power via the presidential primaries means that the new president is not restricted by commitments given to professional politicians around the country, as was so often the case in the past, but neither can he call upon their loyalty to the party, nor to him personally, in order to ensure the passage of his policies through Congress. John F. Kennedy, by his defeat of the party professionals, showed what could be achieved by an individual in this new political system, but his presidency also showed how such an individual, once in the White House, could be powerless to implement his policies. President Carter followed the Kennedy road through the primaries to success in the presidential election and, to an even greater extent, he has proved to be unable to gain the support of Congress for his policies.

The consequence, therefore, of the disintegration of the American party system for the position of the president is difficult to exaggerate. After 1932 the constitutional and statutory powers which accrued to the office of the President of the United States were staggering in their extent and

significance. The Supreme Court, and the Congress, gave to the president a degree of legal authority perhaps unprecedented in a democratic society. As a result attacks were made upon 'the Imperial Presidency' and demands were made at the time of Watergate for the diminution of the overwhelming power of the president. But although the American President has wide constitutional and legal authority to act, particularly in the fields of foreign affairs and defence, his political authority has been steadily diminishing since the mid-30s. As the legal power of the President and his administration increased, its political power-base was shrinking. The levers of political power which existed in the political system when the bosses and the machines were there to deliver the goods have been disconnected, but no other machinery for the effective exercise and coordination of power has been put in their place. The Watergate crisis, far from being an indicator of the excessive power and influence of the presidency, was a symptom of the weakness of the president, and of his isolation from the rest of the political community. The presidency is increasingly ineffectual, not because the men who contend for the office are incompetent, but because they are no longer at the centre of political life in the way in which Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson or Franklin Roosevelt were. They are presidents, but they are not party leaders. They are at the centre of government, but they do not work with, and are not in the midst of, effective political organisations.

The only alternative available way for a president to gain acceptance for his policies in this political system is to appeal directly through the media to the American people. At times of great crisis such an appeal can indeed be effective, and there is a tendency on the part of American public opinion to support the president, particularly when the United States is in conflict with other nations. Thus, in the desperately difficult situation facing Mr. Carter in Iran, and in spite of his inability to deal effectively with the situation, he has received remarkably strong support from the American people in this election year. But in the normal business of politics, in the day to day taking of decisions of vital importance for American domestic and foreign policy, it is impossible for the president continually to mobilise public support through the media. Constant, repetitious demands for support, and continual complaints about the refusal of Congress to support his policies will produce only indifference or boredom on the part of the American public. The levers of power need to be more discreet, and more immediate, and these are almost entirely lacking. As a result the prestige of the presidency diminishes and the confidence of the electorate in the president's ability to solve the problems facing American society dwindles almost visibly.

It is clear that the choice of an individual as president of the United States remains one of considerable importance for the people of America, and, indeed, of the world. The president's ability to control the armed forces of the United States and to commit them to war, is an awesome responsibility which cannot but make his office the focus of interest and concern for us all. Indeed where a presidential candidate is as old as Mr.

Reagan, we should perhaps be equally, if not more, interested in the choice of his vice-presidential running-mate. Powerful as the president is in his capacity to unleash nuclear war, however, he is pitifully weak in his ability to control almost every other aspect of the governmental policy of the United States, unless he has the backing of an aroused public opinion, or of a solid and loyal following in the Congress. The current state of the American party system almost by definition rules out the possibility of a coherent party following for the president in the American legislature, and without such a following it may make little difference whether Mr. Carter remains in office, whether he is displaced by Mr. Reagan, or by Senator Kennedy. For the foreseeable future it would be unwise to expect decisive action, either in external or internal affairs, from the American president. Whether this is something to be deplored or not, depends very much on one's point of view. The argument that the president is weak because he lacks a highly organised party upon which to base his Administration and its policies, might seem to lead to the conclusion that the United States would be better served by a party system which produced 'strong government' as in Great Britain. But it is at least arguable that the strong government which Britain has enjoyed for most of the period since 1945 has not been noticeably successful in solving the problems which Britain has faced.

Strong, effective government is fine if the government knows the answers, but if it does not it may be more of a danger than an advantage. Before deploring the weakness of American governments, therefore, one should at least pause to consider where a stronger and more powerful Administration might take us. Nevertheless, the greatest cause for disquiet which remains is that weakness in government may lead to attempts to demonstrate to the world the existence of the determination and strength which it lacks, and such demonstrations can be extremely dangerous.

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PAKISTAN: THE SWORD AND THE BOOK

by John Biggs-Davison, M.P.

THE Western media's selection of heroes and ogres is often capricious. Rulers who, to use Marxist parlance, are 'objectively' on our side, may have a worse press than dictators who are not.

It took the Christmas-tide invasion of Afghanistan to restore American aid suspended under the Symington Amendment because of Pakistan's determination to become a nuclear power. Two years have elapsed since the Afghan revolution enabled the USSR to secure overnight what Britain in India had for a century denied the Tsars. The West, in the phrase of diplomacy, stood idly by. So the Kremlin could be forgiven its surprise at the strength of President Carter's reaction to a coup and an intervention to replace one puppet with another and secure the threatened Soviet protectorate. Democracies are seldom logical. There was a like revulsion against Hitler's occupation of Prague in 1939 after Munich in 1938.

Having lost several sets, if not the match, in the modern 'Great Game', in Central Asia, the West now understands that the preservation of Pakistan is an important strategic interest.

Pakistan is a conservative, rather than a radical, country. Islamic economics are critical of capitalism as well as hostile to Communism; but that property is a trust from God is also a part of Christian social doctrine. Some of the socialism of the Bhutto era is being reversed, to the encouragement of private enterprise. The Minister of Finance, Commerce, Planning and Co-ordination, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, has written learnedly on Islamic economic teaching. He is a former Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. He has been cutting subsidies on basic commodities and, although there is to be no denationalisation of banks or life insurance, he is undoing the inefficient, and in some instances, vindictive expropriation of small cotton ginning and rice husking plants. During a recent visit the Minister told me that extreme members of the late Mr. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party believed that existing structures must be demolished and replaced, to which revolutionary end they fomented irresponsible trade union agitation.

All this struck a familiar note in a British ear. None of it, however, saved General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq from a scorching reprimand in much of the world's press when he called off the elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies planned for October, 1979. The *Daily Telegraph's* leader writer classed the President of Pakistan no longer as a comic 'Terry-Thomas' but as a 'disaster'.

I found him polite, lucid and articulate. He is devout to the point of fanaticism—although it was not the General but Mr. Bhutto who enforced prohibition—and his soldierly patriotism is part of his Muslim faith. He overworks. He finds it necessary to be for ever on tour, exhorting officials and haranguing notables and threatening the corrupt with the rigour of the law. Pakistan is politically torn and economically, the Finance Minister

said, partly on account of a particularly bad harvest, on the brink of a precipice.

On our way to see General Zia at the Chief of the Army Staff's house in Rawalpindi—the Presidential Palace in Islamabad is not yet complete—we were overtaken by his outriders and motorcade. The President had only just touched down from Karachi.

General Zia got on well with Mr. Callaghan. He has children at school in England and is just old enough to have held the King's commission in the Guides' Cavalry. He thus has regimental as well as command and staff experience—he remains COAS—and was decorated by King Hussein when serving as military training officer to the Jordanian Army. This was in 1970-71 when the Hashemite was at grips with the Black September terrorists.

Western liberal opinion can sometimes bring itself to tolerate a foreign military regime, as in Black Africa. Our Liberal Party quaintly venerates Cromwell, who cured the English of military dictatorship. But in the Western secularist vocabulary 'theocracy' is as dirty a word as 'medieval'. Few Westerners have understood Islam and its renaissance. Thus Britain was slow to perceive that to 'quit India' it was necessary to split India.

Ten years ago Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wrote in his book, *The Myth of Independence,*

> The British were hostile to the Muslim demand for partition . . . If the British had left India 'united' as one state, there would be today four or five national states in the sub-continent. The choice was not between leaving India as one united country or divided into two, but between leaving India divided as two nations, or letting it burst into fragments of not fewer than four or five states. The creation of Pakistan has contributed to the crystallization of an Indian nationhood.

Puritanical Islam, exemplified in 'Cromwellian' Pakistan, accords ill with Western permissiveness and some Muslim punishments are repugnant. But let us not be complacent. In 1920, as in 1979, the Punjab was under martial law. The Hunter Committee was set up to enquire into the disturbances and their suppression. The majority report mentioned flogging, often in public, for such offences as 'the contravention of the curfew order . . . for failure to salaam a commissioned officer, or refusal to sell milk'.

The last mentioned has a topical sound. Under General Zia's martial law, hoarders and black marketeers have been whipped. As a result, the soaring retail prices of essential commodities have been brought down. The punishments have been as popular with the poor as was the Star Chamber when it arbitrarily humbled the rich and mighty in Tudor and early Stuart times.

Such in emergency in British India was the rule of Santayana's 'sweet masters'. The leading article in the *Daily Telegraph* already mentioned condemned not only the execution of Mr. Bhutto but the seemingly furtive manner in which it was done. It must be remembered that Pakistan is not Britain; yet when what is now Pakistan was under British rule the terrorist Bhagat Singh, known as 'the Michael Collins of India', was hanged and his remains disposed of secretly for fear of public demonstra-

tion. Mr. Bhutto was no terrorist, although his underlings terrorized many when he was Prime Minister. He and his co-accused were found guilty as charged and his appeals were rejected by a British-type judiciary under law inherited from British days. I do not regret being about the first British Member of Parliament to suggest that clemency would have been statesmanlike, for in fact Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's soul goes marching on!

One of Mr. Bhutto's former Ministers, who had been jailed and grievously maltreated, still spoke of his chief's success in starting a democratic process. He appealed to the masses with simple slogans such as 'bread, cloth, home'. Not that Bhutto was a democrat. He was more of a Whig grandee preaching populism and a forward foreign policy with the assurance bred of an Oxford education—he had been a brilliant undergraduate and lawyer—and an aristocratic descent. It is said that Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan treated Pakistan as though it were a cantonment whereas Mr. Bhutto used the country as if it were his estate in Larkhana, Sind.

In the PPP he forged a pervasive instrument. He was building a one-party state and he played the party against the bureaucracy. PPP militants were intruded into the police and civil administration; Civil Servants of a proud Imperial tradition would be castigated at public rallies. Mr. Bhutto thus added resentment in the Services to the hostility of much of the business community. They have not forgiven him. In Pakistan much ill is spoken of the dead: not even now is the late Lord Mountbatten excused the bloody manner of partition, and India's annexation of Kashmir and other princely states.

Since I was serving in Jinnah's Pakistan there have been twelve Prime Ministers and four periods of martial law. The previous, and only civilian, Chief Martial Law Administrator was none other than Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. A new attempt at parliamentary democracy was bound to be delicate and dangerous. In Pakistan politics are tribal and personal; the electorate is immature; the forces of separatism, dissension and disruption are strong. It might have been better for the reputation of the politically inexperienced President if he had earlier on deferred the elections indefinitely instead of ordering successive postponements. 'Order, counter-order, disorder' used to be the bugbear of military men. True, General Zia insisted throughout that elections must be 'positive'; that is, they must produce an effective government able to safeguard the national integrity and enforce the ideology of Islam. In demanding from the plethora of parties that they should register, publish their accounts—some of them receive Arab, others Soviet, money—and elect their office holders, the President was relying on the electoral law passed under Mr. Bhutto in 1973.

The holding of elections to the local bodies was disparagingly compared by opponents of the General to President Ayub's policy of 'basic democracies' from the village up. Looking back, one may see much that was good in the Field Marshal's regime. Essentially unchanged—despite electrification, Massey-Ferguson tractors, the remittances and influence of overseas workers whether in Kuwait or Coventry, the transistor radio

and even television—the village community is still the real Pakistan. Empires have conquered and been conquered: the *panchayat*—or council of elders—has endured through centuries as the primary unit of local self-government.

In September 1969 the elections in towns and districts throughout every Province were keenly, and on the whole peacefully, contested. There were no fewer than 24,000 candidates. In Karachi I watched polling conducted on the British model, except that there were separate polling stations for the women.

When the pre-war constitutional Reforms—designed to bring about provincial autonomy in British India and a Dominion-style Federation for the sub-continent—split the Conservative Party, ranging Baldwin and Amery against Churchill and the Duchess of Atholl, one of the arguments used against the Reforms was that the *panchayat* system would suit the Indian Empire better than imitations of Westminster. In 1972 the late Professor L. F. Rushbrook Williams applauded President Ayub's system of basic democracies, 'founded on the theory that the masses, although they might not be able to understand complicated questions of national policy, were quite competent to choose the best men in the locality to run local affairs . . . ' The manifesto of Air Marshal Asghar Khan's *Tehrik-i-Istiqlal* party, which has been at odds with the General, urges that much of the bureaucracy should be replaced by *panchayats* and tribal *jirgas*.

Parliamentary democracy in Pakistan has been a fiasco. Separatist and irredentist movements imperil the very existence of the state. Tourist literature may make an archaeological appeal, as in Egypt with the Pharaohs, or the glorious unity of the Indus basin manifested in the civilizations revealed at Harappa in Punjab and Moenjodara in Sind. But today what binds Pakistan together is the sword of Islam. For, unlike his predecessor, General Zia possesses no political machine.

Five years before partition, in 1941, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India recognised the right to self-determination of the Sindhis, Baluchis and Pathans. Their separate chamber of commerce were cited to reinforce what has since become a theory of 'four nationalities.' There are Baluchis on both sides of the border with chaotic Iran, and in the Sultanate of Oman, guardian of the Straits of Hormuz, many Baluchis serve in the Sultan's forces and settle down in his territory. I learnt recently in Oman that 'Greater Baluchistan' propaganda has been mailed from London to Baluchi soldiers of the Sultan. In Pakistan the Baluchi people are tribal, poor and restless. They have bitter memories of punitive air bombardment under Mr. Bhutto. Separatist propaganda makes comparison with Kurdish irredentism. The Kurds, too, overflow the frontiers of several states and are open to Soviet manipulation. Recently, Moscow has threatened to break Pakistan into its four parts.

At Landi Kotal in the Officers' Mess of the Khyber Rifles I picked out Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq in a group photograph. The regiment from which that young officer was seconded has its spiritual home at Mardan. The Guides' chapel in the cantonment there might be an English country

church. It is lovingly tended, as is the graveyard outside, where the Queen came to salute an heroic cousin. The Punjab Regiment now stationed in Mardan care also for the Mogul-style Hamilton Memorial to those Guides of several races who fought to the last man in defence of our Residency in Kabul.

Nowadays it is not the British but the Russians who are harried and beleaguered by Afghan tribesmen roused to *jehad* by anger at the foreign occupier and his puppets. Empires rise and fall; geo-political realities persist. As no one knows better than the Guides Cavalryman who became President, it is but 300 miles from southern Afghanistan to the Straits of Hormuz.

Pakistanis know the score in a Great Game that is not confined to the pages of Kipling. Surprisingly little has changed. The Chief Secretary of the North-West Frontier Province asked me in Peshawar what changes I noticed in the administrative and 'political' structure since I was serving Pakistan. I could find none except: 'for Governor-General, read President;' and much in the British system was derived from the Moguls.

At Torkham on the Durand Line through the Khyber we were within feet of the late President Hafizulla's frontier guards, impassive beneath their red flag. We talked to refugees from his predecessor's, Tarakki's, terror lodged in the permanent camp at Warsak. We saw others in roadside tents awaiting the bitter Frontier cold. The gun factories at Darra Adam Khel were busy. There, a captured Kalashnikov was much admired. Prices, however, were down; which suggests that the tribal and Islam resistance is being armed from less amateur sources.

Doubtless, despite the freedom fighters, the Soviet 'protector' will hold his bases and airfields and the roads he has been building for seven years. The route from Herat to Chaman is favourable to tanks.

It is not far to the warm waters and the Gulf. On the Baluchistan coast are the ports of Gwadar (ceded by the Sultan of Muscat to Pakistan), Pasni and Jiwani, which in the world war served as a Royal Navy and Royal Air Force base. Britain is the largest single investor in Port Qasim, which is being developed outside Karachi under Vice-Admiral Ahsan, once Mountbatten's ADC, and the Governor of East Pakistan who resigned in protest at a foolishly provocative policy at the Centre.

If Port Qasim is not to be built for the Soviet empire to inherit, the West must back its strategic stake in the unity and integrity of Pakistan, a country that still cherishes British connections and joins hands with China on the Karakoram Highway.

[John Biggs-Davison is Conservative Member of Parliament for Epping Forest. He revisited Pakistan in the autumn of 1979.]

LOOKING AHEAD IN MALTA

by Christopher Jones

MALTA enters the Eighties with the shadow of coming general elections looming in the background, the country going to the polls in October, 1981. As there are now only two political parties in Malta and as the last elections were won by a mere 2% majority, much is bound to depend on the record of the outgoing government and its impact on the electorate. In this respect, if the pulse of the nation is a guidance, there appears to be a definite indication which points to a change in Government from the present Labourite to that of the Nationalists.

It is interesting to note that public opinion is again demonstrating the same attitude towards the coming elections as that which was shown in 1971, when the Nationalist Party was opted out by the people who felt that there was a dire need for a change after nine years of continuous Nationalist rule. Today, despite the fact that no Gallup Poll has been taken, the mood of the masses is eloquent and explicit enough to show its underlying discontent with the way things have been shaping in Malta, where the tentacles of total Socialism have stifled many aspects of Maltese life.

There is for instance a growing conviction that the Socialists were wrong to sever connections with Britain because, whatever the faults of the latter, it was folly to scrap an agreement which, irrespective of its defects, ensured that Malta derived £M31m annually, besides attracting other financial advantages. It is held that, given the heavy burden Malta now has to carry to make up for this lost financial aid, it would have been wiser to negotiate a new agreement under new terms, subject to periodic revision in the light of ever-changing world conditions.

Looking at events in retrospect, financial assistance was bound to become a major factor once Britain had decided to close down its naval base in Malta following the British Labour Party's decision to streamline armed warfare. Then, when Malta became independent in 1964, a Financial and Defensive Agreement was completed with Britain to last for ten years, aimed at helping Malta on to its feet during the usual transition period of any emerging nation.

The Agreement with Britain was subject to further negotiation (or revision) but unfortunately the Nationalist Party Government, which negotiated Independence and embarked on a new chapter in the history of the country, lost the 1971 elections. The Malta Labour Party that then came to power, was dissatisfied with the Agreement because it was felt that it did not afford adequate compensation to Malta for the use of its military and naval bases by Britain and the Nato forces. As a result steps were immediately taken for the drawing up of a new agreement. It is now past history that these negotiations created a crisis both with Britain and her Nato allies. In the end a compromise was sought and a fresh agreement to run for five years to the 31st March 1979 was concluded. This new agreement

ensured compensation and new relations with Malta plus an assurance that the base would not be used against Arab countries. Through this new agreement Malta continued to enjoy financial help to an amount of £M23.5m for the use of its base, Britain keeping a token force as part of the Nato set-up until the country was able to reconstruct its economy and eliminate the need for economic dependence on financial help.

The difference between the Socialists and the Nationalists was that the Malta Labour Party neither supported the Nato presence in Malta nor accepted Independence in the form that made Malta still dependent on another country—in this case Britain. Furthermore, the Malta Labour Party did not approve of Malta's adherence to the pro-Western bloc under the Nato umbrella. On the contrary, it supported an active policy of non-alignment—and in fact joined the latter bloc in 1973—subscribing at the same time to a policy of involvement in Euro-Mediterranean and Euro-Arab relations, membership of the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations and its attendant Agencies.

Again, one of the direct results of the conflict with Britain and its Nato allies was the setting up of special relations with Libya, who had extended moral support to Malta during the crisis and given assurances of financial help. This was confirmed when Libya signed bilateral agreements in the field of economy and education. Malta for its part handed over most of its former air space, which covered a wide area up to Chad, receiving in return oil supplied at favourable prices. This notwithstanding Malta has yet to reach an agreement with Libya about offshore oil prospecting as there is disagreement between the two countries over the Median Line to be adopted.

Another new development has been the special agreement made with the People's Republic of China enabling the latter country to gain a foothold in the Mediterranean. The agreement covered technical, financial and cultural aids, China providing technical aid for the construction of a new dock in the Valetta harbour.

Despite its slender majority in Parliament the Malta Labour Party was returned to Parliament for a second run in 1976 and introduced very slowly at first and then with a gathering momentum measures devised to transform Malta into a Socialist state, levelling class differences and freezing privileges.

This policy of direct socialism permeates the entire structure of the Maltese nation involving intelligentsia, schools and the university, the civil service, the church and industry. Schools are now expected to give as their end-product trade workers as against white collar workers. The University, one of the oldest in Europe, has been stripped of importance and preference given to the former Technical College, now styled as the 'New University'; students being called student-workers, studying for six months and working and being paid for the remaining period. The Civil Service, the backbone of the country which ensured a safe passage from Colonial to Independent rule, has been relegated to insignificance by the absorption of members of defunct organizations such as the labour,

pioneer and *'dirghjan il Maltin'* corps: its promotion prospects stifled and power to strike withdrawn. The Roman Catholic Church has been relegated to the role of a mute spectator following the adoption of a policy of appeasement in order to avoid clashes with government. This is evident in its inability to fight controversial bills which have been introduced, such as civil marriage, curtailment of religious feasts, homosexual legislation and civilian family-planning centres.

The commercial world now has to comply with the adoption of quota imports aimed at closing the gap in the balance of payment and controlling foreign exchange. Some imports have now been curtailed to such an extent that even with essential commodities, replenishment is not allowed before stocks are completely exhausted.

This latter policy has tended to create an artificial scarcity of certain goods which is most harassing to the housewife who time and again has to face a dearth of some items such as flour, meat, oil, paraffin, fruit, potatoes, tinned milk, etc. Furthermore the commercial world now has to put up with Government playing the role of direct buyer—and thus restricting the ambit of trade through bulk-buying and, more recently, entering into direct competition with retailers even to the extent of opening a supermarket!

Other sectors where Government has shown its hand is in its dispute with doctors, which remains unsolved and obliges Government to employ foreign doctors from behind the Iron Curtain and the Islamic world. Also apparent has been the decision to stamp out unjustified or incorrect criticism in the press. This is being accomplished through the implementation of laws governing sedition and libel.

But it is in the field of foreign policy that the greatest changes have been effected. The present government adopts a pro-Arab policy, backed by its support of Libya and the Palestinian cause, as well as non-alignment with the Third World. Malta has in fact tried to bridge the gap—often attempted unsuccessfully by other Mediterranean countries—between the African continent and Europe, while at the same time fostering the concept of a Mediterranean free from super-power domination. Hence its stand at the Helsinki, Belgrade and Madrid conferences on Security in Europe.

What of the present government's stand to consolidate the country's economic stability? Thanks to the establishment of relations with the General Workers Union, who now share the same political platform as the labourites, strikes formerly cancerous are now practically non-existent, especially at the drydocks. There has been a rise in the export sector; the leading manufacturing industries such as textiles, footwear and wearing apparel accounting for no less than 50% of the total production, followed by printing, electrical, mechanical and machinery products.

The drydocks, formerly the leading naval repair yard in the Mediterranean, has been converted into a tanker repair yard and is now a viable undertaking. The docks are owned by the workers themselves, who now manage this thriving industry; Government remaining the ultimate controller. This new development has given an impetus to the dock's chief

work which consists of tanker repair work as well as light shipbuilding of small barges and craft.

In order to help engaged or newly-married couples and those families wanting to move to better accommodation, Government has extended its housing programme by the construction of housing estates in practically every town and village in Malta. Also, it has increased the number of industrial estates, equipped with ready-to-occupy factories; encouraged the construction of new hotels and given aid to existing ones.

However, the prime concern of Government has been the plight of the aged, the sick and the handicapped. Help to the unemployed has been given through increases in the social services. Besides adopting the system of paying annual bonuses to offset the rise in the cost of living, the Government has now established that all employees—government or private—should be eligible for 2/3 of their retiring salary. The intention is to introduce a National Health Scheme, despite the unsolved doctors dispute, which has robbed the island of a large percentage of its best doctors and professors.

During the Eighties, the Malta Labour Party plans to provide jobs for all through improved grants and subsidies. A significant move in this sphere is direct governmental intervention, which has been ensured by the setting up of para-statal bodies which now control shipping, air travel, sea travel, communications and energy. Steps have also been taken to set up oil-serving centres for oil exploration in the Mediterranean while a new port is being constructed at Marsaxlokk on the extreme south of the island with Arab aid.

So far so good, but what of the Opposition formed by the Nationalist Party under their new young leader, Dr. Fenech Adami?

Nine years of government rule by the Nationalists has been followed by an equal number of years as the Opposition.

Defeat in the past two elections has done the Nationalist party a world of good. Led by 46-year-old Dr. Adami, a lawyer, like his predecessor Dr. Giorgio Borg Olivier, the new leader is a serious-looking and moderate politician who knows clearly where he is going. Calm, forceful and painstaking, not easily ruffled by the obstructive antics of the Government, he has knit his party together and has a style of repartee which seems to be the right answer to the persuasive oratory of Dom Mintoff. Under his leadership the Party, now celebrating its centenary, has been completely overhauled and has already launched a far reaching programme with a Shadow Cabinet ready to take over. Besides the normal party organ, a new Saturday tabloid in English and a Sunday newspaper in Maltese are published regularly.

Meanwhile, the Party continues to maintain regular contacts with political parties abroad. At the Council of Europe, where the Opposition forms a regular part of the Parliamentary delegation from Malta, the Nationalist Party ensures that its views are heard. Recently, in October 1979, at the invitation of the British Conservative Party, Dr. Adami led a group of Nationalist Party members on a visit to Britain. During that visit

he addressed the Royal Institute of International Affairs and refuted the aim of the Maltese Socialist Government to seek guarantees for neutrality from France, Italy, Libya and Algeria—which had in any case proved unsuccessful. His party's policy was that Malta should never be part of any military bloc. He emphasized his country's role in the Mediterranean, and rejected a request made by the Malta Labour Party for the super powers to leave the Mediterranean, especially as Russia considered itself to be a Mediterranean nation!

It is certainly in the sphere of foreign policy that the Nationalists differ most from the Socialists as will be seen from a speech delivered earlier this year by the Deputy Leader of the Nationalist Party, Dr. Guido Demarco. He blamed the short-sighted policy of the Socialists for Malta's defenceless state during the present world crisis; the country being unprotected by any defence treaty with those who are not only able to defend the island but also share the ideals of freedom and democracy. Although a maritime unit had been formed, the disbandment of two territorial units, together with the transformation of the Royal Malta Artillery from a military to a work-unit, the suspension over a long period of military training and the axing of the civil defence force left Malta virtually defenceless. The Nationalist Party was in favour of controlled disarmament and had taken initiatives towards this end with the United Nations when in office. Referring to the oil problem, Dr. Demarco stated that the oil situation was leading Malta, as a small developing country, into a situation where, although it received a certain amount of oil at a low price from Libya, this favourable price obviously had a political price.

The problem of the unsolved median line, had been taken to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. If and when it was settled Malta would exploit its offshore oil. The strategic value of the island would increase the need for adequate defence.

In view of the diametrically opposed political ideals of the Labour and Nationalist parties, the scene seems set for a battle royal. In the General Election of 1981 the issue will almost certainly be whether the country wants an intensification of Socialism or a more stable and conservative state as projected by the Nationalists, with their democratic and freedom loving principles.

THE GLOBAL VILLAGE

by John Elsom

ARTHUR Koestler once remarked that the difference between the post-war generation and all preceding ones was that for the first time they knew how to destroy the world. That knowledge altered all perspectives. Previously, for example, it had been possible to argue the case for just wars. There were certain principles for which whole nations could fight, even contemplate their own destructions, in the belief that, through the carnage, some good could come. With the prospect of nuclear warfare, however, that pious rationalisation of blood-lust disappeared for good. No cause could conceivably justify the abandonment of restraint by the nuclear powers. No morality exists on a dead planet.

The Bomb, in short, made cowards of us all; and long may such cowardice thrive. In the 1980s, however, another knowledge—no less crucial or revolutionary, but perhaps even more pervasive—will take pride of place in our thinking. It is the realisation that, for the first time, we can control the world, for good or ill. Science has placed remarkable forces at our disposal, powers which in the past would have been beyond our capacity to understand, let alone manipulate. How we use the new technology is up to us. We can within a generation or so end the perennial scourges of mankind—famine, disease, dire poverty, even certain kinds of climatic disasters. Or we can destroy the planet by subtler methods than blowing it up. We can burn off the oil, cut down the trees, pollute the oceans and leave ourselves gasping in thin air, grasping at our neatly packed oxygen containers to stop the dizziness as we walk from shop to shop in fumed cities. If there are deserts, we will have created them: where there is want, we are the chief cause of deprivation.

This recognition as to what technology has laid at our feet is admittedly not globally shared. It belongs, for the most part, to the developed North rather than the underdeveloped South, to use the Brandt Commission's most valuable shorthand. Most of the world's population still lives in a dumb, uncomprehending submission to the ebbs and flows of fortune, not understanding why their crops fail or the fish absent themselves from the sea. Not least among the inequities upon this planet is that of information; and as with all such blatant imbalances, the privileged suffer along with the disadvantaged.

In the North, I suspect that our anxieties and frustrations will increase as we learn more about what can and should be done, but is not. The Brandt Commission's Report, *North-South* (Pan Paperbacks), is full of horrifying statistics. There are already 800 million absolute poor in the world, and this number is steadily increasing. Each chapter provides throwaway facts about injustice and global absurdities. 450 billion dollars is spent annually on military programmes, over half by the two Northern superpowers, Russia and the United States; whereas only 20 billion is spent on official development aid. 'With 600 million people, India has a GNP two-

fifths the size of that of the United Kingdom, which has 55 million people.' 'All the fuel used by the Third World for all purposes is only slightly more than the amount of gasoline the North burns to move its automobiles.' And so on. If the Brandt Commission's Report serves no other purpose than to remind the North of these global facts, it will not have been compiled in vain.

It attempts, however, more than that. It relates the statistics together in ways which are not immediately obvious. It points out, for example, that the shortage of energy in the South, particularly of oil, causes the poor to search for the most primitive fuel of all, wood, which leads to deforestation. It tries with admirable dexterity to steer away from normal political configurations, which is why the very title is significant, lumping Russia in with the States as part of the North, together with such obviously antipodean countries as Australia and New Zealand which are nevertheless seen as northern in culture and development. It also proposes an immediate programme for action; and within that programme, it stresses mutual self-interest as the mainstring for endeavour, rather than charity or straight aid. In that sense, it is a liberal document, as in its emphasis on the rights of man and on the cultural independence of nations.

It is a constructive, thoughtful, non-coat-trailing document; and one of the few encouraging signs in Britain during the past few months has been the way in which not only the papers have given it proper coverage, but also the public seem to have taken it to heart. *North-South* is a best-seller, according to the *Evening Standard* lists. And yet I must confess that I did not find it an easy book to read. It is presented and written with the utmost clarity: it avoids jargon and repeats the salient points with a doggedness which brooks no opposition. It does not suffer, except in details, from the normal failings of committee reports; and the commissioners, widely drawn from North and South, East and West, and including Brandt himself, Edward Heath, Olaf Palme, Adam Malik and other esteemed statesmen, are to be congratulated on discovering a unanimity of purpose.

The material is fascinating, the presentation clear, the style readable; and yet my mind kept wandering, glancing through passages and then frantically re-reading them, as if my attention had to be screwed to the sticking post again and again, for the bolts were always working loose. This was partly because the information was so densely packed: each sentence set off a train of thought, which had to be followed to its often bitter conclusion. Partly too, it was because we were being asked to think in global rather than the familiar national terms. In Chapter 7, for example, on 'Disarmament and Development', the authors tell us that 'more arms do not make mankind safer, only poorer', which is perfectly true, on a global scale; but I can think of many countries which are made both safer and richer, at least in the short term, through their military expenditure. South Africa would be an illustration; but if somebody were also to come along with a visionary scheme to make Europe an arms-free zone, I would want to look very closely at the small print, the safeguards and guarantees, before the instinctive doubts in my mind were calmed.

There are many such passages. The authors rightly stress the importance of free trade, good nineteenth-century liberals that they are. They point out that while low-cost goods from the Third World may damage, say, the clothing industry in the North of England, the British economy as a whole may benefit, for the exports from India and Taiwan bring in much-needed foreign currency to those countries which can then be spent on buying high technology British goods. It is a convincing case which the authors develop, with the careful use of statistics, to suggest that the North can only get out of its recession through encouraging the development of the South. And yet if I were an MP for a Northern town and had to watch over the decline of a once-thriving local industry, it would require an almost Panglossian faith to argue to my constituents that all is really for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

The great stumbling block, indeed, to the entire programme presented by the Brandt Commission is the presence of innumerable parish outlooks around the world which individually may be of little significance but collectively are formidable—with one group digging their heels in here, and another raising objections there, until the grand design is lost in a conglomeration of sensitive details. I have just been round the world for the first time, which still sounds a majestic boast, although in fact I stuck to countries labelled as North by the Brandt Commission with only a brief stopover in Singapore to break the pattern. It was impossible not to be struck by the different headlines, and the local emphases that were implied by them, in the various countries. A cyclone which devastated Fiji over Easter rated not a column inch in the British papers. The leading story on New Zealand's News at Ten, when I arrived, concerned the leaking of a secret report which warned of a glut of timber in the mid-1990s. The unemployed during the depression had been set to work in planting pine trees during the 1930s, to replace the sub-tropical forests plundered by the early settlers; and now these trees had matured, and over-matured, to swamp the timber and paper industries. What other country, I thought, could be so removed from the daily threats which pester the world as to speculate about problems so far ahead; and in any case, what accountants' alchemy could transform these grand forests, which harboured so much richness of life, into a debit on the national balance sheet?

That was one parochial headline; but another, more sinister, variety appeared in the West Coast papers in the United States, when I arrived there briefly in early April, two weeks before President Carter's ill-fated mission to rescue the hostages in Iran. In Los Angeles, there was much speculation about the prospect of an Entebbe-style raid; and journalists and editors alike were fantasising about the chances of success. I thought that this was all wild cowboy talk, dangerous electioneering, and surely not to be taken seriously in Washington. Could the Americans not see that such a raid, if it went marginally wrong, might, at worst, trigger off a Third World War, or, at best, so damage future relations with Middle East countries that the oil on which the United States depends would be instantly threatened? Even if the raid worked, might this not encourage

other countries to try their luck in other dangerous escapades? Despite one's sympathy for the hostages and their families, and one's dislike of the Iranian 'students'' behaviour, the stakes involved in the rescue mission seemed absurdly high.

In Los Angeles, however, all these surrounding problems were reduced to one simple choice—to act or not to act—and one question—would the mission work? And I, not taking this debate seriously, left, thanking God prematurely that Cyrus Vance was at the White House to keep the local hotheads in check—for London where I was greeted by headlines announcing that British Leyland was once more facing a life-or-death crisis. The Brandt Commission valiantly strive to remind us that we live in a global village; but there are so many family feuds to overcome, so many difficulties and such a variety of perspectives that their task requires a messianic fervour, to batter down all quibbles with zeal.

The tone of *North-South* is not quasi-religious, but cool and determined; and there were times when the commissioners seemed to underrate the power of the parish outlooks lined up against them. It was also disconcerting to read passages where an apparently admirable stance conflicted with my inevitably limited and slight view of reality. Let us take two comparatively small—but in fact, very large—examples. We can all agree that the world's resources of oil are finite: they are so by definition. What nobody knows is just how finite they are, whether they will virtually dry up in thirty, fifty or a hundred years' time, or even longer. New sources of oil are being discovered rapidly; and in New Zealand, where the oil crisis has bitten more deeply than in the United States or Britain, they are considering the prospect of prospecting for oil in the waters off the South Island.

Timing here is crucial. If we take an apocalyptic view, then the world requires a massive and immediate energy programme, harnessing tidal and solar power, and at any rate exploring the possibilities of widespread nuclear energy, although the Commissioners express the various fears about the safety of nuclear power stations and the dispersal of radioactive waste. If our outlook is more sanguine, we can afford to talk about conservation programmes and letting market forces work, to price oil gradually out of the system, while alternative sources take over. One view requires unprecedented international action, while the other does not. It is guesswork on an enormous scale; just as it is guesswork as to whether central sheathes housing the nuclear core in nuclear power stations will stand the test of time, or whether they may develop flaws, like metal fatigue in aircraft, an unforeseen hazard of the past.

On an assessment of the world's energy resources, many other matters depend. When we talk about the development of the South, what do we mean? Widespread industrialisation, on the Northern model? And if so, would this involve the proliferation of national car, aircraft and shipping industries, all energy intensive, all contributing to a wasteful use of the world's resources? Or do we mean some new kind of development, more appropriate to the future—and if so, what? Are we aiming towards a

plateau of sufficiency, where each country has enough according to its needs, but no more? Or do we anticipate a future where each country is developed industrially, competitive in the world's market, but disregarding the ecological consequences? It may be all too easy and comforting for Northern nations to say to the poor South, 'Disregard our example. We must discover new ways to become rich and self-sufficient without plundering the environment.' But is that not the advice which, in the long term, we must give? And will the poor Puerto Ricans, gazing agog at the Cadillacs, listen? And if we decide against wasteful industrialisation, can we expect the aim of world sufficiency to be achieved through the modified and monitored market forces in which the Brandt Commission for the most part place their trust? Even if we accept the Brandt Commission's call for a new World Monetary Order, releasing countries from their dependence on the American dollar and the tattered remains of the Bretton Woods agreement, is it at all likely that in the state of uneasy suspicion, sometimes amounting to outright war, that much of the world accepts as its natural order, the supernational trust can be discovered to support a supernational currency?

It is all highly speculative; and behind such speculations, looms the awful prospect of what happens when elaborate, costly development aid programmes go wrong, as in the case of Micronesia. Micronesia, a group of many small islands in the Pacific, stretching along the Equator, came under US trusteeship after the Second World War. It includes the Bikini atoll, as well as Guam, the largest island, the Caroline and Palau islands, and the Marshall and Gilbert islands. The Micronesians, less than half a million of them, lived an idyllic, peaceful existence, until the Second World War. There was plenty of fish in their waters, plenty of food on the land; but by international standards, their life was primitive in the extreme. They had almost no monetary income, no welfare services, little Western-style education and little contact with the outside world. It was also an area where atom bombs could be exploded with the minimum fuss; and in the wake of the bomb, came the trusteeship. President Kennedy decided that something should be done about Micronesia and for the past fifteen years, aid and development programmes for Micronesia have been pouring out of Washington. The result has been disastrous. No industries have been established, but the Micronesians' techniques of elegant survival, and, in places, the balance of nature, have been lost. The staple diet of the Micronesians has become canned food—tuna fish from Japan, bully beef from the States. There is little fishing, little farming, and the natives queue up for US government dole, to be spent largely on Coca-Cola and tinned beer, whose remains litter the villages.

This text-book example of how not to do it should not be taken, of course, as an argument against all development aid programmes; but as a peripheral warning when considering the first task in the Brandt Commission's Emergency Programme, 1980-85—the large-scale transfer of resources to developing countries. This consists of two main objectives—immediate assistance to the 'poverty belt' of countries stretching across

Africa and Asia, and the provision of financing the debts and deficits of middle-income countries; and would require, in different forms of international financing, a minimum of 4 billion dollars, in addition to current aid. The rich countries should aim at a commitment of 0.7 of their GNPS towards development; but the Brandt Commission have other ingenious ways of raising the finance, including a special tax on armaments and a re-cycling of oil revenues through a proposed new international financial institution, a World Development Fund.

The principle is laudable and needs to be urgently started. In practice, however, one would like to know more about what is meant by development, both by the rich Northern countries and the OPEC bloc, and by the poor Southern countries needing assistance. There could be cases where (as in Micronesia) the best form of aid is leaving well alone; and so many of the world's worst disasters are humanly self-inflicted, particularly in South-East Asia, that one has sympathy for those pessimists who believe, with Voltaire, that the best response to global disorders is that of cultivating one's own garden.

The Brandt Commission counsel against pessimism. Among their other immediate aims, they call for an international energy strategy, a world food programme and major reforms in the international economic system. Their view calls for optimistic action, based on a sober assessment of the world's needs; and I would like to be able to share it without any qualifications at all, for all mental reservations are a threat to its success, and it is easy for the 'hue of resolution to be sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought.' Nevertheless, I sense that there is a dimension missing from *North-South* which could perhaps never have been included and yet whose absence threatens the enterprise.

If I term this a 'religious' or 'moral' dimension, there is the danger of misinterpretation. I wish for no bland submissions to divine will; but rather a wisdom and respect for the natural powers which technology has placed at our disposal, a sense of awe, a charity which is not selfishness in another disguise, a clearer recognition of the many rough beasts which are slouching towards different Bethlehems to be born, a new humility and a fresh sense of beauty and wonder. I do not think that the enlightened self-interest in which the Brandt Commission for the most part place their trust, is a strong enough moral force to accomplish the ends which we all desire. Last year in *Contemporary Review*, I asked at the time of the general election whether we in Britain could change our minds. That was a parochial question which invited and received a parochial answer. The Brandt Commission have left unasked the vital question—which is whether we can change our hearts and souls. This curious, intangible, quasi-philosophical, quasi-religious area—which penetrates all our lives and yet cannot be relegated to any particular aspect of them—remains beyond the reach of any five, ten or fifteen year crash programme. It is also where, I suspect, the future of the world will be decided.

EXIT RHODESIA — AND BEIT

by C. C. Aronsfeld

NOW that the name of Rhodesia passes from the stage of history it seems fitting to remember some of the great men who had a share in the 100 years' story. Cecil Rhodes, of course, the colossus of the latter-day Empire, is well known and his monument will stand up well to the rise of Zimbabwe. But powerful though his achievement is, much of it was possible only in partnership with a man little less remarkable. Alfred Beit died in 1906, aged 53, and though the press of the world then went out of its way to record the event, the name has since settled into that obscurity which this modest man eagerly courted throughout his formidable career.

Beit, who left such millions as Rothschild and Rockefeller might envy, was, as a financier, a visionary genius. He was fated, however, and perhaps fortunately so, to meet a more dramatic genius who cast a spell over him and sometimes, perhaps unjustly, a powerful shadow too.

No two men could have been, at first sight, more strikingly unlike. Rhodes was the son of an English clergyman, Beit of a Jewish businessman; the one was a British imperialist, the other a German merchant; Rhodes was a champion of the Anglo-Saxon race, Beit believed in the universal race. Yet (says Beit's biographer, G. Seymour Ford) they were 'so essentially alike in spirit, character and mental qualities that they inevitably arrived at complete unity.'

Neither of them intellectual or scholar, both possessed 'great powers of organisation which they used as much for the productive expenditure of wealth as for its acquisition, and above all for the maintenance of a practical form of Imperial policy.' Each had the same sweep of constructive vision and absolute confidence in the other. If Rhodes' belief in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race was romantic, so was Beit's 'supreme faith in the reality of Rhodes' ideas.'

Beit came from Hamburg, the son of a struggling businessman who could provide, at best, a meagre existence. The boy's education was irregular owing to delicate health and he later often declared himself unable to write a grammatical letter. But then, of course, he could do different things. In 1875, at the age of 22, he went out to South Africa as the representative of a shipper's office doing business with the then new mining settlement at Kimberley. Within less than fifteen years he established himself as one of the two founders of the diamond industry in Kimberley, chief founder of the gold-mining industry in Johannesburg and one of the three founders of Rhodesia. He was fortunate in that he arrived in the early days of the world's richest diamond field and he seized the opportunity boldly. Diamonds were found in such quantities that wealth could be had almost for the asking, and having served first with two relatively small firms, Beit began to coordinate production on a commercial basis.

He was probably the first to realise that unless some control was estab-

lished, restraining the urge to get rich quickly and ensuring 'the orderly evolution of the diamond fields out of the welter of unbridled production and competition', the diamond industry would be ruined by its own expansion and he lost no time in taking action after he had met Rhodes, who possessed the same ambition. Between them, they brought off the great take-over by which they formed the towering De Beers Consolidated Mines Company. When soon afterwards rumours of gold filtered through they immediately staked claims on the Rand, and by 1888 their British South Africa Company struck north into what became Rhodesia.

If Beit readily acknowledged the daring master-mind of Rhodes who could force the astute rivals, 'Barney' Barnato and Wolf Joel, to accept 'amalgamation', nevertheless it was he, 'little Alfred' (as Rhodes was fond of calling him) who, by his tenacity of purpose, ensured a successful issue. And this was true throughout their association. The huge schemes mapped out by Rhodes were shaped by Beit to practical proportions. Truly has it been said that without Beit, Rhodes whould have been 'helpless and muddled in details of business, yawning over balance sheets and puzzled by costs of production', and without Rhodes 'whispering sonorous words of conquest', Beit would have 'dwindled to a successful share-dealer'.

But while the making and managing of money was in Beit's blood, it did not fill all of his mind. He seemed to be embarrassed by it and being by nature an introvert (who never married), he had an almost nervous dread of publicity. He was, however, intensely aware of the social obligation that money carries. 'Remember (he used to say) you cannot expect to make money unless others make it with you. To do anything big you must also be careful that others will prosper with you.'

One of the many stories told about him is that Rhodes once wondered what had brought him from the Fatherland to Africa. Beit blushed (as he often did) and said: 'H'm, if you want to know—only one reason, to make money, to make enough money to give my mother in Hamburg £1,000 a year and keep her a carriage and pair with a liveried coachman.'

No single need seemed to him greater for the immediate purposes of civilisation as he (and Rhodes) could best conceive them than the opening up of what was then still the dark continent by way of all kinds of communication. He believed that (in his own words) 'by construction of railways, telegraphs (including wireless telegraphy) and telephones, and kindred or other methods of transmission of persons, goods and messages, civilisation will be best advanced and expedited in Africa for the benefit of the inhabitants, whether native or immigrant.' Accordingly he left a vast sum for the building of the Cape-Cairo Railway—a favourite scheme of Rhodes'—and Southern Africa particularly benefited much from his generosity. General Smuts wrote:

> By the common man Beit will be remembered mainly because of his services to transport in South Africa. Who has not travelled over the wide expanse of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and has not blessed the memory of Beit at sight of a bridge or a causeway over a hopelessly deep and rough river-bed, even when there was not water flowing in it? These useful memorials of Beit are scattered all over that young country.

The most memorable perhaps is the Alfred Beit bridge spanning the Limpopo river towards the Transvaal, one of Zimbabwe's most vital links with her neighbours, and it seems an appropriate monument too, for shy though he was, almost to the point of self-effacement, Beit would have loved nothing better than to be remembered as a builder of bridges—in every respect—and therefore (like so many Jews) he took a particular interest in education, if only to make up for the schooling he had been denied. If the sums he spent on this cause are a reliable yardstick he may well be regarded as one of the greatest benefactors of his time. 'Practically every single man, woman and child in Rhodesia has reaped some material or cultural advantage from his benefaction (writes Ford). No other British colony has received such a rich endowment in the early stages of its history.'

Nor were the gifts confined to Rhodesia or South Africa's high schools (including Johannesburg University). A Chair of Colonial History was established at Oxford; £160,000 was bequeathed to London University's College of Technology and Medical Science Funds, and a grateful thought was spared for his native city of Hamburg which received £100,000 to build a university.

The Germans appreciated his interest while at the same time wondering why it was that 'Germans outside Germany managed within a relatively short time to secure great economic and political power.' In its memoir of Beit in 1906, one of Berlin's liberal papers found that this was 'by no means an accident', because it was 'precisely the ablest men' who 'soon realise that Germany puts so many obstacles in their path that they follow the most elementary common sense when they prefer to apply their talents abroad. Our bigotry in political, social and religious affairs has always driven away the very best people', and it was 'Germany's misfortune' that in this way 'our most dangerous rivals on the world markets—the United States and Britain—reap immeasurable benefits from the services rendered by Germans.'

Normally Beit was at pains to keep clear of politics which, on the whole wisely, he left to Rhodes, but such was his devotion to his friend that, much against his better judgment, he got himself involved in the notorious Jameson Raid which eventually sparked off the Boer War. He assisted, no doubt at Rhodes' bidding, the Outlanders' rebellion against Kruger, and a Select Committee found he must 'share full responsibility for the consequences.'

Inevitably, having settled in London, he was assailed by a great deal of hostility, much of it unscrupulous and often directed against his German origin and/or Jewish descent. It little availed him that, under Rhodes' inspiration, he had become an ardent imperialist. The detractors were not interested in the fact (noted by the biographer) that 'England would have been a definitely poorer country if these German-British subjects had elected to domicile themselves elsewhere.'

There was a strong anti-German feeling in the country, and the Anglo-Germans of Beit's generation were almost bound to be misunderstood as

they worked for good relations between the two powers. However sound the intention of the Rhodes scholarships, an Anglo-German *entente* simply did not then go well with the Rhodes-Beit conception of a United British Empire as the embodiment of an idea embracing and superseding all national differences. Nor was Beit always the most inspired protagonist of Anglo-German peace. When in 1905 he visited the Kaiser who complained, much like Hitler, of a 'certain anti-German section in London', Beit promised to talk his English friends into virtual isolationism; they were to keep out of continental affairs, leaving the French to the Germans' tender mercies, and as for South Africa, he fancied the interests of Germany—'only commercial interests'—were identical with those of England.

Beit was not the first hard-headed businessman to reveal remarkable *naiveté* in politics. Out of its chosen field, the undoubted genius was reduced to commonplace. He was indeed unlikely to carry conviction, even if his health had not by then declined. A few months later he died, four years after Rhodes whom he no doubt was pleased to join again, forsaking at last the loneliness of his millions for the kingdom of the for ever greater dreams.

The July issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The End of an Epoch: A Successor to Roy Jenkins* by Cosmo Russell, *The West and Yugoslavia After Tito* by Stephen C. Markovich, *The Moral Case of a Carnivore* by Hugh V. McLachlan and *Rediscovering Forrest Reid* by K. G. Ponting.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND MEDICINE IN THE 1980s

by John A. Loraine

IT is acutely ironic that just when the overall rate of global population growth is slowing—from 2% per annum in 1970 to 1.7% in 1980—the world will be called upon to face another devastating explosion, that of its labour force.

Growth of the labour force is caused by the entrance each year of millions of able bodied young people into the working age groups. It can be compared to a prism reflecting previous reproductive performance; it remains in a continuous state of flux, as the roaring engine of technology speeds along the track, as the tide of female emancipation ebbs and flows, as our finite planet approaches ever nearer to its resource limits. Undoubtedly the situation of the labour force worldwide will be pivotal to the evolution of history during this decade.

Joblessness will reach its apotheosis in the developing world. By 1990 the Asian labour force is likely to have expanded by 40%, the African by 60%, the Latin American by 70%. Individual Third World countries are destined to show specially marked rises in the next 10 years. The Mexican, Peruvian, Venezuelan and Algerian labour forces could increase by one third, Nigeria's by 12 million, Pakistan's by 15 million, Brazil's and Indonesia's by 25 million. The Geneva-based International Labour Organisation which is concerned with forecasting trends in this area has projected that by 2000 AD 800 million new jobs will have to be created in the Third World to keep pace with demand. In a world likely to experience a low rate of economic growth in association with mounting inflationary pressures such a figure is, of course, quite chimerical—just about as relevant as is the phlogiston theory to modern chemistry. Accordingly the unpalatable fact must be squarely faced that in the next 10 years literally millions of children in the developing world will grow up having been exposed to an educational experience varying greatly in quality, and then proceed permanently into retirement.

In the quarter of the planet which constitutes the industrialised world—Western Europe, North America, Japan, the Eastern bloc, Australia, New Zealand—20 million people are already out of work and by 1983 the figure could well have risen by a further 10 million. This is an ominous development but at first sight the ultimate prognosis seems less grim than for developing countries. Overall numbers are smaller—for example the North American and Soviet labour forces are projected to rise by only 30 and 20 million respectively by 2000 AD; fertility is likely to remain low (at or below replacement level) as various factors including inflationary pressures in the economy, expanding family planning services, increasing liberalisation of abortion laws and perhaps a certain pessimism about the world's future, continue to damp down procreative activity. Also palliatives such as shortening hours of work, extending the period of educational exposure and lowering the retiral age are much more readily applied in developed

countries.

But it must be continuously stressed that what has been dubbed the Second Industrial Revolution, will bite much more deeply in the industrialised countries in the Eighties than in the Third World. The Revolution encompasses a degree of automation undreamt of by visionaries of the past. Microelectronics is its base, the computer and the silicon chip are its pivots. By 1985 the number of electronic functions incorporated into products of all kinds will have risen inordinately—probably more than 100 fold. The market will remain highly buoyant: it will proliferate with dizzying speed and will be associated with a vertiginous fall in costs continuing a trend which has been a dominant feature of the microelectronics industry over the past 20 years.

Life styles in the Eighties will change spectacularly in the wake of the microprocessor. That there will be benefits to humanity is not in doubt, and these are now well documented in the literature. They include impressive modifications in the home, in the office and on the road. Advances in medicine through computers will facilitate the keeping of better hospital records and the improvement of diagnostic techniques; the law is likely to be codified and many of its more arcane and anachronistic facets eliminated; the whole educational process will come under scrutiny and by 1990 teaching methods could have been improved out of all recognition.

But it is the relationship of the chip to employment which is by far the most worrisome aspect of the Second Industrial Revolution. Jobs can be created by microprocessors—this has already been demonstrated in the USA and particularly in Japan; but work created will certainly not compensate for jobs which are lost. In 1980 prospects for the decade are already mapped. Information technology using advanced, all-digital, voice and communications networks are coming increasingly into use. So are word processors and 'intelligent copiers'; an internal electronic mail service is already operating in the USA. The overall effect of these innovations will be to automate office work in a manner which is quite unprecedented. Once and for all the 'paper shuffling' which up until now has been a *sine qua non* of office routine will be eliminated. As a result myriads of typists, clerks, secretaries and administrators will find themselves made redundant.

The industrial sector will certainly not be immune from the long arm of the chip. Already the textile industry is under severe threat and its labour force is being reduced dramatically in Britain, France and the USA. Robotry and other automatic handling devices are making a significant imprimatur on the motor trade and will soon extend their influence into other sectors of industry. Given such trends it seems reasonable to conclude that during the Eighties the chip will become the rationaliser *par excellence*, the quintessential de-industrialiser, the means whereby literally millions of people in the developed world are deprived of their livelihood. The social effects of this change can only be profound. The work ethic is woven into the warp and the woof of our *persona*, our culture, our accepted norms. It cannot and will not be extinguished in a few brief years. Instead,

unrest in a frustrated and embittered labour force is likely to spread increasingly, making the industrial troubles associated with the Great Economic Depression of the 1930s appear minor by comparison.

Yet for some the advent of the chip produces a tantalising prospect. It is of course that of the post-industrial society—freed from the remorseless burden of toil, fairer, more leisured, less thrusting, with a better quality of life. It is the vision of John Stuart Mill in his *Principles of Political Economy* published over 120 years ago when he proclaimed that a stationary condition of capital and population implied no stationary state of human improvement. As Mill wrote, 'there would be just as much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and moral and social progress; as much room for improving the art of living and as much likelihood of its being improved, when minds cease to be engrossed by the art of getting on.' For the long term the viewpoint is impeccable and all those associated with the environmentalist movement must endorse it. But nevertheless in the Eighties it is the immediate effects of the chip which must be faced and that these will be damaging both at personal and societal levels can scarcely be doubted.

As of now the medical effects of joblessness remain singularly ill-researched. That they will be conspicuous and the focus of increasing interest to the profession in the Eighties is inevitable. To the vast majority of individuals joblessness constitutes a searing and shattering experience. In the USA the aphorism 'you are what you do' is common, and certainly employment serves a number of purposes other than merely providing an income. It gives a time structure to the day; it enhances personal status and identity; it lifts the mind from goals which are purely personal to a more corporate level. In its absence pride and self-esteem are greatly reduced; social contacts narrow as the carapace of depersonalisation and anomie grips even tighter. There are also notable effects on the family; marital friction becomes more frequent, because the female partner feels her rights have been infringed in the race for jobs. Under such circumstances children are not noted for their sympathy and understanding. Instead, they come to look on the jobless parent as a pariah, the epitome of failure when compared with the parents of their peers, an object for resentment and disdain.

What then are likely to be the direct medical sequelae of joblessness? Anxiety states will undoubtedly proliferate and family doctors and psychiatrists in the Eighties will spend an increasing proportion of their time attempting to treat them. Depressive episodes will become more frequent; sad-eyed people staring at the wall and apologising for their very existence will be commonplace; cases of attempted suicide will swell the admission rate to hospitals. Diseases already known to be associated with stressful situations—high blood pressure, gastric and duodenal ulcers, ulcerative colitis, various cardiological complaints to name but a few—will increase in incidence.

Many people will seek the anodyne for the depression resulting from joblessness in drug addiction. This represents a pathetic attempt to relieve

unsupportable psychological tensions and to escape into a world of make believe. Addiction to alcohol is already assuming epidemic proportions in many parts of the industrialised world and this could well become the quintessential medical and social problem of the Eighties. The disease is now manifesting itself at an earlier age; the rise in incidence of female drinking in the past 10 years has been nothing short of spectacular. My native country Scotland admittedly has a rather unusual problem in relation to alcohol abuse with some 3% of the population over 15 years of age with a significant drinking problem and 20% of admissions to all psychiatric hospitals resulting from this cause. But as joblessness spreads in the Eighties the Scottish exemplar could well be transported to other parts of the industrialised world. If this is so one might expect that Skid Row, that bleak, grim, lawless area where alcoholics congregate and which is already a feature of most big cities, could well increase its territorial boundaries.

At the time of writing the most reliable data on the medical effects of unemployment have been reported from the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore where a sociologist, Dr. Harvey Brenner, has been working on this theme for more than a decade. Brenner was the first to demonstrate conclusively that unemployment contributed directly to both morbidity and mortality. In the USA between 1970 and 1975 a 1% increase in the jobless rate affected 1½ million people and was responsible for 40,000 deaths. Twenty thousand people died from heart attacks and associated kidney disease; there were 500 cases of cirrhosis of the liver due mainly to excessive alcohol consumption; 920 people killed themselves and there were 420 homicides. Brenner's work has subsequently been extended to the different cultural setting of England and Wales and his conclusions have been confirmed there also.

Almost 200 years ago the Luddites of Nottingham, starving and very angry, smashed their knitting frames and rampaged through the streets. Eventually an army larger than that which had recently faced Napoleon in Portugal had to be mobilised to quell the riots. The Parliament of the day was slow to act against the Luddites; history is likely to repeat itself in relation to the chip. The ostrich syndrome will prevail, Micawberism run rife; the best brains will not be summoned to grapple with effects of microelectronics on the employment situation; the hope will continue to be expressed by contemporary politicians that the pumpkin will somehow turn into a carriage. One is reminded of Churchill's criticism of the Baldwin Government in the 1930's in relation to German rearmament, that they were 'decided only to be undecided . . . adamant for drift, solid for fluidity'. With the chip as with the Nazis the time span is short, and by 1990 the period for resolute action to deal with a cataclysmic degree of joblessness will have passed. If this happens one cannot but have every sympathy with future generations inhabiting the Western world who will wish to impugn political leaders of this decade before the bar of history.

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POEM

WAITING

I do not really care to think
About the things I might have done
Or said, had I been smart enough.
I think I just prefer to sun
Myself. A lady rather tired
Of living and a little scared
Of dying.

Warm milk and softly boiled eggs decide my place:
Awake/Abed. My keepers do not notice when
The pillow slips beneath my head
But rather tend to books and toys
To worries and to times of trains.
They find me tedious—I know——
But after all is said and done
I do not really think I mind—I think
I just prefer to sun
Myself—a lady rather tired
Of living
And
A little scared
Of dying.

ELIZABETH GOWANS

THE POLITICS IN CRIME (AND VICE VERSA)

by Michael Laver

MUCH has recently been made of the analogy between the political and the economic market place. Indeed, a whole school of political theory (rational choice theory) has been based upon this analogy, which makes one important omission. While the outputs of both political and economic markets are determined by the relative power of the participants, one significant source of political power is denied to legitimate entrepreneurs. This is force. Much political power depends in the final analysis on the, legitimate or illegitimate, use of physical coercion. While honest businessmen are unable to call upon this useful weapon, force is a stock in trade for another group of entrepreneurs. Much criminal activity depends on force in the first, the final, and every other analysis. I wish, therefore, to float another analogy, and explore the underlying strategic similarities between politics and crime.

Not all crime requires force. The con-man and the forger have more peaceful means of making a dishonest living. Nevertheless, even they inhabit a world whose rules are made and enforced by doing nasty things to people who step out of line. Similarly, a lot of crime is not 'political' at all. If I hit you over the head with a pick-axe handle and remove your valuables, we cannot be said to have interacted in any meaningful way. The next time you walk the streets with bulging pockets, they may be full of knuckle-dusters and bicycle chains. If I try and club you again we may have a serious set-to. All of this, however, looks much more like war than politics. Notwithstanding this, there is one important category of crime which does have a significant political content. We might think of this as *strategic crime,* and it includes kidnapping, hijacking, protection racketeering, blackmail and so on. Furthermore, all organised crime syndicates operate in an intensely political fashion, bringing peace, order and prosperity to an underworld which, without them, would be one of the best examples imaginable of Hobbesian chaos and disaster. The crucial point about these types of political crime is that the victims/participants are always offered a *choice.* It may not be a very attractive choice, and the manipulation of force by the principals may mean that some of the alternatives on offer are hard to refuse, but it is a choice nonetheless.

Thus, if I kidnap your spouse and demand one million pounds for her safe return, my bargaining advantage has been gained by coercive means, but it is still only a bargaining advantage. I haven't yet got the money. If you turn your back and walk away whistling with ill-concealed glee, I am stuck with your spouse on my hands, and nothing to show for it. I can't *make* you pay me. Similarly, if I hire a private eye and discover some particularly embarrassing detail of your personal life, I can try to blackmail you by threatening to show the photographs to your friends and relations if you don't give me large sums of money. Once more, this is only the beginning. All I have done is given you a choice. You can go

to the police, ignore me, or pay me. If you refuse to pay me, I can always post my prurient parcels, but where does that get me? Nowhere!

In general, strategic crime concerns those circumstances where one of the parties has used illegitimate, and probably coercive, means to acquire a bargaining advantage over the other. In these circumstances the coercion itself is secondary to the real action which takes place in the negotiations which follow. Is that so different from politics? The only real difference is that, in politics, some of the coercive means are legitimate.

One of the classic interactions of politics is captured in a game known as the Prisoners' Dilemma. This dilemma is a very useful means of exploring the first aspect of strategic crime which I want to consider, the benefits brought to a criminal underworld by an organised syndicate. Very briefly, the story behind the Prisoners' Dilemma runs as follows. Two hardened criminals are arrested while committing some minor offence, such as stealing a car. The police know, but cannot prove, that the two men are mixed up in something much more serious. They therefore separate the prisoners and offer each the same deal. 'If you turn Queen's evidence against your partner, we will let you walk out of here a free man. If you don't, we've got you anyway for the car theft, and you'll draw a year in jail. If your partner turns Queen's evidence against you, you'll take the whole blame for the major crime, and draw ten years.' Each also knows that, if both confess, both are convicted of the major crime, although they receive some reduction of sentence for helping the police, ending up with, say, eight years. The inescapable logic of this interaction leads both to confess, since whatever the other does, each draws a shorter jail sentence by confessing. Confession yields eight years, rather than ten if the other confesses, and no years rather than one if the other keeps quiet. Both confess (drawing eight years apiece), despite the fact that both prefer another outcome, mutual silence (and one year each in jail).

This game has been used to illuminate a wide range of political interactions, ranging from nuclear disarmament to pollution control, even to the origins of the state. The main reason for this is that one way in which the Prisoners' Dilemma can be 'solved' is for a strong external authority to intervene and help the participants to cooperate. This 'help' is usually arranged by imposing strong penalties on the participants if they choose an uncooperative strategy. When the prisoners' dilemma is played by real prisoners, this help can be provided by a powerful organised crime syndicate. Nearly all such organisations hold, as one of their fundamental beliefs, the belief that criminals should not inform to the police. This 'norm' is enforced with the very severe penalties exacted from those who violate it. In other words, the coercive power of the syndicate is used,not to force the prisoners to cooperate (only those possessed of supernatural powers can achieve this feat) but to offer them a choice rather different from the one intended by the police. In effect, new payoffs are added to the game, which considerably outweigh anything contained in the original scenario. The original payoffs for grassing are no years or eight years in jail, depending on the behaviour of the other prisoner. The relative benefits

of grassing (rather than keeping quiet) are one year or two years less in jail, respectively. The syndicate simply reverses these relative payoffs by adding something very nasty, such as death, to the payoffs associated with confession. In consequence, the game ceases to be a prisoners' dilemma, and the participants easily settle upon the cooperative, and silent, outcome. Now, whatever the other does, it is better to stay silent. If the other stays silent, you get no years in jail plus death for confessing, and one year in jail for staying silent. If the other confesses, you get eight years plus death for confessing, and ten years for staying silent. No dilemma.

The interesting feature of this solution is that, by submitting themselves to fearful punishments from the syndicate, the prisoners derive enormous benefits. They each end up with one year in jail, rather than the inevitable eight years they receive if they do not belong to an organisation which is likely to kill them if they step out of line. In exchange for these very real benefits, the syndicate can, of course, exact a tribute. However, even having paid the tribute, all concerned (except the police) can come out ahead. By killing grasses, the syndicate provides a valuable strategic service to the criminal community. This service is almost exactly analogous to that provided by a Hobbesian sovereign by forcing his subjects from a state of war to a state of (albeit mistrustful) peaceful cooperation.

The illicit welfare gains generated by the organisation of criminal activity manifest themselves in many circumstances. Consider, for example, the allocation of territories. If a disorganised collection of gangs develop patches of territory which they control exclusively, then each will always be trying to expand in order to increase profits. Yet if each does this then all will frequently be embroiled in costly gangland wars. Disorganised, the gangs face a prisoners' dilemma. Each would rather govern its own patch peacefully than continually fight gangland wars, but none can resist the temptation to expand if the others are peaceful, nor take the risk of being overrun without a fight if the others are expanding. A central organisation which allocated exclusive territories, and heavily penalised encroachments, would do all a great service. Such an organisation has existed (and may well still exist) in order to coordinate the activities of the various American Mafia families.

As a further example, consider illegal gambling. The services provided by illegal bookmakers are clearly valued by their clients, yet all are greatly hampered by the fact that most gambling debts are not enforceable in law. On many occasions, the various parties to these illicit transactions will be tempted to welch on their deals. The benefits of each welching will be great compared to the loss of trust which ensues, since there is always another punter. If everyone concerned continually welched, however, the whole market would collapse in chaos. With no coordination of activity, it would never be worth the while of any individual to be honest when everyone else was cheating. Once more we have an enterprise which simply cries out for organisation. A syndicate which enforces otherwise unenforceable deals (however unpleasant the means it uses) provides a very real service, and enables all who so desire to engage in this illicit activity in reasonable

confidence. Once more, we should not expect this service to be paid for out of the goodness of anyone's heart, a small 'contribution' will always be expected.

This last example can, of course, be extended to almost any type of illicit transaction where the possibility of being double-crossed provides a role for the professional 'enforcer'. Thus we should not be surprised to find this important political role being filled by syndicates in the worlds of illegal drinking clubs, drugs, sex, currency deals and immigration, the bribery of judges, policemen and bureaucrats. In each case, the force at the disposal of the syndicate does not *impose* a particular solution. The cooperative outcome is simply made much more likely by the changed payoffs of the principal actors. In this context, the tribute exacted in return is not really so different from the taxation extracted by governments (by ultimately coercive means) to provide certain goods and services to the population 'for their own good'. The underworld governments which emerge may well look more like dictatorships than liberal democracies, but they are nonetheless governments, with 'unwritten' constitutions. The gangland bosses who rule over them may well look more like Hobbesian sovereigns than elected heads of state, but they are nonetheless politicians, with a constituency to satisfy if they are to govern in reasonable comfort.

Kidnapping and blackmail are enterprises with a very similar strategic structure. In each case one side gains control of something which is intrinsically valueless to them, but extremely valuable to someone else, and attempts to extract money from the other in exchange for its return. The blackmailer controls information which is potentially embarrassing to the victim. The kidnapper controls the life of someone dear to the victim. In each case, the crime is strategic, because the victim is not forced to pay, and can choose to ignore the deal entirely. The similarities, however, go far beyond this. In each case, the criminal usually threatens to scrap the deal if the police are involved, killing the hostage or publishing the information. Thus both victim and criminal can develop a common interest in excluding the police. In each case the simple mechanics of making the exchange dominate the negotiations since, obviously, neither side can trust the other. Many deals abort precisely because of failure to come to an agreement on these mechanics. In particular, the criminal will always suspect a trap, since the moment of exchange is the one point at which he declares his whereabouts, and the victim will always suspect a doublecross, paying the money and getting nothing in return. In each case, the victim will have an intense interest in keeping the deal secret, since its publication will render him liable to subsequent similar attempts. In each case, for the same reasons, the police will be strongly inclined to resist any attempt at a deal. There is a strong pressure, therefore, for a secret deal between both parties, provided that satisfactory arrangements for transfer can be worked out.

We also see that there are two clear roles for an organised syndicate. The first role is the middle man, using muscle to guarantee the deal, or acting as a stake holder. The second role is more direct, with the Mob

actually engaging in kidnapping or blackmail, but using its position to make the consummation of the deal more likely. 'Freelance' kidnappers and blackmailers, as we have seen, have their bargaining position considerably undermined by the fact that they cannot be trusted. They cannot be trusted because the victim cannot imagine any incentive for them to keep their side of the bargain. (Indeed, every incentive is to doublecross, either killing the kidnapped hostage to destroy the evidence, or keeping copy negatives for another blackmail attempt.) A syndicate which reguarly engaged in kidnapping or hijacking as a continuing business enterprise would, however, have an incentive to fulfil its side of the bargain. If it did not, future victims would not pay. Knowing this, the victim is more likely to pay. The syndicate with a reputation to consider can thus do much better business than the freelance and, in a peculiar way, everyone is better off (once more with the exception of the police). If *someone* kidnapped my nearest and dearest, I would much rather it was the Mob than some wildcat. While I might not like the Mob, I can trust them at least a little bit, and possibly do business with them.

Kidnapping has, of course, also developed as an explicitly 'political' crime, with organisations attempting to extract political concessions from governments in exchange for the return of important public figures. An interesting strategic variant of kidnapping is hijacking which has an almost exclusively political history. (Although purely criminal hijackings have, of course, taken place, they seem largely to have been inspired by their political precursors). The crucial strategic difference between hijacking and other forms of kidnapping is that, with hijacking, the location of the perpetrator and his hostages is known to the victim. Thus, the hijacker is often quickly besieged by the forces of law and order, and this makes the interaction far more complex, since interdependence is almost total. If the hijacker has chosen his hostages well, then the victim is intensely concerned with their safe custody. This can only be guaranteed by convincing the hijacker that he has something to gain by not killing the hostages (a good reason for making the penalties for abortive hijackings considerably less than for murder). This can be particularly difficult if the hijacker has already killed in the earlier stages of the incident. Conversely, while the hostages themselves are intrinsically valueless to the hijacker, they are his only guarantee of safe conduct. The threat to kill the hostages, the only threat which is likely to extract any concessions, is the threat to destroy that guarantee. This is obviously why it is best to take as many hostages as possible, since the threat to kill some and keep others for safe conduct is particularly effective. (If this threat is enacted, it also has the 'advantage' of leaving the victim no inducement to offer to encourage a surrender.) On the other side of the barricades, governments, as perennial victims of hijack attempts, simply cannot afford to give in on any occasion, however seductive this may seem at the time. Any sign of weakness would clearly make them much more vulnerable in the future. This is the crucial difference between the criminal and political taking of hostages. The criminal is much more likely to get away with it, because the victim need pay less attention to the possibility of future attempts. One important

caveat must be made at this point. Since *secret* deals, for the reasons we have just discussed, are much more attractive to the victims, it is quite possible that we only ever hear about those attempts which are successfully resisted. Who knows how many hijack victims have capitulated in private?

Hijacking, kidnapping and blackmail all have the general strategic property that the criminal attempts to extract concessions on the basis of threats which are potentially disastrous for all concerned if enacted. They all involve a critical element of bluff. All bluffs can be called and both calling and being called can be very costly. In a more general political context, people are often accused of 'holding the country to ransom' or engaging in 'blackmail'. From the preceding discussion, however, we can see that these are inacurate descriptions, since they are usually applied to people who attempt to extract concessions by threatening action which is relatively costless to themselves. (This is more like extortion, which we will discuss below.) A much closer parallel to hijacking is the threat of a strike or a lock out which may ruin a particular company. These actions certainly damage the victim, but form the basis complex threats, since enactment can damage the threatener as much, or more than, the threatened. If I threaten to bankrupt your company if you don't give me a payrise, I am really hijacking you, since the strategic calculations involved are, in principle, the same. My threat does me little good if I am forced to carry it out.

Another favourite political hijack comes at a late stage in a complex set of negotiations, where one side can try to hijack the others by threatening to tear everything up if large concessions are not made. This may be the last thing everyone wants, but is nevertheless a threat to be taken seriously, and can sometimes be effective.

The possibility of hijacking has become a central concern of international strategists, particularly since the advent of nuclear weapons. While no one has yet tried a fully fledged nuclear hijack, demanding surrender in exchange for not launching a nuclear attack, the Cuban Missile Crisis took us pretty close. Certainly the implications of both surrender and resistance in the face of such a threat must have been extensively researched by the various actors, who are at once potential hijackers and victims. This illustrates the crucial 'political' connotation of nuclear, as opposed to conventional, warfare. The mutual interdependence engendered by ferocious nuclear capabilities means the people with their fingers on the button must think politically. In contrast, a conventional attack looks more like a smash-and-grab raid.

Extortion and protection racketeering involve little risk to the criminal. This is the critical difference between them and the strategic crimes discussed in the previous section. Thus, if I write to you and threaten to have my operatives blow up your valuable jumbo jet if you don't give me lots of money, then that is extortion. If I board your jumbo jet and threaten to blow it up in mid-air if you don't pay up, then that is hijacking.

The second major difference is that, with extortion and protection

racketeering, the negotiations come before the use of illicit force, rather than after. Indeed, if I want to *extort* money from you, I don't actually have to *do* anything more than pick up the phone, or pay you a casual visit with a couple of large friends. This is obviously a much more convenient method of proceeding, yielding potentially rich returns for very little investment. The threat, of course, must be credible, and the lack of prior commitment on the part of the threatener is the one major drawback with extortion, as opposed to kidnapping. The kidnapper has demonstrated himself to be something of a desperado before the negotiations begin. At the same stage in the proceedings, the self-styled protection-racketeer might simply be a fierce-looking Walter Mitty. The temptation for the victim to call the potential bluff is therefore much greater with extortion.

This factor is reinforced by the fact that it is the use of illicit force which generally exposes the criminal to greatest risk, both because it involves physical exposure of the perpetrator to the possibility of capture and because of the greater penalties imposed upon those who are caught. For kidnappers, the most dangerous part is over by the time it comes to the negotiations, and there is little reason not to go the whole way.

With extortion, if the bluff is called, the extortionist must reassess the position. It may well be worth backing down at this stage, since little has been risked. This knowledge further tilts the strategic balance in favour of the victim. Thus, while extortion might seem a convenient crime in comparison with kidnapping, its very convenience reduces the chance that the victim will capitulate.

Once more, however, extortion and protection racketeering provide examples of the way in which an organised syndicate can extract much more value out of a given situation than a band of disorganised freelances. If the Mob move into protection as a business enterprise, then the very fact that this activity provides a part of their long-term livelihood greatly strengthens their position. The Mob never bluffs. If it does, it will be quickly run out of town by more steadfast rivals. It may well make threats it wishes it did not have to carry out, but, if the threats are not heeded, they must be enacted. One of the Mob's main stocks-in-trade is its credibility. People pay the Mob rather than a freelance precisely because they know that it has no choice but to carry out a threat once it is made. It has no choice because, if it did otherwise, no one would ever pay it. Because each threat is but a small part of a much larger enterprise, every time a threat is made, a piece of overall credibility is put at stake. In contrast to a freelance, the Mob commits itself far more when engaging in an extortion or a protection racket. Because it commits itself more, its chances of success are greater. Eliminating a small-time bar owner may seem like an expensive and dangerous way to make a point. But if every other small-time bar owner is looking on, it can become a profitable investment of illicit force.

This is, of course, precisely the position of a colonial power faced with a rebellion in one of its minor dominions. Colonialism in general has a very similar strategic structure to protection racketeering. As long as

colonies pay their dues, they are 'protected' against the encroachments of others, despite the fact that the protection is often unwanted, and the potential encroachment little more than a convenient fiction. The imperial power makes little commitment until it is faced with a rebellion. At this point the very fact that it is an imperial power means that the rebellion must be crushed. If it is not, then the other protectorates will soon be rebelling right, left and centre. This would certainly seem to be a convincing explanation of the United States' costly action in Viet Nam, and the need for imperial credibility illuminates several other cases of apparent overkill in dissident but worthless colonies.

Other real-world political examples occur in industrial relations, where extortion is frequently attempted by both sides. The interaction here is complicated by the fact that neither side is invariably extortionist or extortionee. Both have the capacity to damage the other, and can attempt to extract concessions on the basis of threats to do so. A more typical parallel to criminal extortion occurs when a large, well-organised and resilient employer confronts a small section of its workforce, or when a powerful union takes on a small business. In each of these cases, the enactment of the relevant threats would be little more than a minor irritation to the threatener which has, nevertheless, its global credibility at stake.

All of the examples we have just looked at depend upon the actual or threatened use of force at some stage in the proceedings in order to strengthen one side's bargaining position. It is the combination of force and negotiation which characterises strategic crime. In each case, the choice offered to the victim is conditioned by the use of force, but not determined by it. This is what puts the politics in crime, and the underworld provides an excellent place to explore these political interactions in a context uncluttered by formal laws and institutions.

The analogy can be usefully operated in both directions. Starting from the underworld, where the combination of market forces and coercion is routine, we can develop a more realistic model of politics than that provided by the free market. Starting from politics, where strategic thinking is essential for success, we can identify the important sub-category of strategic crime, where the offers which are made may be hard, but are not impossible, to refuse.

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T. S. ELIOT'S *THE FAMILY REUNION* — FORTY YEARS LATER

by Robert Rubens

> Perhaps my life has only been a dream
> Dreampt through me by the minds of others.

WHEN Harry Monchensey, the hero of T. S. Eliot's play *The Family Reunion,* utters these words he is making both an incisive comment on the nature of twentieth century despair and suggesting a sense of unreality and disorientation which permeated the atmosphere of the author's own generation.

It is an interesting phenomenon that *The Family Reunion,* when it was first produced in 1939 was, except for a small circle of admirers, received with general incomprehension; and yet forty years later in 1979 the play had a resounding popular and artistic success, first in Manchester, then at the New Round House, London, N.W.1, where it attracted predominantly youthful audiences, and finally the production transferred to the West End where it achieved full houses at the Vaudeville Theatre.

When it takes almost half a century for a major work by a great poet and dramatist to be fully appreciated, it seems worth trying to speculate on the reasons. Despite Eliot's efforts to adapt this play to the naturalistic conventions of the London stage in the late 1930's, *The Family Reunion* remains essentially a drama which explores unconscious levels of emotion and its often elliptical verse attempts to reveal the power of specific subliminal forces in the human mind which can affect our everyday lives.

These subconscious eruptions which in this play derive from the young hero's inherited guilt, take the form of a succession of his terrifying visions of Eumenides pursuing him. (Actually Eliot considered the Furies to be, 'divine instruments, not simply hell-hounds,' as he wrote in a letter to his first theatrical director, E. Martin Browne, 19th March, 1938.)

Harry Monchensey also suffers from a gnawing uncertainty as to whether or not he murdered his own wife.

T. S. Eliot was not primarily concerned with presenting a realistic picture of an unhappy family gathering, but was attempting, through the cumulative effect of poetic dialogue, to explore the roots of Harry's particular dilemma and the healing process, partly through self-exploration, which leads to the eventual expiation of his private torments.

To understand fully *The Family Reunion* we must remember that although T. S. Eliot eventually became a devoutly religious man, he had also gone through a period of profound pessimism and even nihilism and at the time he wrote the play, despite the fact that by then he was a confirmed Christian, he undoubtedly felt that the ills of modern civilisation had caused a general disability in human communication and had contributed to a pervading mood of personal isolation. Eliot pin-points these views in a later play, *The Cocktail Party,* when his character, the psychia-

trist Sir Henry Harcourt-Riley, tells a patient that a conventionally dull non-communicative marriage is about the best solution he can advise. He explains:

> In this world of lunacy,
> Violence, greed . . . it is a good life.

In *The Family Reunion* Harry Monchensey's struggles with his embittered, domineering mother eventually lead to his discovery that the source of his anxieties springs from a legacy of family guilt; his late father had wished to murder his mother before his son was born. It is this revelation which finally frees the young hero.

Harry's parental problems and his hallucinations, often bordering on madness, seem to have struck a recognizable chord to our own generation of theatre-goers. For this is an era in which young people are acutely aware of the dangers of parents imposing rigid demands and specific roles on their children. We are now living in a period in which the younger generation has not hesitated to rebel against established authority and to attempt to discover the true nature of their personalities through such methods as psychoanalysis, transcendental meditation and the studying of various eastern and middle eastern religions. So Mr. Eliot's metaphysics, his mysticism and the personal horrors which his hero experiences came as no shock to the audiences of *The Family Reunion* in 1979.

The director of this recent and remarkably effective revival, Michael Elliott, feels that *The Family Reunion* has for years been much underrated not only by the critics but by the author himself and he makes it clear that the play is particularly significant to today's audiences because he considers it to be a play, '. . . in which two worlds co-exist on the stage —one realistic, the other entirely insubstantial and yet at least as real'.

Michael Elliott not only thinks that the play succeeds on both levels, but he goes on to say that it reflects life as he himself sees it: '. . . two worlds that interleave and flow through each other simultaneously and yet apart which is the product of fantasy, hallucination and something closer to mysticism'.

One cannot help feeling that when *The Family Reunion* was first produced there were very few directors or even non-theatrical people who would openly state as Michael Elliott does that: 'We live on several different planes.' And it is this new more fluid and tolerant attitude towards life that is shared by many other people today; which is presumably the reason why *The Family Reunion* has finally been recognized as a masterpiece for its depth, power and undeniable truth.

Michael Elliott's production at the Royal Exchange, Manchester, of *The Dresser*, by Ronald Harwood, is now at the Queens Theatre, London.

POETRY IN THE NEW DECADE

by Howard Sergeant

ALTHOUGH it is my task in this article to consider the prospects for English poetry during the next ten years or so, I would indeed be foolish, lacking the aid of a crystal ball or second sight, to attempt to make predictions of any kind at the beginning of a new decade so beset with uncertainties—many of them quite unrelated to poetry—and with so many variables to be taken into account. Politics, international affairs, the economic situation, enforced leisure resulting from the extension of micro-electronic technology, developments in medical science and space exploration, changes in methods of education and communications, and new techniques in printing and reproduction processes, to mention only a few of the factors, all may have an impact upon poetry in one way or another; to say nothing about the ever-changing nature of poetry itself. As one poet said to me, 'We could all be dead in 10 years.'

Take the political aspects of the situation today, for example. In the last article I wrote for *Contemporary Review* nearly three years ago, I referred to some of the changes that had taken place in poetry over the last 12 years and remarked that

> one might almost say that a revolution has quietly been taking place. . . . If one is to judge by the interest displayed by the ordinary public in poetry readings, it would appear that poetry is in a far more flourishing state than at any other time in this century. More poetry is being written today by young and old alike; more magazines have been put into circulation to cater for the demand; more competitions are being held, both for children and adults; more awards are being given and more poetry festivals are being organised than ever before.

One could take these comments a great deal further and demonstrate that poets today enjoy more advantages than any previous generation of poets. Quite apart from having wider opportunities for publication in magazines, they may enter for many competitions such as the National Poetry Competition (prizes of £2,000 are offered), the Michael Johnson Competition of the Ver Poets, Cheltenham Festival, Winchester Festival, Stroud Festival, and many others; in fact it seems to be becoming an established feature for different towns to have their festivals which include poetry contests. Less rewarding in financial terms, but equally encouraging, are the competitions held by small poetry groups and societies throughout the country. More recently there has been a growing tendency for competitions to be held in aid of such charitable bodies as the British Migraine Association, and all these events have been given enormous publicity in newspapers and magazines. Creative Writing Fellowships, sponsored by the Arts Council, can be obtained at schools, colleges, universities and even libraries (within an 18 month period I have enjoyed a one-year spell at Basingstoke Sixth Form College, and a week's 'Poet-in-Residence' at Eastbourne). Poets may be awarded bursaries, grants, commissions, creative writing fellowships, by the Arts Council or any of the regional Arts Associations. Poetry magazines are similarly assisted finan-

cially by the Arts Council and Arts Associations. The National Poetry Secretariat and London Poetry Secretariat subsidise the fees and sometimes the expenses of poets in order to give readings to local societies; the Arts Council's 'Writers-in-Schools' and the W. H. Smith & Sons 'Poets-in-Schools' schemes make possible readings and poetry workshops in a whole range of educational establishments. Each year the E. C. Gregory Trust makes valuable awards to promising poets under 30 (this year £9,500 was shared among four British poets).

Far more books of poetry are being published than ever before—not, let it be emphasised, by the established publishing companies who seem to be suffering from an acute failure of nerve so far as the work of individual poets is concerned, as distinct from anthologies—but by the numerous small 'shoestring' presses, many of which could not exist without financial grants from the Arts Council. Curiously enough, despite all this enthusiasm and activity in the field of poetry, the few established publishers interested in poetry at all still complain that they make a loss on its publication. There is no reason to doubt the statement, but one is tempted to ask why this should be the case when poetry is clearly so popular, when people read and buy more poetry than ever before. Could it be that the marketing methods of publishers have never been adapted to the needs of a changing age; that their books of poetry are rarely available in the places where they would be in demand—at poetry readings? Or that most of them seem to be quite unaware of the existence of the specialist poetry magazines when it comes to advertising their wares to readers who *do* buy poetry?

Among other activities one should perhaps mention the work of the Arvon Foundation which organises creative writing courses at the Devon and Yorkshire centres, courses which are tutored by practising poets. Here again many of the students have their course-fees subsidised directly by the regional Arts Associations, who also make grants to the Foundation itself. I think that I have said enough about the poetry activities taking place to show what an important part is played by the Arts Council of Great Britain and what might be called its subsidiaries, the regional Arts Associations.

It can be argued that the Arts Council has not always used its resources in the most effective way and that the amounts devoted to poetry are incomparably smaller than those to music, opera, ballet and the theatre, but it can hardly be disputed that the Arts Council is doing more for poetry at present than the wealthy patrons of the Arts did in the past. Through grants, subsidies, commissions and fellowships, it has bought time for poets to concentrate on their writings, it has sustained publications and small presses to publish what is written, it has devised schemes by which poets can give readings to groups and societies throughout the country, and it has made it possible for poets to run workshops in the schools and on special courses, thus arousing interest in poetry and increasing the poetry-reading public.

How will this be affected by the change of Government? We know that

over the past 20 years under both Labour and Conservative Governments the amounts allocated to the Arts Council has gradually increased to the current figure of something like £70 million. We know that in its policy document *The Arts and the People*, the Labour Party declared its intention to make the arts available to the people and to improve conditions for those employed in the sphere of the Arts, and that the Conservative Party, before winning the last election, made supportive noises in *The Arts—The Way Forward*; but during the past year we have been emphatically warned that the Conservative Government, in keeping with its monetarist philosophy, is determined to reduce all public expenditure by substantial amounts. Although Mr. Norman St. John Stevas, Minister for the Arts, has valiantly succeeded in postponing any drastic cuts in his first year of office, he has also made it abundantly clear that the policy of the present Government is to reduce the Arts Council budget in the future as an essential part of its programme for financial control; indeed, he has been appealing to industry to assume more responsibility for sponsorship of the Arts.

Yet the objectives of commercial and industrial undertakings are somewhat different from those of the Arts Council or the wealthy patrons of previous centuries. Some return, in the form of publicity, industrial relations or goodwill, is required. It seems to me very doubtful that industry, faced with high interest rates and monetary restrictions on the one hand, and inflation combined with pressing wage demands on the other, will have either the inclination or the funds for such sponsorship. What resources are made available in this way will probably go to sport, orchestras, music festivals, opera or ballet, rather than poetry.

Such a situation would certainly create problems for poets, poetry magazines and small presses. *Meridian*, *Phoenix* and other well-known magazines ceased publication almost immediately when their support grants were switched off. It is likely that many more magazines and small presses would disappear without grant aid. In such a situation, of course, the Arts Council and regional Arts Associations may change their policies in order to maintain publications. There are poets and critics who have already advocated a re-direction of public funds. Some few years ago, in his article on *Patronage Again*, John Wain said

> It is no less obvious that this problem could be tackled if the money at present being handed out to individuals were used to subsidise publication. . . . What the Literature Panel of the Arts Council ought to be doing is to channel all the available money into making it cheaper and easier for poetry to be printed and circulated. . . . The main thing is, give the money to the people who are editing, publishing and distributing poetry, and let them give it to the poets. In that way, a poet would be paid *for work*, not for his air of willingness to do some work, nor for the distant memory of work he did twenty years ago. . . .

I have given particular attention to the political aspects of the situation because they will have direct bearing upon the future. What impact will be made upon poetry by the other aspects mentioned at the beginning of this article is anyone's guess. As for the threat of enforced leisure as a result of the micro-chips revolution, we have only to study the development of

industry and the results of automation to see that almost every change in technology has created new jobs whilst eliminating old ones: what leisure is forced upon us will be the result of our present industrial efforts in relation to those of our competitors abroad. Certainly the trade unions will continue to make demands for a shorter working week, but no one seems to have any official plans for the extra time which might be made available.

So much for the background conditions; what about the poetry itself? At this juncture I should perhaps mention that, whilst I am fully aware of the danger of generalisations, in the space available to me here, I am unable to discuss the relative merits of individual poets and must talk about trends and groups and general ideas. There will, I feel confident in asserting, always be some poets who choose to experiment with language, form and sound in their work, and others engaged in desperate attempts to humanise the scientific and technological developments of the age in which we live, just as there will always be some regionalist and nationalist poets, and individualists like R. S. Thomas, Norman Nicholson and Jack Clemo, who will follow their own compulsions whether they are fashionable or not. Generally speaking, it can be said that at present—despite the interminable bickering that goes on between poets—two broad groups can be distinguished: the academically-educated poets working within clearly established literary traditions and looking towards Yeats, Hardy and Eliot, etc. or taking their models from America, and the oral or 'pop' poets, looking towards the protest singers and popular music groups with which they have so much in common. There has, of course, been a merging of the two groups and a crossing of lines. Some of the academic poets have been quick to appreciate the value of public readings in building up a relationship with their audience, and poets like Dannie Abse, Alan Brownjohn, Vernon Scannell and George MacBeth have frequently taken part in these readings, often on the same platform as the oral poets. In the oral camp it is noticeable that poets like Brian Patten and Adrian Henri tend to develop literary aspirations after their first books are put into print. Both groups have their strengths and weaknesses. As Martin Dodsworth writes in *The Survival of Poetry*

> Academicism . . . consists in a conformity to academic demands for a verse that can be easily taken to pieces. Academic verse should be sophisticated in construction and apparently individual in form, but it must be devoid of any feeling that is at once strong and individual, since that will distract the student from the task of grasping the poem intellectually.

The worst elements of both groups have been heavily criticised. Philip Larkin has expressed our doubts and misgivings:

> If by such readings a poet enables his audience to understand his poems more fully, and so to enjoy them more, this is good. But if doing so tempts him to begin writing the kind of poems that succeed only in front of an audience, he may start to deal in instant emotion, instant opinion, instant sound and fury, and this may not be so good. . . . The same kind of danger awaits the poet on the campus. If literature is a good thing, then exegesis and analysis can only demonstrate its goodness, and lead to fresh and deeper ways of enjoying it. But

> if the poet engages in this exegesis and analysis by becoming a university teacher, the danger is that he will begin to assume unconsciously that the more a poem can be analysed . . . the better poem it is, and he may in consequence . . . start writing the kind of poem that is earning him a living.

If there is to be more audience participation, as the oral poets hope, then the constitution of the audience becomes important, since the poet will tend to play to the gallery by concentrating on what seems to achieve the most active response. Not only will his poems reflect the attitudes of the audience, but the mode of presentation will also be determined by the listeners. The poet's desire to please, to win approval, may result in the use of superficial advertising techniques. The setting-up of a relationship between poet and public is certainly useful to an appreciation of poetry, but if immediate response at a single reading is to become the criterion, what effect will this have upon the subsequent poetry?

It is true that many poets tend to read superficial work at public readings simply because they believe, understandably, that it gets across to listeners more quickly than poetry of a higher standard, but I don't think we need worry too much about that. As soon as the work is printed its limitations become apparent almost immediately. I am inclined to take the view of Dannie Abse: 'Rather it is the poem that has been wilfully or unconsciously structured that it may be disentangled by a critic short on feeling but high on invention that is the most pernicious danger.' At the same time, I do see the danger of the lowering of standards if immediate audience reaction is to become the criterion for judging the quality of the work. Perhaps we may have to learn to distinguish between good poetry and good performance or entertainment. As a result of the increasing interest in poetry too many poets seem to have gained the impression that if they are recognised as good performers on the public platform they must automatically be good poets. The personality of the poet (and we are all interested in personalities) can make a great deal of difference to the way in which a poem is read.

As for the more academic poetry, there are no poets left of the stature of Yeats, Eliot, Auden or Lowell to exercise a predominating influence in the period ahead, no pioneering figures like Ezra Pound or charismatic personalities such as Dylan Thomas. The 'underground' poets (if they ever were underground) led by Michael Horovitz caught the limelight momentarily to repeat, endlessly, 'All you need is love'; the starkness of the *Review* poets (Ian Hamilton, Colin Falck, Peter Dale, etc.) has worn so thin by this time as to be almost threadbare; and the 'confessional' poetry of the mythologised Sylvia Plath, John Berryman and Anne Sexton has led to a dead end, so to speak. Yet there is a general feeling amongst British poets that some infusion of energy is needed, whether it is in ideas, form or language. The American critic, M. L. Rosenthal, has just about written off contemporary British poetry as a whole, and both he and our own Donald Davie have recommended us to turn to American poetry for the shot in the arm required; and poets like Thom Gunn, Charles Tomlinson and Davie have been strongly influenced by American poetry. There is a line of argument which maintains that the true modernist tradition

can most effectively be traced through Eliot's *Waste Land*, Pound's *Cantos*, Carlos Williams's *Paterson*, *The Maximus* Poems of Charles Olson, to the work of Robert Lowell and that of the Black Mountain poets; and that Auden succeeded in swinging British poetry back to the line of Hardy, Owen, the Georgians, etc. and this has since been continued by poets like Larkin and Hughes. Nevertheless, there are many poets in this country who believe that British and American traditions have drifted so far apart that it would be an artificial gesture for British poets to adopt American models.

British poetry in this century has been remarkably susceptible to the literary manoeuvres of groups of poets in an attempt to seize the limelight and foster a public interest in their own work. Since 1910 we have had Georgians, Imagists, Symbolists, Socio-Political poets, Objective Reporters, Surrealists, Apocalyptics, Personalists, Neo-Romantics, Neo-Classicists, the Movement and the Group. It is now 17 years since the publication of *A Group Anthology*—perhaps the time is ripe for another group of poets to publicise themselves in a new take-over bid, but who can say what particular form it will take? It could be that, as a direct result of the many translations that have been appearing in the Penguin Modern European Poets series and the interest shown by magazine editors in translated poetry, there may be a European influence.

Meanwhile, the Establishment, like Hughes' *Hawk Roosting*, will endeavour to hold its own—

> Nothing has changed since I began.
> My eye has permitted no change.
> I am going to keep things like this.

Certainly our three most prominent poets, Philip Larkin, Ted Hughes and Seamus Heaney will continue to have considerable influence on what is being written, and the more inimitable poets like Geoffrey Hill and Peter Redgrove will have their partisans. Even more certainly the Establishment, the university and academic critics will give total approval to the ingenuities, the intellectual riddles, and the metaphorical conceits of Craig Raine and Christopher Reid, despite the superficiality, the lack of integration and the failure to come to grips with any pattern of values.

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LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

SOMERSET MAUGHAM

Somerset Maugham. Ted Morgan. Jonathan Cape. £8.95.

'This', writes the searching and comprehensive author, 'is the biography of a man "whose defects were glaring, but they should not be used to diminish his accomplishments".' Somerset Maugham's literary executor, to whom Mr. Morgan is gratefully indebted, refers to 'the final tragic years', during which Maugham behaved abominably in word and deed to his daughter and his wife's memory. Even leaving out this repulsive period, which can be attributed to the senility of a nonagenarian, Maugham cannot possibly be described on the evidence here as a lovable character. Yet many people liked him and enjoyed his company, including for example Malcolm Muggeridge, who assures me that he 'was very fond of William Maugham, while disdaining the meretriciousness of his values.'

No one in recent years has made anything like as much money out of the craft of fiction, but he was well aware that he was never rated highly by 'the best writers or the best critics.' He remains the essential middle brow, of supreme talent. Somewhere below Graham Greene and somewhere above Ian Fleming. D. H. Lawrence wrote of his book *Ashenden:* 'Mr. Ashenden is almost passionately concerned in proving that all men and all women are either dirty dogs or imbeciles. . . . These stories being serious . . . are faked. Mr. Maugham is a splendid observer. He can bring before us persons and places most excellently. But as soon as the excellently observed characters have to move, it is a fake.'

Many like myself who have obtained enormous enjoyment from the stories, novels and plays of Somerset Maugham cannot attach any meaning to the word 'fake' in this connection. But I at least agree with the implications of the first part of the criticism. I have frequently risen from a work of Maugham's feeling a worse person than when I sat down to read it, far more so than in the case of most pornography. To disseminate a low view of human nature seems to be one of the supreme disservices one can render to one's fellow humans. But to Maugham much can be forgiven because he entertained much.

It is impossible to know what sort of man, or what sort of writer Somerset Maugham would have been if he had not been profoundly homosexual, though those tendencies did not prevent him marrying and causing much pain to his wife and daughter. His long-time secretary and lover, Gerald Haxton, was succeeded after his death by Alan Searle, presented here as a scheming acolyte who may have had a better side than the one shown us. Maugham's devotion to Haxton, who died slowly and painfully, emerges as the finest thing about him, even if the mutual benefits they received from each other were peculiar enough. His last words to Searle are creditable to them both: 'Why, Alan, where have you been? (Maugham had been picked up unconscious on the floor). I want to shake your hand and thank you for all that you have done for me.' We may be told that if society had been more enlightened towards homosexualism, Somerset Maugham would have behaved better to everyone, including his wife and daughter. As it was, he was guilty of much unkindness,

but he performed many acts of kindness also to struggling writers. And his true memorial must lie in the aforementioned stories, books and plays.

FRANK LONGFORD

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SIGNPOSTS

Global Signposts to the 21st Century. John A. Loraine. Peter Owen. £8.75.

The tragedy of prophecies and warning signs as frightening as those made by John Loraine is that most people choose to ignore them. More culpable are the politicians, not including Lord Avebury whose Foreword emphasises that growth as the underlying objective of economic policy is not only self-defeating but reflects the inability of man to live up to the teachings of Isaiah, Jesus and the Buddha.

Indeed, failure to comply with the Global Signposts to the 21st Century could make man an endangered species. At best the remnant would be fighting the war after next with spears. It is such telling phrases and the picture they conjure up that makes John Loraine's work compelling reading. One requires a strong stomach, a head for statistics and a rather overdeveloped vocabulary. Indeed, I would like to see a simplified pamphlet that would reach a mass readership so that the research, statistics and effort that have gone into this analysis of the four major issues facing mankind could become central to political debate.

It is ironical that the fuel shortage, one of the four major themes, is being swept under the carpet by the present Minister by cutting down on the propaganda for conservation. I wonder how long it will be before the 'Greens' or the Ecology Party or something preferably broader incorporating these signposts into its Manifesto can become a real force in Britain?

Perhaps the most horrifying statistic, apart from the millions dying of disease and malnutrition, is in relation to another of the four themes—and by far the most deadly—nuclear proliferation. An M.I.V.R. can carry up to 20 nuclear warheads and the neutron bomb is the ultimate in horror while the 350 metre precision will be down to about 30 if we live until 1990; but the fact that the world's arsenal is now a million times more deadly than at the time of Hiroshima shows the insanity in our priorities as another country each year acquires the civilised techniques of mass destruction developed by the so-called advanced nations. The problem we face is the manner in which peaceful use of nuclear energy can be diverted, as in India, for warlike purposes. This poses a moral dilemma for those who want to see the under-developed nations given the facility to increase their energy. The North South Rift and the attendant poverty, starvation and disease that afflicts the majority of mankind is in a sense inextricably linked with the other two themes.

In spite of Loraine's signposts growth would not be bad if it were properly directed and distributed and this is where the conservationists are self defeating in argument, but then one would have to overcome once and for all the fourth major problem, population growth, which is only stemmed in the poorer countries by starvation and disease or war. Famine or nuclear radiation is hardly a substitute for birth control. Here, India serves as an example again as the population increases by one million each month and an over zealous attempt by Mrs. Gandhi to impose rather than educate led to her catastrophic if temporary downfall. The contrast with the well ordered methods used in China, which contains about 900 million of the world's population, is instructive. Only the affluent countries, irrespective of ideology, have conquered the problem; so the vicious circle of poverty, population growth and greater poverty in a

world where oil resources and other raw material are consumed with gay abandon or used for war is the problem in a nutshell.

We are taken on a fascinating tour of the world's energy producers which again shows research in breadth and depth with value judgements and forecasts that would be hard to challenge other than by injecting the unknown factor of energy resources not yet discovered but not beyond the ingenuity of man.

We see the contradiction between the desire to conserve and keep up the tempo of domestic industrialisation in the ever more influential O.P.E.C. states. One wonders whether the Emirates' demand for Arab solidarity backed by oil will turn the tables in the Arab Israeli conflict. After all it was the Yom Kippur war, referred to a little too frequently, that heralded the awareness of our current vulnerability. But then, might this not be balanced by nuclear weaponry or worse developed at the Weizmann Institute by a nation with the tradition of Masada and the Warsaw Ghetto? A discussion of this might have been fruitful.

If British politicians may be tempted to go on a North Sea Oil bonanza and Germans yield to the siren song of nuclear power, there are at least forces urging moderation in the West. Dr. Loraine is pessimistic in demanding a massive programme of energy conservation in the U.S.A., citing the deferment of reprocessing of spent fuel and looking at the Shah's most extensive armoury outside the three powers. He fails to look at the political motivation of the superpowers in such build up but is rightly jaundiced about denuclearisation, on past experience. Perhaps only a major but not total catastrophe is mankind's greatest hope if it chooses to ignore the signposts.

In the same way we are shown the various approaches to birth control. Just as we learn of the plentitude of natural resources in Venezuela, which I know from personal experience is penetrating the Caribbean while Kazakhstan has the highest rate of cancer of the gullet. The approach is indeed global and environmental medicine is not inappropriately introduced since it is the converse of all that makes the book unpalatable to what is termed 'Micawberism'. From our globe we may take the Nordic countries as leading the way in the various fields covered. However, their total population is no more than the South of England and it needs a complete change of attitude by big men of real impact is to be made. 'Solar Good, Nuclear Bad' may be a slogan that the writer would adopt but there are surely political issues which could make nuclear good and solar bad. Motivation may be as important as what we use. The problem seems to be that what we use influences our motivation and we ignore Dr Loraine's signposts at our and our children's peril.

PAUL ROSE

ARCHBISHOP GRINDAL

Archbishop Grindal: 1519-1583: The Struggle for a Reformed Church. Patrick Collinson. Jonathan Cape. £13.50.

There are few periods of English history in which the standard of biographical writing is as high as the Tudor era. This new biography of Archbishop Edmund Grindal is a distinguished addition to the list.

Grindal is one of the most important and most characteristic figures of the Elizabethan church. He rose from an obscure background in the village of St. Bees in Cumberland to the splendour of Lambeth Palace. This small village could boast during seven years of Elizabeth's reign that it had produced both

Archbishops. Like so many of the principal figures in the Reformation in England, Grindal was a Cambridge man. Indeed one of the most interesting sections of the book deals with Grindal's Cambridge career and this should be read by anyone interested in the spread of the "new learning" and its effects. When the boy king Edward VI died, Grindal was about to become Bishop of London but his religious views were not welcome in the England of Queen Mary. Professor Collinson offers us a good guide to the complexities of those Marian exiles like Grindal.

When Grindal returned, he was lucky to have such a powerful patron as William Cecil, Lord Burghley. Grindal rose from Bishop of London to Archbishop of York and finally in 1575 to his unhappy occupancy of St. Augustine's chair at Canterbury.

In spite of the obvious importance of a man who held such vital posts at such a time, comparatively little has been written about Grindal. Many accounts in recent times have been unfavourable. Thus V. J. K. Brook in his *Life of Archbishop Parker* (1962) sees Grindal as a weak and unworthy successor of Parker. Professor Collinson, however, is an unabashed partisan of Grindal and in this well presented work offers the best case that can be made.

Grindal, like all Elizabethan bishops, had a difficult task, beset on one side by the defenders of the old religion, whom he persecuted fiercely in York, and on the other by Puritan advocates of more vigorous reformation. Professor Collinson defends Grindal's role in the north in his suppression of the survivals of the medieval church such as mystery plays. Indeed he argues Grindal is one of the most important men in the history of the north of England.

Yet the most important section of the book deals with Grindal's relations with the Puritans and the consequent conflict with the Queen. He had a sympathy with the more moderate Puritans but he disliked the more rabid ones. He was capable of standing up to the Queen herself. On one memorable occasion he told her: 'Bear with me, I beseech you, Madam, if I choose rather to offend earthly Majesty than to offend the heavenly Majesty of God.'

Nevertheless his primacy was a failure as the Queen felt he had not resisted the rising tide of Puritanism and she deprived him of much of his authority. Grindal was John Milton's favourite bishop and have even argued that his conciliatory policies towards the Puritans would have prevented the Civil War. Professor Collinson does not accept this completely. He agrees that Grindal's primacy was a failure but argues that he did great service by setting a course of moderate bishops. What he does not take sufficient account of is the deeply held feeling of churchmen such as Laud and Charles I that Grindal and Grindalism had nearly destroyed the basis of authority essential to any episcopal church.

RICHARD MULLEN

THE THORPE TRIAL

The Last Word. Auberon Waugh. Michael Joseph. £6.50.

The trial of John Jeremy Thorpe on charges of conspiracy and incitement to murder does not rate very highly as compared with so many of the dramas which have been enacted in Number One Court of the Central Criminal Court and found subsequent permanent celebration in the Notable British Trials series. The case seemed to Mr. Waugh and his fellow journalists to promise, at the committal proceedings, extraordinary revelations; but when it came to trial there was little such revelation. Mr. Waugh's book cannot therefore add anything to the material of the case. What it can, and does, do, is to analyse

and criticise the manner of the conduct of the trial. The author's method is to provide an edited transcript of the trial, interspersed with italicised passages of his own eye-witness comments and interpretations. Nothing quite like it has ever been produced before, and the result is highly interesting and entertaining, except perhaps to those concerned. The tone which is set in the Introduction, one of heavy irony and sarcasm, continues unmitigated to the last word. What we are seeing is a collision between the law and the (thinking, but lay) writer.

Mr. Waugh is not alone in harbouring misgivings about the handling of the trial, but jurists will argue, quite rightly, that his quarrel is with the system. Judge and counsel operate within rigidly defined confines, and it is by deliberate design (albeit often criticised in certain quarters) that the balance is weighted in favour of the presumption of innocence. Ours is not the inquisitorial method. Mr. Waugh is extremely critical of what he saw as the judge's attitude, especially to the prosecution witnesses; but the plain fact is that a trial judge, however authoritarian, or autocratic, or even destructively frivolous he may appear to be, will always bear in mind that if he should happen to overstep the mark in any direction he may well, in the event of a conviction, lay himself open to appeal. The judge must also be superlatively aware—and make the jury superlatively aware—of the 'good character' of the accused. Read aright, Mr. Waugh's criticisms, whatever their *intention*, must be construed as proposals for reforms in the British judicial system rather than as strictures upon those who are simply following the rules of evidence and procedure in a specific instance of its operation. Read as a record of what was said and done between May 8th and June 22nd, 1979, at the Old Bailey, the book describing the trial and acquittal of Mr. Thorpe and his co-defendants is securely within the well-established tradition of recountings of criminal *causes célèbres*, and will take its place on the shelves below the more Notable British Trials volumes.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

ONE FAITH—TWO CHURCHES

The Church and Unity. B. C. Butler. Geoffrey Chapman. £9.95.

Bishop Christopher Butler, sometime Abbot of Downside and before that an Anglican undergraduate at Oxford, is now at 77 an *eminence* not only in his own church but also in that host of churches which help to make up the ecumenical movement. He is a Catholic, of the Roman persuasion, by conviction, experience and by theological certitude. For him the man known to history as Jesus of Nazareth is part of the 'higher order of creation'. 'It is an inauguration' and is already belonging to 'the end' of creation. This process of an inauguration is more than a single act of incarnation. The man Jesus of Nazareth is both Message and Messenger of the continuing process of the church however widely separated the churches may be. The Jesus who is the *koinonia*, the Communion in flesh and blood, is the Resurrection Man from Everlasting to Everlasting.

This is a profound and most readable book and I recommend that it should be read taking the Conclusion first, for here Bishop Butler faces the issues roused by the ecumenical movement which, in spite of his final choice of churches, he puts first among the creative movements of our time. He says that the common life, the collective life, is an essential part of the Christian life:

> Christianity is intended for everyone... Everyone is at least an amateur theologian. But not everyone is a professional theologian. Professional

theologians have a tremendous service to perform for the church and the world. But it is not their task to turn us all into professional theologians.

So Bishop Butler comes to his inevitable choice of churches—a choice that the 'amateur' as well as the 'professional' has to take, and the choice for him is the Catholic Church in its two aspects living to-day, the Roman and the Orthodox. But having said that, Bishop Butler courageously argues that these two churches, although each claiming to be the Church Visible, are in fact divided. Here is the momentous change that the ecumenical movement has achieved. Each of them now carries its own unity with it in the making of the great Church to be, which the Man of Nazareth lived and died for.

CECIL NORTHCOTT

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Presidency (Prentice-Hall International. £6.45). Robert J. Sickels, of New Mexico University, has produced a very timely and useful Introduction to the institution of the American Presidency and, more particularly in this election year, to the process both constitutional and political of electing the chief executive. He discusses, for example, the electoral college, elected by the states, 'a winner-take-all election state by state.' In the result, as in parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom, 'first past the post' can mean that the President is elected on a minority of votes. He points out that in 1976 a shift of only 6,000 votes in Hawaii and Ohio would have given Gerald Ford the election, while Jimmy Carter's popular vote was 50.1% to Ford's 48.0%. Furthermore, there is the unlikely but distinct possibility that in close voting between the major candidates in the electoral college the comparative few votes of a third candidate could have a decisive effect on the result or throw the election into the House of Representatives. In this connection, the candidature of Mr. Anderson could be of great interest. This book also discusses the working in practice of the Presidency in recent times, its relations with the Congress and the Supreme Court, and the place of the Cabinet and the White House staff. Unlike, of course, the collective responsibility of the British Cabinet, members of the American Cabinet are officials individually responsible to the President in whom executive power is personally vested by the Constitution. This volume should have a wide appeal.

The Rise and Fall of Empires (Cassell). This is described as a 'new series which charts with great vividness the rise and fall of the world's major empires'. This is a fair description of the first two volumes. Each has more than 150 pages of photographs and text, of coffee table size and superior produced. They are concerned to discuss in outline the political and military history, the life and culture of the peoples concerned. The first volume *Sunrise of Power* (£7.95) covers Ancient Egypt and the World of Hellenism, both written by Joyce Milton, with a Preface by William Kelly Simpson, Professor of Egyptology at Yale. There are special features on, for example, Egyptian funeral customs and Alexander's Campaigns. Classical Greece is covered in the second volume, *Clash of East and West* (£7.95), by John Bowman in the title, Imperial Greece. There are inevitably some disappointments, such as the minimal attention given to

Minoan Crete. Indeed Knossos is not mentioned in the Index. Perhaps the great Minoan civilisation will be discussed at length in a later volume: we hope so. Daisy More in the first part of this volume outlines the history and culture of the Persian Empire and its destruction by Alexander. It is fair to say that the numerous colour photographs dominate both volumes. In many cases the colour is rather hard; but there are nonetheless superb photographs of ancient sites, cities, temples, sculptures and artefacts. It would have been a great asset to be told in what museums they are kept. It is also unfortunate that neither volume has a bibliography, which would be particularly encouraging to the general reader.

Voltaire: Letters on England (Penguin Books. £1.50). This new addition to the Penguin Classics series is introduced by Leonard Tancock, who is responsible for the English translation. Voltaire was in exile in England between 1726 and 1729 and his *Lettres Anglaises* were published in 1734 preceded by an English version in 1733. Mr. Tancock follows the first French text of 1734 as used by Gustave Lanson. There are 25 letters devoted to denominational religion, government and commerce, science and literature. He was, of course, greatly impressed by the comparative freedom of thought, speech and action in England. Nonetheless there is irony in his praise, in many passages, as to be expected.

The Glorious Obsession (Souvenir Press. £7.50). For thirty-five years, the author, Maurice Rheims, enjoyed a very distinguished career with one of the great French auction houses of which he became a principal. In 1975, he published his memoirs which are now translated into English by Patrick Evans. This book is highly entertaining and also instructive in the whole process of appraisal, valuation and sale by auction of works of art on the continent. Apart from the sales themselves, always of interest, Maurice Rheims spent a great deal of time with clients who needed his advice before sale, to identify and appraise the work of art. Much of this book is about his relationship with and assessment of clients, including such great collectors as 'Five per cent' Gulbenkian. With his vast experience, he was able to penetrate their idiosyncracies and obsessions and obtain their complete confidence. This book is full of his experiences, delightfully and lightly told, of exhilaration and disappointments, of dramatic situations, of the routine, of his vast experience and knowledge of art and perhaps most of all of the varied characteristics of his clients.

Witchcraft (The Aquarium Press. £4.25 paperback). Charles Williams' celebrated history of witches and magic was published in 1941 and is now reprinted for the first time. Dr. Glen Cavaliero's Introduction is a tribute to Charles Williams as writer, novelist and religious thinker as much as an evaluation of this particular study. The author was a profound Christian, combining theology and historical analysis. 'Up to the full Middle Ages' there was the almost level 'struggle between the two ways of regarding magic and witchcraft—as a falsity of imagination, basely and wickedly indulged, or as an act, possible, successful, and propagandist.' But 'when heresy became a crime, then the sterner methods against magic and witchcraft were quickened'. He gives the appalling paradox: 'cruelty, denounced as a sin, was welcomed and embraced as a saviour'. It is a frightening story.

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